This article is about authoritarianism in political science and organizational studies. For authoritarianism in psychology, seeAuthoritarian personality. For a form of government where power is held by a single individual, seeAutocracy.
The political scientistJuan Linz, in an influential[8] 1964 work,An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:
Political legitimacy based on appeals to emotion and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such asunderdevelopment orinsurgency."
Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, used to extend the power of the executive.[9][10]
Minimally defined, an authoritarian government lacks free and competitivedirect elections tolegislatures, free and competitive direct orindirect elections forexecutives, or both.[11][12][13][14] Broadly defined, authoritarian states include countries that lackhuman rights such asfreedom of religion, or countries in which the government and theopposition do not alternate in power at least once following free elections.[15] Authoritarian states might contain nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures and elections which are managed to entrench authoritarian rule and can feature fraudulent, non-competitive elections.[16]
Since 1946, the share of authoritarian states in the international political system increased until the mid-1970s but declined from then until the year 2000.[17] Prior to 2000, dictatorships typically began with acoup and replaced a pre-existing authoritarian regime.[18] Since 2000, dictatorships are most likely to begin throughdemocratic backsliding whereby a democratically elected leader established an authoritarian regime.[18]
Characteristics
Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated andcentralized government power maintained bypolitical repression and the exclusion of potential or supposed challengers by armed force. It usespolitical parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.[19]Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity."[20]
Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise ofpolitical power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation ofcivil liberties and little tolerance for meaningfulopposition.[19] A range ofsocial controls also attempt to stiflecivil society while political stability is maintained by control over and support of thearmed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation ofallegiance through various means ofsocialization and indoctrination.[19]Pippa Norris andRonald Inglehart identify authoritarianism in politicians and political parties by looking for values of security, conformity, and obedience.[21]
Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler orruling party (often in aone-party state) or other authority.[19] The transition from an authoritarian system to a moredemocratic form of government is referred to asdemocratization.[19]
Constitutions in authoritarian regimes
Authoritarian regimes often adopt "the institutional trappings" of democracies such asconstitutions.[22] Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function); "billboard" (signal of regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice).[23] Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes.[24] An authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting re coordination on a different set of arrangements."[25] Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior.[26]
TheSoviet Russia Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the newRussian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described byVladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state.[27] The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholarMark Tushnet.[28] Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power).[28] He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritariandominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do notarbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permit "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections", without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail – and by a substantial margin"; (5) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (6) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." Tushnet citesSingapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state, and connects the concept to that ofhybrid regimes.[28]
China received 9 out of 100 points in Freedom House's 2024 Global Freedom Score.[48] The party promotes itself as 'consultative' on local issues and some scholars describe the Chinese system as "a fragmented authoritarianism" (Lieberthal), "a negotiated state", or "a consultative authoritarian regime."[49]
Since the enactment of theHong Kong National Security Law, the Hong Kong government began cracking down on pro-democracy activists, politicians, and news outlets. Which is considered by many to be a sign of rising authoritarianism in Hong Kong.[63][64][65]
After theIranian Revolution, Iran became atotalitarianclerical state (nominally an "Islamic republic") based on the absolute authority of the unelectedSupreme Leader of Iran, based on the strictShia concept ofGuardianship of the Islamic Jurist.If it has the opportunity, this legal body will remove reformist politicians.[68][69] In 2000, Juan José Linz wrote that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated."[70]
Although it has boasted of being the "only democracy in the Middle East" the treatment in reference to Palestine is strictly authoritarian, such as the prohibition of commemorating theNakba to members of theKnesset, the prohibition of blocking a state sovereign Palestinian or even not abiding by UN resolutions.[71][72][73][74]
The Tatmadaw allowed a democratically elected administration to exercise some power from 2016 to 2021, without allowing civilian control of the military.[80]
Habré was deposed byIdriss Déby, he was tried in Senegal for crimes against his country and died in prison months after the man who removed him from power died in combat.
Nino Vieira would govern in an authoritarian manner in the 80s and 90s until his overthrow, in 2005 he returned to the presidency until his assassination in 2009.
