InBuddhism, the termanattā (Pali:𑀅𑀦𑀢𑁆𑀢𑀸) is the doctrine of "non-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self exists, and is the absence of essence in any phenomenon.[note 1] While often interpreted as a doctrine denying the existence of a self,anatman is more accurately described as a strategy to attain non-attachment by recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of an unchanging essence.[1][2][3] In contrast, dominant schools of Hinduism assert the existence ofĀtman aspure awareness orwitness-consciousness,[4][5][6][note 2] "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self".[7]
Anattā is a composite Pali word consisting ofan (not) andattā (self-existent essence).[8] The term refers to the central Buddhist concept that there is no phenomenon that has a permanent, unchanging "self" or essence.[1] It is one of the Three Marks of Existence, along withdukkha,("suffering, dissatisfaction") andanicca,("impermanence").[8]
Anattā is synonymous withAnātman (an + ātman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts.[9] In some Pali texts,ātman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the termAttan, with the sense of "soul".[8] An alternate use ofAttan orAtta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven by the Vedic-era Brahmanical belief that the Atman is the permanent, unchangeable essence of a living being, or the true self.[8][9]
In Buddhism-related English literature,Anattā is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "non-Self", meaning not an essential, permanent self or the possession of such a thing equivalent to "empty of Self or what belongs to Self". And to take anything as Self or "its" possession is a source ofDukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness) when it changes.[10][11][note 3] Buddhist scholarRichard Gombrich, however, argues thatanattā is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a self or essence", but actually means "is notātman" instead of "does nothave ātman."[1] It is also incorrect to translateAnattā simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey, because the Indian concept ofātman andattā is different from the Freudian concept of ego.[15][note 4]. Close to the Western idea of ego is the " 'I am' conceit", the root of self-importance and self-centredness. This is seen as a delusion that only the enlightened lack.
The concept ofAnattā appears in numerousSutras of the ancient BuddhistNikāya texts (Pali canon). It appears, for example, as a noun inSamyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 ofAnguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 ofPatisambhidamagga, III.406 ofDhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, inSamyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 ofVinaya.[8][17] It is also found in theDhammapada.[18]
The ancient Buddhist texts discussAttā orAttan (self), sometimes with alternate terms such asAtuman,Tuma,Puggala,Jiva,Satta,Pana andNama-rupa, thereby providing the context for the BuddhistAnattā doctrine. Examples of suchAttā contextual discussions are found inDigha Nikaya I.186–187,Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and IV.54,Vinaya I.14,Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265–271 andAnguttara Nikaya I.284.[8][17][19] According to Steven Collins,[non sequitur] the inquiry ofanattā and "denial of self" in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while they use the termsatta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts.[19] The elaboration of theanattā doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.[19]
According to Collins, the Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anattā).[20] Second, states Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" (etam mamam eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ti).[21] Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively the Wrong view and the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins.[21] The first two usages incorporate the idea of soul.[22]
Buddhist scholarsRichard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's descriptions of no-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self.[1][2] Wynne and Gombrich both argue that the Buddha's statements onanattā were originally a "not-self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought.[2][1] According to Wynne, early Buddhist texts such as theAnattalakkhaṇa Sutta do not deny that there is a self, stating that thefive aggregates that are described as not-self are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience.[2] According toJohannes Bronkhorst, it is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence.[23]
TibetologistAndré Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholarsJean Przyluski andCaroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs.[24] While there may be ambivalence on the existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking Atman-like self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be regarded as the self.[25] This is a reverse position to theVedic traditions which recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation."[25]
According to Harvey, the contextual use ofAttā in the Nikāyas is two-sided. In one, it directly denies that anything can be found called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical traditions.[26] In another, states Peter Harvey, such as atSamyutta Nikaya IV.286, the Sutta considers the materialistic concept in the pre-BuddhistVedic period of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self".[27] "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts.[27] However, adds Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because the wording presumes the concept of "Self" before denying it; instead, the early Buddhist texts use the concept ofAnattā as the implicit premise.[27][28]
According to Peter Harvey, while theSuttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed.[29] This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-likenibbana state" is a mature self that knows "everything as Selfless".[29] The "empirical self" is thecitta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the Suttas is the development of thiscitta.[30]
One with "great self", state the early BuddhistSuttas, has a mind which is neither at the mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal ofnibbana and a 'Self-like' state.[29] This "great self" is not yet anArahat, because he still does small evil action which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this fruition in hell.[29]
AnArahat, states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that theArahat has transcended.[31] The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes a development of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an illusion".[32]
The Buddha emphasized both karma andanattā doctrines.[3] The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda". He also criticized the materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".[33] Instead, the Buddha asserted that there is no essence, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right actions are necessary for liberation.[34][35]
