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Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation

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Interpretation of intuitionistic logic

Inmathematical logic, theBrouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation, orBHK interpretation, is an explanation of the meaning ofproof inintuitionistic logic, proposed byL. E. J. Brouwer andArend Heyting, and independently byAndrey Kolmogorov. It is also sometimes called therealizability interpretation, because of the connection with therealizability theory ofStephen Kleene. It is the standard explanation of intuitionistic logic.[1]

The interpretation

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The interpretation states what is intended to be a proof of a givenformula. This is specified byinduction on the structure of that formula:

Note that it may be possible to provePQ{\displaystyle P\to Q} even though there are no proofs ofP{\displaystyle P} (or proofs ofQ{\displaystyle Q});PQ{\displaystyle P\to Q} is the hypothetical assertion that a proof ofQ{\displaystyle Q} could be built out of a proof ofP{\displaystyle P}, if one were available.

Kolmogorov followed the same lines but phrased his interpretation in terms of problems and solutions. To assert a formula is to claim to know a solution to the problem represented by that formula. For instancePQ{\displaystyle P\to Q} is the problem of reducingQ{\displaystyle Q} toP{\displaystyle P}; to solve it requires a method to solve problemQ{\displaystyle Q} given a solution to problemP{\displaystyle P}.

The interpretation of a primitive proposition is supposed to be known from context. In the context of arithmetic, a proof of the formulax=y{\displaystyle x=y} is a computation reducing the two terms to the same numeral.

Definition of construction

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The BHK interpretation will depend on the view taken about what constitutes aconstruction that converts one proof to another, or that converts an element of a domain to a proof. Different versions ofconstructivism will diverge on this point.

Kleene'srealizability theory identifies constructions with thecomputable functions. It deals with Heyting arithmetic, where the domain of quantification is the natural numbers and the primitive propositions are of the formx =y. A proof ofx =y is simply the trivial algorithm ifx evaluates to the same number thaty does (which is always decidable for natural numbers), otherwise there is no proof. These are then built up by induction into more complex algorithms.

If one takeslambda calculus as defining the notion of a construction, then the BHK interpretation describes thecorrespondence between natural deduction and lambda functions.

Definition of absurdity

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It is not, in general, possible for alogical system to have a formal negation operator such that there is a proof of "not"P{\displaystyle P} exactly when there isn't a proof ofP{\displaystyle P}; seeGödel's incompleteness theorems. The BHK interpretation instead takes "not"P{\displaystyle P} to mean thatP{\displaystyle P} leads to absurdity, designated{\displaystyle \bot }, so that a proof of¬P{\displaystyle \lnot P} is a construction converting a proof ofP{\displaystyle P} into a proof of absurdity.

A standard example of absurdity is found in dealing with arithmetic. Assume that 0 = 1, and proceed bymathematical induction: 0 = 0 by the axiom of equality. Now (induction hypothesis), if 0 were equal to a certainnatural numbern, then 1 would be equal ton + 1, (Peano axiom:Sm =Sn if and only ifm =n), but since 0 = 1, therefore 0 would also be equal ton + 1. By induction, 0 is equal to all numbers, and therefore any two natural numbers become equal.

Therefore, there is a way to go from a proof of 0 = 1 to a proof of any basic arithmetic equality, and thus to a proof of any complex arithmetic proposition. Furthermore, to get this result it was not necessary to invoke the Peano axiom that states that 0 is "not" the successor of any natural number. This makes 0 = 1 suitable as{\displaystyle \bot } inHeyting arithmetic (and the Peano axiom is rewritten 0 =Sn → 0 =S0). This use of 0 = 1 validates theprinciple of explosion.

Examples

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The identity function is a proof of the formulaPP{\displaystyle P\to P}, no matter whatP is.

Thelaw of non-contradiction¬(P¬P){\displaystyle \neg (P\wedge \neg P)} expands to(P(P)){\displaystyle (P\wedge (P\to \bot ))\to \bot }:

Putting it all together, a proof of(P(P)){\displaystyle (P\wedge (P\to \bot ))\to \bot } is a construction that converts a paira,b{\displaystyle \langle a,b\rangle } – wherea{\displaystyle a} is a proof ofP{\displaystyle P}, andb{\displaystyle b} is a construction that converts a proof ofP{\displaystyle P} into a proof of{\displaystyle \bot } – into a proof of{\displaystyle \bot }. There is a functionf{\displaystyle f} that does this, wheref(a,b)=b(a){\displaystyle f(\langle a,b\rangle )=b(a)}, proving the law of non-contradiction, no matter whatP is.

Indeed, the same line of thought provides a proof for themodus ponens rule(P(PQ))Q{\displaystyle (P\wedge (P\to Q))\to Q} as well, whereQ{\displaystyle Q} is any proposition.

On the other hand, thelaw of excluded middleP(¬P){\displaystyle P\vee (\neg P)} expands toP(P){\displaystyle P\vee (P\to \bot )}, and in general has no proof. According to the interpretation, a proof ofP(¬P){\displaystyle P\vee (\neg P)} is a paira,b{\displaystyle \langle a,b\rangle } wherea is 0 andb is a proof ofP{\displaystyle P}, ora is 1 andb is a proof ofP{\displaystyle P\to \bot }. Thus if neitherP{\displaystyle P} norP{\displaystyle P\to \bot } is provable then neither isP(¬P){\displaystyle P\vee (\neg P)}.

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^Van Atten 2022.

References

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External links

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