Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Battle of Malplaquet

Coordinates:50°20′10″N3°52′35″E / 50.33611°N 3.87639°E /50.33611; 3.87639
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1709 Spanish Succession War battle

Battle of Malplaquet
Part of theWar of the Spanish Succession

The Battle of Malplaquet,Jan van Huchtenburgh
Date11 September 1709 (1709-09-11)
Location50°20′10″N3°52′35″E / 50.33611°N 3.87639°E /50.33611; 3.87639
ResultSeeAftermath
Belligerents
 France
Commanders and leaders
Strength
86,000 to 110,000 men, 100 guns[1][2]75,000 to 90,000 men, 80 guns[3][2]
Casualties and losses
c.22,000c.11,000
Map
Low Countries, Upper France and Upper Rhine
Germany
Italy and Southern France
Iberian Peninsula
Hungary
Naval battles

TheBattle of Malplaquet took place on 11 September 1709 during theWar of the Spanish Succession, nearTaisnières-sur-Hon inFrance, then part of theSpanish Netherlands. A French army of around 75,000 men, commanded by theDuke of Villars, engaged aGrand Alliance force of 86,000 under theDuke of Marlborough. In one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, the latter won a narrow victory, but suffered heavy casualties.

Allied advances in 1708 led to the renewal of peace talks, which collapsed in April 1709. After takingTournai in early September, the Alliesbesieged Mons, whose capture would allow them to enter France itself, andLouis XIV ordered Villars to prevent its loss. Although this proved impossible, he decided to fight anyway, and the two armies made contact on 10 September. Marlborough's attack was delayed until the next day, giving the French time to construct strong defensive positions.

After an opening artillery barrage, the Allied infantry made simultaneous assaults on the French flanks. These were intended to divert troops from their centre, weakening it sufficiently so it could then be broken by a mass allied cavalry charge. Although successful in previous battles, at Malplaquet the flank attacks incurred heavy casualties, while the French cavalry ensured their centre did not collapse. This allowed their infantry to retreat in good order, with the victors too exhausted to conduct a pursuit.

Most historians estimate Allied losses as about 22,000 killed or wounded, those of the French being around 11,000. These levels shocked contemporaries, and heightened internal divisions within the Grand Alliance over the wisdom of continuing the war. By saving his army, Villars ultimately enabled Louis to negotiate far betterpeace terms in 1713 than those available in 1709. However, it did little to change the immediate strategic situation; Mons surrendered shortly afterward and the Allied advance resumed in 1710.

Background

[edit]

By early 1709, theFrench state was bankrupt, while the severewinter of 1708–1709 caused widespread famine, with garrisons atTournai,Arras,St Omer,Valenciennes andCambrai all mutinying over lack of food and pay.[4] Desperate to end the war,Louis XIV initiated peace talks with theGrand Alliance inThe Hague. He accepted most of their terms, including replacing his grandsonPhilip V of Spain with theHabsburg candidateArchduke Charles, the principle for which they were ostensibly fighting. However, he and his ministers could not agree to the demand French troops be used to remove Philip, and talks broke down at the end of April.[5] When the 1709 campaign began, Louis orderedVillars, his commander in Northern France, to avoid battle and to prevent any further deterioration in the French position. Ordinarily an extremely aggressive general, Villars instead built defensive lines along theRiver Scarpe, running fromSaint-Venant toDouai.[6]

Battle of Malplaquet is located in Hauts-de-France
Douai
Douai
Tournai
Tournai
Mons
Mons
Ypres
Ypres
Malplaquet
Malplaquet
Saint-Venant
Saint-Venant
Boussu
Boussu
Le Quesnoy
Le Quesnoy
Key locations; modern French region ofHauts-de-France (dark green),Belgium (light green)

Convinced France was on the verge of collapse, the allies looked to keep up the pressure by advancing through the line of border fortresses known as theFrontière de fer. However, unlike France, whose strategy was ultimately determined by Louis XIV, theirs had to be approved separately by theBritish,Dutch andAustrian governments, which often required compromise.Marlborough, the allied commander, considered the positions held by Villars too strong for a frontal assault, and sincePrince Eugene of Savoy and the Dutch opposed his preferred option ofYpres, he agreed to make Tournai the main objective for 1709.[7]