Formelly named Nur Otan. The incumbent presidentKassym-Jomart Tokayev renounced his party membership, establishing in the amendments of the second republic that no president should have affiliation with any party.[46]
The 250-member Senate, appointed by themilitary junta, has considerable power, they have the right to approve the appointment of the Prime Minister and theHouse of Representatives has often been intervene by the Senate. In the 2023 election, even though theMove Forward Party withPita Limjaroenrat as the leader will have the most votes. However, the Senate rejected Pita as Prime Minister.[164]
The Democratic Republic of the Congo after 1997 is listed above.[127]
Economy
Scholars such asSeymour Lipset,[171] Carles Boix,Susan Stokes,[172] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens[173] argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization.Adam Przeworski andFernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).[174]
Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances thebourgeoise andlabor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.[175] Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.[176]
According to Michael Albertus, mostland reform programs tend to be implemented by authoritarian regimes that subsequently withholdproperty rights from the beneficiaries of the land reform. Authoritarian regimes do so to gain coercive leverage over rural populations.[177]
Institutions
Authoritarian regimes typically incorporate similar political institutions to that of democratic regimes, such as legislatures and judiciaries, although they may serve different purposes. Democratic regimes are marked by institutions that are essential to economic development and individual freedom, including representative legislatures and competitive political parties.[178][179] Most authoritarian regimes embrace these political structures, but use it in a way that reinforces their power.[178] Authoritarian legislatures, for example, are forums through which leaders may enhance their bases of support, share power, and monitor elites.[180] Additionally, authoritarian party systems are extremely unstable and unconducive to party development, largely due to monopolistic patterns of authority.[181] Judiciaries may be present in authoritarian states where they serve to repress political challengers, institutionalize punishment, and undermine the rule of law.[182]
Democratic and authoritarian arguably differ most prominently in their elections. Democratic elections are generally inclusive, competitive, and fair.[183] In most instances, the elected leader is appointed to act on behalf of the general will. Authoritarian elections, on the other hand, are frequently subject tofraud and extreme constraints on the participation of opposing parties.[181] Autocratic leaders employ tactics like murdering political opposition and paying election monitors to ensure victory.[178][184] The proportion of authoritarian regimes with elections and support parties has risen in recent years.[178] This is largely due to the increasing popularity of democracies and electoral autocracies, leading authoritarian regimes to imitate democratic regimes in hopes of receivingforeign aid and dodging criticism.[178][185] Flawed elections also give authoritarians a controlled way to monitor public sentiment.[186]
According to a 2018 study, most party-led dictatorships regularly hold popular elections. Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to choose. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime.[187] In 2020, almost half of all authoritarian systems had multi-party governments.[188] Cabinet appointments by an authoritarian regime to outsiders can consolidate their rule by dividing the opposition and co-opting outsiders.[188]
Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:[187]
Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
Interference with opposition campaigning.
Electoral fraud.
Violence against opposition.
Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
Permitting of some parties, but not others.
Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.
Interactions with other elites and the masses
The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation orrepression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts.[189][190] Authoritarian rule entails a balancing act whereby the ruler has to maintain the support of other elites (frequently through the distribution of state and societal resources) and the support of the public (through distribution of the same resources): the authoritarian rule is at risk if the balancing act is lopsided, as it risks a coup by the elites or an uprising by the mass public.[191][192]
According to a 2019 study bySergei Guriev andDaniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and massrepression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted tomanipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.[193]
While authoritarian regimes invest considerably in propaganda out of a belief that it enhances regime survival, scholars have offered mixed views as to whether propaganda is effective.[194]
Systemic weakness and resilience
Anarchist protest with sign reading "just say no to authoritarian rule"
Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. ... Few authoritarian regimes – be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist – have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions."[195]
Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise thelegitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.[19]
One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of theChinese Communist Party which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors such as (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large."[195]
Some scholars have challenged notions that authoritarian states are inherently brittle systems that requirerepression and propaganda to make people comply with the authoritarian regime.Adam Przeworski has challenged this, noting that while authoritarian regimes do take actions that serve to enhance regime survival, they also engage in mundane everyday governance and their subjects do not hold a posture towards the regime at all moments of their life. He writes, "People in autocracies do not incessantly live under the shadow of dramatic historical events; they lead everyday routine lives."[196] Similarly,Thomas Pepinsky has challenged the common mental image of an authoritarian state as one of grim totalitarianism, desperate hardship, strict censorship, and dictatorial orders of murder, torture and disappearances. He writes, "life in authoritarian states is mostly boring and tolerable."[197]
Violence
Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses.[189]
Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to ascoup-proofing (structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power). Coup-proofing strategies include strategically placing family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creating of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.[198] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring[199][200] and reduce the likelihood of mass protests.[201] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,[202][203][204][205] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[206] A 2016 study shows that the implementation ofsuccession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[207] Succession rules are believed to hampercoordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.[207] According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighboring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-relatedrepression in a region.[208] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[209] A 2018 study in theJournal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.[210] A 2019 study inConflict Management and Peace Science found thatpersonalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."[211]
According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.[212]
According to University of Michigan professor Dan Slater, modern forms of authoritarianism are fundamentally dissimilar from historical forms of nondemocratic rule. He links modern authoritarianism to the era ofmass politics, which began with theFrench Revolution.[215]
Similar terms
An authoritarian regime has "a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people".[216] Unlike totalitarian states, they will allow social and economic institutions not under governmental control,[217] and tend to rely on passive mass acceptance rather than active popular support.[218]
AnAutocracy is a state/government in which one person possesses "unlimited power".
