TheBattle of Berlin (November 1943 to March 1944) was a bombing campaign againstBerlin byRAF Bomber Command, along with raids on other German cities to keep German defences dispersed and which was a part of thebombing of Berlin during thestrategic bombing of Germany in the Second World War. Air Chief MarshalArthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Bomber Command, believed that "we can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF come in with us. It will cost us between 400 and 500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war".[3]
Harris could expect about 800 serviceable heavy bombers for each raid, equipped with new and sophisticated navigational devices such asH2S radar. TheUnited States Army Air Forces (USAAF), having recently lost many aircraft in attacks onSchweinfurt, did not participate. The Main Force of Bomber Command attacked Berlin sixteen times but failed in its object of inflicting a decisive defeat on Germany. TheRoyal Air Force lost more than 7,000 aircrew and 1,047 bombers, (5.1 per cent of the sorties flown); a further 1,682 aircraft were damaged or written off.[4] On 30 March 1944, Bomber Command attackedNuremberg with 795 aircraft, 94 of which were shot down and 71 were damaged.[5] TheLuftwaffeI. Jagdkorps recorded the loss of 256night fighters from November 1943 to March 1944.[2]
TheLuftwaffe retaliated withUnternehmen Steinbock (Operation Capricorn) againstLondon and other British cities from January to May 1944. TheLuftwaffe managed to assemble a force of 524 bombers butSteinbock caused little damage for the loss of 329 aircraft, a greater percentage loss per raid and in total than that suffered by Bomber Command over Germany.[6] There were many other airraids on Berlin by the RAF, the USEighth Air Force and Soviet bombers. The RAF was granted abattle honour for the bombardment of Berlin by aircraft of Bomber Command from 1940 to 1945.[7]
In 1942 some answers to the chronic problems of night navigation and target finding suffered by Bomber Command began to emerge but the number of bombers had stagnated. In November 1941 Bomber Command had a daily average of 506 bombers available and in January 1943 the average was 515. To carry out thethousand-bomber raids, Bomber Command drew on crews and aircraft from theOperational Training Units, a practice that could not become routine because of its disruption of the training system. Navigation had been helped by the introduction ofGee but this device lacked accuracy for bombing through the dark and smog of the Ruhr, lacked range and from 4 August 1942 the Germans began tojam the device.[8] ThePathfinder Force (PFF) was established on 15 August 1942 but with Gee jammed and notarget indicator bombs to mark the aiming point for the rest of the bombers (the Main Force), the task of the PFF varied from thankless to impossible. Despite its problems, Bomber Command had been able to achieve some spectacular results but these had been isolated events and due to favourable circumstances as well as judgement. The loss of 1,404 aircraft and 2,724 damaged to German night defences of increasing quantity and quality, especially Germannight fighters (Nachtjäger) had become a serious threat to the viability of the command and of strategic bombing as a theory of war.[8]
In 1942 Bomber Command had created 19 new squadrons but 13 had been transferred to other commands. The quantity of aircraft had barely increased but a big improvement in quality had been achieved.Bristol Blenheim light bombers andArmstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bombers had been retired from the command in mid-1942, followed by theHandley Page Hampden medium bomber in September. The disappointments of theShort Stirling and the earlyHandley Page Halifax variants and the fiasco of theAvro Manchester, withdrawn in June 1942, was balanced by theAvro Lancaster, which made its operationaldébut in March and demonstrated its superiority over all other bombers.[9][a] Re-equipment with new types of aircraft led to an average of 16.36 per cent of Bomber Command squadrons withdrawn from operations for conversion onto new aircraft in 1942, against 3.3 per cent in 1943. On 1 January 1942 the command had 48 squadrons, 9 with heavy bombers, 34 with medium and five with light bombers (Blenheims). On 1 January 1943, there were 49 squadrons, 32 heavy, 11 medium and six light (de Havilland Mosquito). The command had flown 30,508 operational sorties in 1941 and dropped 31,646long tons (32,154 t) of bombs, in 1942 it dropped 45,501 long tons (46,231 t) from 29,929 sorties.[10]
GEE airborne equipment, with the R1355 receiver on the left and the Indicator Unit Type 62A on the right.
Gee worked by wireless signals transmitted from three ground stations in England, on a line about 200 mi (320 km) long, being displayed on a cathode ray tube to the navigator and placed on a Gee chart, giving a fix of the aircraft's position in less than a minute. Accuracy varied from 0.5 to 5 mi (0.80 to 8.05 km) and Gee had a range of 300–400 mi (480–640 km), accuracy falling with distance. Gee worked well as a homing device but early hopes of it being accurate enough for blind bombing were not realised. Crews appreciated the value of the apparatus for navigation on the return journey, removing the fear of flying into hills and other obstructions. By August 1942, 80 per cent of the bomber force was equipped and 100 per cent by January 1943.[11]
Coverage of the Ruhr was known as the eastern chain and later northern and southern chains were added. Gee was usually ineffective east of the Ruhr and was easy to jam, which began on 4 August 1942, from when Gee fixes were only obtainable over the North Sea and parts of France. Gees loss of accuracy with distance made it a better target-finding device forLuftwaffe raiders over Britain. The signals were encoded to prevent German use but this made it harder for Bomber Command navigators to get Gee fixes. Anti-jamming devices were short-lived in effectiveness as the Germans quickly overcame them but Gee Mk II was easier for navigators to use.[11]
