| Battle of South Shanxi | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theSecond Sino-Japanese War | |||||||
A map of the battle | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 180,000 troops in 8armies | 100,000 troops in 6divisions, 3brigades | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| According to commander-in-chief Wei Lihuang's report on 5th September 1941 : 25,066 killed or wounded and 21,611 missing[2][a] According to the history of the Anti-Japanese War (based on reports from each unit in June and July) : 75,600 killed, wounded, or missing[3] Japanese claim : 42,000 killed and 35,000 captured[4] According to Japanese interrogations of Chinese POWs : 12,672 prisoners | Chinese claim : 39,600 casualties[3] Japanese claim : 673 killed and 2,292 wounded[4] | ||||||
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TheBattle of South Shanxi , also known as theBattle of Jinnan (Chinese:晉南战役) andZhongtiao Mountains campaign (Chinese:中條山會戰) by the Chinese and as theChungyuan Operation by the Japanese, was one of the 22 major engagements between theNational Revolutionary Army and theImperial Japanese Army during theSecond Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

The disastrous losses of the first year of the war (1937-38) meant that the internationally-recognized Chinese government (controlled by theKuomintang or KMT party) had been forced to abandonits capital and all the industrialized areas of the country. It fought on from a new base in the west, mainly the province ofSichuan andGuanzhong.
The Zhongtiao Mountains held symbolic importance as the largest area of territory north of theYellow River still under full Chinese control.
They also had some strategic importance as defensive ground on the north bank of the Yellow River. Beyond the south bank laythe railway line connecting the KMT's western base with theZhongyuan central plain, the 'breadbasket of China'.[5]
The area of the battle was very roughly in the shape of a triangle, with the Yellow River as the base to the south. On the northwest side were Japanese armies that had advanced downthe railway line from the north as far as its Yellow River terminus atFenglingdu. Likewise, the frontline to the northeast side was the territory captured by theBeiping–Hankou Railway Operation.
Since the loss of Fenglingdu in the spring of 1938, Chinese and Japanese forces had fought for the Zhongtiao Mountain thirteen times.[6]: 3 In April 1940, the North China Front Army launched a massive offensive in South Shanxi to expand its occupied territories and succeeded in capturingGaoping,Jincheng,Yangcheng, and other counties and cities. In early 1941, the Japanese army in North China made plans to eliminate the Kuomintang presence in the Zhongtiao Mountains. In March of the same year, they launched attacks against the NRA 27th corps inLingchuan and the NRA 15th corps south of Yicheng and east ofJiang County for a more favorable position before the Zhongtiao Mountains operation at a cost of 924 casualties.[7][6]: 4 [8]
In mid-April 1941, the Chinese army detected the Japanese army amassing a large force of 200,000 troops in 4 divisions and 3 independent brigades for an offensive at Zhongtiao Mountain. The Southern Shanxi army thus deployed its troops accordingly for guerilla warfare while planning a counterattack with the support from parts of the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Military Fronts.[6]: 3-7 However, due to lack of coordination between the military fronts, the Fifth and Eighth Military Fronts did not support the First Military Front in a timely manner.[6]: 181
At the onset of the battle,KMT-CPC relations were at a low point following the still recentNew Fourth Army incident in early 1941. As a result, the nearby8th Route Army refused to assist the surrounded Nationalists. South Shanxi was later remembered in China as one of the worst defeats of the entire war.
The campaign is extensively discussed in the travel bookTwo Kinds of Time by the US journalist Graham Peck, based on eyewitness interviews with refugees. Peck reports that the NRA had built a line of fortifications overlooking the major roads through the mountains, which had withstood several earlier Japanese assaults. It was garrisoned by second-line warlord troops. He claims that the Chinese commanders had become complacement and were caught out when the Japanese adopted new, guerrilla-style tactics. They used peasant paths to infiltrate into the mountains and encircled the mountain range by moving along north bank of the Yellow River. Once they realized they were surrounded, the Chinese forces disintegrated before better-quality troops could be brought across the river.[9]
In May and June, the Southern Shanxi army broke out from Zhongtiao Mountain through different routes. Most of the units moved their main force to Henan or Shaanxi for rest. The 27th corps, which had been ordered to support the troops besieged in Zhongtiao Mountain, returned to Lingchuan to continue its guerilla activities. The 43rd corps and 98th corps moved to the Taiyue Mountain.[6]: 146-147 The 98th corps ended up cooperating with the friendly Eighth Route Army despite tensions between the Kuomintang and Communist authorities.
The battle of Zhongtiao Mountain resulted in tens of thousands of casualties for the Chinese army. Moreover, a large number of Chinese generals were killed or captured in the operation.
Generals killed in action :[10]: 166–188
Generals captured during the battle :[11]
On 31 July 1941, the General Staff of the North China Front Army launched an investigation on the 12,672 POWs captured in the battle of Southern Shanxi and recorded the interrogations of senior officers. This investigation allowed the Japanese army to better understand the internal problems and combat effectiveness of the National Revolutionary Army at the time.[12]
The two corps in Taiyue Mountain would continue fighting behind the lines for a few months. On September 5, the Japanese army attacked the 70th division of the 43rd corps in Jiang County. By the 6th, the Japanese army had surrounded the division’s headquarters. Divisional commander Shi Zuoheng (石作衡) personally led more than 200 soldiers of the 209th regiment to break out when they encountered enemy reinforcements. Shi Zuoheng was killed by an artillery shell during the hand-to-hand fighting[10]: 189–190 In the same month, the Japanese army launched a massive sweep against the 98th corps and Eighth Route Army in Taiyue which lasted for a month. The Eighth Route Army was able to avoid encirclement and suffered 374 killed, wounded, or missing during the operation.[13] The 98th corps was surrounded by two Japanese divisions on September 29 and was annihilated. Corps commander Wu Shimin (武士敏) was badly wounded and captured while leading his men to break-out. On October 1, the corps commander died of his wounds.[10]: 197–199
By the end of the Qinhe mopping-up campaign, corps commander Wu Shimin, divisional chief of staff Wang Ruqin (王儒钦), and more than 1,180 officers and soldiers had been killed in action. Divisional commander Wang Kejing (王克敬), deputy divisional commander Xue Rulan (薛如蘭), and more than 2,000 officers and soldiers were captured. Guo Jingtang (郭景唐), the commander of the 169th division, led the remaining hundreds to break out and cross the Yellow River towards friendly lines.[14][15][10].: 195–196 The Japanese army claimed to have killed 2,862 soldiers and captured 4,311 from the 98th corps and Eighth Route Army, suffering 16 killed and 52 wounded in the process.[16] In a few months, the Nationalists had lost its foothold in Southern Shanxi.
1st War Area –Wei Lihuang
§ 43rd Corps was formerly with 2nd War Area.
North China Front Army – Major GeneralHayao Tada (Early May 1941)
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