Assadism (Arabic:اسدية,romanized: ʾAsadiyah) orAssadist Ba'athism is aleft-wing[1] ideology and a variant ofneo-Ba'athism based on the policies and thinking of theAssad family, which governedSyria as atotalitarianhereditary dictatorship from 1971 to 2024.[2][3] Assadism was characterized byArab nationalism,socialism, totalitarianism, extrememilitarism, and acult of personality around the Assad family. This period spanned the successive regimes ofHafez al-Assad and his sonBashar al-Assad. The Assads rose to power as a result of the1970 Syrian coup d'état, leading to the consolidation ofAlawite minority dominance within themilitary andsecurity forces. Their governance was largely characterized bynepotism,sectarianism, and ethnic favoritism.[4] The ideology enshrines the Assad family's leadership role in Syrian politics and presented the Assad regime in a verypersonalist fashion, creating a government based upon and revolving around its leader. Under this system, theSyrian Ba'ath Party portrayed the wisdom of Assad as "beyond the comprehension of the average citizen."[5] Syrian state propaganda cast Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolvedBa'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[6]
The Assad family cultivated extensive patronage networks, securing loyalty while monopolizing vast portions of theSyrian economy and fostering widespread corruption.[7] The Syrian Ba'ath party used its control over Syria's political, social, economic, cultural, educational and religious spheres to enforce its neo-Ba'athist ideology in the wider society and preserve the Assad family's grip on power. Hafez al-Assad's goal upon coming to power was to consolidate thesocialist state with the Ba'ath party as itsvanguard by establishing a "coup-proof" system that eliminated factional rivalries. As soon as he seized power, the armed forces,secret police, security forces, and bureaucracy were purged, subjugating them to party command by installing Alawite elites loyal to Assad.[8][9] To maintain control, although Assadism initially attempted to solve problems within the country through political maneuvering in 1970s, by the early 1980s the regime had shifted toward the use of brute force and relentless oppression, exemplified by theHama massacre in 1982 and theseveral sectarian massacres over the course of theSyrian civil war since 2011.[10] Following thefall of the Assad regime in 2024 as a result of aSyrian opposition offensive amid the civil war, Assadists loyal to the former regime have engaged inan insurgency across Alawite strongholds in western Syria.[11]
Prior to Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in 1970, the neo-Ba'athist movement in Syria had been dominated by strongmanSalah Jadid, who came to power after asuccessful coup in 1966.
Salah Jadid pursued a very radicalMarxist–Leninist policy internally,[12] and aggressive andinterventionist externally.[13][14][15] In the end, his uncompromising radicalism and brutal imposition of his ideas alienated almost all layers of Syrian society, as well as members of the ruling party, who believed that the situation required a more moderate approach: The latter united around Hafez al-Assad, who was opposed to Jadid's adventurism.
Tensions between Jadid and Assad increased following theSix-Day War in 1967 andinvasion of Jordan in 1970. The conflict was not limited to heated debates at party meetings and congresses, sometimes escalating into military clashes between supporters of both parties (in particular between pro-Assad elements in the army and thePalestinian fedayeen groupas-Sa'iqa, which supported the Jadid regime[16]), especially in 1969. Hafez al-Assad took advantage of his control over the military to dismantle Jadid's support network, beforecarrying out a coup and imprisoning Jadid and then Syrian presidentNureddin al-Atassi.[17]
After Assad seized power, the ideology of neo-Ba'athism transformed into Assadism, with even greaternationalism,militarism and the now establishedcult of personality of the Assad family. Assadism is very different from the ideas propagated by the original leaders of theBa'athist movement,Michel Aflaq andSalah al-Din al-Bitar, which caused them great dissatisfaction with such an ideological transformation.[18][19] Assad set upon a project of rapid institution-building, reopened parliament and adopted a permanent constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat and a provisional constitutional documents since 1963.[20]
Political participation was limited to theNational Progressive Front, the ruling coalition of Syrian Ba'ath andMarxist–Leninist parties; entrenching itself firmly within theSoviet Bloc. The Party also began building a personality cult around Assad and brought the elite of thearmed forces under Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed withAlawite loyalists, further alienating theSunni majority from the party.[21]
The Ba'athists initially pursued a verymilitaristic policy aimed at some kind of "mobilization of the nation to fight against the Israeli enemy." But under Assad, militarism reached new heights. Following the Syrian loss during theSix-Day War withIsrael, Hafez initiated a huge expansion of the military to achieve military parity with Israel. Assad gave a high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of theGolan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from theSoviet Union.[22] TheSyrian Arab Army, which was mainly a conscripted force, increased from 50,000 personnel in 1967 to 225,000 in 1973, and to over 350,000 by the 1990s.
