| Battle of Hyelion and Leimocheir | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theByzantine–Seljuq wars | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Byzantine Empire | Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| John Komnenos Vatatzes | Atapakos † | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| Unknown | 20,000–24,000[1][2] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Unknown | Unknown (heavy) | ||||||
TheBattle of Hyelion and Leimocheir saw the almost complete destruction by theByzantines of a largeSeljuq Turk army. The Seljuq army had been raiding Byzantine territory in the Maeander Valley inAnatolia, and had sacked a number of cities. The Byzantine force ambushed the Turks at a river crossing.
Following EmperorManuel Komnenos's defeat at theBattle of Myriokephalon (1176) theByzantines failed to implement all the conditions, particularly the destruction of border fortresses, demanded by theSeljuq sultanKilij Arslan II as a prerequisite for a cessation of hostilities.[3] A substantial Seljuq cavalry army, includingTurcoman nomad auxiliaries, was dispatched into Byzantine territory, in theMeander Valley in westernAnatolia, on a retaliatory raid. A Byzantine army under the generalJohn Komnenos Vatatzes, the emperor's nephew, set out from Constantinople with instructions to intercept the Seljuq raiders.[4] Vatatzes was given two other generals as his subordinates, Constantine Doukas andMichael Aspietes, and was able to pick up reinforcements as his army moved through Byzantine territory.[5]
The date of the battle is unknown, it has generally been ascribed to the year 1177 on the basis of its position within the narrative ofNiketas Choniates.
The Turks, who had orders to ravage the Meander Valley as far as the sea-shore, sacked the Byzantine settlements ofTralles,Antioch, Louma and Pantacheir. As a result of these successes, they were loaded with plunder, including, rather poetically, water from the sea, an oar and shore sand.[6] These burdens would have drastically slowed their progress and lessened their tactical mobility. The Seljuq army was returning towards Turkish territory when it approached a "choke point" in its journey where the great eastern highway crossed the Meander River by way of a bridge (probably ruined or semi-derelict), near the villages, or forts, of Hyelion and Leimocheir.[7] The Byzantines had concealed themselves and were divided into two corps, separated by the river. They caught the Seljuq army in an ambush when it had partially crossed over the river, destroying it as a fighting force.[8]
The Byzantine light troops played a prominent role in the battle; posted on high ground they are described as raining missiles down onto the near helpless Seljuqs. Many of the Seljuq soldiers tumbled into the river and were drowned.[9] The Seljuq commander, known as "Atapakos" in Greek sources—evidently a bearer of the title ofAtabeg—tried to help his forces cross the river by rallying the most heavily armed of his cavalry and attacking the Byzantines. This attack having failed, he tried to save himself by swimming across the river with his horse. When he reached the opposite shore, however, he was killed by anAlan soldier of the Byzantine force.[10] Following the death of their commander the Seljuq troops fled in disorder, with a great number of them being drowned in the river; Choniates stating that only a few out of many thousands were able to save themselves. On the Byzantine side, the general Michael Aspietes fell; he was drowned in the Meander when thrown by his wounded horse.[11]
The battle was a significant Byzantine victory and demonstrated that their recent defeat at Myriokephalon had only a limited immediate effect on the empire's hold over its Anatolian possessions. The victory was followed up by punitive expeditions against the Turcoman nomads settled around the upper Meander Valley.[12]
The Byzantine strategy at this battle, ambushing a raiding army on its return journey when it would be slowed by plunder and captives, is exactly what had been prescribed in much earlierByzantine military treatises, such as theTactica ofLeo VI (886–912). This points to a retention by Byzantine commanders of knowledge of the successful military strategies of the past.[13]
The emperor Manuel died in 1180; his son and successorAlexios II Komnenos was a minor, and the empire was governed by a divided regency. Without the strong presence of Manuel, the military advantage in Anatolia reverted to the Seljuqs. Sultan Kilij Arslan invaded the empire in 1182, when Byzantium was distracted by thecoup d'état of Alexios's cousinAndronikos Komnenos, and following theSiege of Cotyaeum captured the towns ofSozopolis andCotyaeum.[14]