Clockwise from the upper left corner: Protesters gathered atTahrir Square inCairo, Egypt, 9 February 2011; Habib Bourguiba Boulevard, protesters inTunis, Tunisia, 14 January 2011; Dissidents inSanaa, Yemen, calling for presidentAli Abdullah Saleh to resign on 3 February 2011; Crowds of hundreds of thousands inBaniyas, Syria, 29 April 2011
A power struggle continued after the immediate response to the Arab Spring. While leadership changed and regimes were held accountable,power vacuums opened across the Arab world. Ultimately, it resulted in a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious elites and the growing support for democracy in many Muslim-majority states.[20] The early hopes that these popular movements would end corruption, increase political participation, and bring about greater economic equity quickly collapsed in the wake of thecounter-revolutionary moves by foreign state actors in Yemen,[21] the regional and international military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the destructive civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.[22] Some referred to the succeeding and still ongoing conflicts as theArab Winter.[12][13][15][16][18]
A new wave of protests began in 2018 which led to the resignation of prime ministersHaider al-Abadi of Iraq in 2018 andSaad Hariri of Lebanon in 2020, and the overthrow of presidentsOmar al-Bashir of Sudan andAbdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria in 2019. Sometimes called theSecond Arab Spring, these events showed how the conditions that started the Arab Spring have not faded and political movements againstauthoritarianism and exploitation are still ongoing.[23] Continued protest movements in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria have been seen as a continuation of the Arab Spring.[24][25]
As of 2025, multiple conflicts are still continuing which might be seen as originating in the Arab Spring. A major shift in theSyrian Civil War occurred in December 2024 when a rebel offensive led to thefall of the Assad regime, after over a decade of warfare. In Libya,a major civil war concluded, with foreign powers intervening.[26][27] In Yemen,a civil war continues to affect the country.[28]
The denomination "Arab Spring" is contested by some scholars and observers claiming that the term is problematic for several reasons. First, it was coined by Western commentators, not those involved in the events. The first specific use of the termArab Spring as used to denote these events may have started with the US political journalForeign Policy.[29] Political scientistMarc Lynch describedArab Spring as "a term I may have unintentionally coined in a 6 January 2011 article" forForeign Policy magazine.[30][31][32] Protestors involved in the events however described their own political actions as "uprising" (intifada), Arab "awakening" (sahwa) and Arab "renaissance" (nahda), using expressions likeal-marar al-Arabi (the Arab bitterness),karama (dignity) andthawra (revolution).[2][19][33]
Some authors argue thatwestern governments, scholars and media used the term to minimize people's revolutionary aims and discourse.[21][19][24]Joseph Massad onAl Jazeera said the term was "part of a US strategy of controlling the movement's aims and goals" and directing it towards Western-styleliberal democracy.[29] When Arab Spring protests in some countries were followed by electoral success forIslamist parties, some American pundits coined the termsIslamist Spring[34] andIslamist Winter.[35]
The term "Spring" further illustrates the problematic nature of projecting Western expectations onto non-Western actors and practices. The terminology follows the Western example of theRevolutions of 1848 referred to as "Spring of Nations" and thePrague Spring in 1968, in which a Czech student,Jan Palach, set himself on fire asMohamed Bouazizi did. In the aftermath of theIraq War, it was used by various commentators and bloggers who anticipated a major Arab movement towardsdemocratization.[36] The term "Arab Spring" is thus contested as it signifies an expectation that the events would replicate the example of democratic revolutions set by the West.[2][19]
The world watched the events of the Arab Spring unfold, "gripped by the narrative of a young generation peacefully rising up against oppressive authoritarianism to secure a more democratic political system and a brighter economic future".[22] The Arab Spring is widely believed to have been instigated by dissatisfaction, particularly of youth and unions, with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide gaps in income levels and pressures caused by theGreat Recession may have had a hand as well.[37] Some activists had taken part in programs sponsored by the US-fundedNational Endowment for Democracy, but the United States government claimed that they did not initiate the uprisings.[38]
Numerous factors led to the protests, including issues such as reform,[39]human rights violations,political corruption, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors,[40] such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the entire population.[41][42] Catalysts for the revolts in allNorthern African andPersian Gulf countries included the concentration of wealth in the hands of monarchs in power for decades, insufficient transparency of its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to accept the status quo.[43]
Some protesters looked to theTurkish model as an ideal (contested but peaceful elections, fast-growing but liberal economy, secular constitution butIslamist government).[44][45][46][47] Other analysts blamed the rise in food prices on commodity traders and theconversion of crops to ethanol.[48] Yet others have claimed that the context of high rates of unemployment and corrupt political regimes led to dissent movements within the region.[49][50]
In the wake of the Arab Spring protests, a considerable amount of attention focused on the role of social media and digital technologies in allowing citizens within areas affected by "the Arab Uprisings" as a means for collective activism to circumvent state-operated media channels.[51] The influence of social media on political activism during the Arab Spring has, however, been much debated.[52][53][54] Protests took place both in states with a very high level of Internet usage (such asBahrain with 88% of its population online in 2011) and in states with some of the lowest Internet penetration (Yemen andLibya).[55]
The use of social media platforms more than doubled in Arab countries during the protests, with the exception of Libya.[56] Some researchers have shown howcollective intelligence,dynamics of the crowd inparticipatory systems such as social media, has immense power to support a collective action—such as foment a political change.[57][58] As of 5 April 2011[update], the number of Facebook users in the Arab world surpassed 27.7 million people.[56] Some critics have argued that digital technologies and other forms of communication—videos, cellular phones, blogs, photos, emails, and text messages—have brought about the concept of a "digital democracy" in parts of North Africa affected by the uprisings.[59][60]
Facebook, Twitter, and other major social media played a key role in the movement of Egyptian and Tunisian activists in particular.[55][61] Nine out of ten Egyptians and Tunisians responded to a poll that they usedFacebook to organize protests and spread awareness.[56] This large population of young Egyptian men referred to themselves as "the Facebook generation", exemplifying their escape from their non-modernized past.[62] Furthermore, 28% of Egyptians and 29% of Tunisians from the same poll said that blocking Facebook greatly hindered and/or disrupted communication. Social media sites were a platform for different movements formed by many frustrated citizens, including the 2008 "April 6 Youth Movement" organized by Ahmed Mahed, which set out to organize and promote a nationwide labor strike and which inspired the later creation of the "Progressive Youth of Tunisia".[63]