In 1973, Syria, together withEgypt, launched analmost successful war against Israel: despite facing stiffer resistance than their Egyptian allies, theSyrian army was able to break through the Israeli defenses.[12] However, due to the lack of coordination and the Egyptian operational pause from October 7 to 14, Syria faced the full fury of theIsraeli forces (who learned of Egypt's modest strategy) and were forced to retreat.[23][24] Israel again invaded Syrian territory, theBashan region, hoping to reachDamascus. However, Syria was able to stop its advance and awar of attrition began, which lasted until May 1974, when Syria signed adisengagement agreement. Although Syria did not liberate theGolan Heights, its army was not defeated, which earned Assad respect inside Syria and abroad.[25]
Bitterness towards the Assadist regime and theAlawite elite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of aSunni Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders ofMuslim Brotherhood likeIssam al-Attar were imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunniulema, Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries andIslamist activists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad throughJihad and establishing anIslamic state. In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in itswar with Iraq and controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups intoLebanon and Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledgedIslamist rebellion in 1976–1982; led by theFighting Vanguard andlocal Muslim Brotherhood movement. The regime responded byslaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hama andAleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and the Muslim Brotherhood armed movement was demolished.[26] After the uprising the government resumed its version ofmilitaristicLeninism, repealing liberalization introduced when Assad came to power.[27]
The Assadist regime was characterized by a very large-scalemilitarization of the entire Syrian society (both men and women, as can be seen from the military parades held in Syria) and a highly militaristic propaganda in themedia andeducation system, mixed with the personality cult of Hafez al-Assad (and later Bashar). The degree of Assadist's militarism of was indecently high: Syria'sair force andtank fleets were not much smaller (if not larger) than those of large European countries. In 1979, Syria was one of the four largest arms importers in the world (between 1961 and 1979, it imported weapons worth $7.4 billion, one of the highest figures).[28] Even if a person has not yet served in the army and is a student, he will eventually receive somemilitary training, such as assembling weapons, in a schools, run by Assadistyouth organizations (such as theRevolutionary Youth Union), membership in which was mandatory.[29][30] These organizations would mobilize boys through enforced training and then membership of paramilitary groups.[31]
Organizations like the RYU also carried out intensiveideological training and spread of Assadist ideas in schools, helping to create "ideologically correct" youth. School students also were taught Ba'athism and Assadism through a course known as "Political Arab Sociology".[32] Students sat through a lesson every week about how to become an "active Ba'athist" and how to show their love for both the nation and the leader, particularly through celebrating a physically strong body and military training. A compulsory 15-day summer camp gave to male students extra time to learn about the soldiers life, in an attempt to prepare them for compulsory army conscription when they finished high school. During enforced marches to celebrate the “great leader”, at the time, Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez, Syrians learned by heart the slogan: “With blood and soul, we sacrifice ourselves for you, Hafez.”[31] According to theConstitution of Syria of 1973, Chapter 3: Educational and Cultural Principles, Article 21, it is written:
The educational and cultural system aims at creating a socialist nationalist Arab generation which is scientifically minded and attached to its history and land, proud of its heritage, and filled with the spirit of struggle to achieve its nation's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism, and to serve humanity and its progress.[33]
Neo-Ba'athism is a far-left version of Ba'athism that originated in Syria. Gradually, neo-Ba'athist military officers led by GeneralSalah Jadid ousted less radical Ba'athists and Aflaqites from all important positions in the traditional civilian elites, government, army and intelligence services since 1963 coup, strengthening their power in the ruling party, but they finally consolidated their power after amilitary coup in 1966, overthrowing aNational Command, drivingMichel Aflaq and his supporters out of Syria.[34]
