Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin[a] (21 February [O.S. 8 February] 1904–18 December 1980) was aSoviet statesman who served as theChairman of the Council of Ministers from 1964 to 1980. FollowingKhrushchev's removal from power, he briefly led the Soviet Union as part of atriumvirate in the mid-to-late 1960s.
Alexei Kosygin was born in the city ofSaint Petersburg in 1904 to a Russian working-class family. During theRussian Civil War, he was conscripted into the labour army. After the Red Army's demobilization in 1921, he worked inSiberia as an industrial manager. In the early 1930s, Kosygin returned to Leningrad and worked his way up the Soviet hierarchy. During theGreat Patriotic War (World War II), Kosygin was tasked by theState Defence Committee with moving Soviet industry out of territories soon to be overrun by the German Army. He served asMinister of Finance for a year before becomingMinister of Light Industry (later, Minister of Light Industry and Food). However, in 1952, Stalin removed Kosygin from thePolitburo, thereby weakening Kosygin's position within the Soviet hierarchy.
Upon Khrushchev's ouster, Alexei Kosygin initially emerged as the Soviet Union'shead of government in both name and practice.[3][4] In addition to overseeing the country's economy, he assumed a preeminent role in directing its foreign policy.[5][6] However, in 1968, thePrague Spring sparked a massive backlash against his reforms, thereby enabling Leonid Brezhnev to decisively eclipse him as the dominant force within thePolitburo.[7][8] Despite having his standing significantly weakened within the Kremlin, Kosygin was allowed by Brezhnev to remain in office until his retirement in October 1980 due to bad health. He died two months later on 18 December 1980.
Kosygin was born into aRussian[9] working-class family consisting of his father and mother (Nikolai Ilyich and Matrona Alexandrovna) and his siblings. The family lived inSaint Petersburg. Kosygin wasbaptized (7 March 1904) one month after his birth.[10] He lost his mother in infancy and was brought up by his father.[11]
He and his father sympathized with theRevolution and Alexei was conscripted into alabour army on theBolshevik side at the age of 14 during theRussian Civil War of 1917–1922. After demobilization from theRed Army in 1921, Kosygin attended the Leningrad Co-operative Technical School[12] and found work in the system of consumerco-operatives in[13]Novosibirsk,Siberia.[14] When asked why he worked in the co-operative sector of the economy, Kosygin replied, quoting a slogan ofVladimir Lenin: "Co-operation – the path to socialism!"[15] Kosygin stayed there for six years untilRobert Eikhe personally advised him to quit, shortly before the repressions hit the Soviet consumer co-operation movement.[11]
As deputy chairman of the Council of Evacuation,[16] he had the task of evacuating industry from territories about to be overrun by the Axis. Under his command 1,523 factories were evacuated eastwards, as well as huge volumes of raw materials, ready-made goods and equipment. Kosygin managed clearing of congestions on the railways in order to maintain their stable operation.[17]
During theLeningrad Blockade he was sent to his hometown to manage the construction ofan ice road and a pipeline across Lake Ladoga.[18] This allowed to evacuate some half million people from the besieged and starving city, and to supply fuel to its factories and power plants.[17] He was also responsible for the procurement of locally available firewood.[17]
Kosygin became a candidate member of thePolitburo in 1946. During theSoviet famine of 1946–47 He headed the foodstuff relief missions to the most suffering regions.[11] He was appointed USSR Minister for Finance in February 1948, and a full member of the Politburo on 4 September 1948, putting him among the dozen or so most ranking officials in the USSR.
Kosygin's administrative skills[19] led Stalin to take the younger man under his wing. Stalin shared information with Kosygin, such as how much money the families ofVyacheslav Molotov,Anastas Mikoyan, andLazar Kaganovich possessed, spent and paid their staff. (A Politburo member earned a modest salary by Soviet standards[20] but enjoyed unlimited access toconsumer goods.) Stalin sent Kosygin to each home[when?] to put their houses into "proper order".