During the Arab Spring, people createdpages on Facebook to raise awareness about alleged crimes against humanity, such aspolice brutality in the Egyptian Revolution (seeWael Ghonim andDeath of Khaled Mohamed Saeed).[64] Whether the project of raising awareness was primarily pursued by Arabs themselves or simply advertised by Western social media users is a matter of debate. Jared Keller, a journalist forThe Atlantic, claims that most activists and protesters used Facebook (among other social media) to organize; however, what influenced Iran was "good old-fashioned word of mouth". Jared Keller argued that the sudden and anomalous social media output was caused from Westerners witnessing the situation(s), and then broadcasting them. The Middle East and North Africa used texting, emailing, and blogging only to organize and communicate information about internal local protests.[65]
A study byZeynep Tufekci of theUniversity of North Carolina and Christopher Wilson of theUnited Nations Development Program concluded that "social media in general, and Facebook in particular, provided new sources of information the regime could not easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual decisions about participating in protests, the logistics of protest, and the likelihood of success."[66] Marc Lynch of George Washington University said, "while social media boosters envisioned the creation of a new public sphere based on dialogue and mutual respect, the reality is that Islamists and their adversaries retreat to their respective camps, reinforcing each other's prejudices while throwing the occasional rhetorical bomb across the no-man's land that the center has become."[66] Lynch also stated in aForeign Policy article, "There is something very different about scrolling through pictures and videos of unified, chanting Yemeni or Egyptian crowds demanding democratic change and waking up to a gory image of a headless 6-year-old girl on your Facebook news feed."[67]
Social networks were not the only instrument for rebels to coordinate their efforts and communicate. In the countries with the lowest Internet penetration and the limited role of social networks, such asYemen andLibya, the role of mainstream electronic media devices—cellular phones, emails, and video clips (e.g.,YouTube)—was very important to cast the light on the situation in the country and spread the word about the protests in the outside world.[55] InEgypt, inCairo particularly,mosques were one of the main platforms to coordinate the protest actions and raise awareness to the masses.[68]
Conversely, scholarship literature on the Middle East, political scientist Gregory Gause has found, had failed to predict the events of the Arab uprisings. Commenting on an early article by Gause whose review of a decade of Middle Eastern studies led him to conclude that almost no scholar foresaw what was coming, Chair of Ottoman and Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University Ehud R. Toledano writes that Gause's finding is "a strong and sinceremea culpa" and that his criticism of Middle East experts for "underestimating the hidden forces driving change ... while they worked instead to explain the unshakable stability of repressive authoritarian regimes" is well-placed. Toledano then quotes Gause saying, "As they wipe the egg off their faces," those experts "need to reconsider long-held assumptions about the Arab world."[69]
Tunisia experienced a series of conflicts during the three years leading up to the Arab Spring, themost notable occurring in the mining area ofGafsa in 2008, where protests continued for many months. These protests included rallies, sit-ins, and strikes, during which there were two fatalities, an unspecified number of wounded, and dozens of arrests.[70][71]
InEgypt, the labor movement had been strong for years, with more than 3000 labor actions since 2004, and provided an important venue for organizing protests and collective action.[72] One important demonstration wasan attempted workers' strike on 6 April 2008 at the state-run textile factories ofal-Mahalla al-Kubra, just outsideCairo. The idea for this type of demonstration spread throughout the country, promoted by computer-literate working-class youths and their supporters among middle-class college students.[72] A Facebook page, set up to promote the strike, attracted tens of thousands of followers and provided the platform for sustained political action in pursuit of the "long revolution".[42] The government mobilized to break the strike through infiltration and riot police, and while the regime was somewhat successful in forestalling a strike, dissidents formed the "6 April Committee" of youths and labor activists, which became one of the major forces calling for the anti-Mubarak demonstration on 25 January inTahrir Square.[72]
InAlgeria, discontent had been building for years over a number of issues. In February 2008, US Ambassador Robert Ford wrote in a leaked diplomatic cable thatAlgeria is "unhappy" with long-standing political alienation; that social discontent persisted throughout the country, with food strikes occurring almost every week; that there were demonstrations every day somewhere in the country; and that the Algerian government was corrupt and fragile.[citation needed] Some claimed that during 2010 there were as many as "9,700 riots and unrests" throughout the country.[73] Many protests focused on issues such as education and health care, while others cited rampant corruption.[74]
In Western Sahara, theGdeim Izik protest camp was erected 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) southeast ofEl Aaiún by a group of youngSahrawis on 9 October 2010. Their intention was to demonstrate against labor discrimination, unemployment, looting of resources, and human rights abuses.[75] The camp contained between12000 and20000 inhabitants, but on 8 November 2010 it was destroyed and its inhabitants evicted by Moroccan security forces. The security forces faced strong opposition from some young Sahrawi civilians, and rioting soon spread to El Aaiún and other towns within the territory, resulting in an unknown number of injuries and deaths. Violence against Sahrawis in the aftermath of the protests was cited as a reason forrenewed protests months later, after the start of the Arab Spring.[76]
The catalyst for the escalation of protests was the self-immolation of TunisianMohamed Bouazizi. Unable to find work and selling fruit at a roadside stand, Bouazizi had his wares confiscated by a municipal inspector on 17 December 2010. An hour later he doused himself with gasoline and set himself afire. His death on 4 January 2011[77] brought together various groups dissatisfied with the existing system, including many unemployed persons, political and human rights activists, labor and trade unionists, students, professors, lawyers, and others to begin theTunisian Revolution.[70]
The series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa that commenced in 2010 became known as the "Arab Spring",[78][79][80] and sometimes as the "Arab Spring and Winter",[81] "Arab Awakening",[82][83] or "Arab Uprisings",[84][85] even though not all the participants in the protests wereArab. It was sparked by the first protests that occurred inTunisia on 18 December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, followingMohamed Bouazizi'sself-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill treatment.[86][87] With the success of the protests in Tunisia, awave of unrest sparked by theTunisian "Burning Man" struckAlgeria,Jordan,Egypt, andYemen,[88] then spread to other countries. The largest, most organized demonstrations often occurred on a "day of rage", usually Friday afternoon prayers.[89][90][91] The protests also triggered similar unrestoutside the region. Contrary to expectations the revolutions were not led by Islamists:
Even though the Islamists were certainly present during the uprisings, they never determined the directions of these movements—after all, there was hardly any central leadership in any of the uprisings. Some Islamist groups initially were even reluctant to join in the protests, and the major religious groups in Egypt—Salafis,al-Azhar, and theCoptic Church—initially opposed the revolution. The mufti of Egypt,Ali Gomaa, proclaimed that rising against a lawful ruler—President Mubarak—washaram, not permissible. And theMuslim Brotherhood's old guard joined in the protests reluctantly only after being pushed by the group's young people.[92]
During this period, several leaders announced their intentions to step down at the end of their current terms.Sudanese PresidentOmar al-Bashir announced that he would not seek reelection in 2015 (he ultimately retracted his announcement and ran anyway),[112] as didIraqi Prime MinisterNouri al-Maliki, whose term was to end in 2014,[113] although there were violent demonstrations demanding his immediate resignation in 2011.[114] Protests inJordan also caused the sacking of four successive governments[115][116] byKing Abdullah.[117] The popular unrest inKuwait also resulted in the resignation of Prime MinisterNasser Al-Sabah's cabinet.[118]
The geopolitical implications of the protests drew global attention.[119] Some protesters were nominated for the 2011Nobel Peace Prize.[120]Tawakkol Karman of Yemen was co-recipient of the2011 Nobel Peace Prize due to her role organizing peaceful protests. In December 2011Time magazine named "The Protester" its "Person of the Year".[121] Spanish photographerSamuel Aranda won the 2011World Press Photo award for his image of a Yemeni woman holding an injured family member, taken during the civil uprising in Yemen on 15 October 2011.[122]
Government overthrown more than once Government overthrown Civil war Protests and governmental changes Major protests Minor protests Other protests and militant action outside theArab world
In February 2011, KingAbdullah II dismisses Prime MinisterRifai and his cabinet[136]
In April 2011, King Abdullah creates the Royal Committee to Review the Constitution with directions to review the Constitution in accordance with calls for reform. On 30 September 2011, Abdullah approves changes to all 42 articles of the Constitution[137]
In October 2011, Abdullah dismisses Prime MinisterMarouf al-Bakhit and his cabinet after complaints of slow progress on promised reforms[138]
Then Palestinian prime ministerSalam Fayyad states that he is "'willing to resign"[191]
Fayyad resigns on 13 April 2013 because of political differences between him and the Palestinian presidentMahmoud Abbas over the finance portfolio[192]
Over100000 Bahrainis taking part in the "March of Loyalty to Martyrs" inManama honoring political dissidents killed by security forces
The protests in Bahrain started on14 February, and were initially aimed at achieving greaterpolitical freedom and respect forhuman rights; they were not intended to directly threaten themonarchy.[98][212]: 162–3 Lingering frustration among theShiite majority with being ruled by the Sunni government was a major root cause, but the protests in Tunisia and Egypt are cited as the inspiration for the demonstrations.[98][212]: 65 The protests were largely peaceful until a pre-dawn raid by police on17 February to clear protestors fromPearl Roundabout inManama, in which police killed four protesters.[212]: 73–4 Following the raid, some protesters began to expand their aims to a call for the end of the monarchy.[213] On 18 February,army forces opened fire on protesters when they tried to reenter the roundabout,fatally wounding one.[212]: 77–8 The following day protesters reoccupied Pearl Roundabout after the government ordered troops and police to withdraw.[212]: 81 [214] Subsequent days saw large demonstrations; on 21 February a pro-government Gathering of National Unity drew tens of thousands,[212]: 86 [215] whilst on 22 February the number of protestors at the Pearl Roundabout peaked at over150000 after more than100000 protestersmarched there and were coming under fire from the Bahraini Military which killed around 20 and injured over 100 protestors.[212]: 88 On 14 March,GCC forces (composed mainly of Saudi and UAE troops) were requested by the government and occupied the country.[212]: 132 [216]
King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa declared a three-monthstate of emergency on 15 March and asked the military to reassert its control as clashes spread across the country.[212]: 139 [217] On 16 March, armed soldiers and riot police cleared the protesters' camp in the Pearl Roundabout, in which 3 policemen and 3 protesters were reportedly killed.[212]: 133–4 [218] Later, on 18 March, the government tore down Pearl Roundabout monument.[212]: 150 [219] After the lifting of emergency law on 1 June,[220] several large rallies were staged by the opposition parties.[221] Smaller-scale protests and clashes outside of the capital have continued to occur almost daily.[222][223] On 9 March 2012, over100000 protested in what the opposition called "the biggest march in our history".[224][225]
The police response has been described as a "brutal" crackdown on peaceful and unarmed protestors, including doctors and bloggers.[226][227][228] The police carried out midnight house raids inShia neighbourhoods, beatings at checkpoints, and denial of medical care in a "campaign of intimidation".[229][230][231][232] More than 2,929 people have been arrested,[233][234] and at least five people died due to torture while in police custody.[212]: 287,288 On 23 November 2011, theBahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry released its report on its investigation of the events, finding that the government had systematically tortured prisoners and committed other human rights violations.[212]: 415–422 It also rejected the government's claims that the protests were instigated byIran.[235] Although the report found that systematic torture had stopped,[212]: 417 the Bahraini government has refused entry to several international human rights groups and news organizations, and delayed a visit by aUN inspector.[236][237] More than 80 people haddied since the start of the uprising.[238]
Even a decade after the 2011 uprisings, the situation in Bahrain remained unchanged. The regime continued suppression against all forms of dissent. Years after the demonstrations, the Bahraini authorities are known to have accelerated their crackdown. They have been targeting human rights defenders, journalists, Shiite political groups and social media critics.[239]
Saudi government forces quashedprotests in the country and assisted Bahraini authorities in suppressing demonstrations there.
Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi critic, covered the Arab Spring and spoke out against the Saudi government during this time. He was murdered by the government a few years later.[240]
Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and prior to his entry as a central figure in Egyptian politics, potentialpresidential candidateMohamed ElBaradei warned of a "Tunisia-style explosion" in Egypt.[241]
Protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and ran for 18 days. Beginning around midnight on 28 January, the Egyptian government attempted, somewhat successfully, to eliminate the nation's Internet access,[242] in order to inhibit the protesters' ability to usemedia activism to organize throughsocial media.[243] Later that day, as tens of thousands protested on the streets of Egypt's major cities, PresidentHosni Mubarak dismissed his government, later appointing a new cabinet. Mubarak also appointed the first Vice President in almost 30 years.
