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Argentina during World War II

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Argentina during World War II
A newspaper announcing Argentina's severing of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers on 26 January 1944.
LocationArgentina
Date1939–1945
Events

Since the 19th century,relations between Argentina and Britain had been strong due to trade, as well asBritish investments andimmigration. Nationalistic groups resented this influence over Argentina's economy.[1] In the interwar years, fascistItalian andGerman influence in the country increased due to trade, investment, and the presence of numerous immigrants from both countries.

The refusal to break relations with theAxis powers as the war progressed furthered the belief that Argentina was sympathetic to them.[2] Because of strong divisions and internal disputes within theArgentine military,[3] Argentina remainedneutral for most of World War II, despite pressure from the United States to join theAllies.[4] Argentina eventually gave in to the Allies' pressure, breaking relations with the Axis on 26 January 1944[5] and declaring war on them on 27 March 1945.[6]

The Nazis had a presence in the country as early as 1925, growing to a peak of 2,110 party members in 1935 before officially dissolving in 1939. Afterwards,Buenos Aires was a major center of Axisespionage[7] under the guise of German labor organizations and with support from theUnited Officers' Group. Argentine,Chilean, and U.S. agencies shut down some local spy networks, butpro-Nazi activity occurred as late as 1950 underJuan Perón, allowing perhaps 5,000 collaboratorsto escape there.

Pre-war political and economic background

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19th century–World War I

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Argentina maintained a long tradition ofneutrality regarding European wars, upheld and defended by all major political parties since the 19th century. One of the main reasons for this policy was related to Argentina's economic position as one of the world's leading exporters of foodstuffs and agricultural products, to Europe in general and to theUnited Kingdom in particular.

Relations between Britain and Argentina had been strong since the mid-19th century, due to the large volume of trade between both countries, the major presence ofBritish investments particularly in railroads and banking, as well asBritish immigration,[8] and the policy of neutrality had ensured the food supply of Britain duringWorld War I against the GermanU-boat campaign.[9][3]

Before the Great Depression

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In 1916, following the enactment ofuniversal and secret male suffrage byconservative presidentRoque Saenz Peña, the voting franchise was expanded, and electoral transparency improved, leading to thefirst truly free presidential elections in the country. As a result of these electoral changes,Hipólito Yrigoyen, leader of the centristRadical Civic Union (UCR), waselectedPresident of Argentina. Under the successive administrations of presidents Yrigoyen (1916–1922) andMarcelo Torcuato de Alvear (1922–1928), Argentina continued the trend of strong economic growth and democratic consolidation that had begun under previous administrations, matching countries such as Canada or Australia in per capita income,[10] while the government enacted social and economic reforms and extended assistance to small farms and businesses. Beginning in 1928, Yrigoyen's second administration faced a crippling economic crisis, precipitated by theGreat Depression (1929–1939).[11]

1930 military coup

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In 1930, Yrigoyenwas ousted from power by the military led byJosé Félix Uriburu, in what became the firstmilitary coup in modern Argentine history, marking the beginning of what would be later called theInfamous Decade in Argentina.

Supported bynationalistic sectors of the military, Uriburu tried to implement major changes to Argentine politics and government, banning political parties and suspending both elections and the1853 Constitution, aiming to reorganizing Argentina alongcorporatist andfascist lines. However, Uriburu's policies would face widespread opposition from civil society and from conservative factions of the military, and only a year later, in 1931, he was forced to step down. Thus, in November 1931, the military government called for elections, but only after banning UCR candidates and organizing a system that was broadly recognized asfraudulent. It was under these conditions that GeneralAgustín P. Justo was elected president.[12][13]

Presidency of Agustín P. Justo

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GeneralAgustín P. Justo

Elected on 8 November 1931, Justo was supported by a newly created conservative party known asConcordancia, which was born as an alliance between theNational Democratic Party, dissident sectors of theRadical Civic Union that had opposedHipólito Yrigoyen, and theIndependent Socialist Party. Still reeling from the aftermath of the Great Depression, Justo's government at first undertook fiscally conservative economic policies, reducing public expenditure and restricting the circulation of currency in an attempt to strengthen the public coffers. However, as in other countries during this period,Keynesian ideas were eventually implemented, and more emphasis was placed on public works and infrastructure, resulting in the creation of the National Office of Public Highways, expansion of the road network, creation of the Junta Nacional de Granos (National Grain Board) and the Junta Nacional de Carnes (National MeatBoard), and, in 1935, creation of theCentral Bank of the Argentine Republic, under the advice of economistOtto Niemeyer.[14]

In foreign policy, the most pressing issue of the Justo administration was the restoration of international trade, which had collapsed following the Great Depression. As a byproduct ofBlack Tuesday and theWall Street crash of 1929, Great Britain, principal economic partner of Argentina in the 1920s and 1930s, had taken measures to protect the meat supply market in theCommonwealth. At the1932 Imperial Conference negotiations inOttawa, bowing to pressure, mainly from Australia and South Africa, Britain had decided to severely curtail imports ofArgentine beef.[15] The plan provoked an immediate outcry inBuenos Aires, and the Argentine government dispatched Vice PresidentJulio Argentino Pascual Roca and a team of negotiators to London. As a result of these negotiations, on 1 May 1933, the bilateral treaty known as theRoca–Runciman Treaty was signed between Argentina and the United Kingdom, which guaranteed Argentina a beef exportquota that was equivalent to the levels sold in 1932, in exchange for Argentina reducing tariffs on almost 350 British goods to 1930 rates and to refrain from imposing duties on coal, strengthening the commercial ties between Argentina and Britain and ensuring atrade surplus during the turmoil of the Great Depression, but drawing ire from nationalistic sectors and several opposition senators, including the denunciations ofliberal SenatorLisandro de la Torre, who claimed that Britain received the most benefits from the treaty.[16] Ratified by theArgentine Senate, the Roca–Runciman Treaty lasted three years and was renewed for another three years as the Eden-Malbrán Treaty of 1936.[17] Argentina under Justo would also rejoin theLeague of Nations, and holdstate visits to presidentsGetúlio Vargas of Brazil andGabriel Terra ofUruguay, signing commercial treaties with those nations. Justo's foreign minister,Carlos Saavedra Lamas would also serve an important role as a mediator in theChaco War betweenBolivia andParaguay, helping both countries reach a peace deal, thus winning the1936 Nobel Peace Prize.