Oboe was a blind-bombing device controlled by two ground stations in England which measured the distance of an aircraft from them with radar pulses. the ground station known as Cat tracked the aircraft over the target and the ground station known as Mouse calculated the point on the track where the aircraft should bomb. Oboe transmissions did not follow thecurvature of the Earth, making the altitude of the aircraft the determinant of range. An aircraft flying at 28,000 ft (8,500 m) could receive Oboe transmissions at about 270 mi (430 km), enough to mark targets in the Ruhr, which led to the device being installed in fast, high-flying Mosquito bombers, which usually navigated with the usual aids until beginning an Oboe run about 10 mi (16 km) from the target. Use of the Mosquito made an Oboe run safer, even when no evasive action could be taken before bombing. Accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards which increased with greater experience of the aircrews and ground operators.[12]
Oboe could be jammed and suffer interference fromMonica and other Bomber Command devices. Oboe Mk I operated on a frequency of 1.5 metres, K Oboe was in general use from mid-June 1943 and was free from jamming. Centimetric Oboe Mk II and Mk III retained the effectiveness of Oboe until the end of the war but are beyond the scope of this article; rushing Oboe Mk I into service delayed Mk II but jamming did not begin until August 1943. Cat and Mouse stations could handle only one aircraft at a time and a marking run took ten minutes, allowing six bomb- or marker-runs per hour. The illumination from a Target Indicator bomb usually lasted for six minutes, guaranteeing four-minute gaps in marking. A failed marking run increased the gap to fourteen minutes. The introduction of multi-channel control and more ground stations eventually increased the concentration of Oboe marking. From the introduction of Oboe in December 1942 until the end of the war, Oboe aircraft made 9,624 sorties on 1,797 raids.[13]
By 1943, for the first time since day bombing was abandoned in 1940, Bomber Command was released from the constraints occasioned by the adoption of night bombing. The tactical use of the new devices was developed quickly but the new equipment had limitations. Oboe had a range which was little beyond the Ruhr and research on repeater aircraft to extend its range was stopped because H2S was expected to be a better system and only a few aircraft could use the device simultaneously; although Oboe had the potential for a vast improvement in target finding, it was not of pinpoint accuracy. H2S could be installed on any aircraft but was complicated, difficult to use and emitted radiation which could be detected, paradoxically exposing the aircraft to interception. Gee remained useful as a means of navigation on return journeys but required development to overcome German jamming.[14]
German searchlights and a Target Indicator (on the right) light up Berlin
The Target Indicator bomb (TI) was an aerodynamic metal case which ejected coloured pyrotechnic candles at a set height by a barometric fuze. If set to ignite immediately they made a cascade. When sky marking, the candles were on parachutes and if fuzed for ground burst, they created a pool of coloured fire. The usual 250 lb (110 kg) TI covered an area on the ground of about 100 yd (91 m) and a ground burst TI contained some candles which were explosive, to deter attempts to extinguish them. The TI was introduced on the night of 16/17 January 1943 and was a great success, making pathfinding a practical operation of war.[15]
H2S was a device for navigation and blind bombing by radar. The emissions of the radar were reflected and received as echoes which were distinctive of the earth below. Built-up areas returned echoes different from fields and forests, land echoes could be distinguished from the sea and sea echoes from those of a ship. The radar had a scanner which swept vertically and the echoes were detected by a receiver and displayed on acathode-ray tube, with a sweep rotating at the same speed as the scanner, giving an impression of the earth below. The contrast between water and land made coasts, lakes and rivers particularly recognisable. Towns also stood out and sometimes railway lines, from which the navigator could determine his position. When closer to the target, if it was recognisable, an H2S bombing run could be made; if the target could not be distinguished the bomber could make a timed run from a landmark in the vicinity. Since the device was airborne its range was limited only to that of its aircraft. The apparatus was limited by echoes from towns and cities, which were harder to distinguish than those from countryside and town.[16]
H2S was inferior to Oboe for blind bombing except on coastal targets likeHamburg. Being a transmitter, H2S disclosed itself to the Germans as soon as enough parts had been recovered from shot-down bombers to analyse its characteristics. German detectors could find a bomber stream and direct night-fighters into it. Once Bomber Command began to use centimetric H2S in January 1943, it was inevitable that the Germans would retrieve one from a crashed bomber and realise that it was similar toair-to-surface-vessel radar (ASV) used by Coastal Command to detect surfaced submarines. In October 1943, the Germans introduced theNaxos radar detector in night-fighters and U-boats. By mid-January 1943, only 10 Halifax bombers and 13 Stirlings carried H2S; the rate of production was slow and by May 1943, no more than 18 H2S-equipped bombers had participated in one raid; by August, 840 H2S sets had been manufactured.[17]
Messerchmitt Bf 110G-4 night fighter on display at RAF Hendon
The threat of Anglo-American strategic bombing had been a concern to German strategists since 1940 at the latest. After theFall of France, a belt ofFreya radar stations was built to give early warning of aircraft entering German-controlled airspace, fromDenmark south toSwitzerland. Freya lacked the accuracy needed for ground-controlled interception of aircraft and was supplemented later in 1940 byWürzburg radar stations which were accurate enough to guide FlaK and night fighters, aWürzburg-guided FlaK battery shooting down a bomber in September 1940. In OctoberOberst (Colonel)Josef Kammhuber established three night-fighter zones on the approaches to the Ruhr. The zones were 56 mi (90 km) long and 12 mi (19 km) wide, with a battalion of searchlights and twoWürzburg radars in each.[18]