Kosygin's patron, Zhdanov, died suddenly in August 1948. Soon afterwards, Zhdanov's old rivalsLavrentiy Beria andGeorgy Malenkov persuaded Stalin to let them remove members of the decapitated Zhdanov faction, of whom the three most prominent wereNikolai Voznesensky, then Chairman of theState Planning Committee and aFirst Deputy Premier,Alexey Kuznetsov, the party secretary with oversight over the security, and Kosygin. During the brutal purge that followed, known as theLeningrad affair, Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others were arrested and shot. Kosygin was relegated to the post of USSR Minister for Light Industry,[21] while nominally retaining his membership of the Politburo until 1952.[22]
TheHouse on the Embankment was a building completed in 1931 to house the government elite; Kosygin lived there.
Beria and Malenkov were doing everything they could to wreck this troika of Kuznetsov, Voznesensky and Kosygin ... Many people perished in Leningrad. So did many people who had been transferred from Leningrad to work in other regions. As for Kosygin, his life was hanging by a thread ... Men who had been arrested and condemned in Leningrad made ridiculous accusations against him ... I simply can't explain how he was saved from being eliminated along with the others. Kosygin, as they say, must have drawn a lucky lottery ticket.[23]
Kosygin told his son-in-law Mikhail Gvishiani, anNKVD officer, of the accusations leveled against Voznesensky because of his possession of firearms. Gvishiani and Kosygin threw all their weapons into a lake and searched both their own houses for any listening devices. They found one at Kosygin's house, but it might have been installed to spy on MarshalGeorgy Zhukov, who had lived there before him. According to his memoirs, Kosygin never left his home without reminding his wife what to do if he did not return from work. After living two years in constant fear, the family reached the conclusion[when?] that Stalin would not harm them.[24]
In September 1953, six months after Stalin's death, Kosygin was appointed USSR Minister for Industrial Goods, and in December he was reinstated as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, under Malenkov, Stalin's immediate successor, but lost that position in December 1956, during Khrushchev's ascendancy, when he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the State Economic Commission. When the power struggle between Khrushchev and the so-called 'Anti-Party Group' came to a head in 1957, Kosygin backed Khrushchev because, as he said later, if Malenkov and his allies had won "blood would have flowed again",[25] but the French journalistMichel Tatu [fr], a close observer who was based in Moscow at the time, concluded that "Kosygin did not owe anything to Khrushchev" and that out of the post-1957 leadership "was visibly the least willing to praise the First Secretary", and that Khrushchev was "somewhat reluctant" to promote Kosygin.[26]
However, despite Khrushchev's reluctance, Kosygin's career made a steady recovery. In June 1957, he was again appointed a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (for the third time), and a candidate member of the PresidiumCentral Committee (the renamedPolitburo). In March 1959, he was made Chairman ofGosplan, and on 4 May 1960, he was promoted First deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and a full member of the Presidium.[27]
As First Deputy Premier Kosygin travelled abroad, mostly on trade missions, to countries such asNorth Korea,India,Argentina andItaly. Since 1959 Kosygin headed Soviet mission to the ComEcon. Later, in the aftermath of theCuban Missile Crisis, Kosygin was the Soviet spokesman for improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.[21] According to Michel Tatu, in 1960–62, Kosygin was one of the 'big four', with Khrushchev,Frol Kozlov andLeonid Brezhnev, who would be present in the Kremlin to greet visiting leaders of East European communist parties, implying, but in November 1962, after Khrushchev complained about the management of Gosplan, and opposed Kosygin's plans for economic reform, he was removed from the inner leadership.[28]
In October 1964, at a ceremony in honour ofSoviet cosmonauts, Brezhnev called for the strengthening of the Party apparatus. This speech was only the beginning of a large campaign directed against Kosygin. Several newspapers, such asPravda andKommunist, criticized the work of the Council of Ministers, and indirectly Kosygin, its chairman, for planning the economy in an unrealistic fashion, and used the highly aggressive rhetoric previously used to condemn Khrushchev against Kosygin.[citation needed]