Mounting political tensions

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In the aftermath of the 1930 military coup and the subsequent accusations ofelectoral fraud against Justo, political tensions in Argentina would remain high throughout the 1930s. On 5 April 1931, supporters of deposed presidentYrigoyen won the elections for governor inBuenos Aires Province, but the government ofUriburu declared the elections invalid. On December, facing uprisings by UCR supporters, Justo decreed a state of siege, and again imprisoned the oldYrigoyen, as well as Alvear,Ricardo Rojas,Honorio Pueyrredón, and other leading figures of the party.[18]

In 1933, attempted revolts continued. The provinces of Buenos Aires,Corrientes,Entre Ríos, andMisiones would be the stage of UCR uprisings, which ended with more than a thousand people being detained. Seriously ill, Yrigoyen was returned to Buenos Aires and kept under house arrest. He died on 3 June, and his burial inLa Recoleta Cemetery was the occasion of a mass demonstration. In December, during a meeting of the national convention of the UCR, a joint uprising by the military and politicians broke loose inSanta Fe,Rosario, andPaso de los Libres. José Benjamin Abalos, who was Yrigoyen's former Minister, and Colonel Roberto Bosch were arrested during the uprising and the organizers and leaders of the party were imprisoned atMartín García. Former President Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear was exiled by the government, while others were detained in the penitentiary inUshuaia.

In 1935, Alvear was allowed to return from exile as part of a gentlemen's agreement with Justo, with Alvear promising there would be no more violent rebellions in exchange for Justo promising an end to fraudulent elections. Thus Alvear took on leadership of the UCR party, vowing that the UCR would once again take part in elections and to continue the fight against fraudulent practices. That same year, once again amid accusations of fraud, the Justo administration managed to secure the victory of its candidateManuel Fresco for governor of Buenos Aires Province, but it could not avoid the UCR victory ofAmadeo Sabattini for governor inCórdoba, despite bloody incidents that aimed at disrupting the election. Meanwhile, the province ofSanta Fe, under the leadership of oppositionDemocratic Progressive Party governor Luciano Molinas, was the subject of afederal intervention by the national government.

In 1937,presidential elections were to be held. Alvear, together with his running mateEnrique Mosca campaigned across the country, vowing that "not even fraud could defeat them". Meanwhile, the rulingConcordancia party, nominated lawyerRoberto Marcelino Ortiz, from the dissident anti-Yrigoyen UCR faction, as presidential candidate, withconservative lawmakerRamón Castillo, as his running mate. The1937 presidential elections were held in September. Completely flouting on his promise, Justo kept his political and security forces busy on election day. Amid widespread reports of intimidation, ballot stuffing and voter roll tampering (whereby, according to one observer, "democracy was extended to the hereafter"), Ortiz won the elections handily.[19]

Beginning of the war

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Political situation

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Roberto M. Ortiz came to power through the system ofelectoral fraud, but soon after taking office he tried to dismantle it.

Despitewinning the presidency in 1937 in a process that was widely recognized as fraudulent by both the government and the opposition,[20] by 1939 Ortiz's government had made democratic normalization a priority of its agenda.[20] To achieve this aim, the administration resorted to federal interventions, but in the opposite way that these had been used under Justo, intervening those provinces where governors had won by proven fraud (namelySan Juan,Santiago del Estero,Catamarca andBuenos Aires), while respecting the results and autonomy in those provinces with no irregularities, including those where elections had been won by the opposition UCR, such as the cases ofTucumán (October 1938 and March 1939) as well as Córdoba (March 1940). In 1940,legislative elections were held in a clean fashion, giving the opposition UCR a majority in Congress.[21] This policy of democratic restoration would soon put the administration of Ortiz at odds with the more conservative factions of his own rulingConcordancia party, including conservative vice-president Ramón Castillo.[20]

The opposition UCR, in turn, was divided between FORJA, a political grouping that consisted of hardline supporters of deposed UCR presidentHipólito Yrigoyen (who died in 1933) and opposed any form of cooperation with the government, and the majoritarian faction of the UCR under the official leadership of Alvear, who, while also remaining in opposition to the government, soon adopted a more conciliary tone to the Ortiz administration as a result of these changes. The two other major parties, theSocialist Party and the liberalDemocratic Progressive Party would also remain in opposition to the government. Meanwhile, theCommunist Party, also staunchly opposed to the government, initially followed a policy of courting the trade unions, and gave priority to supporting the international stance of theSoviet Union.[22]

Economically, recovery from the Great Depression had been underway since 1933, but the beginning of the war resulted in changes to the Argentine economy, as imports from Europe were reduced. Thus began a process ofimport substitution industrialization, which had some antecedents during the Great Depression. This led to a process of internal migration as well, with people living in the countryside or in small villages moving to urban centers.[23]

Initial diplomatic reaction

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At the beginning of the Second World War on 1 September 1939, the Argentine government proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict. On 3 September, the diplomatic representatives of the United Kingdom and France informed the Argentine government that their countries had entered a state of war againstNazi Germany. Following the initial policies of other states in the Americas, the Ortiz government issued a decree on 4 September 1939, declaring Argentine neutrality in the conflict. To enforce the observance of neutrality, on 14 September 1939, Ortiz issued a second presidential decree, creating a special commission integrated by representatives from each ministry, housed on theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and chaired by a delegate from this ministry.[21]

Battle of the River Plate

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The Germanpocket battleshipAdmiral Graf Spee took part in theBattle of the River Plate, and was scuttled by her captain after being damaged in combat.

On 13 December 1939, theBattle of the River Plate took place. During this battle, the German pocket battleshipAdmiral Graf Spee was severely damaged by British ships on the waters of theRiver Plate estuary. Cornered, the German captainHans Langsdorff ordered the scuttling of the ship,[24] while the crew were taken under custody and interned by Uruguayan and Argentine authorities.[24] While under custody, Hans Langsdorff later committed suicide at theImmigrant's Hotel in Buenos Aires, while the crew was eventually released, a dozen of them taking residence in Argentina and Uruguay.[25]

Aborted attempt to join the Allies

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In December 1939, partly as a consequence of theBattle of the River Plate, the Ortiz government concluded that the worldwide nature of the conflict would eventually make neutrality untenable and impossible to maintain.[3] Thus,Minister of Foreign AffairsJosé Maria Cantilo was tasked with drafting a proposal, under which Argentina, together with the U.S. and eventually otherLatin American states, would join theAllies as "non-belligerent" states, offering economic and diplomatic support to theEuropean Allies.