ATotalitarian state is "based on subordination of the individual to the state and strict control of all aspects of the life and productive capacity of the nation especially by coercive measures (such as censorship and terrorism)".[219] and are ruled by a single ruling party made up of loyal supporters.[220] Unlike autocracies, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[221] totalitarian states are characterized by an official ideology, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[221] and "seek to dominate every aspect of everyone's life as a prelude to world domination".[221]
AFascist state is autocratic and based on a political philosophy/movement, (such as that of the Fascisti of pre-WWII Italy) "that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition".[222]
Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others.[224] Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:
Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy,patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties." An example isEthiopia underHaile Selassie I.[224]Honoring South Korean PresidentPark Chung-hee in Army Parade atArmed Forces Day on 1 October 1973
Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by acoalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality."[224]Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" suchSouth Korea underPark Chung-hee.[224]
According toBarbara Geddes, there are seven typologies of authoritarian regimes: dominant party regimes, military regime, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic regimes, indirect military regimes, or hybrids of the first three.[225]
Subtypes of authoritarian regimes identified by Linz arecorporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.[224]
Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups." This type has been studied most extensively inLatin America.[224]
Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as inSouth Africa under apartheid.[224]
Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are more personalistic orpopulist.[224][additional citation(s) needed] Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule andauthority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules."[224] Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups."[224] Examples includeArgentina underJuan Perón,[224]Russia underVladimir Putin,Egypt underGamal Abdel Nasser[224] andVenezuela underHugo Chávez andNicolás Maduro.[232][233]
A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories:
Lai and Slater argue that single-party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g.mass mobilization, patronage networks and coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control as compared to single-party regimes.[4][3]
John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism andcollectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition toindividualism.[234] Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submergeindividual rights and goals to group goals, expectations andconformities.[235]
According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, authoritarian regimes that are created insocial revolutions are far more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes.[236]
A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes calledmilitarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewercivil wars.[247][248]
Research shows that the democratic nations have much lessdemocide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.[249] Research by theWorld Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence ofcorruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability andfreedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.[250]
A 2006 study by economistAlberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediatepolitical freedom. The nations with the leastterrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism."[251] Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies."[252] A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies andpolyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety", resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care" which averts casualties.[252] Magen also stated that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.[252]
Within national democratic governments, there may be subnational authoritarian enclaves. A prominent examples of this includes the Southern United States afterReconstruction, as well as areas of contemporary Argentina and Mexico.[253][254]
Competitive authoritarian regimes
Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."[255][256] The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type ofhybrid regime that emerged during and after theCold War.[255][257]
Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power."[255] Competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies such as free elections (i.e. elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e. the freedom of speech, press and association) and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media and legal recourse).[258]
Authoritarianism and fascism
Authoritarianism is considered a core concept offascism[259][260][261][262] and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.[263]
Multiple scholars have identified a form of libertarian authoritarianism emerging in the early 21st century.Wendy Brown describes it as emerging from neoliberalism, opposing both democracy and public institutions while defining freedom in terms of speech and actions that promotehomophobia,white supremacy andmale privilege.[268][269] Other scholars have connected it toQAnon[270] and to the ArgentinianPresidency of Javier Milei.[271]
Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey, inOffended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism, describe libertarian authoritarianism as arising from a backlash to government efforts to contain theCOVID-19 pandemic and, more broadly, against the increasing complexity of the world, ultimately leading to hostility towards democracy.[272][273] Writing inJacobin andNew Statesman, Amlinger and Nachtwey define libertarian authoritarians as those who believe in the abolition of the democratic state on the basis of its restrictions on individual freedoms, and "consider the democratic state itself, the authorities and their regulations, to be invasive and harmful"; they described the fundamental basis of libertarian authoritarianism to be based in "post-truth politics", and that in thelate-modern era, believers validate their opinions "withproto-scientific evidence, rumours,conspiracy theories andfake news". They describeneoliberalism as an additional factor contributing towards the recent rise of the ideology.[274][275] Individuals they identify as modern adherents to the ideology includePeter Thiel,Elon Musk, andJavier Milei, having merged their libertarianism with their "authoritarian tendencies".[274][275]
Authoritarianism and totalitarianism
Benito Mussolini, the founder ofItalian fascism, called his regime the "Totalitarian State": "Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State."[276]
Totalitarianism is a label used by variouspolitical scientists to characterize the most tyrannical strain of authoritarian systems; in which the ruling elite, often subservient to adictator, exert near-total control of the social, political, economic, cultural and religious aspects of society in the territories under its governance.[277]
Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, takingFrancoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, theCatholic Church,Falange,monarchists,technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.[218] According to Juan Linz the distinction between an authoritarian regime and atotalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization while totalitarianism seeks to control and use them.[213] Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of theUniversity of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:[217]
Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms ofautocracy, they differ in three keydichotomies:
(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop acharismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democraticinterdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.