The U.S. embassy and international students began a voluntary evacuation near the end of January, as violence and rumors of violence escalated.[244][245]
On 10 February, Mubarak ceded all presidential power to Vice PresidentOmar Suleiman, but soon thereafter announced that he would remain as president until the end of his term.[246] However, protests continued the next day, and Suleiman quickly announced that Mubarak had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to theArmed Forces of Egypt.[247] The military immediately dissolved theEgyptian Parliament, suspended theConstitution of Egypt, and promised to lift the nation's thirty-year "emergency laws". A civilian,Essam Sharaf, was appointed asPrime Minister of Egypt on 4 March to widespread approval among Egyptians inTahrir Square.[248] Violent protests, however, continued through the end of 2011 as many Egyptians expressed concern about theSupreme Council of the Armed Forces' perceived sluggishness in instituting reforms and their grip on power.[249]
Demonstration inCairo in solidarity with protestors in Syria, 4 February 2012
Hosni Mubarak and his former interior ministerHabib el-Adly were sentenced to life in prison on the basis of their failure to stop the killings during the first six days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.[250] His successor, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated IslamistMohamed Morsi, won apresidential election in 2012 regarded as free and fair by election observers, and was subsequently sworn in before judges at theSupreme Constitutional Court.[251]Fresh protests against Morsi erupted in Egypt on 22 November 2012. Moreprotests against Morsi's rule occurred one year into Morsi's presidency in June 2013, and on 3 July 2013, the militaryoverthrew Morsi's government, thus removing him from office.[252]
The Arab Spring was generally considered to have been a success in Egypt, much like in Tunisia. However, a December 2020 report published by PRI'sThe World, a US-based public radio news magazine, suggests otherwise. The report says that the Egyptian government increased the amount ofexecutions that it carried out by more than twofold, with the report saying that the government put to death approximately 60 people. This number, according to the report, included human rights activists of theEgyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), who were arrested in November 2020. The executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, Stephen McInerney, said that a majority of pro-democracy activists had escaped Egypt, while those who could not had gone into hiding. The Project on Middle East Democracy mentioned using encrypted communication channels to talk to the activists regarding the protection of their whereabouts. Western countries are perceived to have generally overlooked these issues, including theUnited States,France, and several other European countries. The founder of theTahrir Institute for Middle East Policy inWashington, DC believed that even ten years after the Arab Spring, Egypt was at its lowest for human rights.[253]
Anti-government protests began in Libya on 15 February 2011. By 18 February, the opposition controlled most ofBenghazi, the country's second-largest city. The government dispatched elite troops and militia in an attempt to recapture it, but they were repelled. By 20 February, protests had spread to the capitalTripoli, leading to a television address bySaif al-Islam Gaddafi, who warned the protestors that their country could descend into civil war. The rising death toll, numbering in the thousands, drew international condemnation and resulted in the resignation of several Libyan diplomats, along with calls for the government's dismantlement.[254]
Amidst ongoing efforts by demonstrators and rebel forces to wrest control of Tripoli from theJamahiriya, the opposition set up aninterim government in Benghazi to oppose ColonelMuammar Gaddafi's rule.[255] However, despite initial opposition success, government forces subsequently took back much of the Mediterranean coast.
On 17 March,United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted, authorising ano-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Two days later, France, the United States and the United Kingdomintervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. A coalition of 27 states from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervention. The forces were driven back from the outskirts of Benghazi, and the rebelsmounted an offensive, capturing scores of towns across the coast of Libya. The offensive stalled however, and a counter-offensive by the government retook most of the towns, until astalemate was formed betweenBrega andAjdabiya, the former being held by the government and the latter in the hands of the rebels. Focus then shifted to the west of the country, where bitter fighting continued. After athree-month-long battle, a loyalist siege of rebel-heldMisrata, the third largest city in Libya, was broken in large part due to coalition air strikes. The four major fronts of combat were generally considered to be theNafusa Mountains, theTripolitanian coast, theGulf of Sidra,[256] and the southernLibyan Desert.[257]
In late August, anti-Gaddafi fighterscapturedTripoli, scattering Gaddafi's government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many institutions of the government, including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped inSirte, which Gaddafi declared to be Libya's new capital.[258] Others fled toSabha,Bani Walid, and remote reaches of theLibyan Desert, or to surrounding countries.[259][260] However, Sabhafell in late September,[261] Bani Walid was captured after agrueling siege weeks later,[262] and on 20 October, fighters under the aegis of theNational Transitional Councilseized Sirte,killing Gaddafi in the process.[263] However, after Gaddafi was killed, theCivil War continued.
Protests in Syria started on 26 January 2011, when a police officer assaulted a man in public at "Al-Hareeka Street" in old Damascus. The man was arrested right after the assault. As a result, protesters called for the freedom of the arrested man. Soon a "day of rage" was set for 4–5 February, but it was uneventful.[264][265] On 6 March, the Syrian security forces arrested about 15 children in Daraa, in southern Syria, for writing slogans against the government. Soon protests erupted over the arrest and abuse of the children.Daraa was to be the first city to protest against theBa'athist government, which has been rulingSyria since 1963.[266]
Thousands of protesters gathered inDamascus,Aleppo,al-Hasakah,Daraa,Deir ez-Zor, andHama on 15 March,[267][268] with recently released politicianSuhair Atassi becoming an unofficial spokesperson for the "Syrian revolution".[269] The next day there were reports of approximately 3000 arrests and a few casualties, but there are no official figures on the number of deaths.[270] On 18 April 2011, approximately 100,000 protesters sat in the central Square of Homs calling for the resignation of presidentBashar al-Assad. Protests continued through July 2011, the government responding with harsh security clampdowns and military operations in several districts, especially in the north.[271] On 31 July, Syrian army tanks stormed several cities, including Hama, Deir Ez-Zour,Abu Kamal, andHerak near Daraa. At least 136 people were killed, the highest death toll in any day since the start of the uprising.[272] On 5 August 2011, an anti-government demonstration took place in Syria called "God is with us", during which the Syrian security forces shot the protesters from inside the ambulances, killing 11 people.[273] The Arab Spring events in Syria subsequently escalated into theSyrian civil war. The war caused massive political instability and economic hardship in Syria, with theSyrian pound plunging to new lows.[274]
The fall of the Assad regime after 54 years of rule and 13 years of civil war was met with shock and surprise throughout Syria and the world. Syrian opposition fighters were surprised at how quickly the Syrian government collapsed in the wake of their offensive.[279] Analysts viewed the event as a significant blow to Iran'sAxis of Resistance due to the use of Syria as a waypoint to supply arms and supplies to their allyHezbollah.[280][281]
Following the self-immolation ofMohamed Bouazizi inSidi Bouzid, a series of increasingly violent street demonstrations through December 2010 ultimately led to the ousting of longtimePresidentZine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. The demonstrations were preceded by high unemployment,foodinflation, corruption,[282] lack offreedom of speech and other forms ofpolitical freedom,[283] and poorliving conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades[284][285] and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators. Ben Ali fled into exile inSaudi Arabia, ending his 23 years in power.[286]
Astate of emergency was declared and a caretaker coalition government was created following Ben Ali's departure, which included members of Ben Ali's party, theConstitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), as well as opposition figures from other ministries. The five newly appointed non-RCD ministers resigned almost immediately.[287][288] As a result of continued daily protests, on 27 January Prime MinisterMohamed Ghannouchi reshuffled the government, removing all former RCD members other than himself, and on 6 February the former ruling party was suspended;[289] later, on 9 March, it was dissolved.[290] Following further public protests, Ghannouchi himself resigned on 27 February, andBeji Caid Essebsi became prime minister.
