| Rovno-Lutsk operation | |||||||
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| Part ofEastern Front (World War II) | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
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| Strength | |||||||
| Personnel strength on 1 February 1944:[2] 45,379 personnel 21,898 personnel 51,400 personnel AFV and AT guns status on 30 January 1944:[3] - 48 operational StuG's - 39 operational heavy AT guns - 13 operational tanks - 3 operational StuG's - 6 operational self-propelled AT guns - 29 operational heavy AT guns | On 27 January 1944:[4] - 174,000 personnel - 3,470 guns and mortars - 141 tanks and self-propelled guns | ||||||
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TheRovno-Lutsk operation[5] (Russian: Ровно-Луцкая операция), known on the German side as theDefensive battles in the Korosten - Rovno area and in the southern Pripyat region[6] (German: Abwehrkämpfe im Raum Korosten - Rowno und im südlich Pripjet-Gebiet), was an offensive operation in theWestern Ukraine, carried out by the far right-wing of theRed Army's1st Ukrainian Front against the elements of the4th Panzer Army ofArmy Group South, with the aim of enveloping the left wing of this army group.[7] This operation was part of the greaterDnieper–Carpathian strategic offensive, carried out on theright-bank Ukraine.
The offensive, spearheaded by the1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps in the wooded marshland, succeeded in capturing important communication centers ofRovno andLutsk.[8] As a result of this offensive, the Soviets deeply enveloped the left flank of Army Group South.[9] This allowed the Red Army to strike southwards, deep in the rear of the Army Group South, which was accomplished a month later during the "Proskurov–Chernvotsy operation" that led to the encirclement of the1st Panzer Army, in what is known as theKamenets-Podolsky Pocket.
In addition, a new westward strategic direction emerged for the Red Army, with the possibility of striking in theKovel-Lublin-Brest direction, which allowed the Red Army to come to the flank and the rear of Army Group Center.[10] This offensive also created the so-called "Belorussian Balcony" – a German-occupied salient that protruded to the east and was over three hundred kilometers away from the front of Army Group South in the west.
This offensive was carried out around the same time that the SovietKorsun–Schevchenkovsky offensive (also known as the Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket). Although precious German armored divisions were being dispatched there to rescue two encircled German corps, the Soviet Rovno–Lutsk operation tied down the forces of the 4th Panzer Army that could otherwise be used in the relief operation of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket.[11]
Army Group South had instructedXIII Corps (Arthur Hauffe) to establish new defensive positions on the Sdolbuno-Uscie-Rovno-Zolotyov line to close the open left flank of the army group and delay the advancing Red Army. The Soviet advance was part of theKorsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive.[12]
The Soviet13th (Nikolai Pukhov) and60th (Ivan Chernyakhovsky) Armies moved through gaps in the defensive line, surrounding the city.[13] The remaining German forces capitulated on 5 February 1944.[14]