(2)Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largelyteleological. Thetyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.
(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal ofideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering akleptocracy.[217]
Kim Il Sung, founder of North Korea, established an authoritarian regime which was modeled after other totalitarian countries.[278]
Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invadesprivate life and asphyxiates it."[279] Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature."[279]Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by asecret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.[279]
Greg Yudin, a professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, argues "political passivity and civic disengagement" are "key features" of authoritarianism, while totalitarianism relies on "mass mobilization, terror and homogeneity of beliefs".[280]
Economic effects
In 2010, Dani Rodrik wrote that democracies outperform autocracies in terms of long-term economic growth, economic stability, adjustments to external economic shocks, human capital investment, and economic equality.[281] A 2019 study byDaron Acemoglu,Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, andJames A. Robinson found that democracy increases GDP per capita by about 20 percent over the long-term.[282] According toAmartya Sen, no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scalefamine.[283] Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have withGDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality.[284] States that undergo democratic backsliding are more likely to face downgrades in their sovereign bond ratings.[285]
One of the few areas that some scholars have theorized that autocracies may have an advantage, is in industrialization.[286] In the 20th century,Seymour Martin Lipset argued that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies that gives authoritarian regimes an advantage ineconomic development.[287] By contrast,Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism, pointing out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes (such as refugee crises) than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties in democracies act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable than authoritarian regimes.[287]
Military effects
According to Allan C. Stam and Dan Reiter, liberal democracies have an advantage in battlefield performance over non-democracies and illiberal democracies.[288] They argue that this democratic advantage is derived from the fact that democratic soldiers fight harder, democratic states tend to ally together in war, and democracies can employ more economic resources towards combat.[288] Due to elevated fears against military coups against authoritarian regimes, authoritarian regimes may also put loyalists in the military. This may reduce military effectiveness as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military.[289][290][291][292] However, critics argue that democracy itself makes little difference in war and that some other factors, such as overall power, determine whether a country would achieve victory or face defeat. In some cases, such as theVietnam War, democracy may even have contributed to defeat.[293][294][295][296] Jasen Castillo argues that autocratic states may in certain circumstances have an advantage over democracies; for example, authoritarian regimes may have ideologies that require unconditional loyalty, which may contribute to military cohesion.[297]
Historical trends
Pre-World War II
Authoritarian rule before World War II includes short-lived dictatorships and has been claimed to be understudied.[298]
BothWorld War II (ending in 1945) and theCold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.
World War II saw the defeat of theAxis powers by theAllied powers. All the Axis powers (Nazi Germany,Fascist Italy andImperial Japan) had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. TheAllied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the CommunistSoviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The newFederal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteenLänder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.[299]
Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based onanti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance fromoccupation and to fears arising from the development ofsuperpowers.[300] Anti-authoritarianism also became associated withcountercultural andbohemian movements such as theBeat Generation in the 1950s,[301] thehippies in the 1960s[302] andpunks in the 1970s.[303]
In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.[304]
With the fall of theBerlin Wall in 1989 and theSoviet Union in1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated.[305] The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed"[306] became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated inFrancis Fukuyama's bookThe End of History and the Last Man.[306] According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving towards democracy in the early 1990s" as were the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.[307]
In December 2010, theArab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first inTunisia, and spreading toLibya,Egypt,Yemen,Syria,Bahrain and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled inTunisia,Libya,Egypt and partially inYemen while other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies. Most Arab Spring revolutions failed to lead to enduring democratization. In the decade following the Arab Spring, of the countries in which an autocracy was toppled in the Arab spring, only Tunisia had become a genuine democracy; Egypt backslid to return to a military-run authoritarian state, while Libya, Syria and Yemen experienced devastating civil wars.[308][309]
21st-century
Since 2005, observers noted what some have called a "democratic recession",[306][310] although some such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have disputed that there was a significant democratic decline before 2013.[310] In 2018, theFreedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018 "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement."[311] Its 2020 report marked the fourteenth consecutive year of declining scores.[312] By 2020, all countries marked as "not free" byFreedom House had also developed practices oftransnational repression, aiming to police and control dissent beyond state borders.[313]
International trends in democracy/authoritarianism
Writing in 2018, American political journalistDavid Frum stated: "The hopeful world of the very late 20th century – the world ofNAFTA and an expandingNATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such asVáclav Havel andNelson Mandela – now looks battered and delusive."[316]
Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment"[306] and Fukuyama himself expressed concern.[305] By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising (that in Tunisia) resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance[317] and a "resurgence of authoritarianism andIslamic extremism" in the region[318] was dubbed theArab Winter.[319][320][321][322][323]
Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization, and the subsequent rise ofpopulism andneo-nationalism,[324] and the success of theBeijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of thePeople's Republic of China.[325] In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the2008 financial crisis and slower real wage growth[326][unreliable source?] as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge – the equivalent ofdisintermediation in economics – so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts" – including everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination – and considers to be fact what are actually only unproven fringe opinions.[327]
The current resurgence of far-right ideology may be explained by a variety of factors, primarily, the strategic adjustment of white supremacists to soften overtly racist rhetoric in order to appeal to a wider audience. This new discourse attempts to normalize white supremacy, developing intellectual and theoretical foundations for racism based on the notion that the white race is at risk of eradication, threatened by the growing population of immigrants and people of colour. The pre-existing, offensive white supremacist, fascist and neo-Nazi ideas that drove the white power movement of the twentieth century were thus rebranded through a new innocuous defensive frame of white victimhood. As such, the new strategy of racist rhetoric has allowed the movement to co-opt mainstream political debates surrounding immigration and globalization, drawing large audiences through a deliberate obfuscation of the underlying ideology.
