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Battle damage assessment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1998 BDA photograph of a military cable station inBasra,Iraq

Battle damage assessment (BDA), sometimes referred to asbomb damage assessment, is the process of evaluating the physical and functional damage inflicted on a target as a result of military operations. It is a core component ofcombat assessment and is used to inform judgments about mission effectiveness and potential follow-on actions, including reattack recommendations.[1]

History

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OSINT can useNASA'sFIRMS for BDA of e.g. the 2024Toropets depot explosions

DuringWorld War I, the expansion ofaerial bombardment made it difficult to determine the effects of attacks on distant targets, leading to the development of early battle damage assessment practices. Initial methods included debriefing aircrews and limited photo review, but byWorld War II, photographicreconnaissance had become widely used to evaluate the results of air operations.[2][3][4]

In some cases, BDA has come from information inadvertently released by the enemy. In World War II,United Press International transmitted a report on the damage caused by the Japanese attack onPearl Harbor, including details on the number of damaged warships and shore installations.[5]

During theVietnam War, U.S. ground forces and reconnaissance elements conducted on-the-ground assessments in operational areas where U.S. forces were present to evaluate the effects of air operations.[6]

BDA was used during both theGulf War andIraq War. In the opening days of the air campaign of the Gulf War, it was used to assess the damage to key Iraqi installations including its nuclear reactors.[7] At the conclusion of the2003 invasion of Iraq, a joint team from the allied nations (including Britain, the United States and Australia) assessed the damage caused to almost 400 sites across the country to determine the effectiveness of weapon strikes.[8]

In recent conflicts,unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used to support post-strike battle damage assessment through persistent overhead surveillance and real-time imagery fromelectro-optical andinfrared sensors.[9]Special operations forces (SOF) have taken part in BDA, both through physical presence, and conducting overflights with equipment such as theRQ-4 Global HawkUAV. TheIsraeli Defense Forces includes two teams dedicated to both target designation and BDA.[10]

As the field has advanced and the quantity of available data has increased, statistical techniques have been introduced to improve the speed and quality of data analysis.[11]

The advent of publicly available satellite imagery such asNASA'sFIRMS has allowed also foropen-source intelligence to do BDA.[12]

Objectives

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US Navy officer from the Combined Weapons Effectiveness Assessment Team (CWEAT) examines the effectiveness of aJoint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) at one ofSaddam Hussein’s presidential palaces.

The goal of this assessment is to evaluate the effects of military force on designated targets in order to determine whether operational objectives were achieved and to support subsequent decision-making.[13]

According to doctrinal guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the BDA methodology seeks to answer the following questions[1]:

  • Did the weapon or capability deliver the desired effect on the target?
  • What was the extent of the effect at the target element, target, and target system level?
  • Was there additional or collateral damage that should be reported?
  • Were the commander’s targeting objectives met?
  • What are the intelligence inputs for MEA (munitions effectiveness assessment)?
  • What are the intelligence inputs for RR (reattack recommendations) or future targeting recommendations?

Assessment process

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U.S. joint guidance describes battle damage assessment as a structured analytical process that evaluates physical, functional, and system-level effects and informs follow-on targeting decisions. The process relies on intelligence and operational reporting, including information derived from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and is refined as additional information becomes available.[1]

Assessment is performed using many techniques including footage from in-weapon cameras,gun cameras, forces on the ground near the target, satellite imagery and follow-up visits to the target. Fornuclear weapons, special techniques may be required due to the extensive damage caused and difficulty in approaching the site.[citation needed]

Limitations

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BDA relies on humans to interpret and analyze the data collected from various sources. Despite improvements in the data capture techniques, limitations in the assessment process were exposed following the 1991 Gulf War when the data supplied by on-board cameras was not analyzed correctly.[14] This flawed analysis resulted in incorrect or incomplete information being given to local commanders on the extent of the damage caused.[15] In particular the analysis did not reliably identify whether a target had been damaged (but remained militarily viable) or was no longer a threat.[15]