On 23 October 2011 Tunisians voted in the first post-revolution election to elect representatives to a 217-memberconstituent assembly that would be responsible for the new constitution.[291] The leading Islamist party,Ennahda, won 37% of the vote, and elected 42 women to the Constituent Assembly.[292]
On 26 January 2014 anew constitution was adopted.[293] The constitution is seen as progressive, increasing human rights, gender equality, and government duties toward people, laying the groundwork for a new parliamentary system and making Tunisia a decentralized andopen government.[293][294]
On 26 October 2014 Tunisia held its firstparliamentary elections since the 2011 Arab Spring[295] and itspresidential election on 23 November 2014,[296] finishing its transition to a democratic state. These elections were characterized by a decline in Ennahdha's popularity in favor of the secularNidaa Tounes party, which became the first party of the country.[297]
There were large protests against the government United Arab Emirates.[298] In the United Arab Emirates, the Arab Spring saw a sudden and intense demand for democratic reforms. However, government repression of human rights, including unlawful detentions and torture, quelled the opposition and silenced dissenters. Even years after the Arab Spring uprisings, the Emirates remain in staunch opposition to free speech.[299][300]
In 2011, 133 peaceful politicalactivists—including academics and members of a social organization,Islah—signed a petition calling for democratic reforms. Submitted to the Emirati monarch rulers, the petition demanded elections, more legislative powers for theFederal National Council and an independent judiciary.[301]
In 2012, the authorities arrested 94 of the 133journalists, government officials, judges,lawyers, teachers and student activists, who were detained in secret detention facilities. For a year, until the trial began in March 2013, the 94 prisoners were subjected toenforced disappearances andtorture. As the "unfair" trial ended on 2 July 2013, 69 men were convicted on the basis of evidence acquired through forced confessions, and received harsh prison sentences of up to 15 years.[302]
The case came to be known as "UAE-94", following whichfreedom of speech was further curbed. For years, these prisoners have been underarbitrary detention, with some "held inincommunicado, and denied their rights". In July 2021,Amnesty International called the UAE authorities to immediately release 60 prisoners of the UAE-94 case, who remained detained nine years after their arrest.[303]
At least 51 prisoners, who were part of the "UAE-94" mass trial, were being imprisoned despite completing their sentences. Some prisoners completed their sentences in March 2023, while others completed it as early as July 2019. HRW said that those the prisoners continued to remain in prison without a proper legal basis, even after completing the sentences between one month and nearly four years before.[304]
Following the 2011 petition, the UAE authorities also arrested five prominenthuman rights defenders and government critics who did not sign the petition. All were pardoned the next day but have been facing a number of unfair acts of the government. One of the prominent Emirati activists,Ahmed Mansoor, reported being beaten twice since then. His passport was confiscated and nearly$140000 were stolen from his personal bank account. Most of the human rights activists have been victims of the UAE government's intimidation for years.[301]
The authorities also exiled a local man to Thailand. He spoke out about the government.[305]
In 2015 it was revealed that there was afoiled palace coup in Abu Dhabi in mid-2011 whereHamdan Al Nahyan attempted to overthrow his brotherKhalifa and implement reforms such as universal Arab resident suffrage, and empowering the legislature.[306]
Protestors inAden calling for reinstatement ofSouth Yemen during Arab Spring.Protests inSana'a
Protests occurred in many towns in both the north and south of Yemen starting in mid-January 2011. Demonstrators in theSouth mainly protested against PresidentSaleh's support ofAl Qaeda inSouth Yemen, the marginalization of theSouthern people and the exploitation of Southern natural resources.[307][308][309] Other parts of the country initially protested against governmental proposals to modify theconstitution of Yemen, unemployment and economic conditions,[310] and corruption,[311] but their demands soon included a call for the resignation of PresidentAli Abdullah Saleh,[311][312] who had been facing internal opposition from his closest advisors since 2009.[313]
A major demonstration of over16000 protesters took place inSanaa on 27 January 2011,[314] and soon thereafterhuman rights activist and politicianTawakkol Karman called for a "Day of Rage" on 3 February.[315] According toXinhua News, organizers were calling for a million protesters.[316] In response to the planned protest, Ali Abdullah Saleh stated that he would not seek anotherpresidential term in 2013.[317]
On 3 February,20000 protesters demonstrated against the government in Sana'a,[318][319] others participated in a "Day of Rage" in Aden[320] that was called for byTawakel Karman,[315] while soldiers, armed members of theGeneral People's Congress, and many protestors held a pro-government rally in Sana'a.[321] Concurrent with the resignation of Egyptian president Mubarak, Yemenis again took to the streets protesting President Saleh on 11 February, in what has been dubbed a "Friday of Rage".[322] The protests continued in the days following despite clashes with government advocates.[323] In a "Friday of Anger" held on 18 February, tens of thousands of Yemenis took part in anti-government demonstrations in the major cities of Sana'a,Taiz, andAden. Protests continued over the following months, especially in the three major cities, and briefly intensified in late May into urban warfare betweenHashid tribesmen and army defectors allied with the opposition on one side and security forces and militias loyal to Saleh on the other.[324]
After Saleh pretended to accept aGulf Cooperation Council-brokered plan allowing him to cede power in exchange for immunity from prosecution only to back away before signing three separate times,[325][326] an assassination attempt on 3 June left him and several other high-ranking Yemeni officials injured by a blast in the presidential compound's mosque.[327] Saleh was evacuated toSaudi Arabia for treatment and handed over power to Vice PresidentAbdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who largely continued his policies[328] and ordered the arrest of several Yemenis in connection with the attack on the presidential compound.[327] While in Saudi Arabia, Saleh kept hinting that he could return any time and continued to be present in the political sphere through television appearances fromRiyadh starting with an address to the Yemeni people on 7 July.[329] On 13 August, a demonstration was announced in Yemen as "Mansouron Friday" in which hundreds of thousands of Yemenis called for Saleh to go. The protesters joining the "Mansouron Friday" were calling for establishment of "a new Yemen".[330] On 12 September Saleh issued a presidential decree while still receiving treatment in Riyadh authorizing Hadi to negotiate a deal with the opposition and sign the GCC initiative.[331]
On 23 September, three months since the assassination attempt, Saleh returned to Yemen abruptly, defying all earlier expectations.[332] Pressure on Saleh to sign the GCC initiative eventually led to his doing so in Riyadh on 23 November. Saleh thereby agreed to step down and set the stage for the transfer of power to his vice president.[333] Apresidential election was then held on 21 February 2012, in which Hadi (the only candidate) won 99.8% of the vote.[334] Hadi then took the oath of office in Yemen's parliament on 25 February.[335] By 27 February Saleh had resigned from the presidency and transferred power to Hadi.[336] The replacement government was overthrown by Houthi rebels on 22 January 2015, starting theYemeni Civil War and theSaudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen.
