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Battle of Preveza

Coordinates:38°57′33″N20°45′01″E / 38.95917°N 20.75028°E /38.95917; 20.75028
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1538 battle of the Third Ottoman–Venetian War
For the battle of the Italo-Turkish War, seeBattle of Preveza (1911).
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Battle of Preveza
Part of theThird Ottoman–Venetian War

Battle of Preveza, Ohannes Umed Behzad
Date28 September 1538
Location
ResultOttoman victory
Belligerents
Ottoman EmpireHoly League
Commanders and leaders
Strength
122 galleys and galliots
366 cannon
3,000 janissaries and 8,000 soldiers[1][2]
112 galleys
50 galiots
140 carracks and galleons[3]
2,500–2,594 cannon
60,000 soldiers[3]
Casualties and losses
Several ships damaged
400 killed
800 wounded[1][4]
Two galleys and five carracks sunk or captured (Spanish and Italian sources)[5][6][1]
128 ships sunk or captured (Turkish sources)[7]
13 ships sunk and 36 captured (English sources)[4]
Central Europe–Balkans

Mediterranean

East Indies

TheBattle of Preveza (also known asPrevesa) was anaval engagement that took place on 28 September 1538 nearPreveza in theIonian Sea in northwesternGreece between anOttoman fleet and that of aHoly League. The battle was an Ottoman victory which occurred in the same area in theIonian Sea as theBattle of Actium in 31 BC.[8] It was one of the three largest sea battles that took place in the sixteenth century Mediterranean, along with theBattle of Djerba and theBattle of Lepanto.[9][10]

Background

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In 1537, commanding a large Ottoman fleet,Hayreddin Barbarossa captured a number ofAegean andIonian islands belonging to theRepublic of Venice, namelySyros,Aegina,Ios,Paros,Tinos,Karpathos,Kasos, andNaxos, thus annexing theDuchy of Naxos to theOttoman Empire. He then unsuccessfully besieged the Venetian stronghold ofCorfu and ravaged the Spanish-heldCalabrian coast in southernItaly.[11]

In the face of this threat, PopePaul III in February 1538 assembled aHoly League, comprising thePapal States,Habsburg Spain, theRepublic of Genoa, theRepublic of Venice, and theKnights of Malta, to confront Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa.[12]Andrea Doria, theGenoese admiral in the service of EmperorCharles V was in overall command. The Papal fleet under AdmiralMarco Grimani,Patriarch of Aquileia and the Venetian fleet underVincenzo Cappello arrived first. Andrea Doria joined them with the Spanish-Genoese fleet on 22 September 1538.

Prior to Doria's arrival, Grimani attempted to land troops near the Fortress ofPreveza, but he retreated to Corfu after suffering a number of casualties in the ensuing encounter with Ottoman forces underMurat Reis. The Holy League assembled its fleet near the island ofCorfu. Barbarossa was still at the island ofKos in theAegean Sea at that time, but he soon arrived at Preveza with the rest of the Ottoman fleet, after capturing the island ofKefalonia on the way.Sinan Reis, one of his lieutenants, suggested landing troops atActium on theGulf of Arta nearPreveza, an idea that Barbarossa initially opposed, but which later proved to be important in securing the Ottoman victory.

Previous movements

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After locating Barbarrosa, Doria stationed his armada on September 25 in front of the mouth of the gulf, where the two fleets observed each other.[13] The situation of both armadas was a stalemate. Barbarossa could not come out of the gulf, as he would have been overwhelmed, but as the surrounding land was under Ottoman control, the Turk armada could wait comfortably. For his part, Doria would prevail in a direct battle, but he could not assault the gulf, whose mouth would have turned into a bottleneck for his ships. Also, the Genoese could not maneuver freely with his sailing ships, in which artillery he trusted to, as increasingly adverse winds threatened to drive the ships into the hostile coast if they approached too much.[13]

Gulf of Arta, showing the Christian fleet outside and the Ottoman fleet inside.

The only viable option for the Christians was to disembark their landing forces, eliminate the Ottoman artillery and install their own, turning the gulf against the Ottomans. They considered a plan, which would execute theSpanish Marine Infantry under the command ofFrancisco de Sarmiento andÁlvaro de Sande, but it was ultimately discarded due to Grimani's previous failure and because their explorers found no ideal orography and weather to safely disembark.[14] The Ottomans attempted to build additional fortifications, which was prevented by the Christian ships' artillery fire from the coast. This composed the only exchange for the next day, as both admirals were aware of their advantages and did not dare to commit a mistake.[13]

Deployment of the opposing fleets.

During the night of 27 September, Doria ordered his fleet to sail off and head 30 miles south towards Sessola, near Leucade, where they would start raidingLepanto and the nearby Turkish positions in order to force Barbarossa to come out.[15] The Turk admiral did so immediately, bursting out of Arta and forming his fleet inY-shaped formation. Barbarossa was in the center with Sinan Reis, Cafer Reis, Şaban Reis and his son Hasan Reis (laterHasan Pasha).Seydi Ali Reis commanded the left wing and Salih Reis commanded the right wing.Turgut Reis, accompanied byMurat Reis, Güzelce Mehmet Reis and Sadık Reis, commanded the rear wing.Turgut Reis was with 6 large galliots and the left wing was close to the shore.