Although persistent heavy rain caused further delays, on 15 June the allies began thesiege of Tournai, one of the strongest fortresses in France. The garrison of 7,700 surrendered on 3 September, and Marlborough immediately marched onMons.[8] Having assumed Tournai would hold out until October and thus consume the entire 1709 campaign season, Louis now ordered Villars to prevent the loss of Mons "at all costs...the salvation of France is at stake".[3] Despite this plea, Villars was too late to prevent the town being encircled on 6 September by thePrince of Hesse-Kassel, with an advance force of 60 squadrons and 4,000 infantry.[9]

Marlborough and Eugene did not expect Villars to risk a pitched battle anymore and resigned themselfs to another gruelling siege, but Villars, bolstered by his undefeated record, was confident that he could secure a victory that would shift the war in France's favour. Louis attempted to temper Villars' confidence with caution, suggesting that the difficult terrain warranted limiting operations to disrupting the siege but Villars was determined to force a battle.[10] The main Allied army arrived east of the town on 7 September, awaiting the arrival of their siege artillery from Tournai. Villars took up positions to the southwest on the 9th, leaving the two forces facing each other across the gap ofMalplaquet.[11]

Prelude

[edit]
Disposition of forces; allied (upper right), French (lower left)

While conscious of the implications of defeat, Villars informed Louis XIV his army would dissolve if he did not fight.[3] This decision gave him the advantage of choosing the battlefield, while his presence nearby prevented the allies from beginning the siege of Mons, since he could either launch a relief attack, or cut their supply lines toBrussels by crossing the Trouille River.[12]

On 9 September, Marlborough and Eugene struggled to assemble their widely dispersed forces amid heavy rain and confusion, only managing to form a battle line by the end of the day. Despite this Villars maintained his position, which has been criticised by some observers and historians, including theCharles Sevin de Quincy, who wrote that "if Marshal de Villars wanted to take advantage of the negligence of the enemy generals, he would obtain an assured victory without much difficulty."[13]

The allies themselves delayed their attack pending the arrival of 21 battalions from Tournai underHenry Withers. This decision was also criticised at the time and later, one analyst arguing "the battle should have taken place on 10 September, or not at all".[14] This gave Villars an extra day to construct defensive positions, includingearthworks covering the open ground in the centre, and additional entrenchments extending into the woods on either side.[3]

Marlborough's plan was the same as that employed atBlenheim,Ramillies andOudenarde. On each occasion, frontal assaults on the French flanks forced them to move troops from the centre, which was then broken by mass cavalry attacks. Although the leading units suffered many casualties, allied losses were substantially less than those they inflicted. At Malplaquet the French held strong defensive positions, were better led, and highly motivated.[15][a]

Villars had also learned from Ramillies, whereVilleroy arguably contributed to his own defeat by over-extending his line.[17] He was helped by the fact that the battlefield at Malplaquet was much more restricted, allowing him to concentrate his infantry in defensive positions. It also prevented Marlborough from quickly shifting troops between wings, a tactic he often adopted to keep opponents off balance.[18]

The French army consisted of 80 guns and 75,000 to 90,000 men,[2] including significant numbers of Bavarian andSwiss mercenaries, as well as theIrish Brigade. Villars commanded the left, de la Colonie led the centre, with the right, where Villars had placed the bulk of the infantry, led by 67-year-old MarshalLouis-François de Boufflers, who was senior to Villars in rank but volunteered to serve under him. The infantry held a continuous line of entrenchments supported by artillery, with the cavalry massed in the rear.[1]

The allied forces, in turn, ranged from 86,000 to 110,000,[2] with the right wing formed of 30,000 German and Danish infantry led by Prince Eugene. Marlborough positioned himself in the centre, where he placed 8,000 mostly British infantry commanded by theEarl of Orkney, with the bulk of the 30,000 cavalry to their rear.[19] Finally, the allied left was held by the Dutch, with 18,000 infantry under thePrince of Orange, plus 10,000 cavalry under the Prince of Hesse-Kassel. Control was exercised byCount Tilly, who had succeededLord Overkirk as senior Dutch commander.[b][22][20]

Battle

[edit]
Dutch troops at Malplaquet led by thePrince of Orange, byCharles Rochussen.

