| Battle of Jalalabad | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part ofAfghan Civil War (1989–1992),Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes | |||||||||
  Jalalabad Battle of Jalalabad (1989) (Afghanistan) | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Afghanistan | Supported by: | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
|
| ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
|
| ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
|
| ||||||||
Civilian casualties: | |||||||||
TheBattle of Jalalabad (Pashto:د جلال آباد جګړه,Dari:نبرد جلالآباد) also known asOperation Jalalabad or theJalalabad War, was a major battle that occurred in the spring of 1989, marking the beginning of theFirst Afghan Civil War.[14] The battle broke out following thePeshawar-basedSeven-Party Union (an alliance of seven Afghanmujahideen groups also known as the Afghan Interim Government or "government-in-exile"),[8][15] supported by the PakistaniInter-Services Intelligence (ISI), attackedJalalabad, which was then under the administration of theSoviet-backedRepublic of Afghanistan.[8][10]
Although the mujahideen quickly captured theJalalabad Airport and Samarkhel, the former base of the Soviet66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, they were successfully recaptured by theAfghan Armed Forces.[16]
TheSoviet Union officially withdrew from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, marking the end of theSoviet-Afghan War. The war was fought between mujahideenguerilla groups (supported byPakistan, theUnited States, Saudi Arabia,China,Iran, and other nations) and the Soviet-backedDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan.[17][18] However, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which the mujahideen perceived as a "puppet government", remained in power after the withdrawal.
The Mujahideen were supported by Pakistani intelligence. ISI DirectorHamid Gul's stated goal was to establish amujahideen government in Afghanistan,[10] led byHezb-e Islami leaderGulbuddin Hekmatyar.[11][4] Analysts disagree as to whetherPakistan's Prime MinisterBenazir Bhutto was kept in the dark about theISI's plan to overturn Afghanistan[10] or was aware of the attack.[11] One analyst stated thatUnited States Ambassador to PakistanRobert B. Oakley was exhortating[clarification needed] this mujahideen attack.[11]
The Americans reportedly were motivated by their wish to humiliate theMarxists and send them out of Afghanistan "clinging to their helicopters" to avengethe fall of South Vietnam. Pakistan wished to establish a friendly government inKabul that would not supportBaloch andPashtun separatists in western Pakistan.[19] The plan was forJamiat-e Islami to close theSalang Pass, paralyzing the Afghan Government's supply lines.[20][21] The plan was to establish an interim government inJalalabad that would be recognized by western nations as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.[20]
On 6 March 1989, a private meeting was held by former PakistaniPrime MinisterBenazir Bhutto andISI officials, responsible for their strategy in Afghanistan, to discuss Hamid Gul's proposal to attackJalalabad. Bhutto, out of concern for the ISI's plan, invited the U.S. ambassador,Robert Oakley, to attend the meeting. Although Oakley had not received specific instructions from Washington, he attended the meeting. Various strategies were discussed, and former ISI directorHamid Gul promised Bhutto that Jalalabad would fall within a week. Bhutto later noted that Hamid Gul spoke so passionately and confidently that she believed Jalalabad might fall within 24 hours.[22][23] Steve Coll additionally states that the idea of attacking Jalalabad did not originate with the Mujahideen, rather, it was the Pakistani government, in collaboration with theCIA, that planned the attack and directed the Mujahideen to participate in the operation's execution.[22]
According toMustafa Hamid, an Egyptian journalist andAl-Qaeda member who had close connections toJalaluddin Haqqani,[8] claimed that the Arab fighters were positioned in a crescent-shaped line surrounding the city, extending from the Saracha line to the left of the main road up to the Jalozai area, covering a distance of about 15 kilometers. They had established approximately 30 posts or bases, with each post housing between 8 and 145 or 300 fighters. These positions were strategically aligned for the occupation ofJalalabad, and they launched a broad offensive against the city.[23]
Involved in the operation were forces of Hekmatyar'sHezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf'sIttehad-e Islami and Arab fighters totaling 14,000 men. Before the battle,Afghan Arab volunteers fromAl-Qaeda reportedly cut the corpses of surrenderingAfghan Army soldiers into pieces and displayed them to other units in the area.[24] General Syed Quddus, who wrote a book on his experiences during the battle, additionally claimed that thePakistan Army shelled the city for 4 months. Reports from the Afghan government additionally confirmed that the Mujahideen assault on Jalalabad was supported by rocket and artillery fire from Pakistan's11th Infantry Division. The intense rocket and artillery bombardments on Jalalabad, marked by their scale and severity, not only highlighted the actions of the aggressors but also necessitated the creation of underground shelters, commonly referred to as "bunkers." In response, Jalalabad quickly transformed into a network of bunkers, as local authorities inNangarhar Province recognised the importance of safeguarding civilians alongside defending the city. Faced with ongoing attacks from thePakistani Army and its jihadist affiliates, authorities prioritized the protection of Jalalabad's residents. Orders were issued permitting the use of trees from roads and public streets for shelter construction. Local councils, urban organizations, and members of thePeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (then referred to as theWatan Party of Afghanistan) coordinated efforts to provide medical services, food, water, and other essential supplies to the population. Within a week,Jalalabad had become an underground city, with daily life continuing under the constant threat of bombardment.[23]