Neo-Ba'athism is very different from the original ideas of the old Ba'athists, including the increased role of the military and the purging of the leadership from members of the old guard – Aflaq andal-Bitar.[35][18] The Neo-Ba'athists were heavily influenced by the ideas ofMarxism–Leninism, which put this ideology on the verge ofcommunism:[36] neo-Ba'athist regime espoused radical leftist doctrines such aswarLeninism andrevolutionary socialism,[37][38][39] prioritised "internal revolution", abandonedpan-Arabism, sought to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, and came into conflict with such ideologies asArab nationalism,Nasserism and theIraqi Ba'athists, .[40] The rise of the neo-Ba'athists to power in Syria caused the deepest split in the Ba'athist movement: the party divided into two factions,Syrian andIraqi, and the Syrian became independent from the National Command, which it overthrew. The neo-Ba'athists condemned Aflaq and accused him of "stealing" ideology fromZaki al-Arsuzi, sentencing him to death in absentia (along with al-Bitar),[41][42][43][44][45] while Iraqi Ba'athists continued to consider Aflaq the creator of that ideology.[42]
Domestically, the Jadid regime pursued a highlyanti-religious policy: it imposed severe restrictions on religious freedom, persecuted the clergy,[46] labeled religious clerics asclass enemies,[47] and government officials and party mass media preached about the dangers of religion and its imminent demise through socialist revolution.[48] The Neo-Ba'athist regime also pursued very active attempts at radical socialist transformation, for example by confiscating the property of businessmen, merchants and landowners.[38] Its relations with most of theArab world remained largely poor: its interventionist policies and calls for the overthrow ofreactionary governments (especiallyJordan andSaudi Arabia) alienated most of its neighbors. The neo-Ba'athist regime was very active in supporting theMaoist concept of "people's war," which was expressed in its huge support for leftistPalestinian fedayeen groups, granting them considerable autonomy and allowing them to carry out attacks on Israel from Syrian territory.[49][50][38]
But after his rise to power, Assad eased the government's repressive and radical policies.[51] Although Assad supported many of Jadid's ideas, he rejected the aggressive imposition of its radical ideas in Syria. He abolished persecution of religion and made overtures to the Writers' Union, rehabilitating those who had been forced underground, jailed or sent into exile for representing what radical Ba'athists called thereactionary classes.[52] He cut prices for basic foodstuffs 15 percent, which won him support from ordinary citizens,[51] and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed.[51] The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid's policy, had new economic opportunities.[53] His reign was marked by the virtual abandonment ofPan-Arab ideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructingsocialist society within Syria.[54] However, despite the abandonment of pan-Arabism and Nasserism, Assad often represented himself as a successor toGamal Abdel Nasser: he modelled his presidential system on Nasser's and hailed Nasser for his pan-Arab leadership.[55] In addition to Assad's ambition to turn Syria into aregional power and for himself to become a pan-Arab leader, Assad calculated that working for Arab unity and stepping up the struggle against Israel were likely to strengthen his legitimacy and leadership among the various sections of the Syrian population.[56] The Assadists actively promoted the values ofArab socialism, but the regime's policy in this regard changed several times: from the implementation of socialism itself to ideas bordering on communism or on the contrary, reforms encouragingcapitalism. In the 1980s, Assad brought back the Leninist ideology that had existed under Jadid,[27] but with thecollapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, he began economic and political liberalization again.[57]
The neo-Ba'athist ideology continued to largely determine the regime's policies on socialism and nationalism, albeit with some differences. For example, already in the first three years of Assad’s rule, all attempts atcollectivization, proposed under Jadid, were stopped, and state farms were mostly disbanded.[58]
Assadism is a strange mixture of several conflicting ideas:Syrian nationalism, Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism.
