TheBattle of Austerlitz (2 December 1805[g]), also known as theBattle of the Three Emperors, was one of the most important military engagements of theNapoleonic Wars.[17] The battle occurred near the town ofAusterlitz in theAustrian Empire (nowSlavkov u Brna in theCzech Republic). Around 158,000 troops were involved, of which around 24,000 were killed or wounded.[18]
The battle is often cited by military historians as one of Napoleon's tactical masterpieces, in the same league as other historic engagements likeHannibal'sCannae (216 BC) orAlexander the Great'sGaugamela (331 BC).[17][19][20] The military victory ofNapoleon'sGrande Armée at Austerlitz brought theWar of the Third Coalition to an end, with thePeace of Pressburg signed by the French and Austrians later in the month.[21] These achievements did not establish a lasting peace on the continent. Austerlitz had driven neitherRussia norBritain, whose armiesprotected Sicily from a French invasion, to settle.
After eliminating an Austrian army during theUlm campaign, French forces seizedVienna in November 1805.[22] The Austrians avoided further conflict until the arrival of the Russians, who helped increase the allied numbers. Napoleon sent his army north in pursuit of the Allies, but then ordered his forces to retreat so he could feign a grave weakness to lure the Allies into thinking that they were facing a weak army, while it was in fact formidable. Napoleon gave every indication in the days preceding the engagement that the French army was in a pitiful state, even abandoning the dominant Pratzen Heights near Austerlitz. He deployed the French army below the Pratzen Heights and weakened his right flank, enticing the Allies to launch an assault there to roll up the French line. The French Emperor meanwhile hid the main army in dead ground. Napoleon's plan was based on the hope thatMarshal Davout and hisIII Corps would arrive soon on their way from Vienna. Aforced march by Davout plugged the gap left by Napoleon just in time. Davout's men stubbornly held their defensive positions under the onslaught of superior opponents. These positions represented both a natural and a fortified-structural barrier. The Allied deployment against the French right weakened the Allied centre on the Pratzen Heights, which was attacked by theIV Corps ofMarshal Soult. Napoleon also exploited the weather: noticing the weakened Allied centre, he sent this corps just as the early morningmist – which contributed to the concealment of both Soult's corps and the Allied centre – was clearing. The mist at that moment had not cleared low enough to uncover Soult's advance. With the centre demolished, the French swept through both flanks and routed the Allies, which enabled the French to capture thousands of prisoners.
Remarkably, the pleiad of Russian military commanders nurtured by the great generalAlexander Suvorov (1730–1800) – includingMikhail Kutuzov,Pyotr Bagration,Mikhail Miloradovich,Nikolay Kamensky,Sergei Kamensky,Peter Wittgenstein andFriedrich (Fyodor) von Buxhoeveden – was decisively defeated at Austerlitz.[h] The blame for the Allied disaster initially lies with the supreme commander EmperorAlexander I of Russia, who, together with his Austrian chief of staffFranz von Weyrother, fell into Napoleon's "trap" at Austerlitz, first accepting encounter on the battlefield chosen by the French Emperor, and then being encircled in the direction of the left Allied flank.[i] The Allied disaster significantly shook the will ofEmperor Francis to further resist Napoleon. France and Austria agreed to anarmistice immediately, and the Treaty of Pressburg followed shortly after, on 26 December. Pressburg took Austria out of both the war and the Coalition while reinforcing the earlier treaties ofCampo Formio and ofLunéville between the two powers. The treaty confirmed the Austrian loss of lands inItaly andBavaria to France, and in Germany to Napoleon's German allies. It also imposed an indemnity of 40 million francs on the Habsburgs and allowed the fleeing Russian troops free passage through hostile territories and back to their home soil. Critically, victory at Austerlitz permitted the creation of theConfederation of the Rhine, a collection of German states intended as a buffer zone between France and the eastern powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Confederation rendered theHoly Roman Empire virtually useless, so Francisdissolved the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, but remained as emperor of Austria.Prussian worries about the growing French influence inCentral Europe led to theWar of the Fourth Coalition in 1806.