Brezhnev was able to criticize Kosygin by contrasting him withVladimir Lenin, who – Brezhnev claimed – had been more interested in improving the conditions ofSoviet agriculture than improving the quality oflight industrial goods. Kosygin's support for producing more consumer goods was also criticized by Brezhnev, and his supporters, most notablyKonstantin Chernenko, for being a return to quasiFirst World policies. At the23rd Party Congress, Kosygin's position was weakened when Brezhnev's supporters were able to increase expenditure on defense and agriculture.[32] However, Brezhnev did not have a majority in the Politburo, and could count on only four votes.[33] In the Politburo, Kosygin could count onKiril Mazurov's vote, and when Kosygin and Podgorny were not bickering with each other, they actually had a majority in the Politburo over Brezhnev. Unfortunately for Kosygin this was not often the case, and Kosygin and Podgorny were constantly disagreeing on policy.[34]
Kosygin's position in the Soviet leadership was ultimately weakened following his enactment of several economic initiatives in 1965 that collectively came to be known within the Party as the "Kosygin reforms". Due largely to coinciding with the political upheaval created by thePrague Spring, the reforms provoked a backlash among the party's old guard who proceeded to flock to Brezhnev and strengthen his position within the Soviet leadership.[8] By March 1971, it became apparent that Brezhnev was the leader of the country, with Kosygin as the spokesman of the five-year plan and Podgorny's position within the collective leadership strengthened.[31]
Kosygin with Egyptian PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser at a visit to Cairo, May 1966
Early on in his tenure, Kosygin challenged Brezhnev's right asgeneral secretary to represent the country abroad, a function Kosygin believed should fall into the hands of thehead of government, as was common in non-communist countries. This was actually implemented for a short period,[18] which ledHenry A. Kissinger to believe that Kosygin was theleader of the Soviet Union.[8] Kosygin, who had been the chief negotiator with theFirst World during the 1960s, was hardly to be seen outside theSecond World[35] after Brezhnev consolidated his position within the Politburo,[18] but also due to Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko's dislike of Kosygin meddling into his own ministerial affairs.[36]
TheSix-Day War in the Middle East had the effect of increasing Soviet–American cooperation; to improve relations even further, theUnited States Government invited Kosygin to a summit withLyndon B. Johnson, the President of the United States, following his speech to the United Nations.[37] At the summit, which became known as theGlassboro Summit Conference, Johnson and Kosygin failed to reach agreement on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, but the summit's friendly and even open atmosphere was referred to as the "Spirit of Glassboro".[38] Relations between the two countries improved further when the1970 Moscow Treaty was signed on 12 August 1970 by Kosygin and Gromyko andWilly Brandt andWalter Scheel who representedWest Germany.[39] In 1971, Kosygin gave anextensive interview to the American delegation that includedDavid Rockefeller, presenting his views on US-Soviet relations, environmental protection, arms control and other issues.[40][41]
Kosygin developed a close friendly relationship with the President ofFinlandUrho Kekkonen, which helped the USSR to maintain active mutual trade with Finland and to keep it away fromCold War confrontation.[42]
Kosygin protectedJános Kádár's economic reforms and his position as leader of theHungarian People's Republic from intervention by the Soviet leadership.[44] Polish leaderWładysław Gomułka, who was removed from all of his posts in 1970, was succeeded byEdward Gierek who tried to revitalize the economy of thePeople's Republic of Poland by borrowing money from theFirst World. The Soviet leadership approved both countries' respective economic experiments, since it was trying to reduce its large Eastern Bloc subsidy programme in the form of cheap oil and gas exports.[45] During the discussions within the Soviet leadership of a possibleSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Kosygin reminded leaders of the consequences of the Soviet suppression of the1956 Hungarian revolution. Kosygin's stance became more aggressive later on when he understood that the reforms in Czechoslovakia could be turned against his1965 Soviet economic reform.[46]
We should tell Taraki and Amin to change their tactics. They still continue to execute those people who disagree with them. They are killing nearly all of theParcham leaders, not only the highest rank, but of the middle rank, too.