Formally, Hafez al-Assad declared the goals of achieving pan-Arab unity and Arab nationalism, but in reality these ideas faded into the background and remained in the ideology more for show. Syria's relations with a considerable number ofArab countries were bad for a long period of time, which in itself did not allow pan-Arab beliefs to be realized in practice: Ba'athist Syriainvaded Jordan,Lebanon andIraq in different periods of time. In addition, Assadist Syria became an important ally of non-ArabIran and sided with it in theIran-Iraq War, supporting it with arms supplies and closing Iraqi oil pipelines (apart from it, onlySouth Yemen andLibya supported Iran).[59][60][61] Syria retained very aggressive views on theArab-Israeli conflict, although many other Arab countries reoriented their attention to Iran. In practice, the ideas of Assadism went towards a mixture of Syrian andleftist nationalism.
Jamal al-Atassi, co-founder ofZaki al-Arsuzi's earlyArab Ba'ath Party and later Syrian dissident, stated that "Assadism is a falsenationalism. It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and themukhabarat... And despite itssocialist slogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—anouvellebourgeoisie parasitaire."[62] The Assad family aligned itself withIran and itsAxis of Resistance for much of its rule, contributing to aninter-Ba'athist rivalry with theSunni-dominatedSaddamistBa'ath Party inIraq.[63] Describing Assadism as aquasi-religion fostered by the Ba'athist state for mobilising the fealty and adulation ofSyrian citizens, Professor ofMiddle Eastern Studies atBonn International Centre Dr. Esther Meininghaus wrote:
"by drawing on religion, the Assad regime successfully sought to promote a value system ultimately rooted in the Baʿathist vision for Syrian society .... To this, we can indeed add the cult surrounding Presidents Hafez and Bashar al-Asad, whose pictures are displayed not only in public buildings and schools but taxis and shops, or ceremonies such as mass parades and/or the playing of thenational anthem during official celebrations. Also, official rhetoric has become increasingly infused with transcendental and metaphysical elements, in particular with regard to the President's personality cult. For instance, the President is addressed as the 'Eternal Leader' who will guide his people to becoming the 'true'Arab nation. The recent slogan of'Bashar, Allah, Suriyya wa-bas' (Bashar, God, and Syria – that's it) possibly best epitomises how close the regime has come to creating a Syrian public religion in its own right. Whether the outward performance of 'regime rituals' was actually fully internalised or secretly mocked, it had to be practised and obeyed."[64]
Al-infitah ala al-Sha'ab was one of the central slogans and remarkable declared idea of Assadism a gave a significant support for Hafez al-Assad after coming to power.[65] The idea behind the slogan was to open the government to the people, and the initial, relaxing reforms succeeded in achieving greater citizen participation in governance and decision-making.[66] The slogan concerned both politics and economics:[67] the relaxing reforms of the 1970s were part of the policies ofinfiraj and al-infitah ala al-Sha'ab, which where a part ofCorrective Movement program.[68]
Ta'addudiyya was the declared policy of Hafez al-Assad's government and hisCorrective Movement program, emphasizing political and economicpluralism. The word "Ta'addudiyya" itself translates from Arabic as "pluralism."[69] The essence of the policy was Syria's shift away from aone-party system toward a more "pluralistic"multi-party system: The Ba'ath Party banned all other political parties sincecoming to power in 1963.[70] This was expressed, for example, in the creation of a coalition of socialist parties known as theNational Progressive Front.[70] In addition, Ta'addudiyya, along with theinfiraj policy, allowed private companies to invest in the public sector of theSyrian economy. As the government claimed, the policy of Ta'addudiyya provided greater representation for the people and greater investment opportunities for the economy. However, the Ba'ath Party still remained dominant in determining policy and social change, and the Ta'addudiyya reforms were largely directly controlled by it.[71]
Al-infiraj, sometimes called infitah, was a socialist policy of limited economic liberalization pursued intermittently by Hafez al-Assad. The goal of the infiraj policy was to attract foreign and private investment to Syria.