However, many problems persisted between the two sides, and implementing the treaty became increasingly difficult.[28] The British government resented having to return theCape Colony and most of the Dutch West Indies to theBatavian Republic.[29][30] Napoleon was angry that the British refused to abandon the island ofMalta.[31] The tense situation only worsened when Napoleon sent an expeditionary force to restore French authority and slavery inSaint-Domingue.[32][33] In May 1803, Britain declared war on France.[34]
In December 1804, an Anglo-Swedish agreement led to the creation of the Third Coalition.[35] British Prime MinisterWilliam Pitt the Younger spent 1804 and 1805 in a flurry of diplomatic activity geared towards forming a new coalition against France, and by April 1805, Britain and Russia had signed an alliance.[36][j] Having been defeated twice in recent memory by France and being keen on revenge, Austria joined the Coalition a few months later.[36]
Before the formation of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had assembled an invasion force called theArmée d'Angleterre (Army of England) around six camps atBoulogne in Northern France. He intended to use this force, amounting to 150,000 men,[38] to strike at England and was so confident of success that he had commemorative medals struck to celebrate the conquest of the English.[39] Although they never invaded, Napoleon's troops received careful and invaluable training for any possible military operation. Boredom among the troops occasionally set in,[40] but Napoleon paid many visits and conducted lavish parades to boost morale.[41]
The men at Boulogne formed the core for what Napoleon would later callLa Grande Armée.[42] The army was organized into sevencorps, which were large field units that contained 36 to 40cannons each and were capable of independent action until other corps could come to their aid.[43] A single corps (adequately situated in a solid defensive position) could survive at least a day without support.[44] In addition to these forces, Napoleon created acavalry reserve of 22,000 organized into twocuirassierdivisions, four mounteddragoon divisions, one division of dismounted dragoons and one of light cavalry, all supported by 24artillery pieces.[43] By 1805, theGrande Armée had grown to a force of 350,000 men,[45] who were well equipped, well trained, and led by competent officers.[46]
The Russian army in 1805 had many characteristics ofAncien Régime organization.[47] There was no permanent formation above theregimental level,[48] and senior officers mostly belonged to aristocratic circles.[49] The Russian infantry was considered one of the hardiest in Europe, with fine artillery crewed by experienced professional soldiers.[50]
Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor, had started to reform the Austrian army in 1801 by taking away power from theHofkriegsrat, the military-political council responsible for the armed forces.[51] Charles was Austria's most able field commander,[52] but he was unpopular at court and lost much influence when, against his advice, Austria decided to go to war with France.Karl Mack became the new main commander in Austria's army, instituting reforms on the eve of the war that called for a regiment to be composed of fourbattalions of fourcompanies, rather than three battalions of six companies.[53]
In August 1805, Napoleon,Emperor of the French since December of the previous year,[54] turned his sights from theEnglish Channel to theRhine to deal with the new Austrian and Russian threats.[55] On 25 September after a feverish march in great secrecy,[56] 200,000 French troops began to cross the Rhine[57] on a front of 260 km (160 mi).[58][59] Mack had gathered the greater part of the Austrian army at the fortress ofUlm inSwabia.[60]
Napoleon swung his forces southward in a wheeling movement that put the French at the Austrian rear while launching cavalry attacks through theBlack Forest, which kept the Austrians at bay.[61] TheUlm Maneuver was well-executed, and on 20 October, 23,000 Austrian troops surrendered at Ulm, bringing the number of Austrian prisoners of the campaign to 60,000.[59] Although this spectacular victory was soured by the defeat of a Franco-Spanish fleetat Trafalgar[62] the following day, French success on land continued asVienna fell in November. The French gained 100,000 muskets, 500 cannons, and intact bridges across theDanube.[63]
Russian delays prevented them from saving the Austrian armies; the Russians withdrew to the northeast to await reinforcements and link up with surviving Austrian units.[64] TsarAlexander I appointed generalMikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov commander-in-chief of the combined Russo-Austrian force.[65] On 9 September 1805, Kutuzov arrived at the battlefield, quickly contactingFrancis I of Austria and his courtiers to discuss strategy and logistics. Under pressure from Kutuzov, the Austrians agreed to supply munitions and weapons promptly. Kutuzov also spotted shortcomings in the Austrian defense plan, which he called "very dogmatic". He objected to the Austrian annexation of the land recently under Napoleon's control because this would make the local people distrust the allied force.[66]
The French followed after Kutuzov but soon found themselves in a difficult position. Prussian intentions were unknown and could be hostile; the Russian and Austrian armies had converged, and French lines of communication were extremely long, requiring strong garrisons to keep them open. Napoleon realized that to capitalize on the success at Ulm, he had to force the Allies to battle and then defeat them.[67]
On the Russian side, Kutuzov also realized Napoleon needed to do battle, so instead of clinging to the "suicidal" Austrian defense plan, Kutuzov decided to retreat. He orderedPyotr Bagration to contain the French at Vienna with 600 soldiers. He instructed Bagration to acceptMurat's ceasefire proposal so the Allied Army could have more time to retreat. It was later discovered that the proposal was false and had been used to launch a surprise attack on Vienna. Nonetheless, Bagration held off the French assault for a time by negotiating an armistice with Murat, thereby providing Kutuzov time to position himself with the Russian rearguard nearHollabrunn.