A night-fighter could be guided to within 55 yd (50 m) of an aircraft and then attack when the aircraft was illuminated by the searchlights, a procedure calledHelle Nachtjagd (Henaja [Illuminated night fighting]). Forward zones were established along the coast, without searchlights, known asDunkel Nachtjagd (Dunaja [Dark Nightfighting]). The system lacked effectiveness on cloudy nights, the range of theWürzburg radar [6–31 mi (9.7–49.9 km)] was too short and it could notIdentify friend or foe, which led occasionally to attacks on friendly night fighters; some night fighter crews disliked ground control for the loss of flexibility. The German system had not been centralised to sift the information provided by radar, searchlights, wireless interception and direction finding to co-ordinate FlaK and night-fighters. To the end of 1940, the new system was credited with the shooting down of 42 bombers by night fighters and 30 by FlaK.[18][b]
Map of a section of theKammhuber Line stolen byAgent Tegal
The system was extended with a line ofHenaja about 20 mi (32 km) wide which, by March 1941, ran 430 mi (690 km) from the Danish–German frontier toMaubeuge in France. AnotherHenaja belt 45 mi (72 km) long was built betweenFrankfurt andMannheim later in the year. ThreeWürzburg guided the searchlights to illuminate bombers as they entered the zone.Dunaja were extended in circumference and the chain was extended along the coasts of France and the Low Countries and around Berlin. Late in 1941 an improvedWürzburg with a 50 mi (80 km)-range and theSeeburg plotting table (Seeburg-Tisch) came into service. Kammhuber used the new equipment to revise the night defence system by increasing the width ofHenaja from 25–60 mi (40–97 km) withDunaja in front of them. Kammhuber intended to introduceDunaja behind theKammhuber Line, placedFreya stations on either side and installed master searchlights. The system was introduced in September but proved to be too complex and the number of interceptions decreased.[20]
In the spring of 1942 the depth of the belt of searchlights was reduced to 6 mi (9.7 km) and widened to 12 mi (19 km). A newKonaja (combined) method was intended to counter the new and faster four-engined bombers coming into service with Bomber Command but the risk of the FlaK shooting down night-fighters was too great and the system was a failure. In 1941, Bomber Command losses rose to 3.6 per cent from the 2.9 per cent of 1940. During a raid on Berlin on the night of 7/8 November, 12.4 per cent of the 169 bombers were shot down. The night-fighter force shot down 433 bombers and by the end of the year, nineGruppen and oneStaffel were in action. The confused and overlapping jurisdictions of the German defence against night attacks were exacerbated by the lack of effectiveness of the British night bomber offensive and this complacency was not shaken by the declaration of war on the United States in December.[20]
Because of the diversion of night-fighters to theEastern front and the Mediterranean, by February 1942, there were 265 night-fighters in the west, of an establishment of 367, only half of which were operational.[21] The British resorted to a deliberate campaign ofarea bombing which immediately increased the amount of destruction achieved by Bomber Command. The bomb tonnage increased from 37,000 long tons (38,000 t) in 1941 to 50,000 long tons (51,000 t) in 1942. The German night defence was not prepared for the change in British methods and the introduction of GEE, the first night navigation aid. The British ended the individual timing of bomber sorties in favour of the concentration of all the bombers in space and time, which made most of the Kammhuber Line redundant, leaving only a few fighters able to attack the bombers. On the 1,000-bomber raid on Cologne, the bombers spent only two hours over Europe, the stream was 18 mi (29 km) wide and only 25 night-fighters could engage the bombers, just over ten per cent of the total; bomber losses fell from 3.6 to 3.0 per cent.[22] In 1942, Bomber Command had been able to inflict considerable damage on several occasions but had failed consistently to disrupt the German war economy.[23]
During 1942, the night-fighter command organisationFliegerkorps XII abolished itsNachjagddivision for threeJagddivisionen on 1 May and by February 1943, 477 night-fighters were available from an establishment of 653, of which 330 were operational, double that of 1942, 90 per cent of which were in the west. Nearly all of the night-fighters carriedLichtenstein, anaircraft interception (AI) radar, with a maximum range of 3,000 yd (2,700 m) and a minimum range of 20 yd (18 m), sufficient to track a bomber after ground control had brought the night-fighter to within 2 mi (3.2 km). Despite the weight of the apparatus and aerodynamic penalty of its aerial array causing a loss of at least 25 mph (40 km/h) in speed, night-fighter interceptions increased to the extent that searchlight illumination was made redundant and the lights were transferred to the local FlaK units around cities. By June the Kammhuber Line had been extended southwards towards Paris and northwards to the north coast of Denmark.[24]
Kammhuber refused to allow night-fighters to roam freely but made the line more flexible, by deepening theDunaja zone to 124 mi (200 km) either side of theHenaja to exploit the increased range ofFreya andWürzburg, which created theHimmelbett system. In each sector, oneWürzburg tracked the bomber and another the night-fighter until it was close enough for the crew to use itsLichtenstein AI for the attack. A zone was limited to one night-fighter but they overlapped by 50 per cent, enabling three night-fighters to operate in one area. GEE was jammed from August, limiting its usefulness to no further than the European coast. Much of the airspace of Europe remained undefended and bomber streams made all but a few night-fighters ineffective, which limited the capacity of German night defences to shoot down no more than about 6 per cent of Bomber Command sorties.[24]
88 mm FlaK battery in firing position