The Assadists have changed the direction of their economic policy several times. By the mid-1960s, government-sponsoredland reform andnationalization of major industries and foreign investments had confirmed the newsocialist direction of Syria's economic policy.[72] As the state assumed greater control over economic decision-making by adoptingcentralized planning and strictly regulating commercial transactions, Syria experienced a substantial loss of skilled workers, administrators, and their capital.[72] Despite the political upheavals, which undermined the confidence of landowners, merchants, and industrialists, the state successfully implemented large-scale development projects to expand industry, agriculture, and infrastructure.[72]
By the 1970s, 85% of agricultural lands were distributed to landless peasant populations and tenant farmers. Banks, oil companies, power production and 90% of large-scale industries were nationalized. By the end of the 1970s, the economy had shifted from its traditional agrarian base to an economy dominated by the service, industrial, and commercial sectors.[72] Massive expenditures for development of irrigation, electricity, water, road building projects, irisin plants and expansion of health services and education to rural areas contributed to prosperity. However, Syria remained noticeably dependent on foreign aid to support its rapidly growing military and arms spending. By the mid-1980s, the country's economic climate had shifted from prosperity to austerity, as a result of the rapid fall of world oil prices, lower export revenues, drought affecting agricultural production, and falling worker remittances.[72] Also, Arab aid levels decreased very much because of economic retrenchment in the oil-producing states and Syrian support for Iran in theIran–Iraq War.
In 1990s, the Assad government instituted a series of economic reforms, although the economy remained highly regulated.[73] The Syrian economy experienced strong growth throughout the 1990s, and into the 2000s.[74] Following his assumption of power in 2000,Bashar al-Assad sought to frame his leadership around modernizing and opening the economy. He emphasized, in particular, "the need to modernize the regulatory environment and the industrial base, activate and encourage the private sector, remove bureaucratic obstacles to investment, increase job opportunities, qualify cadres, improve education and expand information technology."[75] But Syria's economy has suffered a catastrophic collapse as a result of years ofcivil war.
When the Ba'ath Party took power in Syria in 1963, it pledged full equality betweenwomen and men as well as full workforce participation for women.[76] Assadists continued those policies and increased women's role in society and the army. Although women are generally not required to serve in the military, for a time in the 1980s they were subject to mandatory military conscription on an equal basis with men.[77] Women actively participated in military marches, demonstrations and in some military classes in schools (which is run by theRYU).