At 07:00 on 11 September, the battle opened with an Allied artillery bombardment. This ended at 08:30, when their right wing, led byCount Finckenstein,Lottum andSchulenburg, assaulted French troops based in Sars Wood. During three hours of fighting, both sides suffered many losses, while Prince Eugene was slightly wounded but refused to leave the field. Around 09:00, Dutch infantry underFrançois Nicolas Fagel, moved against the French right with 13 battalions, including Swiss mercenaries and theScots Brigade. When their initial attack was repulsed, the Prince of Orange andSicco van Goslinga sent another 17 battalions to support Fagel by attacking French positions around Blairon Farm.[23][24]

Although Blairon Farm was captured, the Dutch incurred over 5,000 casualties, including many senior officers.[25] Despite breaching the defensive line in several places, French reinforcements forced the Dutch back to their original positions, covered by their cavalry. Boufflers, in command of the French right, had over 60 battalions at his disposal, but made no attempt to launch a counterattack, a decision which has been criticised. For the next ninety minutes, action on this flank was limited to musket and artillery fire, with severe losses inflicted on the badly positioned eliteMaison du Roi cavalry.[26]

Pressure from Prince Eugene forced Villars to keep moving troops from the centre to prevent the collapse of his left wing. Withers and the detachment from Tournai arrived too late to support the Dutch, and were instructed instead to make a flanking move north of the French lines in Sars Wood. This manoeuvre took over two hours to complete, by which time the fighting had largely ended, but their approach forced Villars to reinforce his left with another twelve battalions.[27] By midday, nine French battalions and sixty cavalry squadrons in the centre faced twenty-three and eighty respectively.[28] In the early afternoon, Villars was badly wounded, and transferred command to Boufflers, with Puységur taking over the left.[29]

Battle of Maplaquet byLouis Laguerre; allied troops enter the French positions

Despite their losses, the Dutch assaults prevented the French right reinforcing their centre. This was now over-run by Orkney's infantry, while the Prince of Orange led another assault against the French right. The Dutch cavalry underGrovestins broke into the French rear, before being attacked by the Maison du Roi cavalry under Boufflers.[c] Superior numbers forced the Allied cavalry back, before the French in turn were repulsed by Orkney's infantry. The allies advanced once again, and engaged the French in what was the largest cavalry action of the 18th century.[31][32] As this unfolded, the French left finally started to crumble under pressure from Withers and Schulenburg.[33]

Puységur now ordered his troops to withdraw. Meanwhile, the Dutch infantry, after initially making some progress, had once again been repulsed. It was only when Grovestins’ cavalry threatened the French rear that they were finally forced to abandon their entrenchments.[34][d] At 15:00, when Boufflers realized that his cavalry was unable to resist for much longer, he ordered a general retreat towardsLe Quesnoy, some 25 km (16 mi) away, with the Allies too exhausted to pursue.[36][37][33]

Casualties

[edit]

Most commentators put Allied casualties between 21,000 and 25,000 killed or wounded,[38] 8,462 of which were incurred by the Dutch infantry on the left wing. Orkney later wrote their dead lay "as thick as ever you saw a flock of sheep."[39][33][e] Other estimates range from a low of 15,000[41] to a high of 30,000.[42] There is less consensus on French killed and wounded, which are generally put at between 11,000 and 14,000,[43][44] with upper estimates suggesting 17,000 killed or wounded, plus 500 prisoners.[f][39][46][47][g] The Allies also captured 16 French artillery pieces.[49]

Aftermath

[edit]
ThePré carré line on the French northern border, defended by a line of fortresses known as theCeinture de fer (marked in red and green); by the end of 1710, this line was badly compromised