The Argentine cargo shipUruguay, stopped and scuttled by the German submarineU-37 on 27 May 1940[26]

In April 1940, Foreign Affairs Minister Cantilo made a visit to U.S. ambassadorNormal Armour, presenting the Argentine proposal for the U.S., Argentina and other Latin American states to join the war together as non-belligerent parties.[3] However, the Argentine proposal suffered from bad timing, as then U.S. president,Franklin D. Roosevelt, was in the midst of a challenging and controversialre-election campaign for an unprecedentedthird term in office. To make things worse, on 12 May 1940, the Argentine proposal was leaked to the press, and was published nationwide by Argentine daily newspaperLa Nación, leading to much confusion in the country, and outrage among nationalist groups, who demanded Ortiz's resignation. On 13 May, the Argentine government issued a communique acknowledging the existence of the proposal, and on 18 May another communique was issued, clarifying that Argentina would continue to observe the "most strict neutrality" in the conflict.[3]

The leak of this proposal at an early stage of the conflict, together with the perceived diplomatic snub, severely weakened the position of the Ortiz administration and of pro-Allied factions within the Argentine government, intensifyingnationalist sentiment and opposition to Ortiz in military circles.[3]

Ortiz's resignation and growing divisions

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Vice-president Ramón Castillo, a conservative politician fromCatamarca Province, became actingPresident of Argentina following the leave of absence by Ortiz in 1940.

From the beginning of his administration, Ortiz had been suffering from diabetes, and his health continued to deteriorate throughout his presidency. By 3 July 1940, after only two years in office, Ortiz had lost much of hiseyesight, and thus he requested a temporary leave of absence from his duties as president, being replaced by conservative Vice-presidentRamón S. Castillo, who became acting president.[21] During Castillo's tenure, stances towards the war became more complex as the conflict developed. The main political parties, newspapers and intellectuals supported the Allies, yet Castillo maintained neutrality. Meanwhile, Ortiz was in leave of absence and unable to serve as president, but he did not resign from office. The position of Argentina vis-à-vis the war generated disputes between them, with Castillo often prevailing.[27]

Despite several treatments from Argentineophthalmologists, and the kind gesture of support from President Roosevelt who sent one of the best ophthalmologists from the U.S. to provide treatment as well, Ortiz's health got progressively worse, until he finally lost his eyesight completely. On 27 June 1942 he would present his full resignation to the presidency, and vice-president Castillo took office as president to fulfill the remaining two years of his mandate.[21] Only 18 days after his resignation, Ortiz died.[21]

Meanwhile, among civil society and the main political parties, support for Argentine intervention on the Allied side continued to grow and became widespread as the war progressed. The main pro-Allied advocacy organization wasAcción Argentina, founded on 5 June 1940, from a proposal of theSocialist Party. The initial manifesto ofAcción Argentina was drafted by former presidentMarcelo T. de Alvear, and leading members of the organization included major intellectuals, journalists, artists and politicians from a wide ideological spectrum, among themAlicia Moreau de Justo,Américo Ghioldi, José Aguirre Cámara, Mauricio Yadarola, Rodolfo Fitte, Rafael Pividal, Raúl C. Monsegur, Federico Pinedo, Jorge Bullrich, Alejandro Ceballos, Julio A. Noble,Victoria Ocampo,Emilio Ravignani,Nicolás Repetto, Mariano Villar Sáenz Peña and Juan Valmaggia. The organization grew to encompass 300 chapters across the country, and organized political meetings and protests, propaganda posters, leaflets, and even direct actions attempting to expose Nazi activity in the country.[28]

Former PresidentMarcelo T. de Alvear remained a leading advocate for the entry of Argentina on the Allied side, and a major political figure until his death in 1942.

On the side of those opposing entry into the war, FORJA was the only political party that supported neutrality throughout the war, seeing it as an opportunity to get rid of what they considered British meddling with the Argentine economy. Starting in 1940, the FORJA faction led by Dellepiane and Del Mazo had drifted away from the organization and rejoined the UCR, while FORJA itself adopted morenationalistic and left-wing ideas, under the leadership ofArturo Jauretche.[29] Nationalistic sectors of the army also promoted neutrality as a way to oppose the United Kingdom and its economic influence. Notably during this time, a plan was made by the Naval War College to invade theFalkland Islands, but was never put into operation.[30] On the other hand, the newspaperEl Pampero, financed by the German embassy, actively supportedAdolf Hitler.[31]

Within theArgentine Army,Germanophile sentiments were strong among many officers, an influence that predated both world wars, having been steadily growing since 1904. Generally, it did not involve a rejection of democracy but rather an admiration ofGerman military history, which combined with an intenseArgentine nationalism influenced the main stance of the army towards the war: maintainingneutrality. The arguments in favor ranged from support for the Argentine military tradition (as the country had been neutral during both World War I and theWar of the Pacific), to a rejection of foreign attempts to coerce Argentina into joining a war perceived as a conflict between foreign countries with no Argentine interests at stake, to outrightAnglophobia.[32] Though only a handful of military leaders actually supported Hitler and pro-Axis positions were a minority, their true influence inside the army remains difficult to ascertain, as their advocates generally disguised themselves and adopted nationalist arguments.[3]

Meanwhile, the Communist Party aligned itself with the diplomatic policies of the Soviet Union. As a result, it supported neutrality and opposed the British influence in Argentina during the early stages of the war, in line with theTreaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. The launching ofOperation Barbarossa and the consequent Soviet entry in the war changed that attitude. SomeTrotskyists promoted the fight against the Third Reich as an early step of an internationalclass struggle.

As for the Castillo administration, there are a number of interpretations for his reasons for staying neutral. One such perspective focuses on the Argentine tradition of neutrality. Others see Castillo as a nationalist, not being influenced by the power structure in Buenos Aires (since he was fromCatamarca), so that, with the support of the army, he could simply defy the pressure to join the Allies. A similar interpretation considers instead that Castillo simply had no power to go against the wishes of the army, and if he declared war he would be deposed in a military coup. A third point of view considers that the U.S. was the sole promoter of Argentina's entry into the war, whereas the United Kingdom benefited from Argentine neutrality as it was a major supplier of beef and wheat. This, however, fails to acknowledge theAnglophile factions' constant requests to declare war.[33] Most likely, it was a combination of the desires of the British diplomacy and the Argentine army, which prevailed over the pro-war factions.[34]

Socialist deputy Enrique Dickmann created a commission in theNational Congress to investigate a rumored German attempt to seizePatagonia and then conquer the rest of the country. The conservative deputy Videla Dorna claimed that the real risk was a similar Communist invasion, and FORJA believed that a German invasion was only a potential risk, whereas British dominance of the Argentine economy was a reality.[35]

A diplomatic mission by the BritishLord Willingdon arranged commercial treaties whereby Argentina sent thousands of cattle to Britain at no charge, decorated with the Argentine colours and with the phrase "good luck" written on them.El Pampero and FORJA criticised this arrangement, withArturo Jauretche andHomero Manzi proclaiming "these are the goods that are not being sent to our needy compatriots in the provinces".[36]

After Pearl Harbor

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The cargo shipVictoria, which theGerman submarine U-201 damaged in error on 18 April 1942.[37]
The cargo shipRio Tercero, which theGerman submarine U-202 sank in error off New York on 22 June 1942.