Although the previous government of Salah Jadid had been extremelyanti-religious, the Assadists reversed its measures in this direction. Syria under the Assadists was one of the most secular and highlyWesternized (in the civil sense) countries in the Arab world. The updatedconstitution of 1973 confirmed the secular direction of the new regime. All schools are government-run and non-sectarian, although there is mandatory religious instruction, provided inIslam and/orChristianity. Political forms of Islam are not tolerated by the government. Syria has separate secular and religious courts. Civil and criminal cases are heard in secular courts, while the Sharia courts handle personal, family, and religious matters in cases between Muslims or between Muslims and non-Muslim.[78] Non-Muslim communities have their own religious courts using their own religious law.[79]
The Assadist government's treatment of theKurds has been the subject of repeated outrage from international organizations such asAmnesty International and others.[80][81][82][83]
TheKurds in Syria had been victims of persecution and harassment by the government even before the Ba'ath Party or Assadists came to power, but it was they that toughened its policies in this regard. AlthoughKurdish was the second most widely spoken language afterArabic, it was officially banned from use,[84] as were a number of other things related to it: for example, Kurds were prohibited from registering children with Kurdish names, opening businesses with Kurdish names, publishing books or publications in Kurdish, and building Kurdish private schools.[85]Decree 768, introduced in 2000, additionally banned the sale of Kurdish-language cassettes and videos in stores.[86]
From 1973 to 1976, the Assad regime carried outArab Belt project - anArabization campaign in the easternSyrian province ofal-Hasakah to the detriment of localethnic groups (including Kurds), forcibly deporting the local population and settling Arab families there.[87][88] While that proposals had officially been accepted by the Ba'athist government as early as 1965, it was Hafez who ordered the implementation of the Arab Belt programme in 1973.[89][90] The project's name was changed by the Assad government to "Plan to establish model state farms in the Jazira region".[91] As a result of the campaign, tens of thousands of Kurds were deported from Syria without the possibility of returning and replaced by Arab families, mostly from the neighboringRaqqa Governorate, and the Kurdish village names of the area were replaced by Arabic names not necessarily related to the traditions and history of the region.[92][88]
Assad, like all his predecessors, verbally spoke in unequivocal support of thePalestinian movement, againstZionism and the state of Israel: thePalestinian flag became second only to theSyrian flag in Syria. However, in reality, his policy towards Palestine and support forPalestinian militias was much more ambiguous: Assadist Syria has been very selective in its support to thePalestinians.
Under Jadid's rule, leftist Palestinian groups were given a lot of support, but Assad already considered this a bad decision: in his opinion, the militants were given too much autonomy in attacks on Israel, which provoked theSix-Day War.[49]
The multi-factional organization known as thePalestine Liberation Organization was the main militant Palestinian group in the early decades, but its leaders had poor relations with Assadist Syria. Hafez al-Assad was known for his hostility towardsYasser Arafat andFaisal Husseini, with attempts to divide the Palestinian leadership.[93]
In 1975, acivil war broke out in neighboringLebanon between various factions, including the PLO. Assad attempted to steer Arafat and the PLO away from Lebanon, threatening him with a cutoff of Syrian aid, but in a result the two sides were unable to reach an agreement.[94] Already in 1976, Syria began a full-fledgedintervention in the war, siding with theMaronites and against mostPalestinian militants, which caused outrage not only among the Palestinians but also in the Arab world: one of the goals of the intervention was to return the PLO under Syrian influence. TheSoviet Union tried to prevent the conflict between its two important allies, but it did not succeed. Assad supported thePalestine Liberation Army, which was much more under his control, which participated in clashes with the PLO (the PLA however proved unreliable when ordered to fight other Palestinians, and suffered from mass defections).[95] Syria's operations against PLO militants have effectively put it on the same side as Israel, which had already begun supplying Maronite militias with weapons since the war began.[96][97]
In the1982 Lebanon War, Syria fought alongside the PLO againstIsraeli forces, but after the war, this short-lived alliance collapsed again. Syria also actively supported theShiiteAmal militia throughout the war, and sided with them in theWar of the Camps, again fighting against PLO. Later, Assadist Syria prioritized supportingHamas, a much more radical paramilitary group which are the enemy of PLO. The Assadists were also accused of massacres by their army againstLebanese (including Palestinians) who opposed theSyrian occupation of Lebanon.[98]