The German night defences managed to shoot down 687 bombers in 1942, 63 per cent more than in 1941 for a loss of 97 night-fighters, 63 per cent more than in 1941 and on 10 SeptemberFliegerkorps XII shot down its 1,000th bomber, 649 byDunaja, 200 byHenaja, 140 by intruder operations over Britain and 11 bombers crashed after being blinded by searchlights. Night-fighters and FlaK were shooting down an average of 5.6 per cent of Bomber Command aircraft per raid by the autumn. The performance of FlaK also showed an improvement, from July to August 1942, Bomber Command reported the loss of 696 bombers, 269 thought to have been destroyed by night-fighters, 193 by FlaK and 334 loses to unknown causes; 1,394 aircraft were damaged, 153 were hit by night-fighters and 941 by FlaK.[25]
By the end of the year, theLuftwaffe had faced 77,500 night sorties, shooting down 2,859 bombers, a rate of 3.6 per cent and damaged far more bombers. In 1940 Bomber Command lost a bomber crashed in Britain for every 32 sorties and in 1942 the rate had increased to one in twenty. To the end of 1942, theLuftwaffe had dropped 67,000 long tons (68,000 t) of bombs on Britain and the RAF had dropped 78,579 long tons (79,840 t) on Germany and 22,537 long tons (22,899 t) on the occupied territories. According to post-war research by the Allies, bombing cut German production by 0.7 to 2.5 per cent in 1942, compared to the devotion of 33 per cent of the British war economy to the bomber offensive.[25]
Despite the big increase in the German anti-aircraft effort, such concern for the future as existed did not prevent 150 FlaK batteries from being transferred to Italy. Only theGeneralluftzeugmeister,Erhard Milch, in charge ofLuftwaffe aircraft production, foresaw the crisis that would ensue if fighter output was not given greater emphasis. The advent of British four-engined bombers had increased by 70 per cent the bomb tonnage carried by Bomber Command. Milch predicted that the Anglo-American air fleets would swamp the German air defences and destroy the war economy. On 21 March 1942, Milch advocated toReichsmarshallHermann Göring, commander in chief of theLuftwaffe andHans Jeschonnek, the chief of staff ofOberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air Force) the creation of an air umbrella. Milch told Goering that his target of 360 new fighters per month would be insufficient even if it were increased to 3,600, which Jeschonnek dismissed by saying that he would not know what to do with 360 new fighters a month.[26] During the spring of 1943, the Germans increased the ground anti-aircraft defences in the Ruhr; by July there were more than 1,000 large FlaK (anti-aircraft guns of88 mm or larger) and 1,500 lighter guns (most being20 mm and37 mm) about a third of the anti-aircraft guns in Germany, which needed 600,000 men, women and boys to operate.[27]
The first Bomber Command raid of the battle occurred on the night of18/19 November 1943. Berlin was attacked by 440 Lancaster heavy bombers of the Main Force and four de Havilland Mosquitos but the city was under cloud and the damage was not severe. The second raid by the Main Force took place on the night of 22/23 November. This was the most effective raid on Berlin by the RAF of the war, causing extensive damage to the residential areas west of the centre,Tiergarten andCharlottenburg,Schöneberg andSpandau. Because of dry weather, severalfirestorms ignited. The ProtestantKaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, now a war memorial and theNew Synagogue (used as a store house by theWehrmacht) were badly damaged in the raid.[28][29]
On 17 December, extensive damage was done to the Berlin railway system. By this time the cumulative effect of the bombing campaign had made more than a quarter of Berlin's living accommodation unusable. There was another Main Force raid on the night of 28/29 January 1944, when the western and southern districts were hit in the most concentrated attack of this period. On 15/16 February, important war industries were hit, including the largeSiemensstadt area in the west, with the centre and south-western districts receiving most of the damage. This was the largest raid by the RAF on Berlin; the campaign continued until March 1944.[30][31][32]
In 1961, the British official historians,Charles Webster andNoble Frankland wrote that Bomber Command sent16 raids comprising9,111 sorties against Berlin. The attacks cost492 aircraft, their crews killed or captured and954 aircraft damaged, a rate of loss of 5.8 per cent, exceeding the 5 per cent threshold that was considered by the RAF to be the maximum sustainable operational loss rate.[33] The Battle of Berlin diverted German military resources from the land war and had an economic effect in physical damage, worker fatalities and injuries, relocation and fortification of industrial buildings and other infrastructure but by 1 April 1944, the campaign had failed to force a German capitulation,
...in the operational sense the Battle of Berlin was more than a failure, it was a defeat....The Battle of Berlin compared unfavourably with the preceding Battles of theRuhr and ofHamburg and the campaign on the road to Berlin.[34]
In 2005, Kevin Wilson wrote that, despite the devastation of Berlin, the British raids failed to achieve their objectives. The bombing prevented increases in German production and caused resources to be diverted from offensive to defensive purposes but German civilian morale did not break. The Berlin defences and essential services were maintained and war production in greater Berlin did not fall.[35]
In 2006,Adam Tooze, an economic historian, wrote that the British bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 appeared to vindicate the hopes of the British leaders in Bomber Command, that it had become a decisive weapon and that the theory of strategic bombing had been proved. Bomber Command was only able to emulate the Hamburg firestorm of 28 July once, at Kassel in October. In the winter of 1943, the attacks on Berlin began, which Tooze called fruitless,
The Ruhr was the choke point and in 1943 it was within the RAF's grip. The failure to maintain that hold and to tighten it was a tragic operational error.[36]
Berlin was a big manufacturing city but the Ruhr was the principal supplier of coal and steel to Germany. Isolating the Ruhr could strangle the rest of the German war economy; in the campaign against Berlin, the British caused much damage but the evolution of German anti-aircraft defences, particularly night fighters, was able to counter the Bomber Command threat on its long flights to Berlin in winter weather.[37]
