| Battle of Taginae | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theGothic War (535–554) | |||||||
 Main army movements during the Gothic War | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Byzantine Empire | Ostrogothic Kingdom | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| Larger force[a] | Smaller force[b] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 6,000 killed | |||||||
TheBattle of Taginae orBattle of Busta Gallorum took place in July of 552 AD, whereByzantines under GeneralNarses defeated theOstrogoths (Goths) under KingTotila. The Byzantine victory paved the way for the Byzantine reconquest of theItalian Peninsula and the dissolution of the Gothic kingdom.
Narses assembled his army atSalona, Dalmatia and from there marched along the coast ofAdriatic sea to Italy. Despite obstacles laid by the Goths, the Byzantines were able to cross theriver Po and reachRavenna. After a nine-day break, Narses continued south along theVia Flaminia towards Rome. Totila, realizing that a defensive strategy was not viable, marched to intercept the Byzantines at Taginae.
On the battlefield and despite his numerical superiority, Narses placed his troops in a strong defensive position, with archers at the flanks protected by natural terrain. Totila used delaying tactics until reinforcements underTeia arrived. He then attempted asurprise attack by withdrawing his troops for lunch, hoping to tempt the Byzantines to pursue and abandon their position. Narses anticipated ruses and prevented this by keeping his army in the original defensive position. Totila then reformed his army for a concentrated cavalry charge into the Byzantine center, composed of foreign mercenaries.
The Gothic attack faltered after several volleys of arrows from Byzantine archers fired from both sides, inflicting many losses. The Byzantine center repelled the Gothic assault, and the cavalry retreat caused the Gothic infantry at the rear to panic and flee as well. Totila was mortally wounded during the battle. The Byzantine victory opened the way for Narses to advance on Rome, which fell with little resistance. The Gothic defeat shattered their military resistance and paved the way for the Byzantine control of Italy.
Following thefall of Ravenna in May 540 AD,Belisarius restoredSicily and most of theItalian peninsula to Byzantine rule. His stratagem of inducing the Goths to surrender by offering him the Western imperial crown alarmed EmperorJustinian, who recalled him toConstantinople with Ravenna's treasury and the captive kingVitiges but denied him atriumph and reassigned him to the eastern front in advance of theLazic War (541–562).[7] Belisarius was replaced by three coequal commanders, whose rivalry and corruption led to indiscipline and plundering of the Italian countryside.[8] Justinian's harsh tax audit to recover alleged Gothic-eraarrears, combined with reduced rewards for wounded and distinguished soldiers, further alienated troops and civilians, collapsing morale and eroding Italian loyalty.[9][10][11]
Byzantine misrule strengthened the Goths underIldibad, who defeated a Byzantine force at theBattle of Treviso and recovered much of the Po Valley. His reign was short-lived because he was assassinated before consolidating his power. The reign ofEraric followed, but it ended with his murder in late 541, because he secretly offered to abdicate and offer the kingdom to the Byzantines in exchange for the rank ofpatrician and a large payment. Through the turmoil among the Gothic aristocracy, Ildibad's nephewTotila became king.[12][13][14] Reprimanded by Justinian for inaction to exploit Gothic disunity, the Byzantine commanders failed tocapture of Verona. Totila took the initiative and pursued them and defeated a larger Byzantine army at theBattle of Faventia in spring 542.[15][16] Advancing onFlorence, Totila again routed Byzantine relief forces at theBattle of Mucellium. The Byzantines withdrew into fortified cities, while Totila bypassed central Italy and advanced rapidly to capture territories in southern Italy with thefall of Naples in March 543.[17][18]
Totila steadily expanded his control over Italy by combining military success withconciliatory policies toward the Italian population, presenting himself as a liberator from Byzantine exactions. In the meantime, aplague (541–549) weakened the Byzantine empire's ability to field armies, and one third of its population was killed.[19] By 543–544, much of southern and central Italy had fallen under Gothic control, leaving Byzantine control confined to a few fortified cities. Rome, poorly supplied and neglected by imperial authorities, wasblockaded andcaptured by Totila in December 546, followingfamine and internal betrayal. Although the city was partially depopulated and its defenses deteriorated, Totila refrained from destroying it, seeking to exploit its symbolic value in negotiations. He offered peace to Justinian on moderate terms, proposing recognition of Gothic rule in Italy in exchange for nominal imperialsuzerainty; Justinian rejected these overtures.[20] With diplomacy exhausted and Byzantine relief efforts faltering, Totilareoccupied Rome in 549 and consolidated Gothic dominance over most of the Italian peninsula and Sicily, prolonging the war until the Byzantinecounteroffensive of 552 AD.[21][22][23]
