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As-Sa'iqa

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For other uses, seeSaiqa.

Political party in Palestine
As-Sa'iqa
الصاعقة
LeaderMohammed Qeis
FoundedSeptember 1966
Membership7,000(1970)[1]
2,000(1980)[2]
IdeologyPan-Arabism
Neo-Ba'athism
Political positionFar-left
National affiliationPalestine Liberation Organization
Alliance of Palestinian Forces
Regional affiliationSyrian-led Ba'ath Party
ColorsBlack, Red, White and Green (Pan-Arab colors)
Palestinian Legislative Council
0 / 132
Party flag
Part ofa series on
Ba'athism

As-Sa'iqa (Arabic:الصَّاعِقَة,romanizedaṣ-Ṣāʽiqa,lit.'Thunderbolt'), officially known asVanguard for the Popular Liberation War – Lightning Forces, (Arabic:طَلائِع حَرْب التَّحْرِير الشَّعْبِيَّة - قُوَّات الصَّاعِقَة,romanized: Ṭalāʼiʽ Ḥarb at-Taḥrīr aš-Šaʽbiyya - Quwwāt aṣ-Ṣāʽiqa) is aPalestinianBa'athist political and military faction created bySyria. It is linked to the Palestinian branch of theSyrian-led Ba'ath Party, and is a member of the broaderPalestine Liberation Organization (PLO), although it is no longer active in the organization.[3] Its Secretary-General is Dr.Mohammed Qeis.[4]

History

Background

1966 coup in Syria

Main article:1966 Syrian coup d'état

As-Sa'iqa's roots go back to the1966 coup d'état inSyria. Thismilitary coup overthrewNational Command purged theBa'ath Party (which hadcome to power three years earlier) of its "old guard" and the founders ofBa'athism in general, sending people likeMichel Aflaq andSalah ad-Din al-Bitar into exile and sentencing them to death in absentia.[5][6][7]

New regime's policy

Main article:Salah Jadid

The coup brought to power themost radical Ba'athist faction, which later became known asneo-Ba'athism. The main ideologist of neo-Ba'athism and organizer of the 1966 coup was the military generalSalah Jadid, who began indirect but complete rule of Syria. Jadid was very radical, and carried out the same radical policies, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, he actively promoted and tried to harshly implement ideas bordering oncommunism, actively persecuted anyreligion,[8][9][10] and intensifiedstate terror in the country.[11][12] In a result, Jadid successfully built atotalitarian andMarxist–Leninist state (sometimes called "Neo-Marxist" by outside observers[13]) with brutal repression. Outwardly, he moved closer to theSoviet Union[14] and pursued very aggressive, provocative and in many ways reckless rhetoric againstIsrael.[15][14] At the same time, his relations with much of theArab world were also poor:[16] his neo-Ba'athist regime was basically indifferent topan-Arab issues except forPalestine,[17] and almost all of the Jadid's rule Syria was isolated from most of the Arab states.

The Jadid's regime pursued hardline policies and calling for the mobilization of apeople's war (Maoistguerilla tactics) againstZionism, which was expressed in its huge support forleftistPalestinian fedayeen groups, granting them considerable autonomy and allowing them to carry out attacks on Israel from Syrian territory: Jadid continued supporting that concept even after catasrophicSix-Day War in 1967.[18][page needed][19][11] Israel has repeatedly accused Syria of supporting Palestinian groups and their acts of violence. At the end of May 1967, the headlines of Syrian newspapers clearly stated that for the neo-Ba'athist regime, war was the only solution to the "Israeli problem".[14] According to Israeli sources, the regime in Syria initiated 177 border incidents and aided 75 Palestinian terrorist incidents between 23 February 1966 and 15 May 1967.[16]