Thecult of personality of the Assad family in Syria was enormous.Statues,frescoes,portraits and other images of Hafez and Bashar Assads could be found everywhere. Hafez al-Assad developed his cult of personality inStalinist style: ruling Ba'ath party initially manufactured Hafez al-Assad's cult of Arab socialist heroism in consultancy withSoviet state propagandists, mimicking the pervasive personality cults prevalent acrossSoviet Bloc dictatorships likeRomania andNorth Korea. Beginning as a tool to bind every Syrian citizen with the obligation of undying loyalty (bay'ah) to Assad in 1970s, the propaganda was further intensified and personalist depictions reached new heights during the 1980s. Through kindergarten, school books, educational institutions andBa'athist media; Assadist propaganda constructed the image of a homogenousArab nation protected by a fatherly leader revelling under the "cult of Saladin". Assad regime venerates Hafez al-Assad'spersonalisticonography perpetually in the public and private spheres of everyday Syrian life.[99][100] Ba'athist propaganda portrayed Hafez al-Assad as a strong leader whose wisdom was "beyond the comprehension of the average citizen."[5] Syrian state propaganda also cast Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[6]
In schools, children were taught to sing songs of adulation about Hafez al-Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our eternal leader, Hafez al-Assad".[101] Syrian officials were made to refer to him as 'the sanctified one' (al-Muqaddas).[101] Assad was sometimes portrayed with apparently divine properties, and many places and objects were renamed in honor of the Assads. Fervently loyalist paramilitaries known as theShabiha (tr. ghosts) deify the Assad dynasty through slogans such as "There is no God except Bashar!" (Arabic: لا إله الا بشار) and pursuepsychological warfare against non-conformist populations.
Middle East Insight magazine wrote: "In no other country in recent memory ... notMao's China, norTito'sYugoslavia, has the intensity of the personality cult reached such extremes. Asad's image, speaking, smiling, listening, benevolent or stern, solemn or reflective, is everywhere. Sometimes there are half a dozen pictures of him in a row. His face envelops telephone poles and trucks, churches and mosques. His is the visage a Syrian sees when he opens his newspaper."[102][103]
After the fall of the Assad regime, a phenomenon calledde-Assadization emerged[104] – the mass destruction of any symbols of the Assadist era.
The Assad regime'shuman rights record has been widely criticized by international organizations for its virtual absence.[105][106][107][108] The regime'stotalitarian measures were intensified after the end of the Islamist uprising in the 1980s and again during the civil war. The Assad regime has consistently been ranked among the worst in the world for human rights.[109][110] The Assadists' long history of arbitrary arrests and detentions extends to neighboring Lebanon, which was occupied for nearly 30 years. Over the decades of Assadist rule, more than 70,000 people have been forcibly disappeared, 40,000 killed and hundreds of thousands deported in Syria,[111] and 17,000 have gone missing in Lebanon during the occupation; the army has also targeted representatives of theRed Cross organization.[112][113] And that's not counting the Syrian civil war, when hundreds of thousandswas killed andmillions fled.
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There was also anopposition to the Assadist regime, especially in the later years of theBa'athist Syria which includedIslamists,Pro-Iraqi Ba'thists,human rights activists,ethnic andreligious minorities likeKurds andDruze and other groups. The regime's crackdown on the Syrian dissidents caused theSyrian revolution,civil war, and the ultimatefall of the Assad regime, ending the 61 years of the Ba'athist regime not only in Syria but worldwide. The opposition to the Assadist regime was also calledanti-Assadism.
Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis ... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
In 1963 ... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy ... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union ... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
influence of different views, came from the more radical left-wing nationalist groups. These groups included ... Syria's Ba'ath party which seized power in Damascus in 1963
Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis ... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
In 1963 ... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy ... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union ... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
influence of different views, came from the more radical left-wing nationalist groups. These groups included ... Syria's Ba'ath party which seized power in Damascus in 1963
yet another coup d'etat in Syria in February 1966 ousted the old guard of the Ba'th Party ... and gave a radical faction (subsequently dubbed the neo-Ba'th) undisputed power. Abandoning the traditional goal of Arab unity, the new leaders proclaimed a radical socialist platform at home and a commitment to violent revolutionary activity abroad..
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