Use of misinformation

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Information on battle damage is highly valuable to the enemy and military intelligence and censors will endeavor to conceal, exaggerate or underplay the extent of damage depending on the circumstances. Following theBluff Cove Air Attacks during theFalklands War, the British military misled the media into exaggerating the real casualty numbers from less than 50 killed to a range of 400–900 killed and wounded.[16] This misinformation is believed to have contributed to the weak resistance faced by the British during the subsequent assault onPort Stanley.[16]

References

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  1. ^abcCJCSI 3162.02A: Methodology for Combat Assessment(PDF) (Report). Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2021-07-16.Archived(PDF) from the original on 2026-01-15. Retrieved2026-01-14.Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in thepublic domain.
  2. ^Rauch, John T. (2004-08-01).Assessing Airpower’s Effects: Capabilities and Limitations of Real-Time Battle Damage Assessment (Report). Air University Press. pp. 1–2. Retrieved2026-01-15.{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  3. ^Cornelius, George (1959-07-01)."Air Reconnaissance—Great Silent Weapon".U.S. Naval Institute. Archived fromthe original on 2026-01-15. Retrieved2026-01-15.
  4. ^Reading, Oliver S. (1944-01-01)."Science—Study of Invariables".American Scientist.32 (1):54–64.
  5. ^Wilsbacher, Greg (2010)."Al Brick: The Forgotten Newsreel Man at Pearl Harbor".The Moving Image.10 (2).University of Minnesota Press: 36.
  6. ^Rosenau, William (2001)."Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War"(PDF).apps.dtic.mil. RAND Project Air Force.Archived(PDF) from the original on 2025-02-02. Retrieved2026-01-15.
  7. ^Feinstein, Lee (1991-03-01)."Iraqi Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Facilities Attacked".Arms Control Today.Arms Control Association: 19.
  8. ^"Cultural pursuit inspires Fellowship: Assessing bomb damage in Iraq". Air Force News. Retrieved2014-08-14.
  9. ^Lambeth, Benjamin S. (2011)."Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah"(PDF).apps.dtic.mil. RAND Project Air Force.Archived(PDF) from the original on 2025-02-02. Retrieved2026-01-15.
  10. ^Brookes, Andrew (2007-05-03)."Calculations for an Air Attack on Iran: Bombs Away?".The World Today.63 (3).Royal Institute of International Affairs.
  11. ^Orr, M. & Spohn, R. H. (July 1967). "A Multivariate Statistical Model for Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment".Operations Research.15 (4): 706.doi:10.1287/opre.15.4.706.
  12. ^Gonzales, Carlos (2022-10-04)."Scorched Earth: Using NASA Fire Data to Monitor War Zones".Bellingcat. Retrieved2024-09-22.
  13. ^"USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide: Air Force Pamphlet 14-210 Intelligence, Chapter 9: Combat Assessment".Federation of American Scientists: Intelligence Resource Program. 1998-02-01.Archived from the original on 2026-01-01. Retrieved2026-01-01.
  14. ^Cohen, Eliot A. (1994-01-01)."The Mystique of U.S. Air Power".Foreign Affairs.73 (1). Council on Foreign Relations: 113.doi:10.2307/20045895.JSTOR 20045895. Archived fromthe original on 2024-01-15.
  15. ^abBoren, David L. (1992-01-01)."The Winds of Change at the CIA".The Yale Law Journal.101 (4): 859.doi:10.2307/796875.JSTOR 796875. Archived fromthe original on 2026-01-17.{{cite journal}}:|archive-date= /|archive-url= timestamp mismatch; 2026-01-18 suggested (help)
  16. ^abYoel Cohen (1986).Media Diplomacy: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age. Frank Cass and Company Limited. p. 145.ISBN 0-7146-3269-4.
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