A third force in the Gothic–Byzantine struggle was theFranks, who sought to expand in northern Italy by exploiting the weakening of the Byzantine and Gothic authorities. They offered limited diplomatic and material support to the Goths while avoiding a formal alliance, aiming to block a lasting Byzantine restoration in Italy. In 538, the Frankish KingTheodebert I send of force ofBurgundians to assist the Goths in thefall and destruction of Milan, while claiming to Justinian that they were not under his authority.[24] The following year, a Frankish army invaded northern Italy, attacking Goths and the Byzantines but retreated due to disease.[25] During Totila's reign, the Franks found the opportunity to occupy provinces at theCottian Alps (part ofLiguria) and theVenetia, since most of the Gothic forces were in the south fighting against the Byzantines. Totila entered into an agreement with the Franks for a provisional occupation of the seized territories, which would become permanent in case of a Gothic victory. After 547 and the loss of Rome to the Byzantines, Totila proposed marriage to an unnamedMerovingian princess, probably a daughter of Theudebert, but the offer was refused on the prediction that he would fail to secure lasting control of Italy after losing Rome. This rejection underscored for Totila the political importance of holding Rome.[26]
As early as 549, the EmperorJustinian I planned to dispatch an army to Italy to conclude the war with the Goths.It started with the cousin of Justinian,Germanus, who had started recruiting an army for this purpose.[27] Germanus's sudden death in 550 resulted in a temporary postponement as Justinian delayed in selecting a replacement for the commander-in-chief for the campaign. During 550–551, an expeditionary force strong enough[a] to remove the Goths from Italy was gradually assembled atSalona atDalmatia, comprising regular Byzantine units and several contingents of foreign allies, notablyLombards,Heruls, andBulgars.[5] The Byzantinechamberlain (cubicularius) Narses was appointed to command in mid–551.[2] The reasons of this choice by Justinian were unclear. Narses had limited military experience but he had the strength of character to unify the fractured Byzantine leadership in Italy.[28] Narses avoided crossing the sea to Italy due to the threat posed by the Gothic fleet in the southernAdriatic sea.[2] The following spring, he led the Byzantine army around the coast of the Adriatic sea.[29]
The Franks controlled the land route through Venetia but Narses failed to get permission to pass on the grounds that the Lombard troops in the Byzantine army were bitter enemies of the Franks.[3] He also faced the threat posed by the Gothic commanderTeias, who heldVerona. Teias with the best Gothic troops hindered a Byzantine crossing of theriver Po, positioning himself to strike any attempted passage. To bypass these dangers, Narses adopted a plan proposed byJohn the Sanguinary, the nephew of consulVitalian, who knew the region well: the army would march along the river coast while a fleet sailed alongside, ferrying troops acrossriver mouths as needed. Though slow, this strategy allowed the Byzantine army to reach Ravenna safely.[3][30]
By the early summer of 552, Narses was in Italy, aiming to march down the Via Flaminia to Rome. At Ravenna, Narses and his army rested for nine days and they were joined by the remnants of the Byzantine forces under Valerianus and Justinus.[31] He left Justinus with a garrison there and then advanced towardAriminum. Narses planned to march directly against Totila, who was at Rome, and force a decisive battle with all his forces. When the Gothic commander of Ariminum,Usdrilas, taunted and insulted Narses, he avoided him and continued his path to Rome.[30] The historian,J. B. Bury, noted that the usual coastal route from Ariminum to Rome throughFanum Fortunae and thenVia Flaminia was blocked by Gothic control ofPetra Pertusa. Narses joined the Via Flaminia west of the gorge of Petra Pertusa, probably near modernAcqualagna, though it is unclear whether he left the coast near Ariminum orPisaurum.[31]
Upon hearing the news that Narses was at Ravenna, Totila assembled his troops[b] and moved to intercept the Byzantine forces.[2] Totila was in a bind because he could not protect Rome and other strongholds without splitting his forces, diminishing the strength of his field army.[30]
But the vast number of the enemy is worthy only to be despised, seeing that they present a collection of men from the greatest possible number of nations. For an alliance which is patched together from many sources gives no firm assurance of either loyalty or power, but being split up in nationality it is naturally divided likewise in purpose. And do not think that Huns and Lombards and Eruli, hired by them with I know not how much money, will ever endanger themselves for them to the point of death. For life with them is not so cheap as to take second place to silver in their estimation, but I well know that after making an appearance of fighting they will desert with all speed, either because they have received their pay, or as carrying out the orders of their own commanders. For even things that seem most delightful,—to say nothing of what happens in war—if they do not turn out in accordance with men's wishes, but if they are forced or hired or subject to any other compulsion, then such things will come no longer to be accounted pleasant, but by reason of the compulsion appear detestable. Remembering these things let us with all enthusiasm engage with the enemy.