Hinduism,Jainism and Buddhism all assert a belief in rebirth, and emphasize moral responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies.[36][37][38] The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such asCharvaka, are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is completely annihilated, dissolved.[39]
Buddha criticized the materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma, states Damien Keown.[36] Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha, because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism.[36] Anattā does not mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts itself to annihilationist schools.[36] Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within each human being there is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature of a living being, existence and metaphysicalreality.[40][41][42]
Theravada Buddhism scholars, statesOliver Leaman, consider theAnattā doctrine as one of the main theses of Buddhism.[43] The Buddhist denial of an unchanging, permanent self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition.[43] With the doctrine ofAnattā the entire Buddhist structure stands or falls, assertsNyanatiloka Mahathera.[44]
According to Collins, "insight into the teaching ofanattā is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses alongthe Path.[45] The first part of this insight is to avoidsakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that is converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self.[45] "A belief in a (really) existing body" is considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The second locus is the psychological realization ofanattā, or loss of "pride or conceit". This, states Collins, is explained as the conceit ofasmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit" refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I".[45] When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or sakkayaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this automatic but illusory "I".[45]
The Theravada tradition has long considered the understanding and application of theAnattā doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely onanattā as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists.[20] The Theravada doctrine ofAnattā, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines ofkamma,rebirth andpunna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior.[46]
TheAnattā doctrine is key to the concept ofNibbana in the Theravada tradition. The liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state ofAnattā, a state that is neither universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized.[47][note 5]
The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout the history of Buddhism.[50] In Thai Buddhism, for example, statesPaul Williams, some modern era Buddhist scholars have claimed that "Nirvana is indeed the true self", while other Thai Buddhists disagree.[51] For instance, theDhammakaya tradition in Thailand teaches that it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric ofanattā (no-self); instead, nirvana is taught to be the "true self" ordhammakaya.[52] The Dhammakaya tradition teaching that nirvana isatta, or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 byVen. Payutto, a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught Nibbana as being no-self".[53][54] The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya tradition, Luang Por Sermchai ofWat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram, argues that it tends to be scholars who hold the view of absolute no-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such asLuang Pu Sodh andAjahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self".[54][55] Similar interpretations on the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12thSupreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939. According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes thetathāgatagarbha sutras.[56]
Several notable teachers of theThai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in contrast to absolute no-self.Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master, described thecitta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall underanattā.[57] He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone the idea of not-self must be dropped as well.[58] American monkThanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth.[3]Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to Thanissaro, agreeing thatanattā is a strategy for awakening but stating that "The reason the teaching ofanattā can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence anontological error."[59] Thanissaro Bhikkhu states that the Buddha intentionally set aside the question of whether or not there is a self as a useless question, and goes on to call the phrase "there is no self" the "granddaddy of fake Buddhist quotes". He adds that clinging to the idea that there is no self at all would actuallyprevent enlightenment.[60] Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddhastays silent when asked whether there is a 'self' or not,[61] as a major cause of the dispute.[62]
Anātman is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions.[43]
There are many different views ofanātman (Chinese:無我;pinyin:wúwǒ;Japanese: 無我muga;Korean: 무아mu-a) within various Mahayana schools.[63]
The early Mahayana Buddhist texts link their discussion of "emptiness" (śūnyatā) toanātman and nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in the common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main sense ofanātman or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate sense ofNirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of suffering.[64] Theanātman doctrine is another aspect ofśūnyatā, its realization is the nature of thenirvana state and to an end to rebirths.[65][66][67]
The Buddhist philosopherNāgārjuna (~200 CE), the founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzeddharma first as factors of experience.[13] David Kalupahana states that Nāgārjuna analyzed how these experiences relate to "bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of personal self (ātman).[13]
Nāgārjuna extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity calledātman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of hisMūlamadhyamakakārikā that there is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self".[68][69][70]
Nāgārjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical personality.[71] This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who acceptsanātman and denies "self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nāgārjuna.[13][14] Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness (śūnyatā).[13][72] Nāgārjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness.[71][73][74] Anyone who has not dissociated from their belief in personality in themselves or others, through the concept of self, is in a state ofavidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and redeaths.[71][75]