Murat initially refrained from an attack, believing the entire Russian army stood before him. Napoleon soon realized Murat's mistakes and ordered him to pursue quickly, but the allied army had already retreated toOlmütz.[66] According to Kutuzov's plan, the Allies would retreat further to theCarpathian region[68] and "atGalicia, I will bury the French."[66]
Napoleon did not stay still. The French Emperor decided to set a psychological trap to lure the Allies out. Days before any fighting, Napoleon had been giving the impression that his army was weak and desired a negotiated peace.[69] About 53,000 French troops—including Soult, Lannes, and Murat's forces—were assigned to takeAusterlitz and the Olmütz road, occupying the enemy's attention. The Allied forces, numbering about 89,000, seemed far superior and would be tempted to attack the outnumbered French army. However, the Allies did not know thatBernadotte,Mortier andDavout were already within supporting distance and could be called in by forced marches—Bernadotte fromIglau, and Mortier and Davout from Vienna—which would raise the French number to 75,000 troops.[70]
Napoleon's lure did not stop at that. On 25 November, GeneralSavary was sent to the Allied headquarters at Olmütz to deliver Napoleon's message, expressing his desire to avoid a battle while secretly examining the Allied forces' situation. As expected, the overture was seen as a sign of weakness. When Francis I offered an armistice on the 27th, Napoleon accepted enthusiastically. On the same day, Napoleon ordered Soult to abandon both Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights and, while doing so, to create an impression of chaos during the retreat that would induce the enemy to occupy the Heights.
The next day (28 November), the French Emperor requested a personal interview with Alexander I. He received a visit from the Tsar's most impetuous aide, PrincePeter Dolgorukov. The meeting was another part of the trap, as Napoleon intentionally expressed anxiety and hesitation to his opponents. Dolgorukov reported an additional indication of French weakness to the Tsar.[71]
The plan was successful. Many Allied officers, including the Tsar's aides and the Austrian Chief of StaffFranz von Weyrother, strongly supported an immediate attack and appeared to sway Tsar Alexander.[72] Kutuzov's plan to retreat further to theCarpathian region was rejected, and the Allied forces soon fell into Napoleon's trap.
The battle began with the French army outnumbered. Napoleon had some 72,000 men and 157 guns for the impending battle, with about 7,000 troops underDavout still far to the south in the direction of Vienna.[73][74] The Allies had about 85,000 soldiers, seventy percent of them Russian, and 318 guns.[73]
At first, Napoleon was not confident of victory. In a letter written to Minister of Foreign AffairsTalleyrand, Napoleon requested that Talleyrand not tell anyone about the upcoming battle because he did not want to disturb EmpressJoséphine. According to Frederick C. Schneid, the French Emperor's chief worry was how he could explain to Joséphine a French defeat.[75]
The battle took place about six miles (ten kilometres) southeast of the city ofBrno, between that city and Austerlitz (Czech:Slavkov u Brna) in what is now the Czech Republic. The northern part of the battlefield was dominated by the 700-foot (210-metre) Santon Hill and the 880-foot (270-meter)Žuráň Hill, both overlooking the vitalOlomouc/Brno road, which was on an east–west axis. To the west of these two hills was the village ofBellowitz (Bedřichovice), and between them, the Bosenitz (Roketnice) stream went south to link up with the Goldbach (Říčka) stream, the latter flowing by the villages ofKobelnitz (Kobylnice),Sokolnitz (Sokolnice), andTelnitz (Telnice).
