| Battle of Makin | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theGilbert and Marshall Islands campaign of thePacific Theater (World War II) | |||||||
Soldiers of the US Army's 2nd Battalion, 165th Infantry, struggle to shore on Yellow Beach on Butaritari Island. | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Richmond K. Turner Ralph C. Smith | Seizo Ishikawa | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
27th Infantry Division193rd Tank Battalion 2nd Raider Battalion | Gilberts Invasion Special Landing Force | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 6,470 soldiers 3 escort carriers 4 old battleships 4 heavy cruisers 16 destroyers 9 transports & landing ships | 400 soldiers 400 Japanese and Korean labourers 3 light tanks 4 anti-tank guns 1 submarine | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 821 killed (755 Navy, 66 Army) 185 wounded 1 escort carrier sunk 1 battleship lightly damaged | 395 killed 17 soldiers captured 129 Korean labourers captured 1 submarine damaged | ||||||
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TheBattle of Makin was an engagement of thePacific campaign ofWorld War II, fought from 20 to 24 November 1943 onMakin Atoll in theGilbert Islands.
On 10 December 1941, three days after theattack on Pearl Harbor, 300 Japanese troops plus laborers of theGilberts Invasion Special Landing Force had arrived off Makin Atoll and occupied it without resistance. Lying east of theMarshall Islands, Makin was intended as an excellentseaplane base to protect the eastern flank of the Japanese perimeter from anAllied attack by extending Japanese air patrols closer to islands held by the Allies:Howland Island,Baker Island,Tuvalu, andPhoenix andEllice Islands.
Heavy aircraft losses and the disabling of fourheavy cruisers during thebombing of Rabaul meant that the original Japanese plan of a strike at the American invasion fleet by forces based atTruk in the nearbyCaroline Islands was scrapped. The garrisons at Tarawa and Makin were left to their fate.
On 17 August 1942, 211Marines of the 2ndMarine Raider Battalion under command of ColonelEvans Carlson and CaptainJames Roosevelt[1] were landed on Makin from two submarines,USSNautilus andUSSArgonaut. The Japanese garrison only posted 83 to 160 men under the command of a warrant officer. The Raiders killed many Japanese but ultimately, under heavy fire withdrew after losing 21 killed and 9 captured. The Japanese moved their prisoners toKwajalein Atoll, where they were later beheaded. One objective of the raid was to confuse the Japanese about U.S. intentions in the Pacific, but it had the effect of alerting the Japanese to the strategic importance of the Gilbert Islands and led to their further reinforcement and fortification.
After Carlson's raid, the Japanese reinforced the Gilberts. Makin was garrisoned with a single company of the5th Special Base Force (700–800 men) in August 1942, and work on both the seaplane base and coastal defenses of the atoll was resumed in earnest. By July 1943 the seaplane base on Makin was completed and ready to accommodateKawanishi H8K "Emily"flying boat bombers,Nakajima A6M2-N "Rufe" floatplane fighters andAichi E13A "Jake" reconnaissance seaplanes. Its defenses were also completed, although they were not as extensive as onTarawa Atoll—the mainJapanese Navy air base in the Gilberts. TheChitose and653rd Air Corps were detached and deployed here. While the Japanese were building up their defenses in the Gilberts, American forces were making plans to retake the islands.
The end of theAleutian Islands campaign and progress in theSolomon Islands, combined with increasing supplies of men and material, gave theUnited States Navy the resources to make an invasion of the central Pacific in late 1943. AdmiralChester Nimitz had argued for this invasion earlier in 1943, but the resources were not available to carry it out at the same time asOperation Cartwheel, the envelopment ofRabaul in theBismarck Islands. The plan was to approach theJapanese home islands by "island hopping": establishing naval and air bases in one group of islands to support the attack on the next. TheGilbert Islands were the first step in this chain.
In June 1943, theJoint Chiefs of Staff directed AdmiralChester W. Nimitz,Commander in Chief of thePacific Fleet (CINCPAC), to submit a plan to occupy theMarshall Islands. Initially both Nimitz and AdmiralErnest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, wanted to attack right into the heart of the Japanese outer defense perimeter, but any plan for assaulting the Marshalls directly fromPearl Harbor would have required more troops and transports than the Pacific Fleet had at the time. Considering these drawbacks and the limited combat experience of the U.S. forces, King and Nimitz decided to take the Marshalls in a step-by-step operation via theEllice and Gilbert Islands. The Gilberts lay within 200 miles (320 km) of the southern Marshalls and were well within range ofUnited States Army Air Forces (USAAF)Consolidated B-24 Liberator aircraft based in the Ellice Islands, which could provide bombing support and long-range reconnaissance for operations in the Gilberts. With those advantages in mind, on 20 July 1943 the joint Chiefs of Staff decided to capture the Tarawa andAbemama atolls in the Gilberts, plus nearbyNauru Island. The operation was codenamed "Operation Galvanic."
