Andronikos II Palaiologos (Greek:Ἀνδρόνικος Δούκας Ἄγγελος Κομνηνὸς Παλαιολόγος,romanized: Andrónikos Doúkās Ángelos Komnēnós Palaiológos; 25 March 1259 – 13 February 1332),[1]Latinized asAndronicus II Palaeologus, reigned asByzantine emperor from 1282 to 1328. His reign marked the beginning of the recently restored empire's final decline. The Turks conquered most of Byzantium's remaining Anatolian territories, and Andronikos spent the last years of his reign fighting hisown grandson in theFirst Palaiologan Civil War. The war ended in Andronikos' forced abdication in 1328, after which he retired to a monastery for the remainder of his life.
Andronikos was acclaimed co-emperor in 1261, after his father Michael VIII recoveredConstantinople from theLatin Empire, but he was not crowned until 8 November 1272.[1] During their joint rule, he was compelled to support his father's unpopular Church union with thePapacy. Made sole emperor by Michael's death in 1282, Andronikos immediately repudiated the union, but was unable to resolve the related schism within the Orthodox clergy until 1310.
In 1283, the first military action of Andronikos II's reign occurred, against the town ofDemetrias inThessaly. At the time, Thessaly was ruled byJohn Doukas, and this attempt was another of many by the Byzantines in an effort to reclaim the region. TheprotovestiariosMichael Tarchaneiotes led a force to the town where they were met by the fleet under the command of Alexios Raoul and themegas stratopedarchesJohn Synadenos.[2] The siege was successful, but an epidemic spread which killed Michael Tarchaneiotes and much of the force. The remaining army had no choice but to abandon the town and withdraw from Thessaly.[2]
Upon his accession to the throne, Andronikos II faced numerous challenges on every front. Financially, his father's policies were unsustainable, and in 1285 he was forced to dismantle the imperial fleet. This action increased the Empire's maritime dependence on theGenoa, which was obliged to aid the Empire in accordance with theTreaty of Nymphaeum. In an effort to improve the treasury's position, Andronikos II devalued the Byzantinehyperpyron, while the state treasury accumulated less than one seventh the revenue (in nominal coins) that it had previously. Seeking to increase revenue, Andronikos II raised taxes and reduced tax exemptions, exacerbating the economy's already precarious state.[2]
In 1291,Charles II, son ofCharles of Anjou, entered into an alliance with the Despot of EpirusNikephoros I Komnenos Doukas. This alliance reawakened Byzantine fears which had been dormant since theSicilian Vespers. A Byzantine army was dispatched to Epirus, and in 1292 besiegedIoannina. Simultaneously, a Genoese fleet accompanied by Byzantine soldiers approached the capital of theDespotate,Arta. The army at Ioannina retreated north at the approach of the prince of Achaia,Florent of Hainault. The fleet departed after some raiding in the area. Like the campaign in Thessaly, the war further stretched imperial resources with little to show for it.[2]
As a result of its alliance with Genoa, the empire was drawn into apointless war with Venice between 1296 and 1302. While the Genoese settled with the Venetians in 1299, Andronikos II continued the war in hopes of gaining something from it. By the end of the war in 1302, virtually nothing was changed except the loss of resources desperately needed on other fronts.[2][3]
Andronikos II also attempted to marry off his son and co-emperorMichael IX Palaiologos to the Latin EmpressCatherine I of Courtenay, thus seeking to eliminate Western agitation for a restoration of the Latin Empire. Another marriage alliance attempted to resolve the potential conflict withSerbia inMacedonia, as Andronikos II married off his five-year-old daughterSimonis to KingStefan Milutin in 1298.
In spite of the resolution of problems inEurope, Andronikos II was faced with the collapse of the Byzantine frontier inAsia Minor, despite the successful, but short, governorships ofAlexios Philanthropenos andJohn Tarchaneiotes. The military victories of Philanthropenos and Tarchaneiotes against the Turks were largely dependent on a considerable contingent of Cretan escapees, or exiles from Venetian-occupied Crete, headed by Hortatzis, whom Michael VIII had repatriated to Byzantium through a treaty agreement with the Venetians ratified in 1277.[4] Andronikos II had resettled those Cretans in the region of Meander river, the southeastern Asia Minor frontier of Byzantium with the Turks.
After the failure of the co-emperor Michael IX to stem the Turkish advance in Asia Minor in 1302 and the disastrousBattle of Bapheus, the Byzantine government hired theCatalan Company ofAlmogavars (adventurers fromCatalonia) led byRoger de Flor to clear Byzantine Asia Minor of the enemy.[5] In spite of some successes, the Catalans were unable to secure lasting gains. Being more ruthless and savage than the enemy they intended to subdue, they quarrelled with Michael IX and eventually turned on their Byzantine employers after the murder of Roger de Flor in 1305. Together with a party of willing Turks they devastatedThrace, Macedonia, andThessaly on their road to Latin occupied southern Greece. There they conquered theDuchy of Athens andThebes.
Andronikos II died as a monk at Constantinople in 1332, and was buried in theLips Monastery (now the Fenari Isa Mosque).[7] He is the only Emperor to have been found still in his tomb.