The centrepiece of the entire area was thePratzen (Prace) Heights, a gently sloping hill. An aide noted that Napoleon repeatedly told his marshals, "Gentlemen, examine this ground carefully, it is going to be a battlefield; you will have a part to play upon it."[76]
Allied (red) and French (blue) deployments at 1800 hours on 1 December 1805
The Allied council met on 1 December to discuss proposals for the battle. Most Allied strategists had two fundamental ideas: contacting the enemy and securing the southern flank that held the communication line to Vienna. Although the Tsar and his immediate entourage pushed hard for a battle, Emperor Francis of Austria was more cautious, and, as mentioned, he was seconded by Kutuzov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russians and the Allied troops.[2] The pressure to fight from the Russian nobles and the Austrian commanders, however, was too strong, and the Allies adopted the plan of the Austrian Chief-of-Staff,Franz von Weyrother.[2] This called for a main drive against the French right flank, which the Allies noticed was lightly guarded, and diversionary attacks against the French left. The Allies deployed most of their troops into four columns that would attack the French right. TheRussian Imperial Guard was held in reserve while Russian troops underBagration guarded the Allied right. The Russian Tsar stripped Kutuzov of his authority as Commander-in-Chief and gave it to Franz von Weyrother. In the battle, Kutuzov could (mainly) command the IV Corps/Column of the Allied army, although he was still the nominal commander because the Tsar was afraid to take over if his favoured plan failed.[66]
Napoleon hoped that the Allied forces would attack, and to encourage them, he deliberately weakened his right flank.[77] On 28 November, Napoleon met with his marshals at Imperial Headquarters, who informed him of their qualms about the forthcoming battle. He shrugged off their suggestion of retreat.[78]
Napoleon's plan envisaged that the Allies would throw many troops to envelop his right flank to cut the French communication line fromVienna.[66] As a result, the Allies' center and left flank would be exposed and become vulnerable.[79] To encourage them to do so, Napoleon abandoned the strategic position on the Pratzen Heights, faking the weakness of his forces and his caution.[78] Meanwhile, Napoleon's main force was to be concealed in a dead ground opposite the Heights.[80] On 1 December Napoleon was finally convinced of the intended outflanking by his opponents, while their camps clearly indicated the extended front of their army. He secretly, during the same day, moved all his troops, except the right flank, to the left bank of the Bosenitz stream, an area of dead ground located between Puntowitz (nowPonětovice) and Girzikowitz (nowJiříkovice). To secure his left flank, from which the retreat to Iglau branched off, he ordered a steep hill on the main Olmütz road to be fortified and armed with 18 cannon; this point (Santon) was occupied by an infantry regiment, which was ordered to defend it to the last extremity. On the afternoon of 1 December, Napoleon gathered his corps commanders and, after outlining the general situation, explained his assumptions and the role he intended for each of them. These verbal orders were communicated to the troops in the form of a writtendisposition, however, only on the morning of 2 December. In accordance with these instructions, Davout was ordered to defend the Goldbach from Telnitz to Sokolnitz Castle inclusive, meaning he was to hold out first with 5,000, then with 12,500, againstBuxhoeveden's 43,000. Buxhoeveden (Buxhöwden) was the commander of the Allied left and the man responsible for leading the attack. For the decisive blow on the center, Napoleon assignedapprox. 2/3 of his forces and concentrated them along a front of about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi). The marshals were ordered to appear before Napoleon on 2 December at 7:30 AM to receive new orders depending on the movements that the enemy would make during the night.[81] According to the plan, the French troops would attack and recapture the Pratzen Heights, then from the Heights, they would launch a decisive assault on the center of the Allied army, cripple them, and encircle them from the rear.[66][79]
If the Russian force leaves the Pratzen Heights in order to go to the right side, they will certainly be defeated.[citation needed]
— Napoleon
The massive thrust through the Allied centre was conducted by 16,000 troops ofSoult's IV Corps. IV Corps' position was cloaked by dense mist during the early stage of the battle; in fact, how long the mist lasted was vital to Napoleon's plan: Soult's troops would become uncovered if the mist dissipated too soon, but if it lingered too long, Napoleon would be unable to determine when the Allied troops had evacuated Pratzen Heights, preventing him from timing his attack properly.[82]
Meanwhile, to support his weak right flank, Napoleon ordered Davout'sIII Corps to force march from Vienna and join GeneralLegrand's men, who held the extreme southern flank that would bear the heaviest part of the Allied attack. Davout's soldiers had 48 hours to march 110 km (68 mi). Their arrival was crucial in determining the success of the French plan. Indeed, the arrangement of Napoleon on the right flank was precarious as the French had only minimal troops garrisoning there. However, Napoleon was able to use such a risky plan because Davout—the commander of III Corps—was one of Napoleon's best marshals, because the right flank's position was protected by a complicated system of streams and lakes,[66] and because the French had already settled upon a secondary line of retreat throughBrunn.[83] TheImperial Guard andBernadotte's I Corps were held in reserve while the V Corps underLannes guarded the northern sector of the battlefield, where the new communication line was located.[66]
By 1 December 1805, the French troops had been shifted in accordance with the Allied movement southward, as Napoleon expected.[79]
The battle began at about 8 a.m., with the first allied lines attacking the village of Telnitz, which the 3rd Line Regiment defended. This battlefield sector witnessed heavy fighting in this early action as several ferocious Allied charges evicted the French from the town and forced them onto the other side of the Goldbach. The first men of Davout's corps arrived at this time and threw the Allies out of Telnitz before they, too, were attacked byhussars and re-abandoned the town. Additional Allied attacks out of Telnitz were checked by French artillery.[84]
Capture of a French regiment's eagle by the cavalry of the Russian guard, byBogdan Willewalde (1884)
Allied columns started pouring against the French right, but not at the desired speed, so the French successfully curbed the attacks. The Allied deployments were mistaken and poorly timed: cavalry detachments underLiechtenstein on the Allied left flank had to be placed on the right flank, and in the process, they ran into and slowed down part of the second column of infantry that was advancing towards the French right.[78] At the time, the planners thought this slowing was disastrous, but later on, it helped the Allies. Meanwhile, the leading elements of the second column were attacking the village of Sokolnitz, which was defended by the 26th Light Regiment and theTirailleurs, Frenchskirmishers. Initial Allied assaults proved unsuccessful, andGeneral Langeron ordered the bombardment of the village. This deadly barrage forced the French out, and at about the same time, the third column under the command ofGeneral Przybyszewski (Przhibyshevsky)[85] attacked the castle of Sokolnitz. The French, however, counterattacked and regained the village, only to be thrown out again. Conflict in this area ended temporarily whenFriant's division (part of III Corps) retook the village. Sokolnitz was perhaps the most contested area on the battlefield and would change hands several times as the day progressed.[86]
While the Allied troops attacked the French right flank, Kutuzov's IV Corps stopped at the Pratzen Heights and stayed still. Just like Napoleon, Kutuzov realized the importance of Pratzen and decided to protect the position. But the young Tsar did not, so he ordered the IV Corps to withdraw from the Heights. This act quickly pushed the Allied army into its grave.[66]
The decisive attacks on the Allied center bySt. Hilaire andVandamme split the Allied army in two and left the French in a golden tactical position to win the battle.