The situation changed dramatically after the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequentAmerican declaration of war upon Japan. During the Third Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Americas (1942 Rio Conference), the U.S. tried to get every Latin American country to join the Allies to generate a continent-wide resistance to theAxis. But the government of Castillo, through foreign ministerEnrique Ruiz Guiñazu, opposed the American proposal. From that moment onwards, relations between both countries worsened, and American pressure for Argentine entry into the war began to increase.[38]

Castillo did, however, declare a state of emergency after the attack on Pearl Harbor.[39]

Military plots

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Main article:United Officers' Group

Castillo's term was due to end in 1944. Initially, it was arranged that Agustín Pedro Justo would run for president for a second time, but after his unexpected death in 1943 Castillo was forced to seek another candidate, finally settling onRobustiano Patrón Costas.[39] The army, however, was neither willing to support the electoral fraud that would be necessary to secure Costas's victory, nor to continue conservative policies, nor to risk Costas breaking neutrality. A number of generals reacted by creating a secret organization called the United Officers' Group (GOU) to oust Castillo from power. Future president Juan Perón was a member of this group but did not support an early coup, recommending instead to postpone the overthrowing of the government until the plotters had developed a plan to make necessary reforms. The coup was to take place close to the elections, should the electoral fraud have been confirmed, but it was instead carried out earlier in response rumors of the possible sacking of the minister of war,Pedro Pablo Ramírez.[40]

It is not known for certain whether Patrón Costas would have maintained neutrality or not. But some declarations of support to Britain and his ties with pro-allied factions suggest that had he become president he would have declared war.[41]

1943 coup

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A newspaper announcing the1943 military coup.
Main article:1943 Argentine Revolution

The military coup that deposed Castillo took place on 4 June 1943. It is considered the end of theInfamous Decade and the starting point of the self-styledRevolution of '43.Arturo Rawson took power asde facto president. The nature of the coup was confusing during its first days: German embassy officials burned their documentation fearing a pro-Allied coup, while the U.S. embassy considered it a pro-Axis coup.[42][43]

Rawson met with a delegate from the British embassy on 5 June and promised to break relations with the Axis powers and declare war within 72 hours. This turn of events enraged the GOU, as did Rawson's choices for his cabinet. A new coup took place, replacing Rawson withPedro Pablo Ramírez.[44] Thus, Rawson became the shortest non-interim president in Argentine history.[45]

One of the first measures of the new Ramírez government was to prohibitAcción Argentina and its pro-Allied advocacy activities.[28]

The new government proceeded with both progressive and reactionary policies. Maximum prices were established for popular products, rents were reduced, the privileges of theChadopyff factory were annulled and hospital fees were abolished. On the other hand, the authorities intervened trade unions, closed the Communist newspaperLa Hora and imposed religious education at schools. Perón andEdelmiro Julián Farrell, hailing from the Ministry of War, fostered better relations between the state and the unions.[46]

As previously discussed, the Communist Party had aligned itself with the diplomatic policies of the Soviet Union. Following the launching ofOperation Barbarossa and the consequent Soviet entry in the war, the Communists became pro-war and halted its support for further labour strikes against British factories located in Argentina. This switch redirected workers' support from the Communist Party to Perón and the new government.[47]

As a result, the Communist Party turned against the government, which it viewed as pro-Nazi. Perón countered complaints by declaring that "The excuses they seek are very well known. They say we are 'nazis', I declare we are as far from Nazism as from any other foreign ideology. We are only Argentines and want, above all, the common good for Argentines. We do not want any moreelectoral fraud, nor more lies. We do not want that those who do not work live from those who do".[48]

One of the leading figures behind the1943 military coup,Pedro Pablo Ramírez was suspected of having Axis sympathies.

The government held diplomatic discussions with the U.S., with Argentina requesting aircraft, fuel, ships and military hardware. The ArgentineMinister of Foreign AffairsSegundo Storni argued that, although Argentina refrained from participating in the war, it remained closer to the Allies, sending them food, and that up to then the Axis powers had not taken action against the country to justify a declaration of war. U.S. Secretary of StateCordell Hull replied that Argentina was the only Latin American country to not have broken relations with the Axis, that Argentine food was sold at lucrative return, and that U.S. military hardware was intended for countries already at war, some of which were facing more severe fuel shortages than was Argentina. Storni resigned after this rejection.[49] The U.S. took further measures to increase pressure on Argentina. All Argentine companies suspected of having ties with the Axis powers were blacklisted and boycotted, and the supply of newsprint was limited to pro-Allied newspapers. American exports of electronic appliances, chemical substances and oil production infrastructure were halted. The properties of forty-four Argentine companies were seized, and scheduled loans were halted. Hull wanted to weaken the Argentine government or force its resignation. Torn between diplomatic and economic pressure as opposed to an open declaration of war against Argentina, he opted for the former to avoid disrupting the supply of food to Britain. Nevertheless, he also saw the situation as a chance for the U.S. to have a greater influence over Argentina than Britain.[50]

The U.S. also threatened to accuse Argentina of being involved with the coup ofGualberto Villarroel in Bolivia, and a plot to receive weapons from Germany after the allied refusal, to face the possible threat of invasion either by the U.S. itself or Brazil acting on their behalf. However, it would be unlikely that Germany would provide such weapons, given their fragile situation in 1944. Ramírez called a new meeting of the GOU, and it was agreed to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers (albeit without yet a declaration of war) on 26 January 1944.[5]

The break in relations generated unrest within the military, and Ramírez considered removing both the influential Farrell and Perón from the government. However, their faction discovered Ramírez's plan. They broke up the GOU, to avoid letting the military loyal to Ramírez know they were aware of his plot, and then initiated a coup against him. Edelmiro Julián Farrell became then the new president of Argentina on 24 February.[51]