In 1982,Laurenz Demps [de] collated loss data using the damage reports of the Berlin police commissioner (Polizeipräsident) issued after each air raid, descriptions of losses and damage indicated by houses and distributed to 100–150 organisations and administrations busy with rescue, repair, planning and other matters, against reports of the main bureau for air raid protection (Hauptluftschutzstelle) of the city of Berlin, which issued more than 100 copies with variable frequency, each summarising losses and damage by the number of air raids; the war diary of the air raid warning command (Luftwarnkommando – (Wako Berlin), a branch of theLuftwaffe and other sources. Demps wrote that 7,480 people had been killed, 2,194 people were reported missing, 17,092 were injured and 817,730 Berliners made homeless.[38] In 2003,Reinhard Rürup [de] wrote that nearly 4,000 people were killed, 10,000 injured and 450,000 made homeless.[39] In 2005, Kevin Wilson described the effects of smoke and dust in the air from the bombing and how long periods spent in shelters gave rise to symptoms that were called cellar influenza (Kellergrippe).[40] In 2006,A. C. Grayling wrote that the campaign caused immense loss of life and devastation in Berlin. The 22 November 1943 raid killed 2,000 Berliners and rendered 175,000 homeless. The following night, 1,000 people were killed and 100,000 bombed out. During December and January, Main Force raids killed hundreds of people and rendered between 20,000 and 80,000 homeless each night.[41]
The campaign comprised sixteen Main Force raids on Berlin, sixteen against other targets in Germany and raids on targets in occupied Europe. Bomber Command conducted other strategic operations such as night-fighter and intruder operations against the German night-fighter force, minelaying, nuisance raids and training sorties.[42]
Night of 18/19 November 1943, Bomber Command had 513Avro Lancasters, 271Handley Page Halifaxes, 137Short Stirlings, 23Vickers Wellingtons and 46de Havilland Mosquitos operational.[43] Bomber Command sent a force of 440 Lancasters to Berlin,1 Group squadrons provided 153,3 Group 12,5 Group182,6 Group (RCAF) 29 and8 (Pathfinder Force) Group 64 Lancasters and four Mosquitos to drop spoof fighter flares; 26 Lancasters returned early (5.9 per cent). The raid opened at 20:56 and ended at 21:12; about 1,575 long tons (1,600 t) of bombs, approximately 792 long tons (805 t) high explosive and 783 long tons (796 t) incendiary were dropped. Losses were nine Lancasters (2.0 per cent) with 43 crew killed, 20 taken prisoner and four evading capture. The Berlin police chief reported 154 people killed, 443 injured and 7,500 people bombed out; he estimated that the raid lasted from 20:11 to 22:23 comprising 11 mines, 75 high explosive bombs, 1,600 incendiaries, 940 phosphorus bombs and 36 flares.[44]
A diversionary raid againstLudwigshafen was carried out by 395 bombers (248 Halifaxes, 114 Stirlings and 33 Lancasters); 23 aircraft lost, twelve Halifaxes, nine Stirlings and two Lancasters (5.8 per cent). Ten Mosquitos to Essen, 6 to Aachen, 6 to Frankfurt, 16 Wellington minelayer sorties from Texel to St Nazaire and 7 OTU sorties for no loss. RAF effort 884 sorties 32 losses (3.6 per cent).[45]
Night of 19/20 November 1943, 266 aircraft toLeverkusen, 170 Halifaxes, 86 Stirlings, 10 Mosquitos; poor weather and pathfinder failures led to one bomb on Leverkusen; many other towns were bombed and 5 aircraft lost (1.9 per cent). Six Mosquitos to Duisburg, 2 to Rheinhausen, 25 minelayer sorties off Biscay ports, 11 OTU sorties no losses. Fog over England led to 2 Halifax and 1 Stirling crashes; 4 Halifaxes of 35 Squadron made safe landings at Graveley which had its firstFog Investigation and Dispersal Operation (FIDO).[46]
Night of 22/23 November 1943, 764 bombers to Berlin; 469 Lancasters, 234 Halifaxes, 50 Stirlings, 11 Mosquitos; 25 aircraft lost, eleven Lancasters, ten Halifaxes and four Stirlings (3.4 per cent). Three aircraft were lost over England; five losses were attributed to FlaK over Berlin, three toground-controlled interception (GCI) by night-fighters over the city and three by GCI near Deelen during the return; 80 aircraft were hit by FlaK and one by a fighter, five were hit by incendiaries from above, two collided and seven aircraft were lost to unknown causes.[47] Pathfinders marked at 20:00 with red and greenTarget indicator bombs. An hour after the raid a wave of Mosquitos bombed. Most of the damage was to the residential areas west of the city centre, Tiergarten and Charlottenburg, Schöneberg and Spandau. Because of the dry weather, several 'firestorms' were caused. Several buildings of note were damaged or destroyed, including the British, French, Italian and Japanese embassies, Charlottenburg Castle and Berlin Zoo. Also the Ministry of Weapons and Munitions, theWaffen-SS Administrative College, the barracks of the Imperial Guard at Spandau, theOsram andTelefunken factories and the Albrecht armaments works employed in the war economy were hit. A German report listed 130 mines, 900 HE bombs, 200,000 incendiaries, 20,000 phosphorus bombs and 60 flares were dropped. Casualties were 1,757 killed, 6.923 injured and about 180,000 people bombed out; 2,791 homes destroyed, 2,300 damaged; some panic and looting ensued, four million ration books were destroyed. After several months of excluding the foreign press from bombed towns, the Press Bureau of the Foreign Office called a conference on 23 November, when the streets were blocked by debris and fires were being extinguished.[48] The most effective raid on Berlin of the war, despite 10/10ths cloud over the city.[49]
Night of 23/24 November 1943: Berlin, 383 aircraft, 365 Lancasters, ten Halifaxes, six Mosquitos, 46 early returns (12 per cent); 21 bombers lost (5.49 per cent); bombing from 19:58 to 20:15, about 1,377 long tons (1,399 t) of bombs 734 long tons (746 t) high explosive, 643 long tons (653 t) incendiary.[50] Primary blind markers each to drop red TIs and a bundle of flares of red and with green stars byH2S. Other blind markers were to mark the aiming point withsalvos of reds and yellows along with four bundles of flares each. Secondary blind markers would drop green TIs and one bundle of flares apiece and early backers-up greens on the reds and yellows if visible and if not the centre of the reds after a two-second overshoot. The Main Force was to bomb on the centre of the greens also with a two-second overshoot or to bomb on H2S of if they were unserviceable, aim at the centre of the flares. The FlaK was as effective as before but the fighter controller commanded aZahme Sau (Tame Boar) interception from 18:12, ordered them to Berlin at 19:30 and Brandenburg at 20:00, the time for the raid to begin. Fighter interceptions began at 20:08.[51]
