| Battle of Chawinda | |||||||
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| Part of theIndo-Pakistani war of 1965 | |||||||
 Sculpture showing the Indo-Pakistani War | |||||||
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 Pakistan |  India | ||||||
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| Pakistan's I Corps Cavalry units:
| India's I Corps Cavalry units:[7][8]
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TheBattle of Chawinda was a major engagement betweenPakistan andIndia during theIndo-Pakistani war of 1965 as part of theSialkot campaign. It is well known as being one of the largesttank battles in history since theBattle of Kursk, which was fought between theSoviet Union andNazi Germany inWorld War II.[14]
The initial clashes inChawinda coincided with theBattle of Phillora, and the fighting here intensified once thePakistani forces at Phillora retreated. The battle came to an end shortly before theUnited Nations Security Council mandated an immediateceasefire, which would formally end the hostilities of the 1965 war.[15][16]
The Sialkot campaign was part of the strategy ofriposte that India had devised to counter Pakistan's advances intoJammu and Kashmir (J&K).[10] It called for relieving Jammu by advancing from eitherSamba (in J&K) orDera Baba Nanak (in Indian Punjab) with a view to encircling the city ofSialkot along theMarala–Ravi Link Canal (MRL).[17][18][b]
The canal starts from the Marala Headworks on theChenab River close to Pakistan's border with J&K, and runs to the west and south of Sialkot, eventually draining into theRavi River near the town of Narang Mandi.
The GOC Western Command Gen.Harbakhsh Singh favoured launching the campaign from Dera Baba Nanak using the1st Armoured Division. But he was overridden by the Chief of Army Staff Gen.J. N. Chaudhuri, who created a newI Corps under the command of Lt. Gen. Pat Dunn for the purpose. It would operate from Samba.[22]
Gen. Dunn was given an assortment of units. In addition to the1st Armoured Division under Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh, he had:[23][24]
The new corps was still in the process of formation when the hostilities broke out in September 1965. Some of the units were also under-strength because of their forces being tied up elsewhere.[25] According to the Indian official history, the force contained 11 infantry brigades and 6 tank regiments.[26][c]
The Pakistani forces opposing the Indian thrust were part ofPakistan's I Corps under Lt. Gen.Bakhtiar Rana. Included in it were:[27]
The 15th Infantry Division was a mixed infantry and armour force, with four pairs of a brigade and an armoured regiment each. However, only one out of the four pairs (the 24th Brigade and 25th Cavalry) was in the conflict area when the Indian campaign started.[27] They were based in and around Chawinda. The 24th Brigade was commanded by Brig. Abdul Ali Malik and the 25th Cavalry was led by Lt. Col. Nisar Ahmed Khan.[28]
The 6th Armoured Division, normally based atGujranwala, was moved toPasrur in preparation for the war.[29] It had three cavalry regiments:10th Cavalry (also called the Guides Cavalry), the22nd Cavalry and the11th Cavalry.[30][31] The 11th Cavalry, along with the 4th Artillery Corps, was in Chamb as part ofOperation Grand Slam when the operations started. The units were recalled and deployed in the vicinity ofPhillora by 8 September.
Later reinforcements included the 8th Infantry Division and 1st Armoured Division.[citation needed]
The main striking force of theIndianI Corps was the1st Armoured Division, which was supported by the 14th Infantry and 6th Mountain divisions.Indian forces seized theborder area on 7 September 1965. This was followed by a short engagement at Jassoran in which the Pakistanis suffered losses in the form of about 10 tanks, consequently ensuring complete Indian dominance over the Sialkot-Pasrur railway.[32][failed verification]
Realizing the severe threat posed by the Indians in Sialkot, the Pakistanis rushed two regiments of the6th Armoured Division from Chamb, Indian-administeredJammu and Kashmir (located today in Pakistani-administeredAzad Jammu and Kashmir) to theSialkot sector to support the Pakistani7th Infantry Division fighting there. These units, supported by an independent tank destroyersquadron, amounted to about 135 tanks; 24M47 andM48 Pattons, about 15 M36B1s and the restShermans. The majority of theAmerican Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry under the command ofLieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmed Khan, which was sent toChawinda. Intense fighting around the village ofGadgor between the Indian 1st Armoured Division and the Pakistani 25th Cavalry Regiment resulted in the Indian advance being stopped.[citation needed]
The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division. At the time, only one Pakistani regiment was present in the area, and it was wiped out by the Indian 1st Armoured Division's thrust, spearheaded by the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade and a tank regiment attacking Gat. The bulk of the Indian 1st Armoured Brigade washurled towards Phillora.Pakistani air attacks caused significant damage to the Indian tank columns and exacted a heavy toll on thetruck columns andinfantry. The terrain of the area was very different from that of the area surroundingLahore, being quite dusty, and therefore the Indian offensive's advance was evident to the Pakistani 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillora road.[citation needed]
Indian forces resumed their offensive on 10 September 1965 with multiplecorps-sized assaults and succeeded in pushing thePakistani forces back to their base at Chawinda, where the Indian advance was eventually stopped. A Pakistani counterattack at Phillora was repulsed with heavy losses, after which the Pakistanis took up defensive positions. The situation for the Pakistanis at this point was highly perilous; the Indians outnumbered them ten to one.[citation needed]
However, the Pakistani situation improved as reinforcements arrived, consisting of two independentbrigades fromKashmir: the 8th Infantry Division, and more crucially, the 1st Armoured Division.[clarification needed] For the next several days, Pakistani forces repulsed Indian attacks on Chawinda. A major Indian assault involving India's 1st Armoured and 6th Mountain divisions on 18 September was repelled, with the Indians suffering heavy losses. Following this, on 21 September, the Indians withdrew to a defensive position near their original bridgehead,[where?] with the retreat of India's advancing divisions, all the offensives were effectively halted on that front.[33]
Pakistaniofficers vetoed the proposed counterattack, dubbed "Operation Windup", in light of the Indians' retreat. According to the Pakistanicommander-in-chief, the operation was cancelled due to the fact that "both sides had suffered heavy tank losses.… would have been of no strategic importance...." and, above all: "the decision... was politically motivated as by then theGovernment of Pakistan had made up their mind to accept [the] ceasefire and foreign-sponsored proposals".[10]
The battle has widely been described as one of the largest tank battles sinceWorld War II.[34] On 22 September 1965, theUnited Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an immediate andunconditional ceasefire from both nations.[15][35] The war ended the following day. The international military and economic assistance to both countries had stopped when the war started.Pakistan had sufferedattrition to its military might and serious reverses in theBattle of Asal Uttar and Chawinda, which made way for its acceptance of the United Nations ceasefire.[5]
Following the end of hostilities on 23 September 1965,India claimed to have held about 518 km2 (200 sq mi) of Pakistani territory in theSialkot sector (although neutral analyses put the figure at around 460 km2 (180 sq mi) of territory), including the towns and villages ofPhillora, Deoli, Bajragarhi, Suchetgarh, Pagowal, Chaprar, Muhadpur and Tilakpur. These were all returned to Pakistan after the signing of theTashkent Declaration in January 1966.[36][37][2]
Battle of Chawinda − Indo Pak War 1965 − Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Tarapore (2018) is an IndianTV documentary which premiered onVeer by Discovery India.[38][39]
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