The U.S. refused to recognise Farrell as long as he maintained the neutralist policy, which was ratified by Farrell on 2 March, and the U.S. broke relations with Argentina two days later.Winston Churchill complained about the harsh policy of the U.S. against Argentina, pointing out that Argentine supplies were vital to the British war effort and that removing their diplomatic presence from the country would even force Argentina to seek Axis protection. British diplomacy sought to guarantee the supply of Argentine food by signing a treaty covering it, while US diplomatic policy sought to prevent such a treaty. Hull ordered the confiscation of Argentine goods in the U.S., suspension of foreign trade with her, prohibited US ships from mooring at Argentine ports, and denounced Argentina as the "nazi headquarters in the Western hemisphere".[52]

According to historianNorberto Galasso, at this point Washington held talks with Brazil, exploring plans for military intervention. The Brazilian ambassador in Washington is said to have claimed that Buenos Aires could be completely destroyed by the Brazilian Air Force, allowing Argentina to be dominated without the open intervention of the U.S., who would support Brazil by providing ships and bombs.[53]

War's end

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TheGerman submarine U-977 moored atMar del Plata, after being surrendered to theArgentine Navy in August 1945

TheLiberation of Paris in August 1944 gave new hopes to the pro-Allied factions in Argentina, who saw it as an omen of the possible fall of the Argentine government and called for new elections. The demonstrations in support of Paris soon turned into protests against the government, leading to incidents with the police.[54] It was rumored that some Argentine politicians in Uruguay would create agovernment in exile, but the project never came to fruition. PresidentFranklin Roosevelt supported Hull's claims about Argentina with similar statements. He also cited Churchill when he stated that history would judge all nations for their role in the war, both belligerents and neutrals.[55]

By early 1945, World War II was nearing its end. The Red Armyhad captured Warsaw and was closing in on East Prussia, and Berlin itself was under attack. Allied victory was imminent. Perón, the strong man of the Argentine government, foresaw that the Allies would dominate international politics for decades and concluded that although Argentina had successfully resisted the pressure to force it to join the war, remaining neutral until the end of the war would force the country intoisolationism at best or bring about a military attack from the soon to be victorious powers.

Negotiations were eased by the departure of Hull as Secretary of State, replaced byEdward Stettinius Jr., who demanded that Argentina hold free elections, declare war against the Axis powers, eradicate all Nazi presence in the country and give its complete cooperation to international organizations. Perón agreed, and German organizations were curtailed, pro-Nazi manifestations were banned, and German goods were seized. The Argentine merchant navy was instructed to ignore the German blockade.[56] These measures eased relations with the U.S. When the Alliesadvanced into Frankfurt, Argentina finally formalized the negotiations. On 27 March, per Decree 6945, Argentina declared war on Japan and, by extension, on Germany, an ally of Japan. FORJA, one of the main proponents of neutrality, distanced itself from the government, but eventuallyArturo Jauretche would come to support the government's change of position a year later. Jauretche reasoned that the U.S. opposed Argentina because of its perceived sm by refusing to declare war although neutrality was based instead on Argentine interests; which were no longer at stake with a declaration of war when the country would not actually join the conflict. Jauretche came to believe that Perón's pragmatism was better for the country than his own idealistic perspective of keeping a neutral stance to the end of the war.[6]

A few days later, on 10 April, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S., and the other Latin American countries restored diplomatic relations with Argentina. Still, diplomatic hostility against Argentina from the U.S. resurfaced after the unexpected death of Roosevelt, who was succeeded byHarry S. Truman. AmbassadorSpruille Braden would organize opposition to the government of Farrell and Perón.[57]

The finalAxis defeat in theEuropean Theatre of World War II took place a month later and was greeted with demonstrations of joy in Buenos Aires.[58] Similar demonstrations took place in August, after thesurrender of Japan, bringing World War II to its final end.[59] Farrell lifted the state of emergency declared by Castillo after the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.[60]

In early May 1945, amidGermany's surrender at theend of World War II in Europe, two GermanU-boats,U-530 andU-977, opted to flee to Argentina rather than surrender to the Allies. The subs reachedMar del Plata, Buenos Aires Province, on 10 July and 17 August 1945, respectively. Argentina quickly handed them over to the American military after first summoning U.S. andBritish Royal Navy experts to interrogate them and examine documentation.[61]U-530's captain did not explain why theship's log and crew identity papers were tossed overboard or their two-month delay.[62]

Local Nazi activity

[edit]
Nazi supporters, evidently includingJuan Perón (center), and potential undercovercounterespionage agents (fromChile's international anti-Nazi probe)[63]

The Nazis had a presence in Argentina since 1925, with a peak of 2,110 local party members in 1935, dwindling to 1,400 in 1938, and officially dissolving in May 1939; subsequently, they operated in secret under the guise of German labor organizations.[64] Buenos Aires served a major center of Axisespionage.[7][65]

There was also a substantialGerman community in Argentina as a result of 19th-century immigration. This community included manyGerman Jews, liberals,social democrats and other opponents of Nazism (e.g. staff of Argentina'smain German-language newspaper, which was banned in Germany for its opposition to Hitler).[66] However, it also included supporters of Hitler and theNazi Party, and Argentina hosted a strong, well-organized pro-Nazi element that was controlled by the German ambassador. During the war, Nazi Germany conductedespionage activities in Latin America, which wasinvestigated by Chile and the United StatesFederal Bureau of Investigation.[67] The network at large was dismantled and most (but not all) of its agents were arrested in 1944.[68][69] Additionally, by 1946, theU.S. Senate had a list of party membershipsc. 1939.[70]

At some point, German-Argentine millionaire Ludwig Freude, who oversaw Buenos Aires'sGerman Overseas Bank (a subsidiary ofDeutsche Bank), established contacts withSwiss banks.[71][72][73] An early 1940s investigation ordered by anti-Nazi president Ortiz identified 12,000 Nazi sympathizers in Argentina who had contributed some USD $40.5 million (2025 currency) to a single account at Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (later acquired byCredit Suisse).[71][72][73] The various government documents indicate financial ties amidst the German Overseas Bank, the nearbyGerman-South American Bank [es] (a subsidiary ofDresdner Bank and the site of the Nazi headquarters),[64] Freude, theEichhorns, and others linked to numerous Argentine companies blacklisted by the U.S.,[74] such as subsidiaries ofIG Farben (which supplied the Nazis withZyklon B).[75][76] In 1943, the pro-fascist GOU destroyed all known copies of the list.[77][a]