Although horrified by the casualties, contemporaries considered Malplaquet a victory for the Grand Alliance, and most modern historians concur.[50][51][52] The French focused on the losses they had inflicted, Boufflers reporting to Louis XIV "...misfortune compels me to announce the loss of another battle, but I can assure your Majesty misfortune has never been accompanied by greater glory".[53] In a similar vein, Villars later wrote: "If God grants us the grace to lose such a battle again, Your Majesty can count on all of his enemies being destroyed".[54]

The Prince of Orange was left to oversee the siege of Mons, which surrendered on 21 October.[55] Despite this loss, in the long term Malplaquet arguably allowed Louis to negotiate far better terms atUtrecht in 1713 than those available in 1709.[56][57] When negotiations resumed in March 1710, the French strategic position was largely unchanged,[58] but Maplaquet accentuated Allied divisions over war aims and their associated cost.[h] Even before the 1709 campaign, Marlborough himself feltWhig demands of "No Peace Without Spain" were excessive.[60] In that respect, Malplaquet had less impact on British policy than Spanish successes the same year atAlicante andLa Gudina, which made prospects of victory there increasingly remote.[61]

Victory atVillaviciosa in December 1710 signalled the collapse of allied ambitions in Spain and accelerated peace talks

Before peace talks resumed in 1710, Marlborough wrote to the allied negotiators that "thanks to our victory..., you may have what peace you want".[62] This view was used on the loss of Mons, which exposed the French interior, while the losses incurred at Malplaquet meant they could only act on the defensive.[63] In spring 1710, the Allies resumed their advance almost unopposed; by September they had broken through the secondary line of the "Pré carré", capturing Douai,Béthune,Aire and Saint-Venant. Short of supplies, and with many regiments reduced to less than half their official size, Villars could not risk the last significant French field army in another battle.[64]

As a result, the immediate impact of Malplaquet was political rather than military. When peace negotiations resumed in March 1710 at Geertruidenberg, it was clear the mood in Britain had changed.[65] Although British losses were comparatively low,[i] Marlborough's domestic opponents used the heavy casualties to attack him.[67] Reluctance to continue fighting for what seemed marginal gains resulted in a landslide victory for theTories in the October1710 British general election, although they confirmed their commitment to the war to prevent a credit crisis.[68][j] Despite success in France, British opposition to continuing the war was strengthened by further defeats atBrihuega andVillaviciosa in December 1710 which confirmed Philip V as king of Spain, ostensibly the original cause of the war.[70]

Portraits of Eugene of Savoy, Marlborough and the Prince of Orange, byPieter Tanjé

The Dutch blamed their losses on Marlborough's tactics, Withers for not supporting their attack, and the Prince of Orange for continuing when it became clear the French positions were too strong.[71] Sicco van Goslinga, aDutch field deputy attached to Marlborough's staff, also faced criticism for granting his permission to fight the battle.[46] Suggestions by some British historians that the Dutch attack was only intended as a demonstration appear unlikely and Marlborough took full responsibility for not monitoring the Prince of Orange more closely.[72][73] AlthoughGrand PensionaryAnthonie Heinsius and several Dutchregenten felt Dutch losses justified more stringent peace terms, Goslinga argued they were to be expected, given the capture of Tournai and Mons, "two of the strongest fortresses in Europe", and victory in "one of the hardest battles ever fought".[71]

In April 1711, the Habsburg candidate for the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles, succeeded his brotherJoseph asHoly Roman Emperor. Since the British and Dutch viewed a union of Spain with Austria as unwelcome as one with France, this effectively undermined a key reason for continuing the war.[74] Although the capture ofBouchain in September 1711 removed one of the last significant obstacles to the Allied advance, the new British government had already secretly negotiated peace terms with Louis XIV, signing the Preliminary Articles of London on 8 October 1711.[75] Marlborough was soon replaced by theDuke of Ormonde, who was ordered to prevent any further offensive action by British troops.[76]

Legacy

[edit]