In July 552, the Byzantine and Gothic forces encountered each other at Busta Gallorum, near the village of Taginae, located somewhere to the north of modernGualdo Tadino.[1][c] Totila had all his forces except for 2,000 soldiers under Teias and pitched his camp at Taginae. Narses pitched his camp nearApennine Mountains and about 100stades,c. 18.4 km (11.4 mi), away from Totila's camp. Narses sent an envoy to Totila, urging him to surrender or name a day for battle. Totila replied that he would fight in eight days. Narses considered this astratagem for asurprise attack, and instead, he deployed his army in a defensive position, anticipating an immediate engagement.[5][33]
In the center, he massed the Germanic mercenaries dismounted in a dense formation and placed the Byzantine troops to either side. On each wing, he stationed 4,000 foot-archers, who had a dual purpose. They could be used simultaneously as foot-archers and adopt a pike/spearphalanx formation.[34] The majority of non-foreign Byzantine troops were placed at the flanks, which were protected by the terrain features, and possiblycaltrops.[35] Narses and John took post on the left and Valerian on the right wing.[36] He also placed at the extreme left a detachment of 1,500 cavalry behind the hill with instructions that the 500 to rescue any routed Byzantine units, while the rest to attack the Gothic infantry's rear once it entered into action.[37][33]
The following day, the two armies drew up facing one another at a distance of about two bowshots. There was a small hill that would provide security from flanking attack to the side occupied it, and it was accessible only by a narrow path fronted by a watercourse. The Goths attempted to seize it to outflank the Byzantine position, but Narses anticipated the move and occupied the hill with fifty infantrymen. Totila sent a cavalrysquadron against them, but they were repelled.[5]
Having failed to turn Narses' position, and expecting 2,000 reinforcements from Teias, Totila attempted to delay the battle. Totila sent outCoccas, who had deserted from the Byzantines to the Goths, to challenge the Byzantines to asingle combat. Coccas was a horseman of great physical strength and rode to the Byzantines within speaking distance to lay the challenge. One of Narses' bodyguards ofArmenian origin, namedAnzalas, answered the challenge. Coccas charged at Anzalas, aiming with his spear at Anzalas's stomach, but at the last moment, Anzalas swerved his horse and stabbed Coccas at his left side. Coccas fell mortally wounded, and triumphant shouts rang from the Byzantine side.[38][39]
To delay further the engagement, Totila rode to the middle of the battlefield, dressed in shining purple and gold armor. His horse went circles, reared, pirouetted, and ran backwards as Totila tossed and caught his lance into the air. After some time, he rode back to his own army and changed into battle armor. He sent a message to Narses proposing negotiations, but Narses refused. With all these delay tactics, the forenoon passed, but by this time, the reinforcements under Teias had arrived.[38]
His reinforcements having arrived, Totila broke formation and retired for lunch. Narses, wary of a ruse, permitted his troops to refresh themselves without leaving their positions. When Totila returned to the field, he found the Byzantines ready. He then formed his whole cavalry into a single body across his whole front, while the infantry was placed in the rear.[40] Totila launched a sudden mounted assault upon the Byzantine center, followed by the Gothic infantry. His strategy appeared to be an attempt to break the Byzantine ranks with a concentratedcavalry charge, with the infantry taking advantage of the broken lines caused by the cavalry charge. Totila had given command to all his troops to use spears over any other weapon.[41]
Narses, anticipating Totila's actions, ordered the two archer detachments to turn half round so as to form crescents, each other facing, so that they fire arrows from both sides upon the Gothic cavalry charge. Caught in theenfilading from both sides, the Gothic cavalry suffered many casualties, and their attack faltered. The battle at the center was fierce but short-lived. Towards the evening, the Gothic cavalry gave way and started to retreat toward the Gothic infantry, which had not taken part in the fighting. Instead of opening a way for the cavalry to pass and to face the Byzantines, they turned and retreated along with the Gothic cavalry. The retreat became a rout, with the Byzantines pursuing the Goths and many prisoners were caught but later put to death, resulting in as many as 6,000 casualties occurring until nightfall.[42][43] Among the casualties was Totila, who died during the retreat or from an arrow wound.[d][46]