At about 8:45 a.m., the mist was already clearing and Napoleon got a good look at the picture; satisfied at the weakness in the enemy center, Napoleon asked Soult how long it would take for his men to reach the Pratzen Heights, to which the Marshal replied, "Less than twenty minutes, sire." About 15 minutes later, Napoleon ordered the attack, adding, "One sharp blow and the war is over."[87][88][89]
A dense fog helped to cloud the advance ofSt. Hilaire's French division, but as they ascended the slope, the legendary 'Sun of Austerlitz' ripped the mist apart and encouraged them forward.[86] Russian soldiers and commanders on top of the heights were stunned to see so many French troops coming towards them.[90] Allied commanders moved some of the delayed detachments of the fourth column into this bitter struggle. Over an hour of fighting destroyed much of this unit. Mikhail Kutuzov commanded the battle at the location of this column.[88] The other men from the second column, primarily inexperienced Austrians, also participated in the struggle and swung the numbers against one of the best fighting forces in the French army, eventually forcing them to withdraw down the slopes. However, gripped by desperation, St. Hilaire's men struck hard again and bayoneted the Allies out of the heights. To the north,General Vandamme's division attacked an area called Staré Vinohrady ("Old Vineyards") and, through talented skirmishing and deadly volleys, broke several Allied battalions.[91]
The battle had firmly turned in France's favor, but it was far from over. Napoleon ordered Bernadotte's I Corps to support Vandamme's left and moved his command center from Žuráň Hill to St. Anthony's Chapel on the Pratzen Heights. The problematic position of the Allies was confirmed by the decision to send in theRussian Imperial Guard;Grand Duke Constantine, TsarAlexander's brother, commanded the Guard and counterattacked in Vandamme's section of the field, forcing a bloody effort and the only loss of a French standard in the battle (a battalion of the 4th Line Regiment was defeated). Sensing trouble, Napoleon ordered his own heavy Guard cavalry forward. These men pulverized their Russian counterparts, but with both sides pouring in large masses of cavalry, no victory was clear.
The Russians had a numerical advantage; however, the tide soon swung asDrouet's Division, the 2nd of Bernadotte's I Corps, deployed on the flank of the action and allowed French cavalry to seek refuge behind their lines. Thehorse artillery of the Guard also inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian cavalry and fusiliers. The Russians broke, and many died as they were pursued by the reinvigorated French cavalry for about a quarter of a mile.[92] Kutuzov was severely wounded, and his son-in-law,Ferdinand von Tiesenhausen, was killed.[66]
I was ... under fierce and continuous canister fire ... Many soldiers, now incessantly engaged in battle from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., had no cartridges left. I could do nothing but retreat ...
