TheBattle of Midway was a major naval battle in thePacific Theater ofWorld War II that took place on 6–7 June 1942, six months after Japan'sattack on Pearl Harbor and one month after theBattle of the Coral Sea. The JapaneseCombined Fleet under the command ofIsoroku Yamamoto suffered a decisive defeat by theU.S. Pacific Fleet nearMidway Atoll, about 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) northwest ofOahu. Yamamoto had intended to capture Midway and lure out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet, especially the aircraft carriers which had escaped damage at Pearl Harbor.
Before the battle, Japan desired to extend its Pacific defense perimeter, especially after theDoolittle air raid ofTokyo in April 1942, and to clear the seas for attacks on Midway,Fiji,Samoa, andHawaii. A related Japaneseattack on the Aleutian Islands began one day earlier, on 3 June. The Japanese strike force at Midway, known as theKidō Butai, was commanded byChuichi Nagumo. Yamamoto's plan for the operation, which depended on precise timing and coordination, was undermined by its wide dispersal of forces, which left the rest of the fleet unable to support theKidō Butai effectively.
On 4 June, the Japanese began bombing Midway and prepared to wait for the Pacific Fleet to arrive from Pearl Harbor to defend the island. Unknown to Yamamoto,U.S. code breakers had determined the date and location of his planned attack, enabling the Americans to prepare their own ambush;Chester Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, had sent a large force underFrank Jack Fletcher to the Midway area before the Japanese had arrived. Land-based planes from Midway and carrier-based planes from the U.S. fleet surprised and attacked Nagumo's force. All four Japanesefleet carriers—Akagi,Kaga,Sōryū, andHiryū—present at the battle were sunk, as was the heavy cruiserMikuma. Japan also lost 3,000 men, including many well-trained and difficult-to-replace pilots. The U.S. lost the carrierYorktown and the destroyerHammann, while the carriersEnterprise andHornet (under the command ofRaymond Spruance during the battle) survived the fighting without damage.
The Battle of Midway, along with theGuadalcanal campaign, is widely considered a turning point in thePacific War. After Midway and the attrition of theSolomon Islands campaign, Japan's ability to replace its losses inmateriel and trained men became rapidly insufficient, while the U.S.'s massive industrial and training capabilities increased over time. HistorianJohn Keegan called the battle "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history ofnaval warfare",[9] while historianCraig Symonds called it "one of the most consequential naval engagements in world history, ranking alongsideSalamis,Trafalgar, andTsushima Strait, as both tactically decisive and strategically influential."[10]
The extent of Japanese military expansion in the Pacific, April 1942
After expanding the war in the Pacific to include western colonies, theJapanese Empire quickly attained its initial strategic goals ofBritish Hong Kong, thePhilippines,British Malaya,Singapore, and theDutch East Indies, the latter of whose oil resources were particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for the second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942.[citation needed]
Because of strategic disagreements between theImperial Army (IJA) andImperial Navy (IJN), and infighting between the Navy'sImperial General Headquarters and AdmiralIsoroku Yamamoto'sCombined Fleet, a follow-up strategy was not formed until April 1942.[11] Yamamoto finally won the bureaucratic struggle with a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his plan was adopted.[12] Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he regarded as the principal threat to the overallPacific campaign. This concern was acutely heightened by theDoolittle Raid on 18 April 1942, in which 16United States Army Air Forces (USAAF)B-25 Mitchell bombers launched fromUSS Hornet bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a shock to the Japanese and highlighted a gap in the defenses around theJapanese home islands as well as the vulnerability of Japanese territory to American bombers.[13]
This, and othersuccessful hit-and-run raids by American carriers in the South Pacific, showed that they were still a threat, although seemingly reluctant to be drawn into all-out battle.[14] Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack onNaval Station Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers. However, considering the increased strength of American land-based airpower on theHawaiian Islands since the 7 December 1941 attack, he judged that it was too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly.[15]
Instead, Yamamoto selectedMidway, a tinyatoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately 1,300 mi (1,100 nmi; 2,100 km) fromOahu. Midway was outside the effective range of almost all the American aircraft stationed on the main Hawaiian Islands. It was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would be compelled to defend it vigorously.[16] The U.S.did indeed consider Midway vital: following the battle, the establishment of aU.S. submarine base onNaval Air Facility Midway Island allowedsubmarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and re-provision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi (1,900 km). In addition to serving as a seaplane base, Midway's airstrips were aforward staging point for bomber attacks onWake Island.[17]
Midway Atoll, several months before the battle. Eastern Island (with the airfield) is in the foreground, and the larger Sand Island is in the background to the west.
Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan for taking Midway (named Operation MI) was exceedingly complex.[18] It required the careful coordination of multiple battle groups over hundreds of miles of open sea. His design was also predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting thatUSS Enterprise and USSHornet, formingTask Force 16, were the only carriers available to thePacific Fleet. During theBattle of the Coral Sea one month earlier,USS Lexington had been sunk andUSS Yorktown suffered so much damage that the Japanese believed she too had been lost.[19] However, following hasty repairs at Pearl Harbor,Yorktown sortied and ultimately played a critical role in the discovery and eventual destruction of the Japanese fleet carriers at Midway. Finally, much of Yamamoto's planning, coinciding with the general feeling among the Japanese leadership at the time, was based on a gross misjudgement of American morale which was believed to be debilitated from the string of Japanese victories in the preceding months.[20]
Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation.[21] To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly hisbattleships) would be concealed from the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers trailed Vice AdmiralChūichi Nagumo's carrier force by several hundred miles. They were intended to come up and destroy whatever elements of the American fleet might come to Midway's defense once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun battle.[22] This tactic was doctrine in most major navies of the time.[23]
Unknown to Yamamoto, the U.S. had broken parts of the main Japanese naval code (dubbedJN-25 by the Americans), divulging many details of his plan. His emphasis on dispersal also meant none of his formations were in a position to support the others.[24] For instance, although Nagumo's carriers were expected to carry out strikes against Midway and bear the brunt of American counterattacks, the only warships in his fleet larger than the screening force of twelve destroyers were twoKongō-classfast battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. By contrast, Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, none of which saw action at Midway.[22]
The light carriers of the trailing forces and Yamamoto's three battleships were unable to keep pace with the carriers of theKidō Butai (機動部隊, "Mobile Strike Force") and so could not sail in company with them. TheKidō Butai would sail into range at best speed so as to increase the chance of surprise and would not have ships spread out across the ocean guiding the USN toward it. If the other parts of the invasion force needed more defense, theKidō Butai would make best speed to defend them. Hence the slower ships could not be with theKidō Butai. The distance between Yamamoto and Kondo's forces and Nagumo's carriers had grave implications during the battle. The invaluable reconnaissance capability of thescout planes carried by the cruisers and carriers, and the additional anti-aircraft capability of the cruisers and the other two battleships of theKongō-class in the trailing forces, were unavailable to help Nagumo.[25]
To obtain support from the IJA for the Midway operation, the IJN agreed to support theirinvasion of the United States through theAleutian Islands ofAttu andKiska, part of theAlaska Territory. The IJA occupied these islands to place the Japanese home islands out of range of U.S. land-based bombers in Alaska. Most Americans feared that the occupied islands would be used as bases for Japanese bombers to attack strategic targets and population centers along theU.S. West Coast.
The Japanese operations in the Aleutians (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas many earlier historical accounts consideredthe Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, according to the original Japanese battle plan, AL was intended to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway. A one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack.[26]
Despite estimates thatYorktown, damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, would require several months of repairs atPuget Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were intact and her flight deck largely so.[29] ThePearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock, and in 72 hours she was restored to a battle-ready state,[30] judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required.[31][32] Her flight deck was patched, and whole sections of internal frames were cut out and replaced. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair shipUSS Vestal, herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard.[33]
Yorktown's partially depleted air group was rebuilt using whatever planes and pilots could be found. Scouting Five (VS-5) was replaced with Bombing Three (VB-3) fromUSS Saratoga. Torpedo Five (VT-5) was replaced byTorpedo Three (VT-3). Fighting Three (VF-3) was reconstituted to replace VF-42 with sixteen pilots from VF-42 and eleven pilots from VF-3, withLieutenant CommanderJohn Thach in command. Some of the aircrew were inexperienced, which may have contributed to an accident in which Thach's executive officer Lieutenant Commander Donald Lovelace was killed.[34] Despite efforts to getSaratoga (which had been undergoing repairs on the American West Coast) ready, the need to resupply and assemble sufficient escorts meant she was unable to reach Midway until after the battle.[35]
During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japaneselight carrierShōhō had been sunk and the fleet carrierShōkaku had been severely damaged and was indrydock for repair. Although the fleet carrierZuikaku escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group and was in port at theKure Naval District in Hiroshima, awaiting replacement aircraft and pilots. That there were none immediately available can be attributed to the growing inability of the IJN to properly train pilots faster than they were killed in action. In desperation, instructors from theYokosuka Air Corps were relieved of their duties to plug the gap.[38]
Thus,Carrier Division 5, consisting of the two most advanced aircraft carriers of theKido Butai, was not available which meant that Vice-Admiral Nagumo had only two-thirds of the fleet carriers at his disposal:Kaga andAkagi formingCarrier Division 1 andHiryū andSōryū making upCarrier Division 2. This was partly due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941 including raids onDarwin andColombo.[39] Nonetheless, the First Carrier Strike Force sailed with 248 available aircraft on the four carriers (60 onAkagi, 74 onKaga (B5N2 squadron oversized), 57 onHiryū and 57 onSōryū).[40]
The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were theAichi D3A1 "Val"dive bomber and theNakajima B5N2 "Kate", which was used either as atorpedo bomber or as a level bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverableMitsubishi A6M Zero. For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses.[41] In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant all carriers of theKidō Butai had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts in the carriers' hangars.[42][nb 1]
In addition, Nagumo's carrier force suffered from several defensive deficiencies: "it could throw a punch but couldn't take one."[44] Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration change deficiencies[clarification needed] which limited their effectiveness. The IJN's fleetcombat air patrol (CAP) had too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including a lack ofradar. Poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control. The carriers' escorting warships were deployed as visual scouts in a ring at long range, not as close anti-aircraft escorts, as they lacked training, doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft guns.[45]
Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. Apicket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[46] A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engineH8K "Emily"flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part ofOperation K, was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay offFrench Frigate Shoals—was occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March. Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle.[47]
Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea inYamato, assumed Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to reveal his position.[48] These messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons that remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions.[49]
Nimitz had one critical advantage: U.S. cryptanalysts had partially broken the Japanese Navy'sJN-25b code.[50] Since early 1942, the U.S. had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF." It was initially not known where "AF" was, butCommanderJoseph Rochefort and his team atStation HYPO were able to confirm that it was Midway:CaptainWilfred Holmes devised the ruse of telling the base at Midway (by secureundersea communications cable) to broadcast an uncoded radio message stating that Midway's water purification system had broken down.[51] Within 24 hours, the code breakers picked up a Japanese message that "AF was short on water."[52] The Japanese seemed unconcerned that the Americans were broadcasting uncoded that a major naval installation close to the Japanese was having a water shortage, which Japanese intelligence might have suspected as deception.[53] HYPO was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJNorder of battle.[54]
Japan had a new codebook, but its introduction had been delayed, enabling HYPO to read messages for several crucial days; the new code, which took several days to be cracked, came into use on 24 May, but the important breaks had already been made.[55] As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz knew that the Japanese had negated their numerical advantage by dividing their ships into four separate task groups, so widely separated that they were essentially unable to support each other.[56] This dispersal resulted in few fast ships being available to escort the Carrier Striking Force, thus reducing the number ofanti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers. Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast, remained largely unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began.[55]
Movements during the battle, according to William Koenig inEpic Sea BattlesCommemorative photo ofCombined Fleet Headquarters staff on board theYamato. The sixth person from the left is Commander-in-Chief AdmiralIsoroku Yamamoto, and the fifth person his Chief of Staff Vice AdmiralMatome Ugaki.