The military policy of Andronikos II was fundamentally shaped by the financial constraints of the empire he inherited from Michael VIII. The treasury was empty, and the grand designs of Michael were simply no longer achievable. Nonetheless, Andronikos attempted to continue his father's military policies to the best of his abilities.
The Serbian frontier of the empire was said to have been embroiled in intermittent war for over a decade since 1282. Andronikos sent an army there in 1298, though its inability to fight a "guerrilla war" made the Emperor sign a peace with Serbia in the following year, sending his five-year-old daughterSimonis as a bride toStefan Milutin.
The empire'sAnatolian holdings, under attack since the 1260s, became the foremost concern of Andronikos; his attention would shift largely away from the west and towards the east. Andronikos frequently toured Anatolia to raise the population's morale and restored many fortresses there, yet this could not stem the massive flows of refugees coming into the empire's European holdings. In 1293, Alexios Philanthropenos was appointed to command and govern all armies in Anatolia, barring theIonian coast. He was an effective general and would score a series of victories in 1294 and 1295 against the Meander Valley Turks. It was said that so many prisoners were taken as to lower the price of a Turkish slave beneath even that of a sheep. Other Turks surrendered and formed a part of Philanthropenos's army. The victories of Alexios Philanthropenos, in comparison to the central government's otherwise ineffective handling of the Turkish threat combined with high taxation, meant that Alexios would become regarded as the foremost leader, with particular loyalty stemming from his Cretan soldiers. The soldiers fromCrete received a salary, but being "settled" in Anatolia probably also held land. It is not known, though, on what conditions they would have received this land. Reluctantly, amid massive popular support, Philanthropenos, in late 1295, accepted the challenge towards Andronikos II. Frightened, Andronikos offered Philanthropenos to become Caesar, though Alexios acted too slowly, and soon his support waned. Libadarios, the Governor ofNeokastra and a loyalist of Andronikos, bribed the Cretans to blind and capture Alexios. The Cretans would never be heard of again—though John VI mentions a mysterious village in Thrace said to have been settled by an "army from Crete" before he arrived on the political scene in 1320.
Following Philanthropenos, John Tarchaneiotes, a first cousin of Andronikos and an Arsenite, was sent to Anatolia. John was a general, but he was meant not to achieve quick victories but reform the military and economy of the region. It is said that many soldiers had lost theirPronoia holdings, while others had increased theirs through bribery of their superiors and stopped serving as soldiers. John sought to end this corruption and would reassess property holdings around theMeander Valley—a process known asexisosis. John's reforms in Anatolia were marked by success, revitalizing the army and even constructing a small fleet. However he faced opposition from the large landowners of Anatolia who his policies were principally aimed against as well as the Church who condemned him for being a supporter of the deposed Patriarch Arsenios. The enmity faced by Tarchaneiotes boiled over when a small number ofPronoia soldiers laid accusations of rebellion against John before the anti-Arsenite bishop ofPhiladelphia. With these treason charges pending in around 1300, Tarchaneiotes fled toThessaloniki and joined Andronikos II there. Tarchaneiotes's reforms would be swiftly abandoned under the combined pressure of high clerical and landowner opposition.
In late 1301, a group ofAlans (a Christian Iranic people) crossed the empire's northern frontier. The Alans, last having fought for the empire in the late 11th century, were fleeing from the Mongol hordes and sought employment in the imperial army. Andronikos seized on this opportunity and hired them as supplemental mercenaries for two planned campaigns into Anatolia. In the spring of 1302, they were supplied with money, provisions, and horses. They would be divided into three groups: One led by theMegas HetaireiarchesTheodore Mouzalon to fight the Turks nearNicomedia, another under Michael IX would march south toMagnesia, and the third group being the wives and children of the warriors remained in Thrace. The first group under Mouzalon deserted almost as soon as it crossed into Anatolia — the deserters indiscriminately plundering Byzantine holdings — such that by July 1302, Mouzalon would only have under him a troop of 2,000 soldiers, perhaps half of which were Alans. Soon, a 5,000 strong army of light cavalry appeared between Nicaea and Nikomedia. These were led by Osman, the Turkish emir ofBithynia and founder of theOttoman Empire. Mouzalon would meet Osman on the plains near Mount Bapheus. Mouzalon was defeated and the empire's northwestern Anatolian holdings were ravaged only accelerating the already severe refugee crisis. In April 1302, Michael IX departed for Anatolia with a mixed army of Alans and other troops. His army remained intact until it reached Magnesia onthe Hermos. But once there, without fighting a battle, the native Byzantine divisions would begin to desert and the Alans would likewise request permission to abandon the campaign. Michael convinced them to stay another 3 months and sent a request to Constantinople for more funds. After the three months, the Alans refused to stay any longer and departed for ThracianKallipolis. Michael was left in a dangerous position and fled in secrecy toPergamon. Once this came out, his army and many of Magnesia's inhabitants followed suit in a scramble for safety. The Alans were eventually convinced to return their horses and weapons to Andronikos and left the empire.