By 1400 hours, the Allied army had been dangerously separated. Napoleon now had the option to strike at one of the wings, and he chose the Allied left since other enemy sectors had already been cleared or were conducting fighting retreats.[citation needed]
Meanwhile, the northernmost part of the battlefield also witnessed heavy fighting.The Prince of Liechtenstein's heavy cavalry began to assaultKellermann's lighter cavalry forces after eventually arriving at the correct position in the field. The fighting initially went well for the French, but Kellerman's forces took cover behind General Caffarelli's infantry division once it became clear that Russian numbers were too great. Caffarelli's men halted the Russian assaults and permittedMurat to send two cuirassier divisions (one commanded byd'Hautpoul and the other one byNansouty) into the fray to finish off the Russian cavalry for good. The ensuing mêlée was bitter and long, but the French ultimately prevailed. On Napoleon's orders, Lannes then led his V Corps againstBagration's men and, after hard fighting, drove the skilled Russian commander off the field. He wanted to pursue, but Murat, who was in control of this sector on the battlefield, was against the idea; Napoleon ultimately called off the attack.[94][95]
Napoleon's focus shifted towards the southern end of the battlefield, where the French and the Allies were still fighting over Sokolnitz and Telnitz. In an effective double-pronged assault, St. Hilaire's division and part of Davout's III Corps smashed through the enemy at Sokolnitz, which persuaded the commanders of the first two columns, GeneralsKienmayer andLangeron, to flee as fast as they could. Buxhoeveden was completely drunk and fled as well. Kienmayer covered his withdrawal with theO'Reilly light cavalry, who managed to defeat five of six French cavalry regiments before they had to retreat.[94]
General panic seized the Allied army, and it abandoned the field in all possible directions. A famous,albeit disputed, episode occurred during this retreat: defeated Russian forces withdrew south towards Vienna via the frozen Satschan ponds. Napoleon deployed cannons on the heights of Augezd (nowÚjezd), which decimated the troops now underDmitry Dokhturov, Buxhoeveden's replacement. French artillery pounded towards the men, and the ice was broken by the bombardment. The fleeing men drowned in the cold ponds, dozens of Russian artillery pieces going down with them. Estimates of how many guns were captured differ: there may have been as few as 38 or more than 100. Sources also differ about casualties, with figures ranging between 200 and 2,000 dead. Thanks to Dokhturov's coolness and resourcefulness, the troops were assembled near Neudorf (nowNová Ves) by nightfall, but with "heavy" losses, as the Russian data confirms without clarifying a specific number.[96][95] Many drowning Russians were saved by their victorious foes.[14] However, local evidence later made public suggests that Napoleon's account of the catastrophe may have been exaggerated; on his instructions, the lakes were drained a few days after the battle, and the corpses of only two or three men, with some 150 horses, were found. On the other hand, Tsar Alexander I attested to the incident after the wars.[97]
Allied casualties stood at about 36,000 out of an army of 89,000, representing about 38% of their effective forces. The French were not unscathed in the battle, losing around 9,000 out of an army of 66,000, or about 13% of their forces. The Allies also lost some 180 guns and about 50 standards. As per more recent data, 186 guns (cannons) and 45 standards. The victory was met by sheer amazement and delirium in Paris, where the nation had been teetering on the brink of financial collapse just days earlier. Napoleon wrote toJosephine, "I have beaten the Austro-Russian army commanded by the two emperors. I am a little weary. ... I embrace you."[98][11] Napoleon's comments in this letter led to the battle's other famous designation, "Battle of the Three Emperors". However, Napoleon was mistaken as Emperor Francis of Austria was not present on the battlefield. Tsar Alexander perhaps best summed up the harsh times for the Allies by stating, "We are babies in the hands of a giant."[99] After hearing the news of Austerlitz, Pitt said of a map of Europe, "Roll up that map; it will not be wanted these ten years."[100]
France and Austria signed a truce on 4 December, and theTreaty of Pressburg, 22 days later, took the latter out of the war. Austria agreed to recognize French territory captured by the treaties ofCampo Formio (1797) andLunéville (1801), cede land to Bavaria,Württemberg andBaden, which were Napoleon's German allies, pay 40 million francs in war indemnities and cedeVenice to theKingdom of Italy. It was a harsh end for Austria, but certainly not a catastrophic peace. The Russian army was allowed to withdraw to its home territory, and the French ensconced themselves in Southern Germany. The Holy Roman Empire was extinguished, 1806 being seen as its final year. Napoleon created theConfederation of the Rhine, a string of German states meant to serve as a buffer between France and Prussia. Prussia saw these and other moves as an affront to its status as the main power of Central Europe, and it went towar with France in 1806.
Napoleon's words to his troops after the battle were full of praise:Soldats! Je suis content de vous ('Soldiers! I am pleased with you').
Napoleon wrote to his victorious army on the night of Austerlitz with his customaryrhetoric:[101]
Even at this hour, before this great day shall pass and be lost in the ocean of eternity, your emperor just address you, and say how satisfied he is with the conduct of all those who had the good fortune to fight in this memorable battle. Soldiers! You are the finest warriors in the World. The recollection of this day, and of your deeds, will be eternal! Thousands of ages hereafter, as long as the events of the universe continue to be relate, will it be told that a Russian army of 76,000 men, hired by the gold of England, was annihilated by you on the plains of Olmütz.