Operation Corona (false instructions to German aircraft) broadcast from England had some effect. Two German night-fighters might have been shot down over Berlin and 21 bombers were lost, with 27 damaged, 14 to FlaK, four to fighters and nine to other causes. Four bombers crashed between the Netherlands coast and Leeuwarden, four were shot down by fighters between Groningen and Hanover, one to Flak near Texel. Three aircraft were shot down by FlaK over Berlin, early in the raid, five by fighters during it. Six of the damaged aircraft were write-offs, one by FlaK and the rest in landing accidents.[c] A German report had the raid beginning at 19:26 and that 13,005 people were killed, 6,383 were injured and 300,000 people were rendered destitute; 120 mines, 850 HE bombs, 20,000 phosphorus bombs, 250,000 incendiaries and 70 flares were counted; 1,989 houses were destroyed and 2,443 were badly damaged and 20,000 slightly damaged; a military installation was destroyed, 22 severely and 22 slightly damaged; the Spandau power station was destroyed.[51]
Night of 25/26 November 1943:Frankfurt was the main target for 236 Halifaxes and 26 Lancasters (262 aircraft). Three Mosquitos were sent to Berlin and other targets were bombed.[54]
Night of 26/27 November 1943: Berlin, the main target, was attacked by 443 Lancasters and seven Mosquitos. The Mosquitos were used to layWindow ahead of the Pathfinder aircraft to drawflak away from them but due to a temporarily clear sky, 21 aircraft were lost to AA guns over Berlin. Most of the damage was in the semi-industrial suburb ofReinickendorf but the city centre andSiemensstadt (with its many electrical equipment factories), was also hit.Stuttgart was raided by 157 Halifaxes and 21 Lancasters as a diversion. Both forces flew the same route almost as far as Frankfurt whichLuftwaffe fighter controllers identified as the RAF target. The total sorties for the night, including minelaying operations, was 666 with 34 aircraft (5.1 per cent) lost. Losses over Berlin were high and combined with landing accidents in fog in England, reached 9.3 per cent. TheAlkett factory, a big producer ofarmoured fighting vehicles, was badly hit and Goebbels described it as "almost completely destroyed" and referred to "virtually irreplaceable tools and machines" being out of action in his diary.[55]
Night of 28/29 November 1943:Essen was attacked by ten Mosquitos, Duisburg by one; ten aircraft laid mines off Brest and Cherbourg; seven OTU sorties, no losses.[56]
Night of 30 November/1 December 1943:100 (Bomber Support) Group debuts with four 192 Squadron WellingtonRadio Counter Measures (RCM) sorties. Essen attacked by four Mosquitos, 29 Stirling and 15 Wellington minelaying sorties from Brest to Bayonne, seven OTU sorties, no losses.[57]
Night of 1/2 December 1943: 19 Stirlings and 12 Halifaxes minelaying offFrisian Islands and east coast of Denmark, 2 Stirlings lost.[57]
Night of 2/3 December 1943: Berlin, the main target, was attacked by 425 Lancasters, 18 Mosquitos and 15 Halifaxes. The Germans identified Berlin as the target. Unexpected cross winds scattered the bomber stream and German fighters shot down forty bombers, 37 Lancasters, two Halifaxes and a Mosquito (8.7 per cent of the force). The bombing was inaccurate and to the south of the city but two more of theSiemens factories, a ball-bearing factory and several railway installations were damaged.[58]
Night of 3/4 December 1943:Leipzig, the main target, was attacked by 307 Lancasters, 220 Halifaxes (527 aircraft). The main force took a direct heading to Berlin, then turned south for Leipzig, leaving 9 Mosquitos to carry on, decoying many German night fighters.[49]
Night of 4/5 December 1943:Duisburg attacked by nine Mosquitos, 48 aircraft minelaying off the Frisians, 9 OTU sorties, one Stirling minelayer and an OTUWhitley lost.[59]
Night of 5/6 December 1943: 3 Wellington RCM sorties, no loss.[60]
Night of 9/10 December 1943: 3 Wellington RCM sorties, no loss.[60]
Night of 10/11 December 1943: Leverkusen attacked by 25 Mosquitos, Krefeld by two, 4 OTU sorties no loss.[60]
Night of 11/12 December 1943: Duisburg attacked by 18 Mosquitos, 1 Wellington RCM sortie, no loss.[60]
Night of 12/13 December 1943: 18 Mosquitos to Essen, 9 to Düsseldorf, 1 to Osnabrück, 4 RCM and 4 OTU sorties, 1 Mosquito lost at Essen.[60]
Night of 13/14 December 1943: 16 Mosquitos to Düsseldorf, 1 to Bonn, 25 OTU sorties, no loss.[60]
Night of 15/16 December 1943: 4 Mosquitos to Bochum, 4 to Leverkusen and 3 RCM sorties, no loss.[60]
Night of 16/17 December 1943: Berlin was the main target. It was attacked by 483 Lancasters and 15 Mosquitos. German night fighters were directed to intercept the bombers; 25 Lancasters, 5.2 per cent of the Lancaster force, were lost over enemy occupied territory and 29 aircraft were lost on landing in England due to very low cloud. The raid was unusual in that losses due to bad weather over England were greater than losses due to flak or enemy night fighters.[49] The damage to the Berlin railway system was extensive and 1,000 wagon-loads of war material destined for theEastern Front were held up for six days. The National Theatre and the building housing Germany's military and political archives were both destroyed. The effect of the bombing campaign had made unusable more than a quarter of the living accommodation in Berlin. Two Beaufighters and two Mosquitos ofNo. 141 Squadron RAF usingSerrate radar detectors managed to damage aMesserschmitt Bf 110, the first successful 'Serrate' patrol. On the same night there was other raids onTilley-le-Haut andFlixecourt, two flying-bomb sites nearAbbeville. The raid failed to destroy the sites but no aircraft were lost.[61]
Night of 19/20 December 1943: 6 OTU Wellingtons leafleted French towns, no loss.[62]