On 4 September, theU.S. 5th Fleet's amphibious troops were designated theV Amphibious Corps and placed under Marine Corps Major GeneralHolland Smith. The V Amphibious Corps had two divisions, the2nd Marine Division based inNew Zealand, and theU.S. Army's27th Infantry Division based inHawaii. The 27th Infantry Division had been aNew York National Guard unit before being called into federal service in October 1940. It was transferred to Hawaii and remained there for 1½ years before being chosen by Lieutenant GeneralRobert C. Richardson Jr., U.S. Army Commanding General in theCentral Pacific, for theGilbert Islands invasion. Captain James Jones (father ofJames L. Jones,Commandant of the Marine Corps 1999–2003), Commanding Officer ofAmphibious Reconnaissance Company, VAC performed a periscope reconnaissance of the Gilberts aboard the submarineUSSNautilus, establishing accurate accounts of the beachheads for the upcoming invasion.[2]
The 27th Infantry Division was tasked to supply the landing force, with one regimental combat team (the 165th Infantry Regiment, the famed"Fighting 69th" of the New York National Guard), reinforced by a battalion landing team (the 3rd Battalion,105th Infantry Regiment), supported by the105th Field Artillery Battalion and the193rd Tank Battalion, under Major GeneralRalph C. Smith, a veteran ofWorld War I who had assumed command in November 1942. He was one of the most highly respected officers in the U. S. Army of the time. In April 1943, the 27th Infantry Division had begun preparing for amphibious operations.
Planning for the 27th Infantry Division's role in "Galvanic" (the Army portion was codenamed "Kourbash") began in early August 1943, with Nauru Island in the western Gilberts as the original objective. Unlike the other objectives, Nauru was an actual island, much larger in size and more heavily garrisoned.
However, in September 1943 the 27th's objective changed. The difficulty of providing adequate naval and air support of simultaneous operations at Tarawa and the much more distant Nauru, plus lack of sufficient transport to carry the entire division required to take the larger, more heavily defended Nauru, caused Admiral Nimitz to shift the 27th's objective from Nauru to Makin Atoll, in the northeast Gilberts. The 27th Infantry Division staff learned the change of target on 28 September, scrapped the original Nauru plan, and began planning to capture Makin.[3]

The invasion fleet, Task Force 52 (TF 52) commanded by Rear AdmiralRichmond K. Turner, leftPearl Harbor on 10 November 1943. The landing force, Task Group 52.6, consisted of units of the 27th Infantry Division transported byattack transportsNeville,Leonard Wood,Calvert, andPierce;attack cargo shipAlcyone;landing ship dockBelle Grove; andLSTs −31, −78, and −179 of Task Group 52.1.
On the eve of invasion, the Japanese garrison on Makin Atoll's main island,Butaritari, numbered 806 men: 284 naval ground troops of the6th Special Naval Landing Force, 108 aviation personnel of the 802nd and 952nd Aviation Units, 138 troops of the 111th Pioneers, and 276 men of theFourth Fleet Construction Department andMakin Tank Detachment of 3rd Special Base Force (3Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks), all commanded by Lieutenant (junior grade)Seizo Ishikawa.[4][5] The number of trained combat troops on Makin was not more than 300 soldiers.
Butaritari's land defenses were centered around thelagoon shore, near the seaplane base in the central part of the island. There were two tank barrier systems: the west tank barrier extended from the lagoon two-thirds of the way across Butaritari, was 12 to 13 feet (4.0 m) wide and 15 feet (4.6 m) deep, and was protected by one anti-tank gun in a concretepillbox, six machine gun positions, and 50 rifle pits. The east tank barrier, 14 feet (4.3 m) wide and 6 feet (1.8 m) in depth, stretched from the lagoon across two-thirds of the island and bent westward with log antitank barricades at each end. It was protected by a double apron ofbarbed wire and an intricate system of gun emplacements and rifle pits.
A series of strongpoints was established along Butaritari's ocean side, with 8-inch (200 mm) coastal defense guns, three 37 mm anti-tank gun positions, 10 machine gun emplacements and 85 rifle pits. The Japanese expected the invasion to come on the ocean side of Butaritari, following the example of Carlson's raid in 1942, and established their defenses two miles (3.2 km) from where the raid had taken place. Without aircraft, ships, or hope of reinforcement or relief, the outnumbered and outgunned defenders could only hope to delay the coming American attack for as long as possible.