Early years

Formation of as-Sa'iqa

Just a few months after the coup, in September, Jadid's regime completed the formation of thePalestinian paramilitary Ba'athist group called as-Sa'iqa, which carried out attacks on Israel fromJordanian andLebanese territory, but was completely under the control of the neo-Ba'athist regime in Syria.[20] As-Sa'iqa became a very important guerrilla group for the Jadid regime: it was present in neighboring Arab countries and also diminished the role of other fedayeen groups in Syria that were not created by him. For example, after the creation of as-Sa'iqa,Fatah (another fedayeen group), under Syrian pressure, was forced to move its bases and training camps from Syria to Jordan.[21] Syria-controlled as-Saiqa successfully replaced the uncontrolled Fatah.[14] The group became active in December 1968, as a member of thePLO. Syria tried to build up an alternative toYasser Arafat, who was then emerging with his Fatah faction as the primary Palestinian fedayeen leader and politician.[22] As-Sa'iqa was initially the second-largest group within the PLO, after Fatah.[23]

Assadist-Jadidist split

After the Six-Day War, the conflict between Jadid andHafez al-Assad, the defense minister, became very intense. Assad believed that Jadid's radicalism and aggressive policies had failed Syria and that a more moderate approach to the domestic and foreign policy situation was required. Although Jadid's regime gave a lot of support to the leftist fedayeen, Assad already then considered this a bad decision. In Assad's opinion, the militants were given too much autonomy in attacks on Israel, which provoked the Six-Day War: he demanded a strong reduction in the autonomy of the fedayeen and the transfer of control over them to thearmy.[24][verification needed][20] Assad also disagreed with the very essence of the concept of "people's war" promoted by Jadid.[20]

The conflict often escalated from heated verbal disputes to military clashes between supporters of both sides: for example in 1969, Assad staged something verymuch like a coup, during which an important ally of Jadid and the director of theNational Security Bureau (the central command of all Syrianmukhabarats, i.e. intelligence services)Abdul-Karim al-Jundi shot himself.[25][verification needed] Since the start of the conflict between Assad and Jadid, the Palestinian fedayeen have become another lever for the various factions who struggle for power. For example, as-Sa'iqa for those years had expanded into a large militia of thousands of fighters by 1969: Jadid used it as a counterweight to armed Assad's supporters.[26]

Al-Assad takeover and Purge of As-Sa'iqa

As a result, as-Sa'iqa was unable to help Jadid stay in power. When al-Assad seized power in the November 1970 "Corrective Revolution", as-Sa'iqa was purged and its leaders replaced with al-Assad loyalists (although Jadid loyalists held on to the as-Sai'qa branch active in the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan until mid-1971, when they were arrested).[27] As new Secretary-General (after Mahmud al-Ma'ayta, who had succeededYusuf Zuayyin), al-Assad choseZuheir Mohsen, a Palestinian Ba'thist who had come to Syria as a refugee fromJordan. He was repeatedly promoted by Syria as a candidate for the post of PLO chairman, to replace Arafat, but never gained support from other factions. By some estimates, by 1983, about 70 percent of all as-Sa'iqa militants were Syrians.[28]

With and against the PLO in Lebanon

As-Sa'iqa was used by Syria as aproxy force in the Palestinian movement.[29][30][31][32] While this has prevented as-Sa'iqa from gaining widespread popularity among Palestinians, it became an important force in the Palestinian camps in Syria, as well as in Lebanon. During theLebanese Civil War, Syria built the movement into one of the most important Palestinian fighting units, but also forced it to join in Syrian offensives against the PLO when relations between al-Assad and Arafat soured. This led to as-Sa'iqa's expulsion from the PLO in 1976, but it was readmitted in December the same year, after the situation had cooled down, and after Syria named this as a condition for further support for the PLO. The attacks on the PLO led to large-scale defections of Syrian-based Palestinians from the movement. As-Saiqa was also responsible for theDamour massacre in 1976 and many other mass murders.[33]

After Muhsin's assassination in 1979,Isam al-Qadi became the new Secretary-General. The movement remained active during the Lebanese Civil War, and again joined Syria, the LebaneseShi'aAmal Movement andAbu Musa'sFatah al-Intifada in attacks on the PLO during theWar of the Camps in 1984–85, and for the remainder of the Civil War (which lasted until 1990). This again led to mass-defections of Palestinians from the movement (Harris quotes the Syrian-aligned Amal Movement as complaining that the Syrian-backed Palestinian forces sent to attack the PLO were "Abu Musa in theBiqa'" but "become Abu nothing in theShuf andAbu Ammar on arrival inBeirut"), and reportedly its ranks were filled with non-Palestinian Syrian army recruits. After the end of the Civil War, the movement was nearly out of contact with the PLO mainstream,[34] and exerted influence only in Syria and in Syrian-occupied parts of Lebanon. It kept lobbying within the PLO against the various peace proposals advanced by Arafat, and was part of the Syrian-basedNational Alliance that opposed Arafat.