Night of 20/21 December 1943: Frankfurt was attacked by 390 Lancasters, 257 Halifaxes and three Mosquitos (650 aircraft). German night fighters got into the bomber stream; 27 Halifaxes and 14 Lancasters were lost, 6.3 per cent of the force. Damage was more than the RAF thought at the time because they knew that the Germans had lit decoy fires, which had some success as diversions. There was a decoy raid on Mannheim by 54 aircraft and a precision attack by eight Lancasters of617 Squadron and 8 Pathfinder Mosquitos, on an armaments factory near Liege that failed to hit the target.[62]
Night of 21/22 December 1943: 9 Oboe Mosquitos attacked theMannesmann factory at Düsseldorf, 4 theKnapsack power station, 4 OTU sorties, no loss.[63]
Night of 22/23 December 1943: 51 aircraft (29 Stirlings, 11 Lancasters, 8 Mosquitos and three Halifaxes) attacked two flying-bomb sites between Abbeville andAmiens. One site was destroyed but the other was not located. Nine Mosquitos to Frankfurt, two toBonn, 2 RCM sorties, 16 minelaying sorties offBiscay ports and 21 OTU sorties, no loss.[63]
Night of 23/24 December 1943: Berlin was attacked by 364 Lancasters, eight Mosquitos and seven Halifaxes. German night-fighters were hampered by the weather and shot down only 16 Lancasters, 4.2 per cent of the force. Little damage was caused to Berlin; several other German towns were attacked by Mosquitos.[63]
Night of 24/25 December 1943: 35 Halifax minelaying sorties off Frisian islands, no loss.[63]
Night of 28/29 December 1943: 10 Mosquitos to Duisburg, 9 to Düsseldorf, 1 to Cologne, 11 OTU sorties, no loss.[63]
Night of 29/30 December 1943: Berlin was the target for 457 Lancasters, 252 Halifaxes and three Mosquitos (712 aircraft), RAF losses were light at 2.8 per cent of the force. Cloud cover frustrated the RAF and little damage was caused.[64]
Night of 30/31 December 1943: 10 Lancasters of 617 Squadron and six Pathfinder Mosquitos failed to destroy a V1 site. Ten Mosquitos to Cologne, 8 to Duisburg, 3 to Bochum, 6 RCM sorties; 36 Minelayers off Texel and French ports, 28 OTU sorties, no loss.[64]
Night of 31 December 1943/1 January 1944: 2 Stirling minelayer sorties, no loss.[64]
Night of 1/2 January 1944: 421 Lancasters dispatched to Berlin, the main target. German night fighters shot down 6.7 per cent of the force. A small raid on Hamburg by 15 Mosquitos and smaller raids on other towns failed to divert the night fighters.[65]
Night of 2/3 January 1944: Berlin was the main target. 362 Lancasters, 12 Mosquitos, nine Halifaxes (383 aircraft), night fighters failed to reach the bombers until they were over the city, then shoot down 27 Lancasters, 10 per cent of the force. There were also minor raids on other cities.[66]
Night of 3/4 January 1944: 6 Mosquitos toSolingen and 2 to Essen, no loss.[66]
Night of 4/5 January 1944: 80 bombers to a flying bomb site in Pas de Calais and one atBristillerie, Cherbourg (57 Stirlings, 12 Mosquitos, 11 Lancasters) for no loss. Berlin raided by 13 Mosquitos, 3 to Krefeld, two to Cologne; 4 RCM sorties, 40 minelayer sorties off Lorient and Brest, 8 OTU sorties no loss.[67][d]
Night of 5/6 January 1944:Stettin not raided in numbers since September 1941; 348 Lancasters and 10 Halifaxes. Accurate bombing on town centre, later drifting to the west; 244 people killed, 1,016 injured 504 houses and 20 industrial premises destroyed, 1,148 houses and 29 industrial buildings seriously damaged and 8 ships sunk in harbour. Diversion by 13 Mosquitos on Berlin and 25 to four other targets succeeded; 16 aircraft lost, 4.5 per cent of the force. A Mosquito flew an RCM sortie, 6 Lancasters laid mines off Swinemünde and lastBristol BeaufighterSerrate patrol flown.[68][e]
Night of 6/7 January 1944: 16 Mosquitos to Duisburg, 2 to Bristillerie, 1 toDortmund and 1 to Solingen; 57 minelayer sorties to Biscay ports and 10 OTU sorties, no loss.[68]
Night of 7/8 January 1944: 6 Moaquitos toKrefeld, 5 to Duisburg, 28 OTU sorties. A 138 Squadron Halifax crashed after take-off, crew and the 3 passengers killed.[68]
Night of 8/9 January 1944: 10 Moaqiutos to Frankfurt, 8 to Solingen, 3 toAachen and 2 to Dortmund; two losses.[68]
Night of 10/11 January 1944: 10 Mosquitos to Berlin, 7 to Solingen, 2 toKoblenz, 1 to Krefeld, no loss.[69]
Night of 13/14 January 1944: 12 Mosquitos to Essen, 9 to Duisburg, 2 to Aachen and 2 to Koblenz, one aircraft lost.[69]
Night of 14/15 January 1944: Raid onBrunswick, the first of the war, by 496 Lancasters and two Halifaxes. 38 Lancasters were lost to night fighters. 11 of the lost aircraft were Pathfinders and the marking of the city was poor. German authorities reported only 10 houses destroyed and 14 people killed, with some damage and loss of life in villages to the south. 82 aircraft attacked flying bomb sites atAilly,Bonneton and Bristillerie without loss; 17 Mosquitos raidedMagdeburg and Berlin.[69]
Night of 20/21 January 1944: Berlin was the target; 495 Lancasters, 264 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitos (769 aircraft) were dispatched; 22 Halifaxes and 13 Lancasters were lost, 4.6 per cent of the force. The damage could not be assessed due to low cloud the next day.[70]
Night of 21/22 January 1944: Magdeburg was the main target for 421 Lancasters, 224 Halifaxes, 3 Mosquitos (648 aircraft); 57 were lost. The attack failed to identify the target, and little damage was done.[71]
Night of 27/28 January 1944: Berlin was the target for 515 Lancasters and 15 Mosquitos (530 aircraft). RAF records state that the bombing appeared to have been spread well up- and down-wind. The diversions were partially successful in diverting German night fighters but 33 Lancasters were lost, 6.4 per cent of the heavy bombers; 167 sorties were flown against other targets, one aircraft was lost.[72]
Night of 28/29 January 1944: Berlin was attacked by 432 Lancasters, 241 Halifaxes and four Mosquitos (677 aircraft). Western and southern districts, partly covered cloud, were hit in what RAF records call the most concentrated attack of this period. German records mention that 77 places outside the city were hit. A deception raid and routing over Northern Denmark did not prevent the German air defences shooting down 46 aircraft, 6.8 per cent of the force. Just over 100 aircraft attacked other targets.[73]