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in various countries, there was a wave of violence and instability commonly known as the Arab Winter[337] or Islamist Winter.[338] The Arab Winter was characterized by extensive civil wars, general regional instability, economic and demographic decline of theArab League and overall religious wars between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
Although the long-term effects of the Arab Spring have yet to be shown, its short-term consequences varied greatly across the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the existing regimes were ousted and replaced through a process of free and fair election, the revolutions were considered short-term successes.[339][340][341] This interpretation is, however, problematized by the subsequent political turmoil that emerged, particularly in Egypt. Elsewhere, most notably in the monarchies ofMorocco and thePersian Gulf, existing regimes co-opted the Arab Spring movement and managed to maintain order without significant social change.[342][343] In other countries, particularly Syria and Libya, the apparent result of Arab Spring protests was a completesocietal collapse.[339][failed verification –see discussion]
Social scientists have endeavored to understand the circumstances that led to this variation in outcome. A variety of causal factors have been highlighted, most of which hinge on the relationship between the strength of the state and the strength of civil society. Countries with stronger civil society networks in various forms underwent more successful reforms during the Arab Spring; these findings are also consistent with more general social science theories such as those espoused byRobert D. Putnam andJoel S. Migdal.[344][345]
One of the primary influences that have been highlighted in the analysis of the Arab Spring is the relative strength or weakness of a society's formal and informalinstitutions prior to the revolts. When the Arab Spring began, Tunisia had an established infrastructure and a lower level of petty corruption than did other states, such as Libya.[339] This meant that, following the overthrow of the existing regime, there was less work to be done in reforming Tunisian institutions than elsewhere, and consequently it was less difficult to transition to and consolidate a democratic system of government.[342][346]
Also crucial was the degree of state censorship over print, broadcast, and social media in different countries. Television coverage by channels likeAl Jazeera andBBC News provided worldwide exposure and prevented mass violence by the Egyptian government in Tahrir Square, contributing to the success of the Egyptian Revolution. In other countries, such as Libya, Bahrain, and Syria, such international press coverage was not present to the same degree, and the governments of these countries were able to act more freely in suppressing the protests. Strong authoritarian regimes with high degrees of censorship in their national broadcast media were able to block communication and prevent the domestic spread of information necessary for successful protests.[347][348]
Countries with greater access to social media, such as Tunisia and Egypt, proved more effective in mobilizing large groups of people, and appear to have been more successful overall than those with greater state control over media.[341][349][350] Although social media played a large role in shaping the events of revolutions social activism did not occur in a vacuum. Without the use of street level organization social activists would not have been as effective.[351] Even though a revolution did take place and the prior government has been replaced, Tunisia's government can not conclude that another uprising will not take place. There are still many grievances taking place today.[352]
In Tunisia, due to tourism coming to a halt and other factors during the revolution and Arab Spring movement, the budget deficit has grown and unemployment has risen since 2011.[353] According to theWorld Bank in 2016, "Unemployment remains at 15.3% from 16.7% in 2011, but still well above the pre-revolution level of 13%."[353] Large scale emigration brought on by a long and treacherous civil war has permanently harmed the Syrian economy. Projections for economic contraction will remain high at almost 7% in 2017.[354]
The support, even if tacit, of national military forces during protests has been correlated to the success of the Arab Spring movement in different countries.[340][342] In Egypt and Tunisia, the military actively participated in ousting the incumbent regime and in facilitating the transition to democratic elections. Countries like Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, exhibited a strong mobilization of military force against protesters, effectively ending the revolts in their territories; others, including Libya and Syria, failed to stop the protests entirely and instead ended up in civil war.[340] The support of the military in Arab Spring protests has also been linked to the degree of ethnic homogeneity in different societies. In Saudi Arabia and Syria, where the ruling elite was closely linked with ethnic or religious subdivisions of society, the military sided with the existing regime and took on the ostensible role of protector to minority populations.[355]
The presence of a strong, educated middle class has been noted as a correlate to the success of the Arab Spring in different countries.[356] Countries with strong welfare programs and a weak middle class, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as countries with great economic disparity and an impoverished working class—including Yemen, Libya, and Morocco—did not experience successful revolutions. The strength of the middle class is, in turn, directly connected to the existing political, economic, and educational institutions in a country, and the middle class itself may be considered an informal institution.[357] In very broad terms, this may be reframed in terms of development, as measured by various indicators such as theHuman Development Index:rentier states such as the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf exhibited less successful revolutions overall.[358]
Charting what he calls the 'new masses' of the twenty-first century, Sociologist Göran Therborn draws attention to the historical contradictory role of the middle class. The Egyptian middle class has illustrated this ambivalence and contradiction in 2011 and 2013: "The volatility of middle-class politics is vividly illustrated by the sharp turns in Egypt, from acclamation of democracy to adulation of the military and its mounting repression of dissent, effectively condoning the restoration of the ancien régime minus Mubarak.[359]
Some trends in political Islam resulting from the Arab Spring noted by observers (Quinn Mecham and Tarek Osman) include:
Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, not only in Egypt by the military and courts following the forcible removal of Morsi from office in 2013; but also by Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf countries (not Qatar).[360][361][362] The ambassadors crisis also seriously threatened the GCC's activities, adversely affected its functioning and could arguably even have led to its dissolution.[362]
Rise of Islamiststate-building where state failure has taken place—most prominently in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Islamists have found it easier than competing non-Islamists trying to fill the void of state failure, by securing external funding, weaponry and fighters – "many of which have come from abroad and have rallied around a pan-Islamic identity". The norms of governance in these Islamist areas are militia-based, and the governed submit to their authority out of fear, loyalty, other reasons, or some combination.[360] The "most expansive" of these new "models" is theIslamic State.[360]
Increasing sectarianism (primarily Sunni-Shia) at least in part fromproxy wars and the escalation of theIran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict. Islamists are fighting Islamists across sectarian lines in Lebanon (Sunni militants targetingHezbollah positions), Yemen (between mainstream Sunni Islamists ofal-Islah and the ShiiteZaydiHouthi movement), in Iraq (Islamic State and Iraqi Shiite militias).[360]