As-Sai'qa today

After the end of the Lebanese Civil War and the 1993 signing of theOslo Peace Agreement, as-Sai'qa has largely lost its usefulness to the Syrian government, and the state and size of the organization deteriorated. Today, it is wholly insignificant outside Syria, although it retains a presence in Lebanon (its future is uncertain after the end in 2005 of theSyrian Army's presence in Lebanon). It is extremely weak in theWest Bank andGaza Strip, non-existent in theGolan Heights,East Jerusalem andIsrael within the Green Line, and has not been active during theal-Aqsa Intifada. Its importance to Syria has lessened, both because the PLO has diminished in importance compared to thePalestinian National Authority. As-Sai'qa boycotts PNA bodies, and its representative on the PLO Executive Committee also boycotts its sessions.

Following the outbreak of theSyrian Civil War in 2011, as-Sa'iqa took up arms in support of the Syrian Ba'athist government, participating in numerous military operations such as theSouthern Damascus offensive (April–May 2018),[35] and the2018 Southern Syria offensive.[36] Having greatly diminished in numbers, the organization's forces had suffered just 30 fighterskilled in action by April 2018.[35] By August 2018, As-Sa'iqa began to lay off a substantial number of its fighters, mostly because they were no longer needed and because of lack of funds.[37]

After thefall of the Assad regime in late 2024, theSyrian transitional government demanded that all Palestinian armed groups in Syria disarm themselves, dissolve their military formations, and instead focus on political and charitable work.[38] Representatives of the new government also raided the offices of as-Sa'iqa,PFLP-GC, and Fatah al-Intifada, confiscating documents, equipment, and weapons.[39] The new Syrian government ultimately allowed as-Sa'iqa to continue its political activities, with the party reshuffling its leadership "to strengthen the faction's Palestinian role".[40] On 8 February 2025, as-Sa'iqa reopened its offices in the Al-A'edeen Camp inHama, prompting protests by locals who demanded that the party be held responsible for violations during the civil war.[41]

Secretary-Generals

Organization and structure

As-Sa'iqa
الصاعقة
LeadersZuheir Mohsen
Isam al-Qadi
Farhan Abu Al-Haija
Mohammed Qeis
Dates of operation1966–1991
2011–2018
HeadquartersDamascus
Active regionsSyria,Lebanon
IdeologyPan-Arabism
Neo-Ba'athism
Part ofPalestine Liberation Organization
Alliance of Palestinian Forces
Allies1966–1991:
Syrian Arab Armed Forces
PFLP-GC
Fatah al-Intifada
Lebanese National Movement
Palestine Liberation Army
Amal Movement
2011–2018:
SyriaBa'athist Syria
IranIran
RussiaRussia
Hezbollah
Opponents1966–1991:
Fatah
Lebanese Front
Lebanese Forces
Israel
2011–2018:
Free Syrian Army
Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis
Jaysh al-Islam
Ahrar al-Sham
Al-Nusra Front/Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
Battles and warsLebanese Civil War
Syrian civil war

Since 2007, Farhan Abu Hayja has been Secretary-General of as-Sa'iqa. Muhammad al-Khalifa is its representative on thePLO Executive Committee, but boycotts sessions of the PLO EC.[42][43] During much of the 1970s, as-Sai'qa's representatives in the PLO EC (Muhsin and al-Qadi) held the prestigious and sensitive post of Head of the Military Department, which reflected the military importance of the movement in those years.

