Armalite and ballot box was apolitical catchphrase used to define the strategy pursued byIrish republicans, from 1981 up until the 1994 IRA ceasefire,[1] by whichSinn Féin ceased its policies ofelection boycott andabstentionism and instead contested elections inNorthern Ireland and theRepublic of Ireland, while theProvisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) pursued anarmed campaign to end Northern Ireland's status as part of theUnited Kingdom.[2]
Armalite refers to theAR-15 andAR-18ArmaLite rifles. TheArmalite corporation initially manufactured both; later Colt did so. The IRAsmuggled significant quantities of these rifles into Northern Ireland during the early 1970s, and the "Armalite" became a symbol of republican armed struggle.[3]
The strategy emerged after the1981 Irish hunger strike as a response to the electoral success ofBobby Sands in theApril 1981 Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election and pro-hunger strike campaigners in theNorthern Ireland local elections andRepublic of IrelandDáil Éireann elections of the same year. It was first formulated by Sinn Féin organiserDanny Morrison at the party'sArd Fheis (Annual Conference) on 31 October 1981, when he said:
Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power inIreland?[4]
The strategy was a mixed success. Sinn Féin had a solid core of 9-13 percent of the vote in Northern Ireland, which gave the party some credibility on the international stage. However, at home, it highlighted the non-violentSocial Democratic and Labour Party's (SDLP's) dominance in Northernnationalist politics, while Sinn Féin's vote in the Republic remained tiny once the emotion generated by the 1981 hunger strike subsided.
In the longer term, it had two significant political consequences, each of which fed into the emergentNorthern Ireland peace process.[5] When thegovernments of the UK and the Republic ofIreland drafted theAnglo-Irish Agreement, this convinced many in Sinn Féin that it was possible to make political gains without violence. However, Sinn Féin's electoral setbacks, such as the loss of 16 of the party's 59 council seats in 1989, pushed the emphasis of the Republican movement away from theArmalite and towards an election-focused strategy.[citation needed]
On 12 August 1994, just 19 days before the first IRA ceasefire, Danny Morrison declared that the Armalite and Ballot Box approach was over, and stated that "different times require different strategies". By that time, a confidential paper had been released within the IRA and Sinn Féin, referred to as the "TUAS document". The TUAS (Total Unarmed Strategy) set the goal of achieving a wide Irish nationalist consensus among the main nationalist players (Sinn Féin, SDLP and theRepublic) with strong international support (especially from the U.S. and theEuropean Union).[6]
The Armalite and ballot box strategy has also been cited as having inspired members of the LoyalistUlster Defence Association such asJohn McMichael to seek a similar route into electoral politics through vehicles such as the Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (laterUlster Democratic Party (UDP)).[7][8] However, parties directly linked to Loyalist paramilitaries had minimal success in elections in Northern Ireland, with the combined electoral share of the UDP and theProgressive Unionist Party (PUP) failing to exceed 1% before the May 1996 elections for theNorthern Ireland Forum.[9]