Kosygin acted as a mediator betweenIndia andPakistan in 1966, and got both nations to sign theTashkent Declaration. Kosygin became the chief spokesman on the issue of arms control. In retrospect, many of Kosygin's colleagues felt he carried out his work "stoically", but lacked "enthusiasm", and therefore never developed a real taste forinternational politics.[48]
TheSino–Soviet split chagrined Kosygin a great deal, and for a while he refused to accept its irrevocability; he briefly visited Beijing in 1969 due to increased tension between the USSR andMaoist China. Kosygin said, in a close-knit circle, that "We are communists and they are communists. It is hard to believe we will not be able to reach an agreement if we met face to face".[48] His view on China changed however, and according toHarold Wilson, formerPrime Minister of the United Kingdom, Kosygin viewed China as an "organized military dictatorship" whose intended goal was to enslave "Vietnam and the whole of Asia".[49]
During an official visit by an Afghan delegation, Kosygin andAndrei Kirilenko criticized Afghan leadersNur Muhammad Taraki andHafizullah Amin forStalinist-like repressionist behaviour. He promised to send more economic and military aid, but rejected any proposal regarding a possible Soviet intervention, as an intervention inAfghanistan would strain the USSR's foreign relations with the First World according to Kosygin, most notably West Germany.[50] However, in a closed meeting, without Kosygin, who strongly opposed any kind of military intervention, the Politburo unanimously supported a Soviet intervention.[51]
TheEighth Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) is considered to be one of the most successful periods for the Soviet economy and the most successful when it comes to consumer production (seeThe "Kosygin" reform).[16] It became known as the "golden era".[52] The23rd Party Congress and theNinth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) had been postponed by Brezhnev due to a power struggle within the Soviet leadership.[31] At the 23rd Party Congress Kosygin promised that the Ninth Five-Year Plan would increase the supply of food, clothing and other household appliances up to 50 percent.[53] The plan envisaged a massive increase in the Sovietstandard of living, with Kosygin proclaiming a growth of 40 percent for the population's cash income in his speech to the congress.[54]
TheTenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1981) was referred to by Kosygin as the "plan of quality".[55] Brezhnev rejected Kosygin's bid for producing moreconsumer goods during the Tenth Five-Year Plan. As a result, the total volume of consumer goods in industrial production only stood at 26 percent. Kosygin's son-in-law notes that Kosygin was furious with the decision, and proclaimed increased defence expenditure would become the Soviet Union's "complete ruin".[56] The plan was less ambitious than its predecessors, with targets of national industrial growth no higher than what the rest of the world had already achieved.Soviet agriculture would receive a share investment of 34 percent, a share much larger than its proportional contribution to the Soviet economy, as it accounted for only 3 percent of the Soviet GDP.[57]
Like Khrushchev, Kosygin tried to reform thecommand economy within a socialist framework. In 1965 Kosygin initiated aneconomic reform widely referred to as the "Kosygin reform". Kosygin sought to make Soviet industry more efficient by including some market measures common in the First World such asprofit making for instance; he also tried to increase quantity of production, increaseincentives for managers and workers, and freeing managers fromcentralized statebureaucracy.[58] The reform had been proposed to Khrushchev in 1964, who evidently liked it and took some preliminary steps to implement it. Brezhnev allowed the reform to proceed because the Soviet economy was entering a period of low growth.[59] In its testing phase, the reform was applied to 336 enterprises inlight industry.[60]
The reform was influenced by the works of Soviet economistEvsei Liberman. Kosygin overestimated the ability of the Soviet administrative machine to develop the economy, which led to "corrections" to some of Liberman's more controversial beliefs aboutdecentralization. According to critics, Kosygin's changes to Liberman's original vision caused the reform to fail.[59]
A propaganda poster promoting the reform. The poster reads:We're forging the keys of happiness.