Syrian backing in the 1970s gave as-Sa'iqa a military weight far greater than its political influence, which has always been small. During theLebanese Civil War, it was often the second largest Palestinian faction in fighting strength, after Yassir Arafat'sFatah movement.[44]

Under the name Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution - possibly the name of the armed wing of as-Sa'iqa - the organization committed a number of internationalterrorist attacks. Among these was the 1979 takeover of theEgyptian embassy inAnkara,Turkey[45] (although attributed to Fatah[46]) and a kidnapping of Jews emigrating by train throughAustria from theSoviet Union toIsrael.[47] Since the early 1990s, the organization has not committed any known attacks, and it is not listed on theU.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Ideological profile

As-Sa'iqa's political agenda is identical to that ofBa'athist Syria, i.e.,Arab socialist,nationalist and strongly committed toPan-Arab doctrine. While this reflects its Ba'thist programme, it has also used Pan-Arabism as a means of supporting the primacy of its sponsor, Syria, over theArafat-led PLO's claim to exclusive representation of the Palestinian people. Thus, it rejected "Palestinization" of the conflict with Israel, insisting on the necessary involvement of the greater Arab nation. This occasionally went to extremes, with as-Sa'iqa leaders denying the existence of a separate Palestinian people within the widerArab nation.

The group has generally taken a hard line stance (reflecting that of Syria) on issues such as the recognition of Israel, theOslo Accords, and other questions of Palestinian goals and political orientation. It was a member of the 1974Rejectionist Front, despite supporting theTen Point Programme that initially caused the PLO/Rejectionist Front split.

See also

Notes

  1. ^Buck, Terry James; Berman, Aaron (2021).The Decline of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: A Historical Analysis. Compass digital repository. p. 27.
  2. ^Alon, Hanan (August 1980).Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures.Rand Corporation. pp. 210–212.ISBN 0-8330-2310-1.
  3. ^"Striving For A Safer World Since 1945".Federation Of American Scientists.
  4. ^"الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين".الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين.
  5. ^Seale 1990, p. 330.
  6. ^A. Paul, James (1990). "Appendex II: Foreign Assassinations".Human rights in Syria. Human Rights Watch. p. 141.ISBN 0-929692-69-1.
  7. ^Tucker, Spencer (2010).The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts. Vol. 1.ABC-CLIO. p. 30.ISBN 978-1-85109-947-4.
  8. ^"Bashar's Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview"(PDF). pp. 364–365. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 23 July 2011. Retrieved8 March 2013.
  9. ^Rubin, Barry (2007)."2: The World's Most Unstable Country, 1946–1970". The Truth About Syria. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 38.ISBN 978-1-4039-8273-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link)
  10. ^Heydemann, Steven (2013).Middle East authoritarianisms: governance, contestation, and regime resilience in Syria and Iran. Stanford studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic societies and cultures. Stanford (Calif.): Stanford university press.ISBN 978-0-8047-8301-9.
  11. ^abKeegan, John (1983).World Armies (2nd ed.). Detroit, MI: Gale. p. 562.ISBN 0-8103-1515-7.
  12. ^Meininghaus, Esther (2016).Creating Consent in Ba'thist Syria: Women and Welfare in a Totalitarian State. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 6.ISBN 978-1-78453-115-7.
  13. ^Jabber, Fuad (1973)."The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71".Journal of Palestine Studies.2 (2):79–101.doi:10.2307/2535482.ISSN 0377-919X.JSTOR 2535482.
  14. ^abcdMann, Joseph (2013)."Syria, Precipitator of the Six Day War".Middle Eastern Studies.49 (4):547–562.doi:10.1080/00263206.2013.798306.ISSN 0026-3206.JSTOR 23470917.
  15. ^Ma'oz, Moshe (2006)."Review of Syria: Revolution from above; The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria".Middle East Journal.60 (4):810–813.ISSN 0026-3141.JSTOR 4330338.
  16. ^abLawson, Fred H. (1986). Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov (ed.)."Linkage Politics".Journal of Palestine Studies.15 (2):152–155.doi:10.2307/2536837.ISSN 0377-919X.JSTOR 2536837.
  17. ^Sievers, Marc J. (1980)."The Ideology of the Ba'th Party and Syrian Politics".Journal of International Affairs.34 (1):187–190.ISSN 0022-197X.JSTOR 24356349.
  18. ^Seale 1990.
  19. ^Meininghaus, Esther (2016).Creating Consent in Ba'thist Syria: Women and Welfare in a Totalitarian State. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 75.ISBN 978-1-78453-115-7.
  20. ^abcKerr, Malcolm H. (1973)."Hafiz Asad and the Changing Patterns of Syrian Politics".International Journal.28 (4):689–706.doi:10.2307/40201173.ISSN 0020-7020.JSTOR 40201173.
  21. ^Jabber, Fuad (1973)."The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71".Journal of Palestine Studies.2 (2):79–101.doi:10.2307/2535482.ISSN 0377-919X.JSTOR 2535482.
  22. ^"Institutional biographies of Palestinian political groups since 1967". 8 February 2006. Archived fromthe original on 8 February 2006.
  23. ^Morris, Benny.Righteous Victims. p. 367
  24. ^Seale 1990, p. 144.
  25. ^Seale 1990, p. 151.
  26. ^Jabber, Fuad (1973)."The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71".Journal of Palestine Studies.2 (2):79–101.doi:10.2307/2535482.ISSN 0377-919X.JSTOR 2535482.
  27. ^"Al-Saiqa". MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Archived fromthe original on 18 October 2007. Retrieved3 September 2013.
  28. ^"Syria - Republican Guard".www.country-data.com. Retrieved15 October 2025.
  29. ^Schulze, Kirsten (2016).Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon. Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 84.ISBN 9780230372474.
  30. ^