The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopherVasubandhu of theYogācāra school similarly discussanātman as a fundamental premise of the Buddha.[76] The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholarCandrakīrti, who then offered his own theories on its importance.[77][78]
Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial because they imply a "self-like" concept.[79][80] In particular are thetathāgatagarbha sūtras, where the title itself means agarbha (womb, matrix, seed) containingTathāgata (Buddha). TheseSutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature".[81] Thetathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of the 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE.[81] Most scholars consider thetathāgatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every living being is equivalent to "self",[citation needed][note 6] and it contradicts theanātman doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that thetathāgatagarbha sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.[83][84]
TheMahayanaMahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that the Buddha used the term "self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.[85][86] TheRatnagotravibhāga (also known asUttaratantra), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of thetathāgatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "self-love" (atma-sneha) – considered to be one of the defects by Buddhism.[87][88] The 6th-century Chinesetathāgatagarbha translation states that "Buddha hasshiwo (true self) which is beyond being and nonbeing".[89] However, theRatnagotravibhāga asserts that the "self" implied intathāgatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-self".[89][90]
According to some scholars, theBuddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self; rather, it is a positive language and expression ofśūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realizeBuddhahood through Buddhist practices.[87] Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towardsmonism in thesetathagatagarbha references.[91] Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in theTathagatagarbha Sutra.[92] Zimmermann also avers that "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathāgatagarbha Sutra".[93] He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata).[94] Williams states that the "self" intathāgatagarbha sutras is actually "non-self", and neither identical nor comparable to the Hindu concepts ofbrahman and self.[87]
Tibetan and Nepalese Buddhist deities Nairatmya and Hevajra in an embrace. Nairatmya is the goddess of emptiness, and ofanātman realization.[95][96]
Theanātman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires the ritual practices of the Vajrayāna tradition. The Tibetan terms such asbdag med refer to "without a self, insubstantial, anātman".[97] These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the Buddha.[98]
The ritual practices in Vajrayāna Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-grasping, and to manifest as a purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayāna path to liberation fromrebirths.[99][100][101] One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-soul, non-self).[102][103][104] She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayāna Buddhism.[95]
The Buddhist concept ofanattā oranātman is one of the fundamental differences between mainstream Buddhism and mainstreamHinduism, with the latter asserting thatātman ("self") exists.[note 2]
In Hinduism,Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observingpure awareness orwitness-consciousness.[4][5][105][106] It is unaffected by ego,[107][108] distinct from the individual being (jivanatman) embedded inmaterial reality, and characterized byAhamkara ('I-making'), mind (citta,manas), and all the defilingkleshas (impurities). Embodied personality changes over time, whileAtman doesn't.[109]
According to Jayatilleke, the Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of the assumedAtman, but nevertheless assumes its existence,[110] and Advaitins "reify consciousness as an eternal self."[7] In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with theempirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence" states Jayatilleke.[110] According to Harvey, in Buddhism the negation of temporal existents is applied even more rigorously than in the Upanishads:
While theUpanishads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real, true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the BuddhistSuttas, though, literally everything is seen as non-Self, evenNirvana. When this is known, then liberation –Nirvana – is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both theUpanishads and the BuddhistSuttas see many things as not-Self, but the Suttas apply it, indeed non-Self, toeverything.[111]
Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their respective abstract doctrines of "Anattā" and "Atman".[112] This, states Peter Harvey, may have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism.[113]
The termniratman appears in theMaitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4.Niratman literally means "selfless".[114][115] Theniratman concept has been interpreted to be analogous toanatman of Buddhism.[116] The ontological teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous positive and negative descriptions of various states – such asniratman andsarvasyatman (the self of all) – are used inMaitrayaniya Upanishad to explain the nondual concept of the "highest Self".[115] According to Ramatirtha, states Paul Deussen, theniratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the metaphysicalBrahman.[117]
The Greek philosopherPyrrho traveled to India as part ofAlexander the Great's entourage where he was influenced by the Indiangymnosophists,[118] which inspired him to create the philosophy ofPyrrhonism. PhilologistChristopher Beckwith argues that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of thethree marks of existence into Greek, and thatadiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the Buddhist concept ofanattā.[119]
AnattaArchived 2015-12-10 at theWayback Machine,Encyclopædia Britannica (2013): "Anatta, (Pali: “non-self” or “substanceless”) Sanskrit anatman, in Buddhism, the doctrine that there is in humans no permanent, underlying substance that can be called the soul. Instead, the individual is compounded of five factors (Pali khandha; Sanskrit skandha) that are constantly changing."
Brian Morris (2006).Religion and Anthropology: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 51.ISBN978-0-521-85241-8.: "...anatta is the doctrine of non-self, and is an extreme empiricist doctrine that holds that the notion of an unchanging permanent self is a fiction and has no reality. According to Buddhist doctrine, the individual person consists offive skandhas or heaps—the body, feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness. The belief in a self or soul, over these five skandhas, is illusory and the cause of suffering."