Kosygin believed that decentralization,semi-public companies, and cooperatives were keys to catching up to the First World's contemporary level of economic growth. His reform sought a gradual change from a "state-administered economy" to an economy in which "the state restricts itself to guiding enterprises".[61] The reform was implemented, but showed several malfunctions and inconsistencies early on.[58]
The salary for Soviet citizens increased abruptly by almost 2.5 times during the plan. Real wages in 1980 amounted to 232.7 rubles, compared to 166.3 rubles before the1965 Soviet economic reform and the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The first period, 1960–1964, was characterized by low growth, while the second period, 1965–1981, had a stronger growth rate. The second period vividly demonstrated the success of the Kosygin reform, with the average annual growth in retail turnover being 11.2 billion rubles, 1.8 times higher than in the first period and 1.2 times higher than the third period (1981–1985). Consumption of goods and daily demand also increased. The consumption of home appliances greatly increased. Refrigerators increased from a low of 109,000 in 1964 to 440,000 units by 1973; consumption declined during the reversal of the reform. Car production increased, and would continue to do so until the late 1980s. The Soviet leadership, under pressure, sought to provide more attractive goods for Soviet consumers.[62]
The removal of Khrushchev in 1964 signalled the end of his "housing revolution". Housing construction declined between 1960 and 1964 to an average of 1.63 million square metres. Following this sudden decrease, housing construction increased sharply between 1965 and 1966, but dropped again, and then steadily grew (the average annual growth rate was 4.26 million square metres). This came largely at the expense of businesses. While the housing shortage was never fully resolved, and still remains a problem in present-day Russia, the reform overcame the negative trend and renewed the growth of housing construction.[16]
Growing hostility towards reform, the initial poor results, and Kosygin's reformist stance, led to a popular backlash against him. Kosygin lost most of the privileges he had enjoyed before the reform, but Brezhnev was never able to remove him from the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, despite his weakened position.[8] In the aftermath of his failed reform, Kosygin spent the rest of his life improving the economic administration through the modification of targets; he implemented various programmes to improve food security and ensure the futureintensification of production.[63] There is no proof to back up the claim that the reform itself contributed to the high growth seen in the late-1960s, or that its cancellation had anything to do with the stagnating growth of the economy which began in the 1970s.[64]
Kosygin initiated anothereconomic reform in 1973 with the intentions of weakening thecentral Ministries and giving more powers to the regional authorities in republican and local-levels. The reform's failure to meet Kosygin's goal led to its cancellation. However, the reform succeeded in creatingassociations, an organization representing various enterprises.[65] The last significant reform undertaken by the pre-perestroika leadership was initiated byKosygin's fifth government in a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the1979 reform.[66] The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, was intended to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. Due to Kosygin's resignation in 1980, and because ofNikolai Tikhonov's conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually implemented.[67]
Kosygin (right) shaking hands with Romanian communist leaderNicolae Ceaușescu in 1974
By the early to mid-1970s Brezhnev had established a strong enough power base to effectively become leader. According to historian Ilya Zemtsov, the author ofChernenko: The Last Bolshevik: The Soviet Union on the Eve of Perestroika, Kosygin "began to lose power" with the24th Party Congress in 1971 which for the first time publicized the formula 'the Politburo led by Brezhnev'". Along with weakening Kosygin's position, Brezhnev moved to strengthen the Party's hold on the Government apparatus, weakening Kosygin's position further.[68] Historian Robert Wesson, the author ofLenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU, notes that Kosygin's economic report to the25th Party Congress "pointed even more clearly to the end of struggle" between Brezhnev and Kosygin.[57] Kosygin was further pushed aside when Brezhnev published his memoirs, which stated that Brezhnev, not Kosygin, was in charge of all major economic decisions.[69] To make matters worse for Kosygin, Brezhnev blocked any future talks on economic reform within the party and government apparatus, and information regarding the reform of 1965 was suppressed.[57]
Brezhnev consolidated his own position over the Government Apparatus by strengthening Podgorny's position asChairman of thePresidium of the Supreme Soviet, literally head of state, by giving the office some of the functions of the Premier. The1977 Soviet Constitution strengthened Podgorny's control of the Council of Ministers, by giving the post of head of state some executive powers. In fact, because of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the Council of Ministers became subordinate to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.[70] When Podgorny was replaced as head of state in 1977 by Brezhnev, Kosygin's role in day-to-day management of government activities was lessened drastically, through Brezhnev's new-found post.[71] Rumours started circulating within the top circles, and on the streets, that Kosygin would retire due to bad health.[68]