In June 1941, Germany sent 83 boxes of documents from its embassy inTokyo, Japan, via theMSNana Maru to Buenos Aires.[79][65] Customs agents impounded the boxes, which were searched byArgentina's foreign ministry. Five boxes containedNazi propaganda hidden amid material labeled as "scientific, literary and cultural",[72] while the others housed mostly children's books, magazines and war photographs. A month later, Argentine officials raided the secret offices of the banned Nazi Party. Perhaps 5,000 seized memberships from theGerman Labor Front and the Germantrade union association were stored by theSupreme Court of Argentina.[65]

In May 1943,Schutzstaffel (SS) functionaryWalter Schellenberg secured a secret agreement with the Argentine military that excluded Nazis from arrest in Argentina and established adiplomatic pouch exchange system between the two regimes. The coup d'état that June opened a way for Perón's rise to power.[80] Meanwhile, German wealth derived fromlooting Holocaust victims was placed in aReichsbank account under the false name ofMax Heiliger.[81] By 1944, this was worth millions ofReichsmarks, in addition to shipments to theReich Chancellery headquarters ofMartin Bormann.[82] SS officerOtto Skorzeny facilitated the international transfer of wealth from the account, reportedly depositing it in the name of Perón's future wife,Eva.[82] According toThe New York Times, the U.S. State Department reported in 1945 that "the personal fortunes of Nazi officials" were delivered to Buenos Aires via diplomatic pouch, with Nazi higher-upHermann Göring possessing over USD $20 million and aU-boat loaded with Nazi loot.[83]

Reportedly aligned with Nazi intelligence, Ludwig Freude coordinated contributions from Nazi collaborators to Perón's1946 presidential campaign.[84][83] Perón appointedanthropologist Santiago Peralta (an avowedanti-Semite) as his immigration commissioner and Ludwig's sonRodolfo Freude as the head of the country'sfirst intelligence bureau.[85][83]

Ratline escapees

[edit]
Main article:Ratlines (World War II) § Argentine haven

After their appointment, Peralta and Rodolfo Freude evidently aided European war criminals by streamlining their pathway to citizenship and employing them within their departments.[86] Péron's regime collaborated with an existing ratline and operated additional ratlines throughScandinavia andSwitzerland.[63] As many as 5,000 Nazi war criminals escaped to Argentina,[87] some as late as 1950, the year Adolf Eichmann arrived.[88] Péron later stated that he helped as many Nazi officials as possible in a reaction to theNuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals (1945–1946), which he thought were a "disgrace".[89][90]

In the late 1940s, under Perón's leadership, the government secretly allowed entry of a number of war criminals fleeing Europe after Nazi Germany's collapse, as part of theratlines. More than 300 Nazi fugitives fled to Argentina, including war criminals such asErich Priebke,Joseph Mengele,Eduard Roschmann,Josef Schwammberger,Walter Kutschmann, and Gestapo ColonelAdolf Eichmann.[91] This also included members of the ultranationalistUstaše regime from theIndependent State of Croatia, including its leader,Ante Pavelić.[92]

In May 1960, Eichmann was kidnapped in Argentina by the IsraeliMossad and brought to trial in Israel, where he was executed in 1962.[93] At the time, Argentina condemned the Israeli government for abducting Eichmann, demanding he be returned to face arrest and extradition through the proper channels.[94] This led to a diplomatic spat between the nations, which was solved amicably shortly afterwards.[95]

In 1992, PresidentCarlos Menem declassified several police files regarding the escape of Nazi fugitives to Argentina,[96] and in 1997 he created a special commission to investigate their activities. This, along with collaboration between local authorities and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, led to the arrest of notorious war criminals such asPriebke,Šakić andKutschmann.[91] In 2000, PresidentFernando de la Rúa issued a formal state apology for Argentina's role in aiding the escape of Nazi fugitives.[97]

Argentines in World War II

[edit]
Anglo-Argentine pilotMaureen Dunlop recorded over 800 hours of service for theAir Transport Auxiliary and was featured on the cover of thePicture Post on 16 September 1942.

During World War II, 4,000 Argentines served with all threeBritish armed services, even though Argentina was officially a neutral country during the war.[98][99] Over 600 Argentine volunteers served with both theRoyal Air Force and theRoyal Canadian Air Force, mostly inNo. 164 (Argentine) squadron,[100] whose shield bore the sun from theFlag of Argentina and themotto,"Determined We Fly (Firmes Volamos)".[98]

Maureen Dunlop, born inQuilmes, left her Australian/English parents to join theAir Transport Auxiliary. She recorded over 800 hours of service, ferryingSupermarine Spitfires,de Havilland MosquitosNorth American P-51 Mustangs,Hawker Typhoons, and bomber types including theVickers Wellington andAvro Lancaster to the frontline RAF stations. After being photographed exiting aFairey Barracuda, she featured on the cover ofPicture Post on 16 September 1942, and became a wartime pin-up. Dunlop returned to Argentina after the war, and continued work as a commercial pilot who also flew for and trained pilots of theArgentine Air Force. She later raised pure-bloodArab horses with her husband on theirstud farm, "Milla Lauquen Stud".[101][102]

Nearly 500 Argentines served in the Royal Navy around the world, from the North Atlantic to the South Pacific.[103] Many were part of the special forces, such asJohn Godwin.

Many members of the Anglo-Argentine community also volunteered in non-combat roles, or worked to raise money and supplies for British troops. The Anglo-ArgentineFellowship of the Bellows in Argentina raised money to buy aircraft for the RAF. In April 2005, a special remembrance service was held at the RAF church ofSt Clement Danes in London.[99]

On 9 May 2015, the remains of the Argentine volunteer Group Captain Kenneth Langley Charney DFC & Bar, were repatriated and buried in the British Cemetery in Buenos Aires. Charney was born in Quilmes, Argentina, in 1920, and died in Andorra in 1982.[104]

Gallery

[edit]
  • The grand opening of the Avenida General Paz in 1941
    The grand opening of theAvenida General Paz in 1941
  • Cordoba's Emilio Olmos Avenue in 1943
    Cordoba's Emilio Olmos Avenue in 1943
  • U.S. ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden and others in 1945
    U.S. ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden and others in 1945

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Footnotes

  1. ^In 1984, a copy of the list was obtained by an employee of an Argentine state-owned bank (reportedly housed in the former Nazi headquarters).[71][72][77] In 2020, the list was shared with theSimon Wiesenthal Center (SWC), which theorized that funds derived fromNazi plunder was sent to the listed Nazi collaborators for deposit in the Swiss account for Nazi Germany to withdraw in exchangeable, non-German currency.[78] The SWC requested access to Credit Suisse's archives to determine if wealth looted fromHolocaust victims was still being held.[72][77]