Increased caution and political learning in countries such as Algeria and Jordan where Islamists have chosen not to lead a major challenge against their governments. In Yemen,al-Islah "has sought to frame its ideology in a way that will avoid charges of militancy".[360]
In countries where Islamists did choose to lead a major challenge and did not succeed in transforming society (particularly Egypt), a disinterest in "soul-searching" about what went wrong, in favor of "antagonism and fiery anger" and a thirst for revenge. Partisans of political Islam (although this does not include some prominent leaders such asRached Ghannouchi but is particularly true in Egypt) see themselves as victims of an injustice whose perpetrators are not just "individual conspirators but entire social groups".[363]
"The repercussions of the 2011 uprisings have influenced Middle Eastern youth's experiences providing impetus for questioning perennial sacred beliefs and positions, and forging ahead avant-garde views and responses to the constraints they face."[22]
Contrary to the common discourse, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley fromThe New Yorker argue that the divide in the post–Arab Spring in the Middle East is not sectarianism:
The bloodiest, most vicious, and most pertinent struggles occur squarely inside the Sunni world. Sectarianism is a politically expedient fable, conveniently used to cover up old-fashioned power struggles, maltreatment of minorities, and cruel totalitarian practices.[364]
Agha and Malley point out that even in Syria there has been a misrepresentation of the conflict, that theAssad regime relied on an alliance that included middle class Sunnis along with other religious minorities. Prior to the uprising, the Syrian regime enjoyed some financial and political support from SunniGulf states. The "select rich urban bourgeoisie, the Sunni Damascene in particular", according to Tokyo University researcher Housam Darwisheh, "now has a direct interest in preserving stability and their relations with the regime as long as their businesses prosper."[365] In the view of the Arab sociologistHalim Barakat, "the persistence of communal cleavages complicates rather than nullifies social class consciousness and struggles."[366]
Very few analysts of the Arab societies foresaw a mass movement on such a scale that might threaten the existing order. In his 1993 sociological study of the Arab societies, culture and state, Barakat stated confidently that "one should expect the first Arab popular revolution to take place in Egypt or Tunisia. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that revolutions may occur in more pluralistic societies as well."[377] What was prevalent, according to the Syrian writer and political dissidentYassin al-Haj Saleh was three 'springs' that ensured the status quo. One of which was a "spring of despotic states that receive assistance and legitimacy from a world system centered around stability".[378] Most democracy protests do not result in reforms.[379]
Two months into the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings,The Economist magazine in a leader article spoke about a new generation of young people, idealists, "inspired by democracy", which made revolutions. Those revolutions, the article stated, "are going the right way, with a hopeful new mood prevailing and free elections in the offing".[380] For those on the streets of Egypt the predominant slogan was "bread, freedom and social justice".[381]
Some observers, however, have questioned the revolutionary nature of the 'Arab Spring'. A social theorist specialising in social movements and social change in the Middle East,Asef Bayat, has provided an analysis based on his decades-long of research as "a participant-observer" (in his own words). In his appraisal of the Arab revolutions, Bayat discerns a remarkable difference between these revolutions and the revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Yemen,Nicaragua and Iran. The Arab revolutions, argues Bayat, "lacked any associated intellectual anchor" and the predominant voices, "secular and Islamists alike, took free market, property relations, and neoliberal rationality for granted" and uncritically.[382] New social movements' define themselves as horizontal networks with aversion to the state and central authority. Thus their "political objective is not to capture the state", a fundamental feature in the twentieth-century revolutionary movements.[383] Instead of revolution or reform, Bayat speaks of 'refolution'.[384]
Wael Ghonim, an Internet activist who would later gain an international fame, acknowledged that what he had intended by founding a Facebook page was a "simple reaction to the events in Tunisia" and that "there was no master plans or strategies" a priori.[385] That the objective was reform to be achieved through peaceful means and not revolution was explicitly put forward byApril 6 Movement, one of the leading forces of the Egyptian uprising, in their statements. It called for "coalition and co-operation between all factions and national forces to reach the reform and the peaceful change of the conditions of Egypt".[386] "Even in Tahrir Square with so many people and the rising level of demands," recalls an activist in the movement, "we were very surprised by the people wanting the downfall of the regime; and not a single one of us had expected this."[387] In comparing the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, researcher Housam Darwisheh concludes: "The Egyptian uprising, in neither dismantling the ancien regime nor creating new institutional mechanisms to lead the transition, permitted the so-called 'deep state' to reassert itself while the deepening polarization led many non-Islamists to side with the military against the MB [the Muslim Brotherhood]."[388]
According to Cambridge sociologist Hazem Kandil, theMuslim Brotherhood did not aim at taking power during the events leading up to the toppling of Mubarak. The biggest and most organised organisation in Egypt in fact negotiated with the regime in "infamous talks betweenMorsi and the then vice-presidentOmar Suleiman", and "an informal deal was reached: withdraw your members from Tahrir Square, and we allow you to form a political party." Then the Brotherhood wavered whether to file a presidential candidate and did not push for a new constitution, choosing to work with theSupreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF):
The Brotherhood and the Salafists went all-out to keep the existing constitution—originating under Sadat—with a few amendments. The result was irrelevant, because the military scrapped the old constitution anyway. But the Brothers managed to persuade over 70 per cent of the voters, so it became clear to the military that they had far more sway on the street than the secular revolutionaries who had brought down Mubarak, yet seemed incapable of much organization once they had done so. For SCAF, the priority was to bring the street under control, so it decided to start working with the Brotherhood to stabilize the country.[389]
George Lawson from theLondon School of Economics places the Arab uprisings within the post-Cold War world. He characterises the uprisings as "largely unsuccessful revolution" and that they "bare a family resemblance to the 'negotiated revolutions'... Negotiated revolutions ... seek to transform political and symbolic fields of action, but without a concomitant commitment to a program of economic transformation."[390] In this 'negotiated revolution', comments Bayat, "revolutionaries had in effect little part in the 'negotiations'."[391] What has been treated by some analysts as intellectual weakness of the revolutionary movement is partly due to the pre-2011 stifling cultural environment under repressive regimes. Although Egyptian intellectuals enjoyed a bigger margin of freedom than their counterparts in Tunisia, cultural figures sought protection from political players, and instead of leading criticism, they complied.[392]
The post-Cold War era saw the emergence of the idea and practice of gradual reform and liberal agenda. It saw an influx of humanitarian projects,NGOs and charity work, liberalthink tanks and emphasis oncivil society work. This new juncture seemed to have made the idea and prospect of revolution an outdated project. The focus instead shifted to individual freedoms andfree market. The new idea ofcivil society was different from the kind of civil societyAntonio Gramsci, for instance, envisaged: 'a revolution before the revolution'.