Richard Gombrich (2006).Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47.ISBN978-1-134-90352-8.: "...Buddha's teaching that beings have no soul, no abiding essence. This 'no-soul doctrine' (anatta-vada) he expounded in his second sermon."
AnattaArchived 2015-12-10 at theWayback Machine,Encyclopædia Britannica (2013): "The concept of anatta, or anatman, is a departure from the Hindu belief in atman ("the self").";
Steven Collins (1994), "Religion and Practical Reason" (Editors: Frank Reynolds, David Tracy), State Univ of New York Press,ISBN978-0-7914-2217-5, page 64; "Central to Buddhistsoteriology is the doctrine of not-self (Pali: anattā, Sanskrit: anātman, the opposed doctrine of ātman is central to Brahmanical thought). Put very briefly, this is the [Buddhist] doctrine that human beings have no soul, no self, no unchanging essence.";
David Loy (1982), "Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta: Are Nirvana and Moksha the Same?",International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 1, pages 65–74;
KN Jayatilleke (2010),Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,ISBN978-8120806191, pages 246–249, from note 385 onwards;
^Buddha did not deny a being or a thing, referring it to be a collection of impermanent interdependent aggregates, but denied that there is a metaphysical self, soul or identity in anything.[12][13][14]
^The termahamkara is 'ego' in Indian philosophies.[16]
^This is a major difference between the Theravada Buddhists and different Hindu traditions which assert that nirvana is realizing and being in the state of self (soul, atman) and is universally applicable. However, both concur that this state is indescribable, cannot be explained, but can be realized.[48][49]
^Wayman and Wayman have disagreed with this view, and they state that thetathāgatagarbha is neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality.[82]
^abDavid Loy (2009).Awareness Bound and Unbound: Buddhist Essays. State University of New York Press. pp. 105–106.ISBN978-1-4384-2680-8.Archived from the original on 2019-12-17. Retrieved2016-10-23.,Quote: Nāgārjuna, the second century Indian Buddhist philosopher, usedśūnyatā not to characterize the true nature of reality but to deny that anything has any self-existence or reality of its own.
^Peter Harvey (2012).An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices. Cambridge University Press. p. 62.ISBN978-0-521-85942-4.Archived from the original on 2020-07-27. Retrieved2016-10-23.Again, anatta does not mean 'egoless', as it is sometimes rendered. The term 'ego' has a range of meanings in English. The Freudian 'ego' is not the same as the Indian atman/atta or permanent Self.
^Surendranath Dasgupta (1992).A History of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass (Republisher; Originally published by Cambridge University Press). p. 250.ISBN978-81-208-0412-8.Archived from the original on 2019-06-02. Retrieved2016-10-23.
^John Carter; Mahinda Palihawadana (2008).Dhammapada. Oxford University Press. pp. 30–31, 74, 80.ISBN978-0-19-955513-0.Archived from the original on 2019-12-23. Retrieved2016-10-23.
^Loy, David (1982). "Enlightenment in Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta".International Philosophical Quarterly.22 (1). Philosophy Documentation Center:65–74.doi:10.5840/ipq19822217.
^pp. 101–103 Maha Boowa, Arahattamagga, Arahattaphala: the Path to Arahantship – A Compilation of Venerable Acariya Maha Boowa's Dhamma Talks about His Path of Practice, translated by Bhikkhu Silaratano, 2005,http://www.forestdhammabooks.com/book/3/Arahattamagga.pdfArchived 2009-03-27 at theWayback Machine (consulted 16 March 2009)
^Merv Fowler (1999).Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 101–102.ISBN978-1-898723-66-0.Archived from the original on 2016-11-21. Retrieved2016-10-23.,Quote: "Some texts of thetathāgatagarbha literature, such as theMahaparinirvana Sutra actually refer to anatman, though other texts are careful to avoid the term. This would be in direct opposition to the general teachings of Buddhism onanātman. Indeed, the distinctions between the general Indian concept ofatman and the popular Buddhist concept of Buddha-nature are often blurred to the point that writers consider them to be synonymous."
^Jamie Hubbard,Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99–100
^Zimmermann, Michael (2002),A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64
^Peter Harvey (2013).The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism. Routledge. p. 34.ISBN978-1-136-78336-4.Archived from the original on 2016-09-01. Retrieved2016-09-27.,Quote: "The post-Buddhist Matri Upanishad holds that only defiled individual self, rather than the universal one, thinks 'this is I' or 'this is mine'. This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations".
^Shinkan Murakami (1971). "Niratman and anatman".Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū).19 (2):61–68.
^Paul Deussen (1980).Sixty Upanishads of the Veda. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 358–359 introductory note, 361 with footnote 1, 380.ISBN978-81-208-1468-4.
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