The Emperor provided two million golden francs to the higher officers and 200 francs to each soldier, with large pensions for the widows of the fallen, also providing 6,000 francs for the widows of fallen generals. Orphaned children were adopted by Napoleon personally and were allowed to add "Napoleon" to their baptismal and family names.[102] He could afford this, and much else besides, thanks to the return of financial confidence that swept the country as government bonds leaped from 45% to 66% of their face value on the news of victory.
Artists and musicians on the side of France and her conquests expressed their sentiments in the popular and elite art of the time. Prussian music criticE. T. A. Hoffmann, in his famous review ofBeethoven's 5th Symphony,
singles out for special abuse a certainBataille des trois Empereurs, a French battle symphony byLouis Jadin celebrating Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz.[103]
Archibald Alison in hisHistory of Europe (1836) offers the first recorded telling of the apocryphal story that when the Allies descended the Pratzen Heights to attack Napoleon's supposedly weak flank,
The marshals who surrounded Napoleon saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour ... "when the enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him."[105]
In subsequent accounts, this Napoleonic quote would undergo various changes until it became: "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."[106]
Napoleon did not succeed in defeating the Allied army as thoroughly as he wanted,[3] but historians and enthusiasts alike recognize that the original plan provided a significant victory, comparable to other great tactical battles such asCannae.[107] Some historians suggest that Napoleon was so successful at Austerlitz that he lost touch with reality, and what used to be French foreign policy became a "personal Napoleonic one" after the battle.[108] InFrench history, Austerlitz is acknowledged as an impressive military victory, and in the 19th century, when fascination with theFirst French Empire was at its height, the battle was revered by French authors such asVictor Hugo, who wrote of the "sound of heavy cannons rolling towards Austerlitz" echoing in the "depths of [his] thoughts".[109] In the 2005 bicentennial, however, controversy erupted when neither French PresidentJacques Chirac nor Prime MinisterDominique de Villepin attended any functions commemorating the battle.[110] On the other hand, some residents of France's overseas departments protested against what they viewed as the "official commemoration of Napoleon", arguing that Austerlitz should not be celebrated since they believed that Napoleon committedgenocide against colonial people.[110]
After the battle,Tsar Alexander I blamedKutuzov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army.[111] However, Kutuzov planned to retreat farther to the rear, where the Allied Army had a sharp advantage in logistics. Had the Allied Army retreated further, it might have been reinforced byArchduke Charles's troops from Italy, and thePrussians might have joined the Coalition against Napoleon. A French army at the end of its supply lines, in a place that had no food supplies, might have faced a very different ending from the one they achieved at the real battle of Austerlitz.[112]
Map of the landscape monument zoneCairn of Peace Memorial on the battlefield of Austerlitz
In the years following the battle, many memorials were set up around the affected villages to commemorate both the individual episodes of the battle and the thousands of its victims. Since 1992, the area where the Battle of Austerlitz took place has been protected by law as alandscape monument zone.[113] Its value lies in the historical peculiarities of the place, the historical connections of settlements, landscapes, and terrain formations, and the overall landscape image. The area extends to 19 of today'smunicipalities:[113]
NearPrace is theCairn of Peace Memorial, claimed to be the first peace memorial in Europe.[114] It was designed and built in theArt Nouveau style byJosef Fanta in 1910–1912.World War I postponed the monument's dedication until 1923.[114] It is 26 m (85 ft) high, square, with four female statues symbolizing France, Austria, Russia, and Moravia. Within is a chapel with an ossuary. A nearby small museum commemorates the battle.[115] Every year, the events of the Battle of Austerlitz are commemorated in a ceremony.
Pyramid of Austerlitz near Utrecht
Other memorials located in the monument zone include, among others:
The Staré Vinohrady height nearZbýšov saw the bloody collision of the French and Russian guards. In 2005, the Monument to the Three Emperors was erected here.[116][117]
Stará Pošta ("Old Post") inKovalovice is an original building from 1785, which now serves as a hotel and restaurant. On 28 November 1805, the French cavalry general Murat set up his headquarters here. On the day of the battle, the Russian general Bagration had his headquarters here. After the battle, Napoleon slept in this house and held preliminary negotiations about an armistice. A small museum commemorates these events.[116][118]
OnSanton Hill [cs] inTvarožná is a small white chapel.[119] The hill was a mainstay of the French position and allowed the French artillery to dominate the northern portion of the battlefield. Below the hill, the yearlyhistorical reenactments take place.[116]
OnŽuráň Hill, where Napoleon was headquartered, a granite monument depicts the battlefield positions.[120][116]
Slavkov Castle, where an armistice was signed between Austria and France after the battle on 6 December 1805. There is a small historical museum and a multimedia presentation about the battle.[116][121]
Several monuments to the battle can be found far beyond the battle area. A notable monument is thePyramid of Austerlitz, built by French soldiers stationed there to commemorate the 1805 campaign nearUtrecht in the Netherlands.[122] InParis, the 44-metre-high bronze Colonne Vendôme, a celebration of Napoleon, also stands on thePlace Vendôme. The monument was initially called the Column of Austerlitz and, according to propaganda, was cast from the melted-down barrels of Allied guns from the Battle of Austerlitz.[123] Several other sites and public buildings commemorate the encounter in Paris, such asPont d'Austerlitz and nearbyGare d'Austerlitz. A scene from the battle is also depicted on the bas-relief of the eastern pillar of theArc de Triomphe andArc de Triomphe du Carrousel.