Narses attributed his victory to divine favor. Afterwards, he dismissed his Lombard allies, whose immediate turn to arson and rape made them intolerable. He paid them generously and entrusted Valerian with escorting them to the Italian frontier. Once separated from the Lombards, Valerian encamped outside Verona and opened negotiations with the Gothic garrison, which was willing to surrender. However, the talks collapsed after intervention by the Franks in Venetia. Valerian then withdrew, where Narses ordered him to remain in the region and observe the remaining Gothic forces. The remnants of Totila's army fled north with Teias toTicinum, where Teias was proclaimed king and, supported by the Franks and the treasury Totila had stored there, sought to revive Gothic resistance.[47]
Narses and his troops entered Rome in July 552 or 553, and the keys of its gates were delivered to Justinian.[1] In 553, Teias was defeated and killed at theBattle of Mons Lactarius (near MountVesuvius) by a Byzantine army under Narses. The Goths failed to appoint a new king, which exposed the fragility of their remaining power.[48] Narses quickly captured a number of cities that lacked Goth garrisons, including Florence,Centumcellae,Volaterrae, andPisa.[49] While theBattle of Taginae was not the last Byzantine–Gothic engagement, it was decisive enough to break the capability of the Goths to field a viable army to resist the Byzantine recapture of the Italian peninsula.[50]
The defeat of the Goths triggered another request from the Goths north of the River Po to the Franks to intervene. A 75,000-strong Frankish army, underAlamannic dukes Lothar and Buccelin, moved south to Italy in the following year. While the Franks outnumbered the Byzantines, the Byzantines had better supplies and fortifications. In October 554, Narses defeated the Franks in theBattle of Volturno, eliminating them as a threat.[51] The remaining cities in Italy under the Goths started to fall, notable cities wereCampsa in 555 and Verona in 561.[52]
The military historian,Charles Oman, placed theBattle of Taginae in his 1898 analysis within the broader development ofmedieval warfare, describing it as "the first experiment in the combination of pike and bow" and drawing parallels with later engagements such as theBattle of Crécy. His interpretation was based on the assumption that in late antiquity, the diminishing role of the infantry was replaced by mounted combat. In Byzantine warfare in particular, the rise ofmounted archers was seen as decisive in many of Belisarius's victories. Narses's seemingly atypical use of infantry, i.e., his deployment of dismounted Germanic allies in phalanx formation and archers' crescent formation, and the Totila's cavalry charge "with spears only," resulted in a narrative of the brilliant "eunuch-general" outsmarting the brave but impetuous "barbarian king".[53]
Modern military scholarship has rejected this interpretation. The historian, Philip Rance, argued that infantry remained the core of Byzantine armies despite the growing importance of cavalry, and attributed this misconception to the fact that sixth-century warfare produced few decisive pitched battles in which infantry played an obvious tactical role and Procopius's narrative disproportionately emphasized mounted combat, marginalizing infantry actions in battles and sieges.[54] Narses's army deployment reflected long-standing Byzantine military traditions and the tactical realities of late antique warfare.[55] Totila's order to fight "with spears only" demonstrated his recognition that Byzantine archers could best be countered by close-quarters combat and a surprise attack would have further minimized their impact.[56] Rance concluded that Totila had strategically lost the battle before it began, because he was compelled to intercept Narses's numerically superior army before reaching Rome.[57]