There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted. States characterized as authoritarian are typically not rated as democracies byThe Economist Democracy Index or as 'free' byFreedom House'sFreedom in the World index, and do not reach a high score onV-Dem Democracy Indices. According to an April 2025 survey, known as Bright Line Watch, of more than 500 U.S.-based political scientists, the vast majority think the United States is moving from liberal democracy to a form of authoritarianism.[329]
^Eritrea gainedde facto independence in 1991;de jure independence was achieved in 1993.
^While FijiFirst's leader,Frank Bainimarama, still forms government in Fiji, democratic elections were held again in 2014 after eight years without elections following the2006 Fijian coup d'état.
^Cerutti, Furio (2017).Conceptualizing Politics: An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Routledge. p. 17.Political scientists have outlined elaborated typologies of authoritarianism, from which it is not easy to draw a generally accepted definition; it seems that its main features are the non-acceptance of conflict and plurality as normal elements of politics, the will to preserve thestatus quo and prevent change by keeping all political dynamics under close control by a strong central power, and lastly, the erosion of the rule of law, the division of powers, and democratic voting procedures.
^abEzrow, Natasha M.; Frantz, Erica (2011).Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders.Continuum. p. 17.
^abcLai, Brian; Slater, Dan (2006). "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992".American Journal of Political Science.50 (1):113–126.doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x.JSTOR3694260.
^Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," inErik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds.,Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society), pp. 291–342. Reprinted in Erik Allardt & Stine Rokkan, eds.,Mas Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 251–283, 374–381.[ISBN missing]
^Svolik, Milan W. (2012).The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 22–23.Archived from the original on 21 October 2019. Retrieved21 October 2019.I follow Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) in defining adictatorship as an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems. Throughout this book, I use the termsdictatorship andauthoritarian regime interchangeably and refer to the heads of these regimes' governments as simplydictators orauthoritarian leaders, regardless of their formal title.
^Svolik, Milan W. (2012).The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. p. 20.Archived from the original on 21 October 2019. Retrieved21 October 2019.More demanding criteria may require that governments respect certain civil liberties – such as the freedom of religion (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Zakaria 1997) – or that the incumbent government and the opposition alternate in power at least once after the first seemingly free election (Huntington 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibib et al. 2010).
^Svolik, Milan W. (2012).The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 8, 12, 22, 25, 88, 117.Archived from the original on 21 October 2019. Retrieved21 October 2019.
^Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald (2018).Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian-populism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 14.ISBN978-1-108-42607-7.
^Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, "The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions", inConstitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80.
^Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser,Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 3–10.
^Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo,Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 54.
^Davis S. Law & Mila Versteeg, "Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism" inConstitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 173.
^Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo,Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 54, 80.
^*Sakhi, Nilofar (December 2022). "The Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan and Security Paradox".Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs.9 (3):383–401.doi:10.1177/23477970221130882.S2CID253945821.Afghanistan is now controlled by a militant group that operates out of a totalitarian ideology.
Madadi, Sayed (6 September 2022)."Dysfunctional centralization and growing fragility under Taliban rule".Middle East Institute. Retrieved28 November 2022.In other words, the centralized political and governance institutions of the former republic were unaccountable enough that they now comfortably accommodate the totalitarian objectives of the Taliban without giving the people any chance to resist peacefully.
Sadr, Omar (23 March 2022)."Afghanistan's Public Intellectuals Fail to Denounce the Taliban".Fair Observer. Retrieved28 November 2022.The Taliban government currently installed in Afghanistan is not simply another dictatorship. By all standards, it is a totalitarian regime.
^Vincent, Rebecca (19 May 2013)."When the music dies: Azerbaijan one year after Eurovision".Al Jazeera.Archived from the original on 7 June 2013. Retrieved10 June 2013.Over the past several years, Azerbaijan has become increasingly authoritarian, as the authorities have used tactics such as harassment, intimidation, blackmail, attack and imprisonment to silence the regime's critics, whether journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, political activists or ordinary people taking to the streets in protest.