Battle

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Christian sources give out mutually incompatible accounts about the movements and intentions of Doria, Grimani and Cappello during the battle. Venetian sources, which became the mainstream version due to their primacy and color, portray Doria as causing the defeat by his inaction, while Hispano-Genoese accounts blame Grimani and Cappello for refusing to follow his battle plan.[14]

Venetian account

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Map showing the positions of fleets in the battle.

According to the Venetian accounts, the surprised Doria considered Barbarossa was still too close to the Ottoman-controlled shore and refrained from ordering to attack. Cappello and Grimani disagreed and pressed to capitalize on the chance as swiftly as possible, and after three hours of parliament, Doria relented and ordered the galleys to turn north, where they would reunite with sailing ships. However, weather disrupted his strategy, as a lack of wind had caused the sailing ships to lag behind, giving Barbarossa the perfect chance to reach and envelop them without leaving himself the protection of the Ottoman shore. The captains urged to make haste and help the ships, which were being surrounded and boarded by more mobile Ottoman galleys.[16]

Doria headed with the Christian galleys towards Barbarossa, intending to intrude between the Ottomans and the coast so the enemies would be trapped between the Christian galleys and the sailing ships. However, upon reaching the battle, he turned away from the action, apparently believing Barbarossa was still too close to the coast, and hoping to make himself a bait for Barbarossa to turn towards. The Turkish admiral understood his strategy and did not give chase.[17] The excess of tactical maneuvering exasperated Cappello and Grimani, who came to the extent of personally boarding Doria's flagship to beg him to give battle.[18][15] However, the night fell without an attempt to engage by Doria, who repeated his feint twice without success before ordering all Christian vessels to escape next morning.[18]

Hispano-Imperial account

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A satellite view ofLefkada and theGulf of Arta.

According to imperial sources, Doria ordered the fleet to be ready upon sighting Barbarossa finally leaving Arta. The Genoese admiral sent a messenger on abrigantine to call Grimani and Cappello, communicating to them his intention to attack and wanting to know their readiness, which they both confirmed. Grimani considered risky to engage Barbarossa frontally, but he claimed to be willing to do it. Doria then ordered the sailing ships to head for the Ottoman left wing, intending to cut them from the coast, and then the Venetian and Papal galleys to follow them even closer to the coast envelope any Ottoman attempt to do the same to the sailing ships. However, the Christian galleys did not move, despite Doria repeated his message thrice.[19]

As the Ottoman galleys were already surrounding the sailing ships, the Genoese admiral dispatched the SpanishViceroy of Sicily,Ferrante Gonzaga, in another brigantine to urge Cappello and Grimani to follow his strategy. However, the allied captains replied evasively.[20] Grimani had changed his mind and claimed he did not have superior orders from the Republic of Venice to engage in direct combat.[19] Doria found himself only followed by nine allied galleys. He sailed around the formation calling the rest to regroup, but many of them became entangled in the attempt, which would make them easy prey had the sailing ships not been between Barbarossa and them. Rain started falling on them, and Doria ordered a retreat at nightfall.[20]

Fights

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Machín de Munguía's vessel fighting in Preveza.

One way or another, the sailing ships were under attack. The huge Venetian flagshipCandia orGaleone di Venezia, captained by Alessandro Condalmiero, had been left stranded 4 miles off the coast and 10 miles off Sessola. Condalmiero was surrounded by dozens of Ottoman galleys, which he initially fended off with the ship's heavy artillery, but Barbarossa's ships managed to position themselves on his ship's blind spots and pepper the Venetian ship, which Condalmiero attempted to turn around in order to present broadsides. The ship fought fiercely for the entire day waiting for galleys that never came, ending up damaged in the process, although ultimately managing to avoid being captured, even after Barbarossa's flagship joined the fray.[16]

The Spanish and Genoese sailing ships also fought back by sheer firepower. The two main flagship, captained by Francisco Sarmiento and Juan Villegas de Figueroa, repulsed multiple Ottoman attacks. Figueroa was eventually boarded and overwhelmed, forcing his marine infantry to fight in a last stand, until the vessel received so much damage that it sank. Another ship captained by Machín de Munguía with another marine company faced another batch of dozens of Turkish galleys, becoming dismasted and severely damaged in the process, although ultimately escaping unboarded.[21] In the rest of the sailing fleet, several ships fired back to the attackers, while in others, the crews lost hope of being helped and abandoned the ships.[16]

According to Christian sources, the Christians had lost two galleys and five ships by the end of the day.[5][6][1] According to Turkish sources, the Ottomans had sunk, destroyed or captured 128 ships and taken approximately 3,000 prisoners.[7] Others give 13 destroyed ships, 36 captured and the same number of prisoners.[4] The Turks did not lose any ships, but they suffered 400 dead and 800 wounded.