    The Scene was, in many ways, paradoxical . Assad, the Socialist, put his "proxy" troops, the Syrian-based Palestinians (As-Saiqa), in the position of preventing effective military moves to oust the president.

    — "Reports", American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, 1977, Volume 25-27

  31. ^Bayman, Daniel (2011).A High Price, The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press. p. 56.ISBN 9780199830459.
  32. ^

    "The terrorist organization As-Sai'qah, which as it is known has so far operated at Syrian initiative ."

    — Arab Affairs Commentor Eliezer Ben-Moshe, "Tel Aviv Israel Armed Forces Radio in Hebrew 1540 GMT 15 Nov [19]70", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign Radio Broadcasts Daily Report, Volumes 221-230 .

  33. ^Cedarland.org."The Lebanon War". Archived fromthe original on 19 October 2009. Retrieved3 September 2013.
  34. ^"Welcome to the Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet". Arts.mcgill.ca. 1 January 2013. Retrieved3 September 2013.
  35. ^abAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (27 April 2018)."The South Damascus Campaign: Interview with Quwat al-Sa'iqa". Retrieved29 April 2018.
  36. ^"Palestinian Refugee Dies While Fighting alongside Gov't Forces South of Syria".Action Group for Palestinians of Syria. 5 July 2018. Retrieved17 July 2018.
  37. ^"Pro-Government Palestinian Factions Lay off Scores of Gunmen".Action Group for Palestinians of Syria. 24 August 2018. Retrieved29 August 2018.
  38. ^"لبنان والحدث السوري: أسئلة حول المقاومة والاقتصاد والاجتماع والحرّيات".Al Akhbar (Lebanon). 13 December 2024. Retrieved13 December 2024.
  39. ^Wesam Sabaaneh (17 December 2024)."Assad's Departure Raises Questions for Palestinian Armed Groups in Syria".Inkstick. Retrieved18 December 2024.
  40. ^"Syria's pro-Assad Palestinian factions tout organizational changes".Daily Sabah. 12 February 2025. Retrieved19 February 2025.
  41. ^"Anger Ignites Hama Camp: Why Did the Residents Revolt Against "Sa'iqa"?".Action Group for Palestinians of Syria. 10 February 2025. Retrieved19 February 2025.
  42. ^"PLO Executive Committee membership 1969-1988".middleeastreference.org.uk. Archived fromthe original on 14 December 2005.
  43. ^"The PLO must end its equivocations".Intelligence Resource Program. 9 May 1989. p. E1580. Retrieved19 June 2023.
  44. ^"Institutional biographies of Palestinian political groups since 1967".middleeastreference.org.uk. Archived fromthe original on 8 February 2006.
  45. ^"Las Vegas Media"(PDF).www.mipt.org. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 11 January 2006.
  46. ^"DIRECTV Packages 1-855-387-5271 DIRECTV Deals & Specials". Tkb.org. Retrieved3 September 2013.
  47. ^John Pike."Yom Kippur War: Grand Deception Or Intelligence Blunder". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved3 September 2013.

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