In 1303, the situation in Anatolia worsened to a point that Andronikos considered the most drastic of reforms that being to take all the lands from churches, monasteries, single monks and the imperial entourage and assign it to soldiers. This would have created more soldiers with more reasons not to desert, and even though there was no notable opposition to this plan the decrepit imperial administration in Anatolia and the ever worsening population flight prevented this from ever being realized. With the ever worsening Anatolian situation the remaining population felt abandoned by Constantinople and occasionally individuals took matters into their own hands. In 1303, amidst the flight of the soldiers, an officer namedKotertzes established an emergency defense and drew to him a following who were “as enemies of his enemies and friends of his friends”. Andronikos was incapable of aiding or stopping Kotertzes or a certain Attaleiates who with popular support seized Magnesia in 1304. Another curiosity was a certainJohn Choiroboskos named “Pigherd”. He gathered 300 peasants in Thrace wanting to campaign against the Turks in Anatolia. But the empire feared this would lead to a general insurrection and so he was Imprisoned. 9 months later, John fled from jail and together with Anatolian refugees campaigned in the east against the Turks, he was eventually captured in battle but escaped and fled back to Thrace. Having evidently proven himself he was then commissioned by Michael IX who gave him 1,000 peasants to fight the Catalans and Turks who were now in the empire's European holdings. This motley troop however only achieved the plunder of the environs of Thessalonica.[8]
The economic destitution which plagued the reign of Andronikos II caused him to undertake drastic measures to cut state spending. These cuts included the native army, which was reduced to a near-token force and largely superseded, first by foreign mercenary companies and then by militias. As shown by the failed campaign of Andronikos's co-emperor Michael IX, these inexperienced militiamen made countering the Turkish advance a difficult and dangerous undertaking.
For a time the Byzantine navy was completely disbanded, leaving the empire reliant on Genoese and Venetian forces who charged exorbitantly for their service. Many discharged Byzantine sailors and shipbuilders found employment with the Turkomans, who had just reached the western Anatolian coast and sought to build up their own naval forces. The resulting new fleets contributed greatly to the exploding problem of Turkic piracy in the Aegean Sea, ravaging trade routes and coastal lands alike.[9]
In 1320, as a result of heightened taxation and more rigorous policies of collection, Andronikos II was able to raise a total of 1 million Hyperpyra for the budgetary year of 1321. He intended to use the money to expand his army to some 3000 horsemen, and to recreate the Byzantine Navy by building 20 ships. This plan, militarily ambitious though still insufficient for the needs of the empire, was disrupted by Andronikos II's impending civil war with his grandson Andronikos III.[6]
For the sake of comparison, the Hyperpyron from 1320 was worth half as much as the undebasedNomisma from the reign ofBasil II.[10]
Chrysobull depicting Andronikos II alongside Christ, AD 1301.
As Andronikos broke thechurch union of his father he also removed many of his church appointments, including the pro-unionistPatriarchJohn XI. The new, anti-unionist PatriarchJoseph I resigned his office and died the following year, and was replaced by a Cypriot who took the nameGregory II.
Andronikos also faced theArsenite Schism, a movement which was anti-union but otherwise had little common ground with the emperor. Its name was derived from the former Patriarch Arsenios, who was removed from office afterexcommunicating Michael VIII for having blinded and imprisonedJohn IV. The Arsenites held that the captive John was the rightful Byzantine Emperor and that the Patriarchs John XI, Joseph I, and now Gregory II were illegitimate.
To try and mend this schism, Gregory called for a church synod to which he invited both the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, asking them to rescind their previous pro-unionist declaration. The Patriarch of Antioch refused, then abdicated from his office and fled to Syria. Gregory also extracted a public avowal from the EmpressTheodora, that she would never ask that her deceased husband Michael VIII receive a Christian burial. Though this Synod did much to satisfy the Orthodox Clergy, it failed to do the same with the Arsenites.
A few years later Gregory II was forced to resign, as some of his writings were deemed to be heretical. His replacement, chosen by Andronikos in order to distract from an ever-worsening political situation, was anAthonite hermit who took the nameAthanasius. The new Patriarch was intenselyascetic, and spent much of his time repudiating clergymen for their earthly possessions; eventually he sought to confiscate property from some of the wealthier churches and monasteries. Many clergymen responded with overt hostility, going as far as pelting him with stones as he walked the streets of Constantinople. Athanasius ceased to appear in public without a bodyguard.
When in the summer of 1293 Andronikos returned from a visit to his swiftly-dwindling Anatolian holdings, he was met by a delegation of leading clergyman who demanded the deposition of Athanasius. Andronikos was unwilling, but the strength of the opposition eventually forced him to comply. Meanwhile, Athanasius personally penned achurch bull in which he excommunicated the clergymen who had denounced him, hiding it in a pillar in the northern gallery ofHagia Sophia. It was only found a few years later, causing much uproar.[11]
Andronikos II also had at least three other daughters, illegitimate only in the sense that they married outside their clan. 3 out of 4 daughters of the king married Mongol khans, showcasing the reality of that time.
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