Night of 29/30 January 1944: 12 Mosquitos to Duisburg, 10 to Herbouville flying-bomb site, 6 OTU sorties, no loss.[74]
Night of 30/31 January 1944: Berlin was attacked by 440 Lancasters, 82 Halifaxes and 12 Mosquitos (534 aircraft) 33 bombers lost (6.2 per cent). A further 76 sorties were flown against other targets; no loss.[74]
Night of 15/16 February 1944: 891 aircraft to Berlin; 561 Lancasters, 314 Halifaxes and 16 Mosquitos, the largest Berlin raid of the war.[75] Despite cloud cover, most important war industries were hit, including Siemensstadt, the centre and south-western districts worst hit. A spoof by 24 Lancasters of 8 Group onFrankfurt-on-the-Oder failed and the RAF lost 43 aircraft, 26 Lancasters and 17 Halifaxes, 4.8 per cent. A further 155 sorties were flown against other targets.[76]
Night of 19/20 February 1944, 823 aircraft to Leipzig; 561 Lancasters, 255 Halifaxes and 7 Mosquitos; 78 aircraft lost, 44 Lancasters and 34 Halifaxes (9.5 per cent, 13.3 per cent of the Halifax sorties, 14.9 per cent of those reaching as far as the enemy coast). Halifax Mk II and Mk V aircraft withdrawn from Main Force raids on Germany. AtKiel Bay 45 Stirlings and 4 Halifax pathfinders laid mines, 16 Oboe Mosquitos bombed night-fighter bases in the Netherlands, 15 Mosquitos flew a diversion to Berlin, 12 Mosquito Serrate sorties, one Mosquito lost from the Berlin diversion force. Three Mosquitos to Aachen, three to flying-bomb sites in France for no loss. The RAF flew 921 sorties, 79 aircraft lost (8.6 per cent) the largest loss yet (58 aircraft lost on Magdeburg raid 21/22 January 1943).[77]
Night of 20/21 February 1944, 598 aircraft to Stuttgart; 460 Lancasters, 126 Halifaxes and 12 Mosquitos. Early diversions successful, 9 aircraft lost, 7 Lancasters, 2 Halifaxes, (1.5 per cent). Four Lancasters and a Halifax crashed in England. Training exercise earlier across North Sea, 156 OTU aircraft, 24 from squadrons before raid got the night-fighters up two hours early; 24 Mosquitos attacked airfields in Netherlands, 7 Mosquitos to Munich, 7 Mosquito Serrate sorties no losses. Mining off French ports by 28 Stirlings and 6 Wellingtons, one Wellington lost. RAF flew 836 sorties, ten aircraft lost (1.2 per cent).[78]
Night of 21/22 February 1944, 17 Mosquitos to Duisburg, Stuttgart and 2 flying-bomb sites, 1 Serrate patrol, 41 aircraft laid mines off Frisian Islands and French ports; 10 OTU sorties, 1 Stirling minelayer lost.[78]
Night of 22/23 February 1944, 10 Mosquitos to Stuttgart, 8 to Duisburg, 3 to Aachen; 71 Halifax and 40 Stirling minelayer sorties to north German coast called back due to weather over their bases; 2 RCM and 2 Serrate sorties; no loss.[78]
Night of 23/24 February 1944, 17 Mosquitos to Düsseldorf where first 4,000 lb (1,800 kg) bomb carried by Mosquito dropped; 2 Serrate sorties, 3 OTU flights, no loss.[79]
Night of 24/25 March 1944: Berlin was the main target. Thebomber stream was scattered and those that reached the city bombed well out to the south-west of theGroßstadt. The RAF lost 72 aircraft, 8.9 per cent of the force.[80]
Night of 26/27 March 1944:Essen attacked by 476 Lancasters, 207 Halifaxes, 22 Mosquitos (705 aircraft).[81]
Night of 30/31 March 1944:Nuremberg attacked by 572 Lancasters, 214 Halifaxes and nine Mosquitos (795 aircraft). Unusually clear weather,contrails formed lower than usual. Bomber stream flew straight track, no evasive routing, led the Germans quickly to decide that Nuremberg was the target. The night fighters reached the bomber stream at the Belgian border; more than 82 bombers were lost before Nuremberg and 13 bombers were shot down on the return, 11.9 per cent loss. It was the costliest RAF Bomber Command mission of the war and ended the Battle of Berlin. Pilot OfficerCyril Barton, a Halifax pilot of578 Squadron, was awarded a posthumousVictoria Cross.[82]
18/19 November 1943 to 31 March 1944; 100 night operations, five by day; 24,449 night sorties, 1,117 losses (3.8 per cent). Circa 78,447 long tons (79,706 t) bombs dropped. Averages per 24 hours, 219.8 sorties, 8.3 aircraft lost and 585.6 long tons (595.0 t) tons of bombs dropped.[83]
^The Lancaster was a redesigned Manchester with a greater wingspan and four of the excellent and tested Rolls-RoyceMerlin XX engines, instead of two more powerful but unreliableRolls-Royce Vulture engines.[9]
^Data fromFreya sets went to the navy (Kriegsmarine) and theLuftwaffe; theLuftwaffe forwarded it toLuftflotten (Air Fleets) and toLuftgaue (Air Districts, commanding the FlaK) and to theReichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM, Air Ministry) in Berlin.[19]
^Middlebrook recorded 20 Lancasters lost (5.2 per cent) plus six Lancasters written off in crashes and accidents; 127 crew killed and 24 captured. Six Oboe Mosquito sorties, one crashed on return, crew killed.[50]
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Hooton, E.R. (1999).Eagle in Flames: Defeat of the Luftwaffe. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.ISBN978-1-85409-343-1.
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Kühne, Günther; Stephani, Elisabeth (1986) [1978].Evangelische Kirchen in Berlin [Evangelist Churches in Berlin] (2nd ed.). Berlin: Wichern-Verlag (Christlicher Zeitschriftenverlag).ISBN978-3-7674-0158-7.
Lloyd, Ian (1978).Rolls-Royce: The Merlin at War (e-book ed.). London: The Macmillan Press.ISBN978-1-349-03908-1.
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Webster, C.; Frankland, N. (2006) [1961]. Butler, James (ed.).The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945: Annexes and Appendices. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. IV (facs. pbk. repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO.ISBN978-1-84574-350-5.
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Boog, Horst; Krebs, Gerhard; Vogel, Detlef (2006) [2001].The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5 [Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943 bis 1944/45]. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. VII. Translated by Cooke-Radmore, Derry; Garvie, Francisca; Osers, Ewald; Smerin, Barry; Wilson, Barbara (trans. Clarendon Press, Oxford ed.). Potsdam, Germany: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History).ISBN978-0-19-822889-9.
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