^Stocks, Tom; Miranda Patrucic; Ilya Lozovsky; Kelly Bloss."Azerbaijan's Ruling Aliyev Family and Their Associates Acquired Dozens of Prime London Properties Worth Nearly $700 Million".OCCRP. Retrieved22 January 2024.The Aliyev family's rule over Azerbaijan began with Ilham's father Heydar Aliyev, a longtime Soviet official who took control of the country two years after it gained its independence in 1991. The elder Aliyev was an authoritarian leader, and under his watch Azerbaijan began developing into a corrupt petro-state.
^Jamgochian, Nevdon (28 February 2021)."Artwashing a Dictatorship".Hyperallergic. Retrieved22 January 2024.This family, the Aliyevs, have ruled Azerbaijan in some manner for 50 years.
^Horan, John (7 December 2023). "Azerbaijan's Aliyev calls snap presidential election for February -- Spoiler alert: He's going to be re-elected by a huge margin".Eurasianet.Aliyev effectively inherited the Azerbaijani presidency after his father Heydar's death in 2003. Heydar Aliyev had been president since 1993. He was also the head of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1969-82. So if Ilham wins in February and serves out his fifth term through 2031, the Aliyev dynasty will have led Azerbaijan in one form or another for more than 50 years in a span of just over 61 years.
^"Profile: Alexander Lukashenko".BBC News. BBC. 9 January 2007.Archived from the original on 23 October 2007. Retrieved7 August 2014...an authoritarian ruling style is characteristic of me [Lukashenko]
^"Belarus: Events of 2004".Essential Background – Belarus. Human Rights Watch. 2005. Archived fromthe original on 26 March 2006. Retrieved26 March 2006.
^Metelits, Claire; Matti, Stephanie (2015). "Authoritarianism and Geostrategic Policies in Djibouti".Democratic Contestation on the Margins: Regimes in Small African Countries. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. pp. 99–122.ISBN978-0-7391-9343-3.
^Metelits, Claire; Matti, Stephanie (12 July 2013). "Deserting Democracy: Authoritarianism and Geo-Strategic Politics in Djibouti".Presented at the African Studies Association Annual Conference, November 2013.
^Mehran Tamadonfar,Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran: Transcending Islam for Social, Economic, and Political Order (Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 311–313.
^Rosefielde, Steven; Hedlund, Stefan (2009).Russia Since 1980. Cambridge University Press. p. 174.ISBN978-0-521-84913-5. Retrieved23 September 2023.Duma election of 2003, reducing the legislature to a rubber stamp.
^Toby Craig Jones,Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (2011), Harvard University Press, pp. 5, 14–15; Kira D. Baiasu,Sustaining Authoritarian RuleArchived 2 January 2013 at theWayback Machine Fall 2009, Volume 10, Issue 1 (30 September 2009),Northwestern Journal of International Affairs.
^Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Limits of Islam" inConstitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity (Oxford University Press, 2012: eds. Rainer Grote & Tilmann J. Röder), p. 428.
^abcdGuillermo A. O'Donnell,Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective (University of California Press, 1988); James M. Malloy,Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, inDemocracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (1996; ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Howard J. Wiards,Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "ism" (1997), pp. 113–114.
^abJames M. Malloy,Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles (ed. Roderic A. Camp), p. 122; Thomas E. Skidmore,The Political Economy of Policy-making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1967–70, inGenerals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America (1985), eds. Philip J. O'Brien & Paul A. Cammack, Manchester University Press.
^Dal Lago, Enrico (2018).Civil War and Agrarian Unrest: The Confederate South and Southern Italy.Cambridge University Press. p. 79.ISBN978-1-108-34062-5....The slaveholding elites' project of Confederate nation building... the idea that the Confederacy was a "herrenvolk democracy" or "democracy of the white race"
^Smith, Haig Z. (2022). "The Plymouth Company and Massachusetts Bay Company (1622–1639): Establishing Theocratic Corporate Governance".Religion and Governance in England's Emerging Colonial Empire, 1601–1698. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 71–111.doi:10.1007/978-3-030-70131-4_3.ISBN978-3-030-70130-7.S2CID245822590.
^Sukkar, Bilal (2022). "International Conflict Mediation in Syria". In Gani, Jasmine K.; Hinnebusch, Raymond (eds.).Actors and Dynamics in the Syrian Conflict's Middle Phase. New York, NY: Routledge. p. 95.doi:10.4324/9781003254904-6.ISBN978-1-03-218502-6.S2CID246317699.
^"Totalitarianism".The Concise Encyclopedia of Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge. 2013. p. 391.ISBN978-1-57958-268-5.