In her field study in Yemen, anthropologist Bogumila Hall depicts the effects of what she terms as "the marketization of civil society and its heavy reliance on donors", which "led to a largely depoliticized form of activism that by passed, rather than confronted, the state". Hall, with her focus on themuhammashīn (the marginalized) in Yemen, described how in the 1990s and 2000s international NGOs established charity projects and workshops "to teach slum dwellers new skills and behaviours". But, besides the "modest changes" brought by the NGOs, concludes Hall, "delegating the problem of themuhammashīn to the realm of development and poverty alleviation, without addressing the structural causes underlying their marginalisation, had a depoliticising effect. It led to a widely held assumption, also shared by themuhammashīn, that ending marginalisation was a matter for experts and administrative measures, not politics."[393]
When Arab regimes viewed NGOs' leaders and other similar organisations with suspicion, accusing Western governments of providing funding and training to 'illegal organisations' and fomenting revolution, diplomatic cables reported "how American officials frequently assured skeptical governments that the training was aimed at reform, not promoting revolutions".[394] And when the Egyptian uprising was gaining its momentum, the American presidentBarack Obama "did not suggest that the 82-year-old leader step aside or transfer power... the argument was that he really needed to do the reforms, and do them fast. Former ambassador to Egypt (Frank G.)Wisner publicly suggested that Mr. Mubarak had to be at the center of any change, and Secretary of StateHillary Rodham Clinton warned that any transition would take time."[395] Some activists, who read the American thinker and nonviolence advocateGene Sharp, obtained training from foreign bodies, including the Serbian opposition movementOtpor!, and April 6 Movement modelled its logo after Otpor's.[395] Otpor, writes Bayat in his discussion of the agencies of the Arab Spring activism in Tunisia and Egypt, obtained funds from well-known American organisations such as the AmericanNational Endowment for Democracy,USAID, and theInternational Republican Institute. Thus Otpur, in line with these organisations' advocacies, "pushed for political reform through nonradical, electoral, and market-driven language and practices".[396]
Early 2019 witnessed two uprisings: one in Algeria and another in Sudan. In Algeria under pressure of weeks of protests, the head of the army forced the ailing twenty-year-serving president,Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to abdicate. In Sudan, after four months of protests, the Sudani defense minister ousted longtime PresidentOmar al-Bashir in a coup.[397] Writing about what he calls "a rebirth of Tahrir Square", the prominent Lebanese novelist and criticElias Khoury, averred that "perhaps the secret of the Arab Spring lies not in its victories or defeats, but in its ability to liberate people from fear." Despite the "faded spirit of Tahrir Square" and an outcome that Khoury describes as a "monarchy that abrogates legal standards", a renaissance of resistance is unstoppable:
The defeat of the Arab Spring has seemed likely to extinguish this glimmer of hope, to return the Arab world to the tyrannical duopoly of military and oil and to crush the will of the people in the struggle between Sunni and Shia, between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The combination has thrown the region into Israelʹs lap. But the defeat cannot and will not stop the renaissance. If the Arab world has reached rock bottom, it canʹt go any lower and it canʹt last forever.[398]
There was a need, suggested Khoury, to turn "the uprisings of the Arab Spring into an intellectual, political and moral project that gives meaning to the goals of freedom, democracy and social justice". From the outset the 2011 Arab uprisings raised the banner of 'social justice'. The concept, what it means and how to achieve it has been a major subject of discussion and contention since then.
In its economic and social manifesto, the TunisianEnnahda Movement states that the movement "adopts the social and solidarised market economy within a national approach based on free economic activity, freedom of ownership, production and administration on the one hand, and social justice and equal opportunities on the other hand" and that "national capital has to be the axis in the development process."[399] TheMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt mainly focuses on "reform of existing political systems in the Arab world. It embraces the idea of political activism and social responsibility, organising charitable works and social support programmes as part of its outreach to its core support base of lower-income populations."[400]
On its part theInternational Centre for Transitional Justice has set nine 'concrete and tangible' goals with focus on "accountability for serious violations of human rights, access to justice, facilitating peace processes, advancing the cause of reconciliation and reforming the state and social institutions".[401] One of those goals was taken up byTruth and Dignity Commission (Tunisia) that recorded and submitted to the relevant court the human rights abuses which had been committed by the Tunisian regime. A new climate of freedom of speech, freedom of organisation and elections characterised the political environment of post-Ben Ali Tunisia.
Some observers and social analysts remarked, however, that the issue ofsocial justice remained a rhetoric or was marginalised. According to Fathi Al-Shamikhi, an expert in debt issues and founder of the Tunisian association RAID, different social forces played a crucial role in matters related to social demands and achieving social justice. "This role varies between those who advocate these demands and those who reject them, according to the social nature of each of these forces."[402] "Bread, freedom and social justice" were the main slogans of the Arab revolutions. But although social and economic demands were raised, argued researcher and former editor in chief of the EgyptianAl-Shorouq Newspaper, Wael Gamal, "they were pushed aside in the political arena, and more attention was given to issues such as the transfer of power arrangements, the constitution first, the elections first, democratic transformation and the religious-secular conflict."[403]
With the survival of the regime in Egypt and the rolling back of what was gained in the short period after the overthrow ofMubarak, the persistence, or even the worsening, of the socio-economic conditions that led to the Tunisian uprising, aSaudi-led intervention in Bahrain assisted the defeat of the uprising in the country, and especially the descent of other uprisings into brutal civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, with acute humanitarian crises, there are:
many in capitals around the world who find it convenient to insist that a strongman is needed to deal with the peoples of this region. It is a racist, bigoted argument and should be called out as such, but many political leaders of the region are quite comfortable promoting it. Indeed, many of the counterrevolutionary moves in the region happened precisely because they agree with that argument.[404]
In April 2019, amidst an offensive to take Libya's capital city. ofTripoli by military leaderKhalifa Haftar, for whom U.S. President Donald Trump had voiced his support, the Syrian policy scholar Marwan Kabalan argued in an opinion piece for Al Jazeera that "counter-revolutionary forces are seeking to resurrect the military dictatorship model the Arab Spring dismantled." Kabalan contended that "regional and world powers have sponsored the return of military dictatorships to the region, with the hope that they would clean up the Arab Spring 'mess' and restore order." He also referred to Western powers' history of backingmilitary rule in the region, and how American interests in the Middle East clashed with French and British ones. He cited the U.S.-supported coups in Syria and Egypt, but generally how, as former U.S. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice admitted, the United States "pursued stability at the expense of democracy... and achieved neither." Kabalan concluded:
There seems to be a concerted effort to establish a crescent of military-ruled countries from Sudan in northeast Africa to Algeria in the northwest through Egypt and Libya to ward off popular upheaval and keep "Islamist" forces in check.[405]
AnalystH. A. Hellyer attributes the persistence ofautocracy anddictatorship, as well as counter-revolution, to structures that go back tocolonialism – and also to the forms that states in theMENA region took in the postcolonial era and the social pacts established in the process. What we are seeing since 2011, Hellyer says, is a clash between those "inherited structures" and the new "demographic realities" of the populations in the region.[406]
Compromise and dialogue with the entrenched regimes, followed by elections inTunisia and Egypt, have produced either limited change or counter-revolution. In the first quarter of 2019, protests and mass mobilisation in Sudan and Algeria succeeded in toppling the heads of state, but, as scholar andWoodrow Wilson Center fellowMarina Ottaway states, there is a dilemma: The demands of the genuine grassroots movements are unlikely "to be attained through a peaceful process – one without violence and the violation of the human rights of many." Ottaway points to the experiences of Algeria and Egypt; in the former, the regime annulled the results of the elections in the early 1990s, and in the latter, the military carried out a bloody repression of the Muslim Brotherhood government after the Brotherhood's own short-lived presidency was removed from office:
Attempts to bring about radical changes, by punishing and excluding a large part of the old elite, are not possible by democratic means, because such efforts elicit a strong reaction – a counterrevolution – leading to violence and repression.[407]
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