Air operations against Makin began on 13 November 1943, with B-24 bombers of theSeventh Air Force from the Ellice Islands.Grumman FM-1 Wildcat fighters escortedDouglas SBD Dauntlessdive bombers andGrumman TBF Avengers from escort carriersUSSLiscome Bay,USSCoral Sea andUSSCorregidor; followed by 8-inch (200 mm) support guns from fire support shipUSSMinneapolis and other war vessels. During thebombardment, a turret explosion on battleshipUSS Mississippikilled 43 sailors.
Troops began to go ashore at two beaches at 08:30 on 20 November. The initial landings on Red Beach went according to plan with the assault troops moving rapidly inland after an uneventful trip on the ocean side of the island. Their progress off the beach was slowed only by an occasional sniper and the need to negotiate their way around the debris and water-filled craters left by the air and naval bombardment. The craters in particular stymied tank support of the Red Beach forces by the light tanks of the 193rd Tank Battalion when the leadM3 Stuart light tank became partially submerged in a shellhole and blocked passage of all the vehicles behind it.

As the landing craft approached Yellow Beach from the lagoon, they began to receive small-arms and machine-gun fire from the island's defenders. The assault troops were also surprised to discover that even though they were approaching the beach at high tide as planned, a miscalculation of the lagoon's depth caused their small boats to go aground, forcing them to walk the final 250 yards (230 m) to the beach in waist-deep water. Equipment and weapons were lost or water-soaked, and three men were killed approaching the beach, mainly because the defenders chose to make their final stand farther inland along the tank barriers.
The U.S. invasion plan was conceived in the hope of luring the Japanese into committing most of its forces to oppose the first landings on Red Beach and thereby allow the troops landing on Yellow Beach to attack from the rear. The Japanese, however, did not respond to the attack on Red Beach and withdrew from Yellow Beach with only harassing fire, leaving the troops of the 27th Division no choice but to knock out the fortified strongpoints one by one. Reduction operations were hampered by the frequent inability to use heavy support weapons, including tanks, because of the danger of cross-fire. The commander of the 165th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Gardiner Conroy, waskilled in action by a Japanese sniper on the afternoon of the first day and was succeeded by Colonel Gerard W. Kelley.[6]
Two days of determined fighting reduced Japanese resistance. After clearing the entire atoll, Smith reported on the morning of 23 November, "Makin taken, recommend command pass to commander garrison force."[7]
The most difficult problem capturing Makin was coordinating the actions of two separate landing forces, made more difficult because the defenders did not respond as anticipated. The unsuitability of the narrow beaches for supply landing operations—which went undiscovered by pre-invasion reconnaissance—was also a severe handicap.
In the early hours of 24 November the escort carrier and flagshipUSSLiscome Bay was sunk by the Japanese submarineI-175, which had arrived near Makin just a few hours before. A single torpedo, launched as part of a torpedo spread byI-175, detonated theLiscome Bay's aircraft bomb stockpile, causing an explosion which engulfed the entire ship, causing it to sink quickly. The attack on theLiscome Bay accounted for the majority of American casualties in the Battle of Makin. Of the 916 crewmen ofLiscome Bay, 702 perished (54 officers and 648 enlisted men), including the flagship's admiral and task force group commander, Rear AdmiralHenry M. Mullinnix, CaptainIrving Wiltsie, and Pearl Harbor Navy Cross recipient Cook Second ClassDoris Miller.[8][9]
The loss of theLiscome Bay on the eve ofThanksgiving that year was caused by a few factors. Two destroyers of the destroyer screen,USSHull andUSSFranks, left the destroyer screen, leaving a gap in the screen. Also, the task force which included theLiscome Bay was not zigzagging. The Japanese submarineI-175 approached the task force undetected and fired a spread of torpedoes through the gap in the anti-submarine screen, one of which struck and sank theLiscome Bay.[10]
The complete occupation of Makin took four days and cost considerably more in naval casualties than in ground forces. Despite possessing great superiority in men and weapons, the 27th Division had difficulty subduing the island's small defense force. One JapaneseHa-Go tank was destroyed in combat, and two tanks placed in revetments were abandoned without being used in combat.
Against an estimated 395 Japanese casualties in action during the operation,[11] American ground casualties numbered 66 killed and 152 wounded, representing nearly 1.8 Japanese casualties for every American casualty, although a considerable number of Japanese casualties would have been incurred before the landing, due to naval and aerial bombardment. U.S. Navy losses were significantly higher: 702 deaths on theLiscome Bay, 43 killed in a turret fire on thebattleshipUSS Mississippi, and 10 killed in action with naval shore parties or as aviators, for a total of 755 naval deaths. The overall total of 821 American dead equaled double the number of men in the entire Japanese garrison.[12]
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