11:00 18 Vals and 6 Zekes (Zeros) take off fromHiryū
11:30 10 planes (Yorktown) take off to search for remaining Japanese ships
12:05 First attack onYorktown
13:30Hiryū detected by aYorktown plane
13:31 10 Kates and 6 Zekes (Zeros) take off fromHiryū
13:40Yorktown again in service, making 18 knots
14:30 Second attack onYorktown
15:00Yorktown abandoned
15:30 24 dive bombers take off againstHiryū fromEnterprise
16:10Soryū sinks
17:00 Dive bombers attack onHiryū
19:25Kaga sinks
5 June
05:00Akagi sinks
09:00Hiryū sinks
7 June
07:00Yorktown sinks
At about 09:00 on 3 June, Ensign Jack Reid, piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol squadronVP-44,[58] spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi (580 mi; 930 km) to the west-southwest of Midway. He mistakenly reported this group as the Main Force.[59] Nine B-17s took off from Midway at 12:30 for the first air attack. Three hours later, they found Tanaka's transport group 570 nmi (660 mi; 1,060 km) to the west.[60]
Harassed by heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Although their crews reported hitting four ships,[60] none were actually hit and no significant damage was inflicted.[61] Early the following morning, the Japanese oil tankerAkebono Maru sustained the first hit whena torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00. This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the battle.[61]
At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway, consisting of 36 D3As and 36 B5Ns, escorted by 36 Zero fighters. At the same time, he launched his seven search aircraft (2 B5Ns fromAkagi andKaga; 4Aichi E13A "Jakes" from the heavy cruiserTone andChikuma; and 1 short-rangeNakajima E8N "Dave" from the battleshipHaruna; an eighth aircraft fromTone launched 30 minutes late). Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force. As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns. At 05:34, a PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers; another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later.[62]
Midway's radar picked up the Japanese at 05:53, at a distance of 93 nautical miles, and interceptors were scrambled.[63] Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. Having taken off at 06:00[64] Midway-based Marine fighters led by MajorFloyd B. Parks, which included six F4Fs and twenty F2As,[65] intercepted the Japanese at 06:20[66] and suffered heavy losses, though they destroyed four B5Ns and one Zero. Within the first few minutes, two F4Fs and thirteen F2As were destroyed, while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged, with only two remaining airworthy. Starting At 06:34, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base.[67] American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate, destroying three Japanese aircraft and damaging many more.[68]
Of the 108 Japanese aircraft that participated in this attack, 11 were destroyed (including 3 that ditched), 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged to some degree. 140 more were available to the Japanese, but never launched, and were destroyed when their carriers sank. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway: American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese, and most of Midway's land-based defenses remained intact. Japanese pilots reported to Nagumo that a second aerial attack on Midway's defenses would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7 June.[69]
Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force. These included six Grumman Avengers, detached to Midway fromHornet's VT-8 (Midway was the combat debut of both VT-8 and the Avenger); Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s of the18th Reconnaissance and69th Bomb Squadrons armed with torpedoes, and 15 B-17s of the31st,72nd, and431st Bomb Squadrons. The Japanese repelled these attacks, losing only three Zero fighters while destroying five Avengers, two SB2Us, eight SBDs, and two B-26s.[70][71] Among the dead was MajorLofton R. Henderson of VMSB-241, killed while leading his inexperienced SBD squadron into action. The mainairfield at Guadalcanal was named after him in August 1942.[72]
One B-26, piloted by LieutenantJames Muri, after dropping his torpedo and searching for an escape route, flew directly down the length ofAkagi while being fired upon by fighters and anti-aircraft fire, which had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their own flagship; the B-26strafedAkagi, killing two men.[73][74] Another B-26, piloted by Lieutenant Herbert Mayes, did not pull out of its run after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and instead flew directly atAkagi'sbridge.[75] Either attempting a suicide ramming or out of control, the plane narrowly missed striking the bridge, which could have killed Nagumo and his staff, crashing into the ocean.[76] This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations.[77]
While the air strikes from Midway were happening, American submarineUSS Nautilus, commanded by Lieutenant CommanderWilliam Brockman, approached the Japanese fleet, attracting attention from the escorts. Around 08:20, she made an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a battleship and then dived to evade escorts.[78] At 09:10, she launched a torpedo at a cruiser and again dived to evade escorts, with destroyerArashi spending considerable time chasingNautilus.[79]
A B-17 attack missesHiryū; this was taken between 08:00 and 08:30. AShotai of three Zeros is lined up near the bridge. This was one of severalcombat air patrols launched during the day.[80]
In accordance with Yamamoto's orders for Operation MI, Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve, comprising two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed (this was doctrinal: dive bombers were to be armed on the flight deck). The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located.[81]
At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed withcontact-fusedgeneral-purpose bombs for use against land targets. This was a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike. Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40,[82] the delayed scout plane fromTone signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east, but neglected to specify its composition. Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00.[83]
Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-arm the bombers and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 20–40 minutes elapsed beforeTone's scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force. This was one of the carriers fromTask Force 16. The other carrier was not sighted.[84]
Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear AdmiralTamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū andSōryū), recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 16 D3A1 dive bombers onSōryū and 18 onHiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[85] Nagumo's opportunity to hit the American ships[86] was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea. Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ("spot") their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch.[87]
The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case ofSōryū, fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol.[88] Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes.[89] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserves to battle without proper anti-ship armament, and likely without fighter escort; he had just witnessed how easily the unescorted American bombers had been shot down.[90]