Citations

  1. ^Senkam, Leonardo (1995).El nacionalismo y el campo liberal argentinos ante el neutralismo: 1939–1943, Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe, Vol. 6 Nº 1, ene-jun 1995, Universidad de Tel Aviv
  2. ^Leonard, Thomas M; John F. Bratzel (2007).Latin America During World War II. Rowman & Littlefield.ISBN 978-0-7425-3741-5.
  3. ^abcdefg"Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe".eialonline.org. Retrieved25 December 2023.
  4. ^Galasso, 117–252
  5. ^abGalasso, pp. 194–196
  6. ^abGalasso, pp. 248–251
  7. ^abHulen, Bertram D. (25 February 1944)."Chile Crushes Vast Axis Spy Ring; Arrests 100 Agents, Seizes Radio; VAST AXIS SPY RING SMASHED IN CHILE (Published 1944)".The New York Times. Retrieved31 July 2025.
  8. ^Porter, Andrew, ed. (1999).The Oxford History of the British Empire: The nineteenth century. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–155.ISBN 978-0-19-820565-4.
  9. ^Allén Lascano, Luís C. (1977).Argentina y la gran guerra, Cuaderno 12. «La Soberanía», Todo es Historia, Buenos Aires, pags. 71–113
  10. ^Yair Mundlak; Domingo Cavallo; Roberto Domenech (1989).Agriculture and economic growth in Argentina, 1913–84. International Food Policy Research Institute. p. 12.ISBN 978-0-89629-078-5.
  11. ^Galasso 2011, pp. 7–178, vol. II.
  12. ^Michael A. Burdick.For God and the fatherland: religion and politics in Argentina. Albany, New York, USA: State University of New York Press, 1995. p. 45.
  13. ^Daniel K. Lewis.The history of Argentina. 2nd edition. New York, New York, USA; Hampshire, England, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. pp. 83–84.
  14. ^Boletín de la Academia Argentina de Letras, Academia Argentina de Letras, 1943
  15. ^Rock, David (1987).Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín. University of California Press.ISBN 978-0-520-06178-1.
  16. ^Rennie, Ysabel Fisk (1945).The Argentine Republic. Macmillan.
  17. ^Rock, David (1985).Argentina, 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War. University of California Press. p. 225.ISBN 978-0-520-05189-8.
  18. ^Parties and Power in Modern Argentina 1930–1946, Alberto Ciria, January 1974,ISBN 978-0-7914-9916-0
  19. ^Todo Argentina: Fraude Patriotico(in Spanish)
  20. ^abc"Roberto Ortiz, una llama que se apagó en la década infame".La Prensa. 23 July 2018. Retrieved20 February 2022.
  21. ^abcdeLuna, Félix.(1985). "Roberto Marcelino Ortiz, reportaje a la Argentina opulenta". Buenos Aires: ed. Sudamericana
  22. ^Galasso, p. 117
  23. ^Galasso, pp. 118–119
  24. ^abLandsborough 2016,Chapter 19: The Prisoners are Freed
  25. ^Landsborough 2016, p. 97–104,Chapter 19: The Prisoners are Freed.
  26. ^Helgason, Guðmundur."Uruguay".Ships hit by U-boats. Uboat.net.Archived from the original on 14 March 2009. Retrieved21 March 2010.
  27. ^Mendelevich, pp. 138–139
  28. ^abFerrero, Roberto A. (1976).Del fraude a la soberanía popular. Buenos Aires: La Bastilla. p. 100.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link)
  29. ^Scenna, Miguel Ángel (1983). "FORJA, una aventura argentina (De Yrigoyen a Perón)". Buenos Aires:de Belgrano. ISBN 950-577-057-8
  30. ^Falklands: the Argentine military planned invasion during World War II, Merco Press 14 November 2013
  31. ^Galasso, p. 133
  32. ^Galasso, p. 118
  33. ^Galasso, p. 135
  34. ^Galasso, p. 137
  35. ^Galasso, pp. 133–134
  36. ^Galasso, p. 134
  37. ^Victoria – Historia y Arqueología MarítimaArchived 23 October 2013 at theWayback Machine(in Spanish)
  38. ^Mendelevich, p. 31
  39. ^abMendelevich, p. 142
  40. ^Galasso, pp. 153–154
  41. ^Galasso, pp. 151–152
  42. ^Galasso, pp. 155–158
  43. ^Mendelevich, p. 146
  44. ^Galasso, pp. 159–161
  45. ^Mendelevich, pp. 144–145
  46. ^Galasso, pp. 162–166
  47. ^Galasso, pp. 167–169
  48. ^Galasso, p. 174
  49. ^Galasso, p. 178
  50. ^Galasso, pp. 193–194
  51. ^Galasso, pp. 196–197
  52. ^Galasso, pp. 198–200
  53. ^Galasso, pp. 215–216
  54. ^Galasso, pp. 230–231
  55. ^Galasso, pp. 237–238
  56. ^Galasso, pp. 247–248
  57. ^Galasso, pp. 251–252
  58. ^Galasso, p. 252
  59. ^Galasso, p. 274
  60. ^Mendelevich, p. 152
  61. ^Paterson, Lawrence (2009)Black Flag: The Surrender of Germany's U-Boat Forces on Land and at Sea Seaforth PublishingISBN 9781848320376
  62. ^"ARGENTINA: U-530".Time. 23 July 1945.ISSN 0040-781X.Archived from the original on 19 February 2020. Retrieved4 March 2021.
  63. ^abGoñi 2002, pp. xiv–xv, xxi, 128–29, 153–54.
  64. ^abFilipuzzi 2020, pp. 274, 278.
  65. ^abcMiller, Leila (15 July 2025)."A Nazi document trove raises questions for Argentina".Reuters. Retrieved16 July 2025.
  66. ^Sebastian Schöpp:Das 'Argentinische Tageblatt' 1933 bis 1945. Ein Forum der antinationalsozialistischen Emigration. Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin, 1996,ISBN 3-932089-02-2)
  67. ^"Descifrando las redes de espionaje nazi: historia del Departamento 50 (1)".Archivo Nacional (in Spanish). Archived fromthe original on 10 December 2023. Retrieved8 April 2024.
  68. ^"Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II"(PDF). Retrieved26 April 2013.
  69. ^Filipuzzi 2020, p. 278.
  70. ^Filipuzzi 2020, pp. 278, 280.
  71. ^abcRosemberg, Jaime (2 March 2020)."Documento: la lista que revela el dinero de los nazis argentinos".La Nacion (in Spanish). Retrieved10 November 2025.
  72. ^abcdeSivak, Martín (9 November 2025)."Credit Suisse, on the trail of the 'Nazi ratlines' in Argentina".EL PAÍS English. Retrieved10 November 2025.
  73. ^abRosemberg, Jaime (3 March 2020)."La dinastía Freude, entre Hitler, Perón y los millones de los nazis en la Argentina".La Nacion (in Spanish). Retrieved10 November 2025.