Aftermath

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Dissension exploded within the Holy League due to their actions during the battle. Due to the long-standing enmity between Venice and Genoa, Cappello accused Doria of sabotaging the battle in order not to risk the Hispano-Genoese ships and preserve them for future operations outside the League, while leaving the ships of Venice, his home city's fierce rival and the primary target of Ottoman aggression at that time, to be destroyed.[22] Chroniclers echoed especially that Doria had inexplicably not attacked despite having a superior fleet.[23]Sephardic scholarJoseph ha-Kohen even proposed that God had confounded Doria's mind as a punishment for mistreating Jewish prisoners in his campaigns.[24]

By Doria's insistence, the Holy League continued the campaign and captured the fortress of Castelnuovo, present dayHerceg Novi,Montenegro, hoping for it to become the beach head of an invasion of the Ottoman Balkans. However, Spaniards and Venetians quarreled again about who would garrison Castelnuovo. To ease tensions, Charles V offered Venice the fortress permanently, but the Venetians rejected the offer, claiming to lack means to defend it. The Republic had already started negotiations with the Ottomans.[25] Barbarossa would launch an expedition to recover the fortress the following year, leading to the famedSiege of Castelnuovo. He captured almost all the remaining Christian outposts in theIonian andAegean Seas.

In October 1540, a peace treaty was signed betweenVenice and theOttoman Empire, under which the Turks gained control of the Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese and Dalmatia and the former Venetian islands in the Aegean, Ionian and EasternMediterranean sea. Venice also had to pay a war compensation of 300,000ducats in gold to the Ottoman Empire.

With the victory at Preveza and the subsequent victory at theBattle of Djerba in 1560, the Ottomans were able to repel the efforts of Venice and Spain, the two main rival powers in the Mediterranean. Ottoman superiority in large-scale fleet battles in the Mediterranean remained unchallenged until theBattle of Lepanto in 1571.[26]

References

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  1. ^abcdDamiani, Roberto."Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Hayreddin Barbarossa (italyanca)". Archived fromthe original on 28 September 2007. Retrieved15 January 2011.
  2. ^[1]Archived 23 November 2010 at theWayback Machine Türk Denizcileri/Türk Denizcilik Tarihi: Preveze Deniz Savaşı (1538)
  3. ^ab[2]Archived 23 November 2010 at theWayback Machine Türk Denizcileri/ Türk Denizcilik Tarihi: Preveze Deniz Savaşı (1538)
  4. ^abcDavid S.T. Blackmore (2002),Warfare on the Mediterranean in the Age of Sail, A History, 1571–1866.[3]
  5. ^abFernández Duro (1895), p. 240.
  6. ^abGarcía Cereceda (1873), p. 337.
  7. ^ab"Denizcilerin piri: Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa". 22 October 2020. Archived fromthe original on 22 October 2020. Retrieved16 April 2024.
  8. ^Hattendorf & King 2013, p. 6
  9. ^Hattendorf & King 2013, p. 15
  10. ^"Preveze Deniz Zaferi nasıl kazanıldı? – Galeri – Fikriyat Gazetesi". 27 September 2019. Archived fromthe original on 27 September 2019. Retrieved16 April 2024.
  11. ^Crowley (2008) pp. 67–69
  12. ^Partridge, Loren (2015).Art of Renaissance Venice, 1400–1600. Univ of California Press.ISBN 9780520281790.
  13. ^abcLane-Pool (1890), p. 102.
  14. ^abFernández Duro (1895), p. 236.
  15. ^abLane-Pool (1890), p. 103.
  16. ^abcFernández Duro (1895), p. 237.
  17. ^Fernández Duro (1895), p. 237-238.
  18. ^abFernández Duro (1895), p. 239.
  19. ^abFernández Duro (1895), p. 242.
  20. ^abFernández Duro (1895), p. 243.
  21. ^Fernández Duro (1895), p. 238.
  22. ^Crowley (2008) p. 71
  23. ^English Travellers to Venice 1450 –1600, 2022, Taulor & Francis, ISBN 9781000528343
  24. ^Martin Jacobs,Cultural Intermediaries: Jewish Intellectuals in Early Modern Italy, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Press, ISBN 9780812237795, p.72-73
  25. ^Fernández Duro (1895), p. 246.
  26. ^"de la Mare, Richard Herbert Ingpen, (4 June 1901–22 March 1986), President, Faber & Faber (Publishers) Ltd, since 1971 (Chairman, Faber & Faber Ltd, 1960–71); Chairman, Faber Music Ltd, 1966–71",Who Was Who, Oxford University Press, 1 December 2007,doi:10.1093/ww/9780199540884.013.u166813, retrieved16 April 2024

Bibliography

[edit]
Battles involving theOttoman Empire by era
Rise
(1299–1453)
Land battles
Naval battles
Classical Age
(1453–1550)
Land battles
Naval battles
Transformation
(1550–1700)
Land battles
Naval battles
Old Regime
(1700–1789)
Land battles
Naval battles
Modernization
(1789–1908)
Land battles
Naval battles
Ottoman victories are initalics.

38°57′33″N20°45′01″E / 38.95917°N 20.75028°E /38.95917; 20.75028

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