The attack began on 5 March 1989, and went well at first for the mujahideen, who captured theJalalabad airfield before facing a counterattack.[25]: 138 On 7 March, an Afghan Army base in Samarkhel temporarily fell to the Mujahideen but was taken back by June, as well as the entire district in what would be known as the Siege of Samarkhel.[26] On the second day of the battle, according to a report from Chief of Staff Major General Asif Delawar, an estimated force of 10,000 mujahideen fighters, Pakistani, and Arab volunteers launched a coordinate three-pronged offensive towardsJalalabad. Supported by artillery and missile fire, the Mujahideen successfully breached the government's defensive positions, leading to the capture of the headquarters of the 11th Infantry Division. Notably, captured Afghan soldiers, prisoners of war, were executed by beheading by the Mujahideen.[27]
When government troops began to surrender, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the mainAfghan Army positions held by the 11th Division, which were protected bybunkers, barbed wire and minefields. The government troops received on intensive air support, as theAfghan Air Force flew 20 sorties a day over the battlefield.An-12 transport aircraft, modified to carry bombs, flew at high altitude out of range of theStinger missiles used by the mujahideen;cluster bombs were used intensively.[25]: 139 ThreeScud firing batteries deployed around Kabul, specifically the99th Missile Brigade, fired 25 missiles in support of the Jalalabad garrison.[28][better source needed]
Despite their lack of precision, these weapons had a significant effect on the morale of the mujahideen, who were unable to defend against them.[29][30] The Battle of Jalalabad is considered to be the most concentratedballistic missile campaign since theV2 Attacks onLondon during theSecond World War.[31][better source needed][30][better source needed]
By the middle of May, the mujahideen had made little progress against the defences of Jalalabad, and were running low on ammunition.[citation needed] In July, they failed to prevent theAfghan Army from retaking the army base in Samarkhel. Jalalabad remained under Najibullah's government control. The mujahideen suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties during this battle. Arab foreign fighters sustained over 300 casualties.[32] Approximately 12,000–15,000 civilians were killed, and 10,000 fled the conflict.[33] TheAfghan Army reported around 1,500 casualties during the battle.[34] Towards the end of the battle, theISI-backedHezb-i-Islami (led byGulbuddin Hekmatyar) launched an attackJamiat-e Islami forces inTakhar Province, resulting in the deaths of 36 ofAhmad Shah Massoud's commanders. In retaliation, Massoud pursued the perpetrators and sent them to face trial inPeshawar, where they were subsequently executed. BBC reporterJohn Simpson, who was temporarily embedded withJamiat-e Islami, was not allowed to film or be present during the operation to hunt the perpetrators under the orders ofAhmad Shah Massoud. Survivors considered men who died in the initial ambush as "lucky", as those of Massoud's men who were captured were subject tomutilation andtorture; having their eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off after having their limbs broken and beingdisemboweled.Gulbuddin Hekmatyar justified the treatment of the prisoners by saying actions like these happen all around the world and that every nation had factions with "slight differences".[35][36]
 | This sectionneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.(June 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Contrary to American and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that theAfghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of themujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders ofHekmatyar andSayyaf concluded truces with the government.[37]
Both the Pakistani and the American governments were frustrated with the outcome. As a result of this failure, GeneralHamid Gul was immediately sacked by Pakistani Prime MinisterBenazir Bhutto and replaced with GeneralShamsur Rahman Kallu as the Director-General of theISI. Kallu pursued a more classical policy of support to the Afghan guerillas.[29] In this respect he cut off the barrier that his predecessors,Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul had placed between the mujahideen and the American secret service, which for the first time had direct access to the mujahideen.[citation needed]
The former Pakistani spies, such as Gul, had argued that this gave the United States an opportunity to both undercut Pakistan's interests as well as to weave discord among the mujahideen (something which Pakistan's promotion of Hekmatyar had of course done as well).[citation needed]
With direct American access to the mujahideen – in particular that of the envoyPeter Tomsen, whose attitude towards independent Afghans was arrogant and arguably hostile in that he deemed them dangerous extremists without direct US supervision – any segment of mujahideen unity crumbled.[citation needed] Traditionally independent mujahideen leaders, such asYunus Khalis andJalaluddin Haqqani, who had tried to unite the mujahideen rivals Massoud and Hekmatyar, now moved closer towards Pakistan because of their suspicion of the United States' intentions.[citation needed] (See alsoHaqqani network).