^Nominal overall commander of the Russo-Austrian army. Substantially, he held control only over the 4th Column.
^Chief of staff. His plan of attack was chosen by Alexander I.
^French numbers at the battle vary depending on the account; 65,000–75,000 are figures often present in the literature. The discrepancy arises because about 7,000 men of Davout'sIII Corps were not at the battle right when it started. Including or not including these troops is a matter of preference (in this article, they will be included as separate from the 67,000 French soldiers originally on the field). David G. Chandler (1966) gives 67,000 (without Davout's III Corps).[2]
^Allied numbers at the battle vary depending on the account; 73,000, 84,000, or 89,000 are figures often present in the literature. Andrew Uffindell (2003) claims 73,000,[3] while David G. Chandler claims 85,000.[4] Scott Bowden (1997) writes that the traditional number given for the Allies, 85,000, reflects their theoretical strength, not the true numbers on the battlefield.[5]
^In all probability, the latter figure is very close to reality, which can range up to 9,000 or 9,500. "As always and everywhere, however, even the most accurate reports give only an order of magnitude." French researchers Danielle and Bernard Quintin recently conducted massive work that identified 1,537 Frenchmen dead, including those who died from wounds. In addition, the fate of the 400 French troops of Austerlitz is unknown.[6][7][8] Alexander Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky (1844) says that the French lost up to 8,000 dead or wounded and 760 missing. He also cites an unverified claim byMarshal Bernadotte, France's future rival, that the French lost "up to" 12,000 men.[9] Based on incomplete French data, Modest Bogdanovich (1869) cites the figure of 8,644 casualties among the French, trying to exalt it by claiming an identical one to Bernadotte's.[10] Andrew Roberts (2014) estimates total losses at 8,279;[11] these are only the dead and wounded.[12]
^Alexander Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky's book has a statement that the 21,000 Russian casualties are incomplete, as it excludes those who "dispersed," or, in other words, wentmissing in action.[9]
^Kutuzov commanded a column in Suvorov'sassault on Izmail. Bagration took one of the leading roles in Suvorov'sItalian and Swiss expedition of 1799, as did Miloradovich and N. Kamensky. Officers Wittgenstein and S. Kamensky took part in theassault on Praga, in which Buxhoeveden commanded one of the columns. At Austerlitz, Bagration commanded the right allied flank, Kutuzov (actually) commanded the central section, Buxhoeveden led the left allied flank, Miloradovich commanded thecolumn, while N. Kamensky, S. Kamensky, and Wittgenstein led thebrigades (seeBattle of Austerlitz order of battle).
^TheBaltic Sea was dominated by Russia, something Britain was not comfortable with, as it provided valuable commodities like timber, tar, and hemp which were crucial supplies to the British. Additionally, Britain supported theOttoman Empire against Russian incursions towards theMediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, French territorial rearrangements in Germany occurred without Russian consultation, and Napoleon's annexations in thePo valley increasingly strained relations between the two.[37]
^Sokolov (2019:344) cites modern French research showing 1,537 killed in Napoleon's army, including died of wounds. From this figure, subtract the older estimate of 1,305 killed cited by Sokolov (from reports given to Napoleon, as per Sokolov), yielding 232. The older figure for wounded cited by Sokolov is 6,940 (from reports given to Napoleon, as per Sokolov). 6,940 – 232 = 6,708.
^Farwell p. 64. "Austerlitz is generally regarded as one of Napoleon's tactical masterpieces and has been ranked as the equal of Arbela, Cannae, and Leuthen."
^Dupuy p. 102 Note: Dupuy was not afraid of expressing an opinion, and he classified some of his subjects as Great Captains, such asNapoleon.
^Hugo, Victor (1843) [1840]."Regard jeté dans une mansarde".Œuvres (in French). Vol. 3. Société Belge de Librairie. p. 51.Je ne hais pas d'entendre au fond de ma pensée / Le bruit des lourds canons roulant vers Austerlitz.
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