While the battle is now chiefly remembered by British and Dutch commentators for the casualties incurred, the French view it differently. At the beginning of the war, their army was considered the best in Europe, a reputation shattered by a series of defeats between 1704 and 1708.[77] Despite being a narrow defeat which did little to change the immediate strategic situation, Malplaquet is seen as more important than victory atDenain in 1712. Historian André Corvisier suggests its significance in French military history is primarily psychological. He argues 18th century authors viewed it as the point when the French army regained its confidence, while for those writing after the 1870Franco-Prussian War, it provided proof of French resilience and ability to recover from catastrophic defeat.[78]

A total of fourteen battalions of Swiss mercenaries fought in the battle, six with the French, including two ofSwiss Guards, and another eight with the Dutch. Malplaquet was the last action where Swiss mercenaries directly engaged one another untilBailén in 1808.[79]

Written many years later, a firsthand account of the battle is given in the bookAmiable Renegade: The Memoirs of Peter Drake (1671–1753).[80] An Irishman who served in various European armies, Drake fought with theMaison du Roi at Malplaquet and was captured after being wounded several times.[81] Another prominent Irish émigré,Féilim Ó Néill, was among those killed serving with the Irish Brigade.[82]

Cultural references

[edit]

In the Campion novel "Sweet Danger" by Margery Allingham, the clues to finding an important document involve an item referred to as The Malplaquet Drum.

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^One suggestion is that this was partly due to the mixing of regular troops with militia units who had not been demoralised by past defeats.[16]
  2. ^Tilly's anti-Orangist sympathies meant his largely pro-Orangist senior officers allegedly took their orders from the Prince of Orange and as a result seems to have had little influence on the battle.[20][21]
  3. ^According to Quincy,James Francis Edward Stuart, under the pseudonym Chevalier de St. George, rode with theMaison du Roi as a volunteer during this charge.[30]
  4. ^Sicco van Goslinga about the Dutch casualties: "Yesterday, the princes and generals saw [...] with horror how our men lay against the field fortifications and entrenchments, still in the rank orders as they had fallen. Our infantry is dilapidated and ruined [...] Tilly will draw up a list [of the dead and wounded] in accordance with the advice of the generals and colonels. [...] It does not suit us to jeopardise our Republic so many times [...], but the good Lord has preserved it, at the cost of a river of blood shed by the bravest people in the world."[35]
  5. ^The British lost 1,800 killed or wounded, although this excludes those serving in the DutchScots Brigade.[40]
  6. ^Dumont and Rousset de Missy relate that after the battle, it was agreed that 1,500 French wounded, who had been left behind during the retreat, would be consideredPrisoners of War until exchanged for an equal number of allied prisoners.[45]
  7. ^The estimate of 17,000 is supported by an intercepted letter from a French officer, who wrote: "...we had at least seven thousand killed on the battlefield, and more than ten thousand wounded."[48]
  8. ^In 1709,Parliament approved expenditures of £6.4 million, up from £5.0 million in 1706; by the end of 1710, these had doubled to £12.9 million.[59]
  9. ^Estimates suggest 600 dead, plus another 1,500 wounded.[66]
  10. ^Tory opposition to the war originated in foreign policy differences going back to the 1690s. Whigs viewed a Continental strategy as essential, while Tories favoured using theRoyal Navy to attack the trading interests of their opponents. The latter also considered European commitments overly expensive, and primarily of benefit to others, notably their Dutch commercial rivals.[69]