Others, like Abdul Haq and Massoud, instead favoured the United States because of their tense relations with Pakistan.[citation needed] While Abdul Haq remained hostile towards the communist government and its militias, Massoud would go on to make controversial alliances with former communist figures.[citation needed] Massoud claimed that this was an attempt to unite Afghanistan, but his enemies such as Hekmatyar attacked him for this.[citation needed]
Hekmatyar's push was also supported by Pakistan, so that by 1990 there was a definite (if loose) pair of competing axes. One was promoted by Pakistan and included Hekmatyar, Khalis, Jalaluddin Haqqani and other mujahideen leaders who were unsympathetic to Hekmatyar. The competing axis was promoted by the United States and led by Massoud, but also including other leaders such as Abdul Haq who were unsympathetic to Massoud.[citation needed]
The government forces further proved their worth in April 1990, during an offensive against a fortified complex atPaghman. After a heavy bombardment and assault that lasted until the end of June, theAfghan Army spearheaded by Dostum's militia, was able to clear the mujahideen entrenchments.[32] During the final stages of the battle,Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin reportedly ambushedJamiat-e Islami fighters, killing 36 ofAhmad Shah Massoud’s fighters and 7 important commanders. Massoud retaliated and captured the perpetrators of the attack, fairly sending them off to partake in a trial inPeshawar, where they were executed.[35]
The defense of Jalalabad during the Afghan Civil War marked a turning point for the government against Mujahideen, Pakistani forces and volunteers fromAl-Qaeda. The city's defense was led by 40-year-old General Mangal, who was recognized as a "Hero of theRevolution". Mangal was additionally the Mayor ofNangarhar. Under his command, theAfghan Armed Forces successfully repelled the six-month siege onJalalabad, pushing the Mujahideen 8–20 miles from the city. By the end of June 1989, the government had also recaptured Samarkhel and the village's military base, putting an end to the Siege of Samarkhel. Army leaders proposed advancing into the region between Samarkhel andTorkham border crossing, both lightly defended by the retreating Mujahideen. The government prioritised consolidating its hold on Jalalabad in order to call for peace negotiations with theAfghan Interim Government.
As fighting diminished, the city began to recover. Schools, shops, and mosques reopened, streets filled with activity, and goods became available despite high prices listed as "$12 gasoline, imported cigarettes, cans of Dutchsoda and rolls of Chinese toilet paper". Bread, meat, fruit and vegetables were also in adequate supply, although they were twice as expensive compared to their prices inKabul. TheJalalabad Airport was opened in July, which allowed civilians who had fled to Kabul to return by boarding flights withAntonov An-32 aircraft, containing numerous women and children.Afghan Army personnel deployed to the airport reportedly had to prevent civilians hoping to return toJalalabad from climbing into the aircraft's rear loading ramp by using their rifle butts.