Japanesenaval doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[91] The arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, andthen launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes.[92]
Had Nagumo instead launched the available aircraft around 07:45 and risked the ditching of Tomonaga's aircraft, they would have formed a powerful and well-balanced force with the potential to sink two American carriers.[93] Furthermore, fueled and armed aircraft inside the ships presented a significant additional hazard for damage to the carriers in an event of attack, and keeping them on the decks was much more dangerous than getting them airborne.[94] Whatever the case, at that point there was no way to stop the American strike against him, since Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 (withEnterprise andHornet having completed launching by 07:55, butYorktown not until 09:08), so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack.[95]
Pilots of Navy Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) aboardUSS Hornet, circa mid-May 1942. Only one member ofVT-8 who flew fromHornet on 4 June 1942 survived in the action.EnsignGeorge Gay (right), sole survivor of VT-8'sTBD Devastator squadron, in front of his aircraft, 4 June 1942
The Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Fletcher, in overall command aboardYorktown, and benefiting from PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while initially holdingYorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found.[96]
Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. He left Halsey's Chief of Staff, CaptainMiles Browning, to work out the details and oversee the launch. The carriers had to launch into the wind, so the light southeasterly breeze would require them to steam away from the Japanese at high speed. Browning, therefore, suggested a launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an hour to close on the Japanese at 25 kn (46 km/h; 29 mph). This would place them at about 155 nmi (287 km; 178 mi) from the Japanese fleet, assuming it did not change course. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriersEnterprise andHornet a few minutes after 07:00.[97] Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 fromYorktown.[98]
Fletcher, along withYorktown's commanding officer, CaptainElliott Buckmaster, and their staffs, had acquired the first-hand experience needed in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy forcein the Coral Sea, but there was no time to pass these lessons on toEnterprise, commanded by CaptainGeorge Murray, andHornet, commanded by CaptainMarc Mitscher, which were tasked with launching the first strike.[99] Spruance ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to target immediately rather than waiting for the strike force to assemble, since neutralizing the Japanese carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force.[98][99]
While the Japanese were able to launch 108 aircraft in just seven minutes, it tookEnterprise andHornet over an hour to launch 117.[100] Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the Japanese as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance calculated that this was worthwhile, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack impaired their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese tactics preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.[98][99]
American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike fromHornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 265 degrees rather than the 240 degrees indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers:[101] the 10F4Fs fromHornet ran out of fuel and had toditch.[102] This became known as the Flight to Nowhere.[103]Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8, fromHornet), led by Lieutenant CommanderJohn C. Waldron, broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading.
Devastators of VT-6 aboardUSS Enterprise being prepared for takeoff during the battle
Waldron's squadron sighted the Japanese carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed at 09:40[104] byVF-6 fromEnterprise, whose Wildcat fighter escorts lost contact, ran low on fuel, and had to turn back.[102] Without fighter escort, all 15TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down without being able to inflict any damage. EnsignGeorge H. Gay, Jr. was the only survivor of the 30 aircrew of VT-8. He launched historpedo onSōryū before he was shot down, butSōryū evaded it.[105] VT-6, led by Lieutenant CommanderEugene E. Lindsey lost 9 of its 14 Devastators (one ditched later), and 10 of 12 Devastators fromYorktown'sVT-3 (who attacked at 10:10) were shot down with no hits to show for their effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their unimprovedMark 13 torpedoes.[106] The TBD Devastator had shown itself to be unsuitable for modern warfare and it was to be replaced by the TBF Avenger.[107]
The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Zeros,[108] made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes—close enough to be able to strafe the Japanese ships and force their carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers—but all of their torpedoes either missed or failed to explode.[109] The performance of American torpedoes early in the war was extremely poor, as shot after shot missed by running directly under the target (deeper than intended), prematurely exploded, or failed to explode at all.[110][111] Remarkably, senior Navy andBureau of Ordnance officers never questioned why half a dozen torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no results.[112]
Despite their failure to score any hits, the American torpedo attacks achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and unable to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, the poor control of the Japanese CAP meant they were out of position for subsequent attacks. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.[113] The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by VT-3 fromYorktown, led by Lieutenant CommanderLance Edward Massey at 10:00 quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet.[114] Better discipline and the employment of a greater number of Zeros for the CAP might have enabled Nagumo to prevent (or at least mitigate) the damage caused by the coming American attacks.[115]
By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, three squadrons of SBDs fromEnterprise andYorktown were approaching from the southwest and northeast. TheYorktown squadron (VB-3) had flown just behind VT-3 but elected to attack from a different course. The two squadrons fromEnterprise (VB-6 and VS-6) were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the Japanese ships. Air Group CommanderC. Wade McClusky, Jr. decided to continue the search and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyerArashi, steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfullydepth-charged U.S. submarineNautilus, which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleshipKirishima.[116] Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced.[117]