^Baker, Jaber; Ümit Üngör, Ugur (2023). "10: Secret Prisons".Syrian Gulag: Inside Assad's Prison System. Dublin, Ireland: I. B. Tauris. p. 95.ISBN978-0-7556-5020-0.
^Pribićević."Serbia – From Authoritarian Regime to Democracy." Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies. Project MUSE.
^Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy".The American Political Science Review.53 (1):69–105.doi:10.2307/1951731.ISSN0003-0554.JSTOR1951731.S2CID53686238.
^Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia (1 July 2017). "Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes".Comparative Politics.49 (4):521–544.doi:10.5129/001041517821273099.hdl:11336/76721.
^abGolosov, Grigorii V. (1 January 2013). "Authoritarian Party Systems: Patterns of Emergence, Sustainability and Survival".Comparative Sociology.12 (5):617–644.doi:10.1163/15691330-12341274.
^Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. (1984). "Democratic Elections and Government".World Affairs.147 (2):61–69.JSTOR20672013.
^Magaloni, Beatriz (21 June 2010). "The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule".American Journal of Political Science.54 (3):751–765.doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x.
^Herre, Bastian; Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban (15 March 2013)."Democracy".Our World in Data.Archived from the original on 11 March 2023. Retrieved3 March 2023.
^abSvolik, Milan W. (2012).The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge University Press. pp. 2, 15, 23.Archived from the original on 21 October 2019. Retrieved21 October 2019.
^Narang, Vipin; Talmadge, Caitlin (31 January 2017). "Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War".Journal of Conflict Resolution.62 (7):1379–1405.doi:10.1177/0022002716684627.S2CID151897298.
^Brown, Cameron S.; Fariss, Christopher J.; McMahon, R. Blake (1 January 2016). "Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution".International Interactions.42 (1):1–30.doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598.ISSN0305-0629.S2CID214653333.(subscription required)
^Easton, Malcolm R.; Siverson, Randolph M. (2018). "Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état".Journal of Peace Research.55 (5):596–608.doi:10.1177/0022343318763713.S2CID117585945.
^Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich (9 April 2019). "Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies".Conflict Management and Peace Science.37 (5):559–579.doi:10.1177/0738894219836285.hdl:10230/46774.ISSN0738-8942.S2CID159416397.
^Frantz, Erica; Kendall-Taylor, Andrea; Wright, Joseph; Xu, Xu (2020). "Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships".The Journal of Politics.82:372–377.doi:10.1086/706049.ISSN0022-3816.S2CID203199813.
^abcSondrol, P. C. (2009). "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner".Journal of Latin American Studies.23 (3): 599.doi:10.1017/S0022216X00015868.S2CID144333167.
^abTodd Landman,Studying Human Rights (Routledge, 2003), p. 71 (citing Linz 1964 and others).
^O'Brien, Maire (1998). "Dissent and the emergence of civil society in post-totalitarian China".Journal of Contemporary China.7 (17):153–166.doi:10.1080/10670569808724310.
^Lai, H. H. (2006). "Religious policies in post-totalitarian China: Maintaining political monopoly over a reviving society".Journal of Chinese Political Science.11:55–77.doi:10.1007/BF02877033.S2CID154504959.
^Juan de Onis,"After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America",World Affairs (15 May 2013): "the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power...one of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela."
^Duckitt, J. (1989). "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct".Political Psychology.10 (1):63–84.doi:10.2307/3791588.JSTOR3791588.
^Kemmelmeier, M.; Burnstein, E.; Krumov, K.; Genkova, P.; Kanagawa, C.; Hirshberg, M. S.; Erb, H. P.; Wieczorkowska, G.; Noels, K. A. (2003). "Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies".Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.34 (3): 304.doi:10.1177/0022022103034003005.S2CID32361036.
^Thomas H. Henriksen,American Power after the Berlin Wall (Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 199: "experts emphasize that elections alone, without the full democratic panoply of an independent judiciary, free press, and viable political parties, constitute, in reality, illiberal democracies, which still menace their neighbors and destabilize their regions."
^David P. Forsythe,Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 231: "Illiberal democracies may have reasonably free and fair national elections based on broad suffrage, but they do not counteract the tyranny of the majority with effective protections for ethnic and religious minorities or various types of dissenters."
^Rod Hague & Martin Harrop,Political Science: A Comparative Introduction (7th ed.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 259: "The gradual implementation of the rule of law and due process is an accomplishment of liberal politics, provide a basis for distinguishing liberal from illiberal democracies, and both from authoritarian regimes."
^Vladimir Popov, "Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why Has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor" inAfter the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition (eds.Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 20: "The least efficient institutions are in illiberal democracies combining poor rule of law with democracy ... Less democratic regimes with weak rule of law ... appear to do better than illiberal democracies in maintaining institutional capacity."
^Nolte, Ernst (1965).The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 300.ISBN978-0-03-052240-6.