General Mangal framed the victory as "proof of the government's resilience" and reiterated calls for peace, with other civilians affected by the fighting criticizingAmerican and Pakistani support for the Mujahideen and calling on theUnited States to the end the war.[38]
| This sectionneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.(June 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Afghanistan
The Jalalabad operation was seen as a grave mistake by some mujahideen leaders such asAhmad Shah Massoud andAbdul Haq, who did not believe the mujahideen had the capacity to capture a major city in conventional warfare.[39]
Neither Massoud nor Abdul Haq have participated in the attack on Jalalabad.[40][41] Massoud claimed it was byBBC radio that he learned about the operation, although other sources allege 500 men fromJamiat-e-Islami took part in the beginning of the battle.[36] Massoud was tasked with closing theSalang Pass, but he advised against it, saying the plan was unsound and would risk the lives of his men, therefore refusing to take part.[42] Haq advocated the pursuit of coordinatedguerilla warfare that would gradually weaken the Afghan government and cause its collapse through internal divisions.[citation needed]
Abdul Haq was also quoted as asking: "How is that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military instructions from the Pakistanis, who never won one?"[33]Ahmad Shah Massoud criticized the go-it-alone attitude of Pakistan and their Afghan followers stating: "The damage caused by our (Mujahideen forces) lack of a unified command is obvious. There is a total lack of coordination, which means we are not launching simultaneous offensives on different fronts. As a result, the government can concentrate its resources and pick us off one by one. And that is what has happened at Jalalabad."[36]
Pakistan
Former Pakistani Minister of InteriorAitzaz Ahsan claimed that the civilian government knew about the "Jalalabad Operation" beforehand and opposed Hamid Gul's proposal but let the operation happen anyway.[12]
Foreign Fighters
Jihad magazine, anArabic propaganda magazine known for glorifying the achievements of theArab foreign fighters in Afghanistan, could not downplay the disastrous defeat at Jalalabad. In its report of the battle, the magazine reported the Afghan communist forces had rained down Scud missiles with two thousand-pound warheads on the Arab fighters resulting in the slaughter of more than a hundred Arab fighters, and that each fallen warrior was soon followed by another rocket taking down another jihadist.[citation needed]
In the account of the battle byOsama bin Laden, the founder ofAl-Qaeda, bin Laden claimed that the defeat at Jalalabad had inflicted greater casualties on the Arab fighters than they had sustained in the entirewar against the Soviets.[43]
The defeat in Jalalabad led to internal squabbles between Al-Qaeda andMaktab al-Khidamat.Ayman al-Zawahiri turned Osama bin Laden againstAbdullah Yusuf Azzam, accusing him of mishandling the MAK. Zawahiri accused Azzam of being a puppet of the United States and theSaudi Arabian monarchy. He distributed leaflets in Peshawar, depicting Azzam as a questionable Muslim and advising Arabs not to pray with him.[citation needed]
Azzam was later killed by a bomb in November of the same year. While the identity of Azzam's killer remains uncertain, it is possible that it was the work ofAl-Qaeda oral-Jihad affiliated jihadists operating in Pakistan, although bin Laden himself is unlikely to have been involved, as he was in Saudi Arabia at the time of the murder and still on (relatively) good terms with Azzam.[44] The assassination of Azzam has also been attributed toKhAD.[22]
It also is a setback to the U.S.-Pakistani policy that supports the guerrillas in their fight against the Kabul government of President Najibullah.
Casualties have been high on both sides. Government troops have been reduced by heavy guerrilla shelling and rocketing from 12,000 to 9,000, Western diplomats say....The Afghan Air Force is said to be taking advantage of the fact that, probably for the first time in the war, guerrilla forces are concentrated in static positions, which makes them easier bombing targets.
His commitment to jihad – to an Islamic revolution transcending national boundaries, was such that he dreamed one day the "green Islamic flag" would flutter not just over Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also over territories represented by the (former Soviet Union) Central Asian republics. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as the director-general of Pakistan's intelligence organization, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, an impatient Gul wanted to establish a government of the so-called Mujahideen on Afghan soil. He then ordered an assault using non-state actors on Jalalabad, the first major urban center across the Khyber Pass from Pakistan, with the aim of capturing it and declaring it as the seat of the new administration. This was the spring of 1989 and a furious prime minister, Benazir Bhutto – who was kept in the dark by ... Gul and ... Mirza Aslam Beg – demanded that Gul be removed from the ISI.
.svg)
.svg)