McClusky's decision to continue the search and his judgment, in the opinion of AdmiralChester Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..."[118] All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6, and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack.[119] Most of the Japanese CAP was directing its attention to the torpedo planes of VT-3 and was out of position; meanwhile, armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily being completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant that bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in themagazines, making the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable.[120]
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons ofEnterprise's air group split up with the intention of sending one squadron each to attackKaga andAkagi. A miscommunication caused both of the squadrons to dive atKaga. Recognizing the error, LieutenantRichard Halsey Best and his two wingmen were able to pull out of their dives and, after judging thatKaga was doomed, headed north to attackAkagi. Coming under an onslaught of bombs from almost two full squadrons,Kaga sustained three to five direct hits, which caused heavy damage and started multiple fires. One of the bombs landed on or right in front of the bridge, killing CaptainJisaku Okada and most of the ship's senior officers.[121] Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson, part of McClusky's group, recalled:
We were coming down in all directions on the port side of the carrier ... I recognized her as theKaga; and she was enormous ... The target was utterly satisfying ... I saw a bomb hit just behind where I was aiming ... I saw the deck rippling and curling back in all directions exposing a great section of the hangar below ... I saw [my] 500 lb [230 kg] bomb hit right abreast of the [carrier's] island. The two 100 lb [45 kg] bombs struck in the forward area of the parked planes ...[122]
Several minutes later, Best and his two wingmen dived onAkagi.Mitsuo Fuchida, the Japanese aviator who had led theattack on Pearl Harbor, was onAkagi when it was hit, and described the attack:
A look-out screamed: "Hell-Divers!" I looked up to see three black enemy planes plummeting towards our ship. Some of our machineguns managed to fire a few frantic bursts at them, but it was too late. The plump silhouettes of the American Dauntless dive-bombers quickly grew larger, and then a number of black objects suddenly floated eerily from their wings.[123]
AlthoughAkagi sustained only one direct hit (almost certainly dropped by Lieutenant Best), it proved to be a fatal blow: the bomb struck the edge of the mid-ship deck elevator and penetrated to the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft in the vicinity. Nagumo's chief of staff,Ryūnosuke Kusaka, recorded "a terrific fire ... bodies all over the place ... Planes stood tail up, belching livid flames and jet-black smoke, making it impossible to bring the fires under control."[124] Another bomb exploded underwater very close astern; the resulting geyser bent the flight deck upward "in grotesque configurations" and caused crucialrudder damage.[109][124][nb 2]
Simultaneously,Yorktown's VB-3, commanded by LieutenantMax Leslie, went forSōryū, scoring at least three hits and causing extensive damage. Gasoline ignited, creating an inferno, while stacked bombs and ammunition detonated.[123] VT-3 targetedHiryū, which was hemmed in bySōryū,Kaga, andAkagi, but achieved no hits.[126]
Within six minutes,Sōryū andKaga were ablaze from stem to stern.Akagi, having been struck by only one bomb, took longer to burn, but the resulting fires quickly expanded and proved impossible to extinguish; she too was eventually consumed by flames and had to be abandoned. Although Nagumo was reluctant to leaveAkagi,[127] Kusaka was able to persuade him.[128][129] At 10:46, Nagumo transferred hisflag to the light cruiserNagara.[130] All three carriers remained temporarily afloat, as none had suffered damage below the waterline, other than the rudder damage toAkagi caused by the near miss close astern. Despite initial hopes thatAkagi could be saved or at least towed back to Japan, all three carriers were eventually abandoned andscuttled.[126][nb 3] WhileKaga was burning,Nautilus showed up again and launched three torpedoes at her, scoring one dud hit.Kaga was later sunk by the Japanese destroyerHagikaze.[132]
Yorktown shortly after being hit by three Japanese bombs
Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, wasted little time in counterattacking.Hiryū's first attack wave, consisting of 18 D3As and 6 Zeros, followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered,Yorktown, hitting her with three bombs, which blew a hole in the deck, snuffed out all but one of herboilers, and destroyed one anti-aircraft mount. The damage forced Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiserAstoria. Damage control parties were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour, giving her a speed of 19 kn (35 km/h; 22 mph) and enabling her to resume air operations.Yorktown hoisted a flag signal to indicate a speed of 5 knots.[133] Captain Buckmaster had his signalmen hoist a new 10-by-15-foot American flag from the foremast. Thirteen D3As and three Zeros were lost in this attack (two Zeros turned back early after they were damaged attacking some ofEnterprise's SBDs returning from their attack on the Japanese carriers).[134]
Approximately one hour later,Hiryū's second attack wave, consisting of ten B5Ns and six escorting Zeros, arrived overYorktown; the repair efforts had been so effective that the Japanese pilots assumed thatYorktown must be a different, undamaged carrier.[135] They attacked, cripplingYorktown with two torpedoes; she lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port. Five B5Ns and two Zeros were shot down in this attack.[136]
News of the two strikes, with the mistaken reports that each had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved Japanese morale. The few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboardHiryū. Despite the heavy losses, the Japanese believed that they could scrape together enough aircraft for one more strike against what they believed to be the only remaining American carrier.[137]
Hiryū, shortly before sinking, photo taken by aYokosuka B4Y off the carrierHōshō[138]
Late in the afternoon, aYorktown scout aircraft locatedHiryū, promptingEnterprise to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers (six SBDs fromVS-6, four SBDs fromVB-6, and 14 SBDs fromYorktown'sVB-3). DespiteHiryū being defended by more than a dozen Zero fighters, the attack byEnterprise and orphanedYorktown aircraft launched fromEnterprise was successful: four bombs (possibly five) hitHiryū, leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft.Hornet's strike, launched late because of a communications error, concentrated on the remaining escort ships but failed to score any hits.[139] A bomb from theEnterprise dive bomber piloted byDusty Kleiss struckHiryū on the bow, essentially crippling her.[140][141]
After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, most of the crew onHiryū were evacuated, and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers. Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and then departed quickly,Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours. She was discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrierHōshō, prompting hopes she could be saved or towed back to Japan. Soon after being spotted,Hiryū sank. Yamaguchi, along with ship's captain,Tomeo Kaku [ja], chose togo down with the ship, costing Japan perhaps its best carrier officer. One young sailor reportedly tried to stay with the officers but was denied.[139]
As darkness fell, both sides made tentative plans for continuing the action. Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelictYorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the U.S. had won a great victory, but he was unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell.[142]
Finally, fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces[142] and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade (based in part on a misleading contact report from the submarineTambor)[143] Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the Japanese at midnight.[144] For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, he detached a cruiser raiding force to bombard the island. The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans because Spruance had briefly withdrawn eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west.[145] It was fortunate for the U.S. that Spruance did not pursue: had he come in contact with Yamamoto'sheavy ships, includingYamato, in the dark, considering the Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack tactics at the time, there is a very high probability his cruisers would have been overwhelmed and his carriers sunk.[146]
Spruance failed to reestablish contact with Yamamoto's forces on 5 June, despite extensive searches. Towards the end of the day, he launched a search-and-destroy mission to seek out any remnants of Nagumo's carrier force. This late afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to orderEnterprise andHornet to turn on their lights to aid the landings.[147]
At 02:15 on 5 June Commander John Murphy'sTambor, lying 90 nmi (170 km; 100 mi) west of Midway, made the second of the submarine force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome, although its impact was heavily blunted by Murphy.[148] Sighting several ships, neither Murphy nor his executive officer, Edward Spruance (son of Admiral Spruance), could identify them. Uncertain of whether they were friendly and unwilling to approach any closer to verify their heading or type, Murphy decided to send a vague report of "four large ships" to AdmiralRobert English,Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. This report was passed on by English to Nimitz, who then sent it to Spruance. Spruance, a former submarine commander, was "understandably furious" at the vagueness of Murphy's report, as it provided him with little more than suspicion and no concrete information on which to make his preparations.[149] Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent problem since the time PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance was forced to assume the "four large ships" reported byTambor represented the main invasion force and so he moved to block it, while staying 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) northeast of Midway.[150]
In reality, the ships sighted byTambor were the detachment of four cruisers and two destroyers Yamamoto had sent to bombard Midway. At 02:55 these ships received Yamamoto's order to retire and changed course to comply.[150] At about the same time as this change of course,Tambor was sighted and during maneuvers designed to avoid a submarine attack, the heavy cruisersMogami andMikuma collided, inflicting serious damage onMogami's bow. The less severely damagedMikuma slowed to 12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph) to keep pace.[151] Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was hazardous and he dived to approach for an attack. The attack was unsuccessful, and around 06:00 he finally reported two westboundMogami-class cruisers before diving again and playing no further role in the battle.[143] Limping along on a straight course at 12 knots—roughly one-third their top speed—Mogami andMikuma had been almost perfect targets for a submarine attack. As soon asTambor returned to port, Spruance had Murphy relieved of duty and reassigned to a shore station, citing his confusing contact report, poor torpedo shooting during his attack run, and general lack of aggression, especially as compared toNautilus, the oldest of the 12 boats at Midway and the only one which had successfully placed a torpedo on target (albeit a dud).[148][149]
SBD Dauntless dive bombers from Scouting Squadron 8 (VS-8) aboardUSS Hornet approach the burning heavy cruiserMikuma on 6 June
Over the next two days, several strikes were launched against the stragglers, first from Midway, then from Spruance's carriers.Mikuma was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses,[152] whileMogami survived further severe damage to return home for repairs. The destroyersArashio andAsashio were also bombed and strafed during the last of these attacks.[153] CaptainRichard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was killed while executing a glide bomb run onMikuma and was posthumously awarded theMedal of Honor.[154]
Meanwhile, salvage efforts onYorktown were encouraging, and she was taken in tow by fleet tugUSS Vireo. In the late afternoon of 6 June theJapanese submarine I-168, which had managed to slip through the cordon of destroyers (possibly because of the large amount of debris in the water), fired a salvo of torpedoes, two of which struckYorktown. There were few casualties aboard since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo struck the destroyerUSS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power toYorktown.Hammann broke in two and sank with the loss of 80 lives, mostly because her own depth charges exploded. With further salvage efforts deemed hopeless, the remaining repair crews were evacuated fromYorktown. Throughout the night of 6 June and into the morning of 7 June,Yorktown remained afloat, but by 05:30 on 7 June, her list rapidly increased to port. Shortly afterward, the ship turned onto her port side.[155] At 07:01,Yorktown capsized and sank.
SBD pilotNorman "Dusty" Kleiss, who scored three hits on Japanese ships during the Battle of Midway (aircraft carriersKaga andHiryū and heavy cruiserMikuma), wrote: "From the experience in the Marshalls, at Wake and at Marcus, I thought our fleet learned its lessons. We could not send TBDs into action unless they had adequate smoke protection and torpedoes that exploded more than 10 percent of the time."[156]
By the time the battle ended, 3,057 Japanese had died. Casualties aboard the four carriers were:Akagi: 267;Kaga: 811;Hiryū: 392 (including Yamaguchi who chose to go down with his ship);Soryū: 711 (includingCaptain Yanagimoto, who chose to remain on board); a total of 2,181.[157] The heavy cruisersMikuma (sunk; 700 casualties) andMogami (badly damaged; 92) accounted for another 792 deaths.[158]
In addition, the destroyersArashio (bombed; 35) andAsashio (strafed by aircraft; 21) were both damaged during the air attacks which sankMikuma and caused further damage toMogami. Floatplanes were lost from the cruisersChikuma (3) andTone (2). Dead aboard the destroyersTanikaze (11),Arashi (1),Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oilerAkebono Maru (10) made up the remaining 23 casualties.[nb 4]
At the end of the battle, the U.S. lost the carrierYorktown and the destroyerHammann. 307 Americans had been killed, including Major GeneralClarence L. Tinker, Commander,7th Air Force, who personally led a bomber strike from Hawaii against the retreating Japanese forces on 7 June. He was killed when his aircraft crashed near Midway Island.
After winning a clear victory, and as pursuit became too hazardous nearWake Island,[159] American forces retired. Spruance again withdrew to the east to refuel his destroyers and rendezvous with the carrierSaratoga, which was ferrying much-needed replacement aircraft. Fletcher transferred his flag toSaratoga on the afternoon of 8 June and resumed command of the carrier force. For the remainder of that day and the next, Fletcher continued to launch search missions from the three carriers to ensure the Japanese were no longer advancing on Midway. Late on 10 June a decision was made to leave the area, and the American carriers returned to Pearl Harbor.[160]
HistorianSamuel E. Morison noted in 1949 that Spruance was criticized for not pursuing the retreating Japanese, allowing their surface fleet to escape.[161]Clay Blair argued in 1975 that had Spruance pressed on, he would have been unable to launch his aircraft after nightfall, and his cruisers would have been overwhelmed by Yamamoto's powerful surface units, includingYamato.[159] Furthermore, the American air groups had suffered considerable losses, including most of their torpedo bombers. This made it unlikely that they would be effective in an airstrike against the Japanese battleships, even if they had managed to catch them during the daytime.[162] Also, Spruance's destroyers were critically low on fuel.[163][164]
On 10 June the Imperial Japanese Navy conveyed to the military liaison conference an incomplete picture of the results of the battle. Nagumo's detailed battle report was submitted to the high command on 15 June. It was intended only for the highest echelons in the Japanese Navy and government and was guarded closely throughout the war. In it, one of the more striking revelations is the comment on Mobile Force Commander Nagumo's estimates: "The enemy is not aware of our plans (we were not discovered until early in the morning of the 5th at the earliest)."[165] In reality, the whole operation had been compromised from the beginning by American code-breaking efforts.[166]
The Japanese public and much of the military command structure were kept in the dark about the extent of the defeat: Japanese news announced a great victory. Only EmperorHirohito and the highest Navy command staff were accurately informed of the carrier and personnel losses. Consequently, even theImperial Japanese Army continued to believe, for at least a short time, that the fleet was in good condition.[167]
On the return of the Japanese fleet toHashirajima on 14 June the wounded were immediately transferred to naval hospitals; most were classified as "secret patients", placed in isolation wards and quarantined from other patients and their own families to keep this major defeat secret.[168] The remaining officers and men were quickly dispersed to other units of the fleet and, without being allowed to see family or friends, were shipped to units in the South Pacific, where the majority died in battle.[169] None of the flag officers or staff of the Combined Fleet were penalized, and Nagumo was later placed in command of the rebuilt carrier force.[170] A possible reason Nagumo was not relieved of command was that he reported two American carriers had been sunk; not one actually sunk.[171]
In this still from the 1942 U.S. Navy filmThe Battle of Midway, shot byJohn Ford, soldiers and civilians inspect the wreckage of a plane while black smoke billows in the distance
As a result of the defeat, new procedures were adopted whereby more Japanese aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment. More carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques, although the losses of theShōkaku,Hiyō, and especiallyTaihō later in the war suggest that there were still problems in this area.[172]
Japanese replacement pilots were pushed through an abbreviated training regimen to meet the short-term needs of the fleet, leading to a sharp decline in the quality of the aviators produced. These inexperienced pilots were fed into front-line units, while the veterans who remained after Midway and theSolomons campaign were forced to share an increased workload as conditions grew more desperate, with few being given a chance to rest in rear areas or in the home islands. As a result, Japanese naval air groups as a whole progressively deteriorated during the war while their American adversaries continued to improve.[173]
Three U.S. aviators were captured during the battle: Ensign Wesley Osmus,[174] a pilot fromYorktown; Ensign Frank O'Flaherty,[175] a pilot fromEnterprise; andAviation Machinist's MateBruno Peter Gaido, O'Flaherty's gunner.[176][177] Osmus was held onArashi; O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiserNagara (or destroyerMakigumo, sources vary); O'Flaherty and Gaido were interrogated and then tied to water-filled kerosene cans and thrown overboard to drown.[178] Osmus was murdered on theArashi.[174] The report filed by Nagumo tersely states that Osmus, "died on 6 June and was buried at sea";[179] O'Flaherty and Gaido's fates were not mentioned.[180] The execution of Osmus was apparently ordered byArashi's captain, Watanabe Yasumasa. Yasumasa died when the destroyerNumakaze sank in December 1943; had he survived the war he would have likely been tried as awar criminal.[181]
Two enlisted men fromMikuma were rescued from a life raft on 9 June byUSS Trout and taken to Pearl Harbor. After receiving medical care, at least one of these sailors cooperated during interrogation and provided intelligence.[182] Another 35 crewmen fromHiryū were taken from a lifeboat byUSS Ballard on 19 June after being spotted by an American search plane. They were taken to Midway and then transferred to Pearl Harbor onUSS Sirius.[183][184]
The Battle of Midway has often been called "the turning point of the Pacific".[186] It was theAllies' first major naval victory against the Japanese.[187] Had Japan won the battle as thoroughly as the U.S. did, it might have been able to capture Midway Island.Saratoga would have been the only American carrier in the Pacific, as no new ones were completed before the end of 1942. While the U.S. would probably not have sought peace with Japan as Yamamoto hoped, his country might have revivedOperation FS to invade and occupy Fiji and Samoa; attacked Australia, Alaska, and Ceylon; or even attempted to occupy Hawaii.[53]
Although the Japanese continued to try to secure more territory, and the U.S. did not move from a state of naval parity to one of supremacy until after several more months of hard combat,[188] Midway allowed the Allies to switch to the strategic initiative, paving the way for thelandings on Guadalcanal and the prolongedattrition of theSolomon Islands campaign. Midway allowed this to occur before the first of the newEssex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942.[189] The Guadalcanal campaign is regarded by some as a turning point in the Pacific War.[190]
Some authors have stated that heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy.[191] Parshall and Tully have stated that the heavy losses in veteran aircrew (110, just under 25% of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers)[192] were not crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrews at the start of the Pacific War.[193] The loss of four large fleet carriers and over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews, were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet.[194][nb 5] A few months after Midway, theImperial Japanese Navy Air Service sustained similar casualty rates in theBattle of the Eastern Solomons andBattle of the Santa Cruz Islands, and it was these battles, combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons campaign, which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.[194]
After the battle,Shōkaku andZuikaku were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still afloat. Of Japan's other carriers,Taihō, which was not commissioned until early 1944, would be the only fleet carrier worth teaming withShōkaku andZuikaku;Ryūjō andZuihō were light carriers, whileJun'yō andHiyō, although technically classified as fleet carriers, were second-rate ships of comparatively limited effectiveness.[195] In the time it took Japan to build three carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers.[196] By 1942 the U.S. was already three years into a shipbuilding program mandated by the 1938Second Vinson Act.[197]
Both the U.S. and Japan accelerated the training of aircrew, but the U.S. had a more effective pilot rotation system, which meant that more veterans survived and went on to training or commandbillets, where they were able to pass on lessons they had learned in combat to trainees, instead of remaining in combat, where errors were more likely to be fatal.[198] By the time of theBattle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, the Japanese had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in terms of numbers, but their planes, many of which were obsolete, were largely flown by inexperienced and poorly trained pilots.[nb 6]
Midway showed the worth of pre-war naval cryptanalysis and intelligence-gathering. These efforts continued and were expanded throughout the war in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Successes were numerous and significant. For instance, cryptanalysis made possible theshooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane in 1943.[200]
The Battle of Midway redefined the central importance ofair superiority for the remainder of the war when the Japanese suddenly lost their four main aircraft carriers and were forced to return home. Without any form of air superiority, the Japanese never again launched a major offensive in the Pacific.[202][page needed][203][page needed]
Because of the extreme depth of the ocean in the area of the battle (more than 17,000 ft or 5,200 m), researching the battlefield has presented extraordinary difficulties. On 19 May 1998,Robert Ballard and a team of scientists and Midway veterans from both sides located and photographedYorktown, which was located 16,650 ft (5,070 m) deep. The ship was remarkably intact for a vessel that had sunk in 1942; much of the original equipment and even the original paint scheme were still visible.[204] Ballard's subsequent search for the Japanese carriers was unsuccessful.
In September 1999, a joint expedition between Nauticos Corp. and theU.S. Naval Oceanographic Office searched for the Japanese aircraft carriers. Using advanced renavigation techniques in conjunction with the ship's log of the submarine USSNautilus, the expedition located a large piece of wreckage, subsequently identified as having come from the upper hangar deck ofKaga.
^The code names "Val", "Kate" and "Zeke", which are often applied to these aircraft, were not introduced until late 1943 by the Allied forces. The D3A was normally referred to by the Japanese asType 99 Navy dive bomber, the B5N as theType 97 Navy torpedo bomber and the A6M as theType 0 Navy fighter; the latter was colloquially known as the "Zero".[43]
^Other sources claim a stern hit, but Parshall and Tully make a case for a near miss, because of rudder damage from a high explosive bomb.[125]
^Parshall and Tully argue that even ifKaga had been towed back to Japan, the permanent structural damage caused by the inferno on board would likely have made the carrier unusable for anything exceptscrapping.[131]
^Japanese casualty figures for the battle were compiled by Sawaichi Hisae for her bookMiddowei Kaisen: Kiroku, p. 550: the list was compiled from Japanese prefectural records and is the most accurate to date.[7]
^Pre-war Japan was less mechanized than America and the highly trained aircraft mechanics, fitters, and technicians lost at Midway were all but impossible to replace and train to a similar level of efficiency. In contrast, the extensive use of machinery in the United States meant that a much larger portion of the population had a mechanical/technical background.[193]
^Shinano, commissioned on 19 November 1944, was only the fourth fleet carrier commissioned by Japan during the war, afterTaihō,Unryū, andAmagi.[199]
^abNimitz, Chester A. (Admiral) (28 June 1942).Battle of Midway, CINCPAC Report (Report).Archived from the original on 17 September 2017. Retrieved11 December 2020 – via HyperWar Foundation.
Buell, Thomas B. (1987).The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-562-0.
Chesneau, Roger, ed. (1980).Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press.ISBN978-0-85177-146-5.
Crenshaw, Russell Sydnor (1995).The Battle of Tassafaronga. Baltimore, Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America.ISBN978-1-877853-37-1.
Cressman, Robert J.; Ewing, Steve; Tillman, Barrett; Horan, Mark; Reynolds, Clark; Cohen, Stan (1990)."A Glorious Page in our History", Adm. Chester Nimitz, 1942: The Battle of Midway, 4–6 June 1942. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Pub. Co.ISBN0-929521-40-4.
Davidson, Joel R. (1996).The Unsinkable Fleet: the Politics of U.S. Navy Expansion in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-55750-156-1.
Ewing, Steve (2004).Thach Weave: The Life of Jimmie Thach. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-59114-248-2.
Isom, Dallas Woodbury (2007).Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.ISBN978-0-253-34904-0.
Lundstrom, John B. (1984).The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-59114-471-X.
Lundstrom, John B. (2006).Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.ISBN978-1-59114-475-5.OCLC62782215.
Miller, Donald L. (2001).The Story of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster.ISBN978-0-7432-2718-6.
Willmott, H. P. (1983).The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-59114-949-5.
Evans, David; Peattie, Mark R. (1997).Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-192-7.
Fuchida, Mitsuo;Masatake Okumiya (1955).Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN0-87021-372-5.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) A Japanese account; numerous assertions in this work have been challenged by more recent sources.
Hara, Tameichi (1961).Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York: Ballantine Books.ISBN0-345-27894-1.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) First-hand account by Japanese captain, often inaccurate
Holmes, W. (1979).Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Bluejacket Books). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-55750-324-9.
Kahn, David.The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet. New York: Scribner.ISBN0-684-83130-9. Significant section on Midway
Kernan, Alvin (2005).The Unknown Battle of Midway. New Haven, Connecticut:Yale University Press.ISBN0-300-10989-X. An account of blunders that led to the near-total destruction of the American torpedo squadrons, and of what the author calls a cover-up by naval officers after the battle
Smith, Douglas V. (2006).Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.ISBN1-59114-794-8.
Smith, Peter C. (2007).Midway Dauntless Victory; Fresh perspectives on America's Seminal Naval Victory of 1942. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime.ISBN978-1-84415-583-5. Detailed study of battle, from planning to the effects on World War II
Stephan, John J. (1984).Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.ISBN0-8248-2550-0.
Willmott, H. P. (2004).The Second World War in the Far East. Smithsonian History of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books. p. 240.ISBN1-58834-192-5.
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_aboard_USS_Hornet_(CV-8)%2c_circa_mid-May_1942_(NH_93595).jpg)
_on_4_June_1942_(80-G-41686).jpg)
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