References

[edit]
  1. ^abLynn 1999, p. 332.
  2. ^abcdIvonina 2010, p. 174.
  3. ^abcdLynn 1999, p. 331.
  4. ^Lynn 1999, p. 328.
  5. ^Holmes 2008, p. 412.
  6. ^Lynn 1999, p. 330.
  7. ^Holmes 2008, pp. 417–418.
  8. ^Holmes 2008, p. 422.
  9. ^Dee 2024, p. 186-189.
  10. ^Dee 2024, p. 188-189.
  11. ^Holmes 2008, p. 423.
  12. ^Nimwegen 1995, p. 265.
  13. ^Dee 2024, p. 190.
  14. ^Burton 1968, pp. 134–135.
  15. ^Bergin 2001, pp. 138–139.
  16. ^Drévillon & Fonck 2017, p. 36.
  17. ^Chandler & Beckett 1996, p. 71.
  18. ^Burton 1968, p. 135.
  19. ^Holmes 2008, p. 426.
  20. ^abVan Lennep 1880, p. 280.
  21. ^De Graaf 2021, p. 153.
  22. ^Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 313.
  23. ^De Graaf 2021, pp. 159–174.
  24. ^Van Nimwegen 2020, pp. 314–315.
  25. ^Chandler 1996, p. 294.
  26. ^Wijn 1959, p. 531–533.
  27. ^Lynn 1999, p. 333.
  28. ^Chandler & Beckett 1996, p. 84.
  29. ^Holmes 2008, p. 431.
  30. ^Sevin de Quincy 1726, pp. 197, 202.
  31. ^De Graaf 2021, pp. 173–174.
  32. ^Wijn 1959, p. 544.
  33. ^abcHolmes 2008, p. 433.
  34. ^Wijn 1959, p. 537.
  35. ^De Graaf 2021, p. 184.
  36. ^Penant 2019, p. 222.
  37. ^Dee 2024, p. 213.
  38. ^Lynn 1999, p. 334;Holmes 2008, p. 433;Clodfelter 2017, p. 74;Chandler 1996, p. 265;Somerset 2012, p. 387.
  39. ^abVan Nimwegen 2020, p. 318.
  40. ^MacDowall 2020, p. 84.
  41. ^Thackeray & Findling 1998, p. 34.
  42. ^Delbrück 1919, p. 229.
  43. ^Lynn 1999, p. 334.
  44. ^Corvisier 1997, p. 1;Oury 2024, p. 108;Somerset 2012, p. 387.
  45. ^Dumont et al. 1729, p. 97.
  46. ^abWijn 1959, p. 543.
  47. ^Van Alphen et al. 2019, p. 95.
  48. ^De Vryer 1738, pp. 444–445.
  49. ^Wijn 1959, p. 541.
  50. ^Lynn 1999, pp. 334–335.
  51. ^Delbrück 1919, p. 325.
  52. ^Jenkins 2021, p. 220.
  53. ^Holmes 2008, p. 434.
  54. ^Anquetil 1819, p. 241.
  55. ^De Graaf 2021, pp. 186–187.
  56. ^MacDowall 2020, p. 89.
  57. ^Parrott 2001, p. 125.
  58. ^Onnekink & Bruin 2013, p. 65.
  59. ^Hattendorf 1987, p. 304.
  60. ^Bergin 2001, pp. 125–126, 140.
  61. ^Gregg 1980, p. 289.
  62. ^Lynn 1999, p. 336.
  63. ^Lynn 1999, p. 337.
  64. ^Lynn 1999, p. 338.
  65. ^Holmes 2008, p. 435.
  66. ^Somerset 2012, p. 387.
  67. ^Somerset 2012, pp. 386–387.
  68. ^Simms 2008, pp. 60–64.
  69. ^Shinsuke 2013, pp. 37–40.
  70. ^Kamen 2001, p. 101.
  71. ^abVan Nimwegen 2020, pp. 319–320.
  72. ^Chandler 1996, p. 261.
  73. ^Dee 2024, p. 204-205.
  74. ^Somerset 2012, p. 445.
  75. ^Bromley 1979, pp. 459–460.
  76. ^Somerset 2012, p. 471.
  77. ^MacDowall 2020, p. 23.
  78. ^Corvisier 1997, pp. 2–4.
  79. ^Z'Graggen 2018, p. 51.
  80. ^Drake 1960, pp. 163–170.
  81. ^Holmes 2008, p. 432.
  82. ^Instituto Português de Heráldica 2006, p. 391.

Sources

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]

External links

[edit]

Media related toBattle of Malplaquet at Wikimedia Commons

International
National
Other
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Malplaquet&oldid=1323821594"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp