| On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan | |
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 Left to right: PresidentIlham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, US presidentDonald Trump, and Prime MinisterNikol Pashinyan of Armenia signing a trilateral joint declaration | |
| Signed | 8 August 2025 (2025-08-08) (initialed) |
| Location | White House,Washington, DC, United States |
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| Language | English |
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TheArmenia–Azerbaijan peace deal,[a] officially titled theAgreement "On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan",[b][1] aims to end the ongoingNagorno-Karabakh conflict betweenArmenia andAzerbaijan. On 8 August 2025, Armenian prime ministerNikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani presidentIlham Aliyev, with the mediation of United States presidentDonald Trump, initialed an agreement and signed a joint declaration emphasizing the need to continue efforts toward the signing and final ratification of the agreement.
One concession made by Armenia is the withdrawal of Russian defensive forces from theArmenia-Azerbaijani border.[2]
Another key part of the agreement is the construction ofa route (described as the "Zangezur corridor" by Turkish and Azerbaijani sources) linking mainland Azerbaijan to itsNakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is separated by a 32 km (20 mi) stretch of Armenian territory.The route will remain a part of Armenian territory and be operated according to Armenian law, but the United States will have exclusive rights to develop the area for 99 years.[3] Because of US president Donald Trump's role in brokering the agreement, the route has been named theTrump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Currently, due to the ongoingTurkish–Azeri blockade of Armenia, direct transit through the region is hampered.[4] In addition to the immediate goal, the completion of the route would allow the passage of people and goods from Europe to Azerbaijan and the broaderCentral Asia without needing to travel through Russia or Iran. Iran and Russia have condemned the role of the United States in the proposed TRIPP project as an encroachment.[5][6]
Observers in Iran and Russia have condemned the corridor as U.S. encroachment. Armenian observers have condemned the peace deal as a legitimization ofAzerbaijan's aggression andexpansionist ambitions against Armenians in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1988 when ethnic Armenians demanded the transfer of the NKAO region to Armenia. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, then both formerSoviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclaredwar in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb thesecessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 February 1988, theenclave's parliament voted in favour of uniting with Armenia. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims ofethnic cleansing andpogroms conducted by the other.[7]
As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union andremoved the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan.The referendum held in 1991 was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population and had an electorate turnout of 82.1%, of which 99.9% voted in favour of independence. The referendum resulted in theunrecognizedRepublic of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region. By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave. An estimated 353,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 500,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh were displaced as a result of the conflict. A Russian-brokeredceasefire was signed in May 1994, leading to diplomatic mediation.[7]
Border clashes continued in the following years, eventually escalating to the2008 Mardakert clashes, which began on 4 March after the2008 Armenian election protests, resulting in several score wounded and killed, with both sides declaring victory.[8][9] It was the heaviest fighting betweenethnic Armenian andAzerbaijani forces since the 1994 ceasefire after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Following the incident, on 14 March theUnited Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adoptedResolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clash was a scattered exchange of gunfire that took place on 18 February on the line of contact dividing Azerbaijani and the Karabakh Armenian military forces. As a result, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded. The2010 Mardakert clashes were the deadliest for Armenian forces since the 2008 violence. Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.[10]
Afour-day escalation in April 2016 resulted in hundreds of casualties but only minor changes to thefront line. In late 2020, the large-scaleSecond Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartiteceasefire agreement on 10 November, resulting in Azerbaijan regaining all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.Ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on theArmenian–Azerbaijani border continued following the 2020 war.[11]
Azerbaijan regained control over the disputed territory and surrounding regions in2020 and2023.[12][13][14]
In October 2022, theEuropean Union announced a civilian mission to Armenia to assist with border delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This mission aimed to support peaceful negotiations, provide technical help in marking the borders, and promote stability in the region amid renewed tensions.[15]
On 13 March 2025, it was announced that both parties had agreed on all terms of the peace agreement.[16] The announcement was described as "historic" by US Secretary of StateMarco Rubio, while European Union High RepresentativeKaja Kallas referred to it as "a decisive step."[17]
According to political analystThomas de Waal, the progress towards the agreement is largely attributed to Armenian prime ministerNikol Pashinyan, who has made a series of concessions in an effort to reach a deal. De Waal also noted that Azerbaijani presidentIlham Aliyev rarely emphasizes the benefits of peace, and continues to use the conflict with Armenia as a means to consolidate his leadership within the country.[17]
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The strategic transit route between Armenia and Azerbaijan is planned to be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, orTRIPP, and the development rights to the project are guaranteed to the United States for 99 years.[18] Under the agreement, the US would sublease the land to a consortium that will develop rail, oil, gas, and fiber optic lines, as well as possibly electricity transmission, along the 43-kilometre (27 mi) route.[19][20]
The deal reduces Russian influence in theSouth Caucasus, as Armenia has shifted toward Western partnerships following Azerbaijan's 2023 military recapture ofNagorno-Karabakh.[21] It strengthens US economic and strategic ties in the region while sidelining theOSCE Minsk Group (a Russia-led mediation body now deemed obsolete).[22] With it, the US replaces Russia as the main mediator in the region.[23]
A US official toldAxios that the main goal of the United States in this development project is to reduce the influence of Iran, Russia, and China in theSouth Caucasus region. The route would allow people and goods to travel between Turkey and Azerbaijan and beyond to Central Asia without passing through Iran or Russia.[24]
According to US SenatorSteve Daines, the deal will allow energy and mineral exports from the region, bypassing Russia and China.[25][26][14]
In the meantime, Iran threatened to block the planned route, citing security concerns, despite earlier welcoming the broader peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[27]
Iran and Russia have condemned the role of the United States in the proposed Zangezur corridor as an encroachment.[5][6] Observers have also criticized the peace deal for not addressing theright of return forethnic Armenians who fled from Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of Azerbaijan's9-month-long military siege andoffensive.[28][29][30][31]Aram Hamparian, executive director of theArmenian National Committee of America, stated that "normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace" and considered the agreement to be predicated on the erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh, the abandonment of holy sites, the neglect of hostages, and the entrenchment ofAzerbaijani occupation.[32]
Armenian sources have also criticized the peace agreement for not addressing Azerbaijan's expansionist project of "Western Azerbaijan" which claims all of Armenia.[2]
But this deal is far from complete. It omits the right of return for displaced Armenians to Artsakh, ignores the destruction of Armenians' towns, homes and businesses, makes no commitment to preserve Artsakh's cultural heritage and says nothing about prisoners of war. For many in the Armenian diaspora, these are glaring and unacceptable omissions.
The opposition also criticized Pashinyan for not mentioning Armenian prisoners in Baku and the potential return of ethnic Armenians from Karabakh, who left the formerly separatist region in September 2023.
Despite the celebratory signing, the peace deal faces significant hurdles. The agreement sidesteps the plight of Armenian prisoners of war and detainees still held in Azerbaijan. It also ignores the right of return for over 110,000 Armenian civilians who were forcefully expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian opposition and diaspora groups have criticised the accord for "sidelining justice".
Notably, the agreement did not touch upon the governance of Nagorno-Karabakh or the right of return for ethnic Armenians displaced by Azerbaijan's takeover.
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