^Turner, Henry Ashby (1975).Reappraisals of Fascism. New Viewpoints. p. 162.ISBN978-0-531-05579-3. "[Fascism]'s goals of radical and authoritarian nationalism".
^Hagtvet, Bernt; Larsen, Stein Ugelvik; Myklebust, Jan Petter, eds. (1984).Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism.Columbia University Press. p. 424.ISBN978-82-00-05331-6. "[...] organized form of integrative radical nationalist authoritarianism".
Weber, Eugen (1964).Varieties of fascism: doctrines of revolution in the twentieth century (reprint ed.). New York: Van Nostrand.ISBN978-0-89874-444-6.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
Laclau, Ernesto (1977).Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: capitalism, fascism, populism (English-language ed.). London: Verso.ISBN978-1-84467-788-7.
Fritzsche, Peter (1990).Rehearsals for fascism: populism and political mobilization in Weimar Germany (1st printing ed.). New York: Oxford Univ. Press.ISBN978-0-19-505780-5.
Griffin, Roger (1991).The nature of fascism (1st American ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press.ISBN978-0-312-07132-5.
^Draper, Hal (1970) [196 3].Two Souls of Socialism (revised ed.). Highland Park, Michigan: International Socialists. Archived fromthe original on 20 January 2016. Retrieved20 January 2016.
^Runyan, Anne Sisson (November–December 2018). "What Is Intersectionality and Why Is It Important?".Academe.104 (6):10–14.ISSN0190-2946.JSTOR26606288.This political moment is fueled by what political theorist Wendy Brown calls "libertarian authoritarianism." Brown defines libertarian authoritarianism as both an extension and a result of neoliberalism: it simultaneously guts public institutions, undermines democracy, and defines freedom as the freedom to be sexist, racist, homophobic, and xenophobic and to engage in speech and actions that uphold the violence of white male supremacy.
^Heinz, Janine (2024)."Libertärer Autoritarismus in Österreich–eine empirische Annäherung".Die Auswirkungen der Corona-Pandemie auf die österreichische Gesellschaft. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG:353–392.doi:10.5771/9783748942696-353.ISBN978-3-7489-4269-6.In 2022, the sociologists Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey published a much-acclaimed book in which they argue that the Corona crisis has given rise to a new form of "libertarian authoritarianism". This new authoritarianism is characterized by the fact that individual freedom is not seen as relative but as an absolute right and, as a result, any governmental interference with the private sphere is seen as an attack on human rights and freedom of expression.
^Delzell, Charles F. (Spring 1988). "Remembering Mussolini".The Wilson Quarterly.12 (2). Washington, D.C.: Wilson Quarterly: 127.JSTOR40257305. Retrieved April 8, 2022
^The Concise Encyclopedia of Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge. 2013. pp. 51, 391.ISBN978-1-57958-268-5.
^Narang, Vipin; Talmadge, Caitlin (31 January 2017). "Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War".Journal of Conflict Resolution.62 (7):1379–1405.doi:10.1177/0022002716684627.S2CID151897298.
^Brown, Michael E.; Coté, Owen R.; Lynn-Jones, Sean M; Miller, Steven E. (2011).Do Democracies Win Their Wars?. International Security Readers. The MIT Press.ISBN978-0-262-51590-0.Archived from the original on 1 July 2022. Retrieved18 January 2025.
^"The way of the hippie is antithetical to all repressive hierarchical power structures since they are adverse to the hippie goals of peace, love and freedom ... Hippies don't impose their beliefs on others. Instead, hippies seek to change the world through reason and by living what they believe."Stone, Skip."The Way of the Hippy".www.hipplanet.com.Archived from the original on 26 August 2003. Retrieved16 May 2022.
^McLaughlin, Paul (2007).Anarchism and Authority. Aldershot: Ashgate. p. 10.ISBN978-0-7546-6196-2.
^Ruthven, Malise (23 June 2016)."How to Understand ISIS".New York Review of Books.63 (11).Archived from the original on 7 August 2016. Retrieved12 June 2016.
^abcdAzani, Eitan; Koblenz-Stenzler, Liram; Atiyas-Lvovsky, Lorena; Ganor, Dan; Ben-Am, Arie; Meshulam, Delilah (2020). "The Development and Characterization of Far-Right Ideologies".The Far Right – Ideology, Modus Operandi and Development Trends. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. pp. 13–36.Archived from the original on 12 June 2024. Retrieved12 June 2024.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1970).Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-party Systems.Basic Books.ISBN978-0-465-00569-7.
Linz, Juan J. (1964). "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain". In Allard, Eric; Littunen, Yrjo.Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore.
Löwy, Michael (1986). "Mass organization, party, and state: Democracy in the transition to socialism".Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism.94.
Further reading
Frantz; Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wrights, Joseph (2018).How Dictatorships Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/9781316336182.
.svg)