  74. ^The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals: Revision X. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 20 December 1945. pp. 4–24.
  75. ^"Supplement to preliminary study on Allied efforts to recover Holocaust assets".U.S. Department of State. June 1998. Retrieved11 December 2025.
  76. ^Filipuzzi 2020, pp. 274, 278–79.
  77. ^abc"Wiesenthal Centre Reveals 12,000 Names of Nazis in Argentina, Many of Whom Apparently Had Accounts Transferred to Credit Suisse".Simon Wiesenthal Center. 2 March 2020. Retrieved10 November 2025.
  78. ^Molina, Federico Rivas (3 March 2020)."Un documento oculto durante casi 80 años revela la ruta del dinero nazi desde Argentina".El País América (in Spanish). Retrieved11 November 2025.
  79. ^Vulcano, Andrea (11 May 2025)."Argentina's Supreme Court finds archives linked to the Nazi regime".AP News. Retrieved14 May 2025.
  80. ^Goñi 2002, pp. 1, 16.
  81. ^Kádár, Gábor; Vági, Zoltán (2004) [2001].Self-Financing Genocide: The Gold Train, the Becher Case and the Wealth of Hungarian Jews. Budapest; New York:Central European University Press. pp. 118–19.ISBN 978-963-9241-53-4.
  82. ^abInfield, Glenn (1988) [1981].Secrets of the SS. New York: Military Heritage Press. pp. 169–71.ISBN 0-88029-185-0.
  83. ^abcBardach, Ann Louise (22 March 1997)."Opinion | Argentina Evades Its Nazi Past".The New York Times.ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved26 June 2025.
  84. ^Goñi 2002, p. xii, 102.
  85. ^Goñi 2002, pp. xii, xiv, 39.
  86. ^Goñi 2002, pp. 109, 125.
  87. ^Klein, Christopher (12 November 2015)."How South America Became a Nazi Haven".History.com. Retrieved16 May 2025.
  88. ^Goñi 2002, p. 160, 300.
  89. ^"The Perfect Hideout: Jewish and Nazi havens in Latin America".The Wiener Holocaust Library. pp. 1, 7. Retrieved19 July 2025.
  90. ^From the 'Perón tapes' he recorded the year before his death, published inYo, Juan Domingo Perón, Luca de Tenaet al. (Goñi 2002, p. 100) "In Nuremberg at that time something was taking place that I personally considered a disgrace and an unfortunate lesson for the future of humanity. I became certain that the Argentine people also considered the Nuremberg process a disgrace, unworthy of the victors, who behaved as if they hadn't been victorious. Now we realize that they [the Allies] deserved to lose the war."
  91. ^ab"Quiénes fueron los nazis que se refugiaron en la Argentina tras la caída del Tercer Reich".Infobae. Retrieved20 February 2022.
  92. ^"Ante Pavelic, the Real Butcher of the Balkans". 13 February 2002.
  93. ^Rohter, Larry (9 March 2003)."Argentina, a Haven for Nazis, Balks at Opening Its Files".The New York Times. Retrieved27 May 2014.
  94. ^"Argentine Presses Demand for Eichmann Return Before Security Council".
  95. ^Rein, Raanan (2001)."The Eichmann Kidnapping: Its Effects on Argentine-Israeli Relations and the Local Jewish Community".Jewish Social Studies.7 (3):101–130.doi:10.2979/JSS.2001.7.3.101.JSTOR 4467612.S2CID 159585565.
  96. ^Comas, José (2 February 1992)."Argentina abre hoy sus archivos sobre criminales nazis".El País. Retrieved20 February 2022.
  97. ^Schrader, Esther (14 June 2000)."President of Argentina Apologizes for Nation's Role as Haven for Nazis".Los Angeles Times. Retrieved23 February 2022.
  98. ^ab"Wings of Thunder – Wartime RAF Veterans Flying in From Argentina".PR Newswire. 6 April 2005. Retrieved8 January 2008.
  99. ^abBuckley, Martha (9 April 2005)."How Argentines helped British win war". BBC News. Archived fromthe original on 8 March 2006. Retrieved8 January 2008.
  100. ^Argentine pilots break silence over World War Two – Reuters
  101. ^"Maureen Dunlop de Popp".The Daily Telegraph. 15 June 2012. Retrieved18 June 2012.
  102. ^Anne Keleny (11 June 2012)."Maureen Dunlop: Pilot for the Air Transport Auxiliary who made the cover of Picture Post".The Independent. Retrieved18 June 2012.
  103. ^Maffeo, Aníbal José – Proa a la Victoria (2014)ISBN 978-987-45062-3-8
  104. ^Graham-Yooll, Andrew,"Chacarita marks end of WWII, 70 years on",Buenos Aires Herald, retrieved2 August 2015

Bibliography

[edit]
  • Di Tella, Guido, and D. Cameron Watt, eds. (2017).Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939–46.
  • Goñi, Uki (2002).The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina (1st ed.). London: Granta.ISBN 1862075816.
  • Guelar, Diego Ramiro (1998). "Argentine Neutrality, and the 'Black Legend'".American University International Law Review.14 (1):201–204.
  • Kedar, Claudia (2010). "The Beginning of a Controversial Relationship: The IMF, the World Bank, and Argentina, 1943–46."Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 35.69: 201–230.
  • Landsborough, Gordon (2016) [1956].The Battle of the River Plate: The First Naval Battle of the Second World War (5th ed.).Barnsley, United Kingdom of Great Britain: Frontline Books.ISBN 978-1-4738-7897-6.
  • McGaha Jr, Richard L. (2009).The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933–1945 (Diss. Ohio University).
  • Newton, Ronald C. (1992).The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931–1947. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.ISBN 0-8047-1929-2.
  • Sheinin, David M. K. (1991). "Argentina's Early Priorities in the European War: Compliance, Antisemitism, And Trade Concerns in the Response to the German Invasion of the Netherlands."Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 16.31: 5–27.

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