Brezhnev's consolidation of power weakened Kosygin's influence and prestige within the Politburo. Kosygin's position was gradually weakened during the 1970s and he was frequently hospitalized.[72] On several occasionsKiril Mazurov, theFirst Deputy chairman of theCouncil of Ministers, had to act on his behalf.[72] Kosygin suffered his first heart attack in 1976. After this incident, it is said that Kosygin changed from having a vibrant personality to being tired and fed up; he, according to people close to him, seemed to have lost the will to continue his work. He twice filed a letter of resignation between 1976 and 1980, but was turned down on both occasions.[16] During Kosygin's sick leave, Brezhnev appointedNikolai Tikhonov to the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Tikhonov, as with Brezhnev, was a conservative, and through his post as First Deputy chairman Tikhonov was able to reduce Kosygin to a standby role. At aCentral Committee plenum in June 1980, the Soviet economic development plan was outlined by Tikhonov, not Kosygin. The powers of the Premier diminished to the point where Kosygin was forced to discuss all decisions made by the Council of Ministers with Brezhnev.[68]
Kosygin was hospitalized in October 1980. During his stay, on 23 October, he wrote a brief letter of resignation; the following day he was deprived of all government protection, communication, and luxury goods he had earned during his political life. When Kosygin died on 18 December 1980 in Moscow,[73] none of his Politburo colleagues, former aides, or security guards visited him. At the end of his life, Kosygin feared the complete failure of theEleventh Five-Year Plan (1981–1985), saying that the sitting leadership was reluctant to reform the stagnant Soviet economy. His funeral was postponed for three days, as Kosygin died on the eve of Brezhnev's birthday, and the day of Stalin's.[74] Kosygin waspraised by Brezhnev as an individual who "laboured selflessly for the good of the Soviet state".[75] Astate funeral was conducted and Kosygin was honoured by his peers; Brezhnev,Yuri Andropov, and Tikhonov laid an urn containing his ashes at theKremlin Wall Necropolis.[2]
Compared with other Soviet officials, Kosygin stood out as a pragmatic and relatively independent leader.[76] In a description given by an anonymous high-rankingGRU official, Kosygin is described as "a lonely and somewhat tragic figure" who "understood our faults and the shortcomings of our situation in general and those in our Middle East policy in particular, but, being a highly restrained man, he preferred to be cautious." An anonymous former colleague of Kosygin said "He always had an opinion of his own, and defended it. He was a very alert man, and performed brilliantly during negotiations. He was able to cope quickly with the material that was totally new to him. I have never seen people of that calibre since."[77]
Canadian Prime MinisterPierre Trudeau said Kosygin was like "Khrushchev without the rough edges, a fatherly man who was the forerunner ofMikhail Gorbachev". He noted that Kosygin was willing to discuss issues so long as the Soviet position was not tackled head-on.[78] FormerUnited States Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger said that Kosygin was devoted, nearly fanatically, to his work. Kosygin was viewed by Western diplomats as a pragmatist "with a glacial exterior who was orthodox if not rigid".[79]Andrei Sakharov, aSoviet dissident, believed Kosygin to be "the most intelligent and toughest man in the Politburo".[71]Singapore Prime MinisterLee Kuan Yew remembered Kosygin as "very quiet-spoken, but very determined, mind of great ability and application".[80] US economistDavid Rockefeller described Kosygin as a talented manager doing miracles in ruling the clumsy Soviet economy.[81]
Kosygin would prove to be a very competent administrator, with the Sovietstandard of living rising considerably due to his moderately reformist policy.[19] Kosygin's moderate1965 reform, as withNikita Khrushchev'sthaw, radicalized the Soviet reform movement. WhileLeonid Brezhnev was content to maintain the centralized structure of the Sovietplanned economy, Kosygin attempted to revitalize the ailing economic system by decentralising management. FollowingBrezhnev's death in 1982, the reform movement was split betweenYuri Andropov's path of discipline and control and Gorbachev'sliberalization of all aspects of public life.[36]
Chernenko: The Last Bolshevik: The Soviet Union on the Eve of Perestroika author Ilya Zemtsov describes Kosygin as "determined and intelligent, an outstanding administrator" and claims he distinguished himself from the other members of the Soviet leadership with his "extraordinary capacity for work".[82]Moshe Lewin, inThe Soviet Century, described him as a "phenomenal administrator".[18] "His strength", David Law writes, was "his exceptional capability as an administrator". According to Law Kosygin proved himself to be a "competent politician" also.[9] HistoriansEvan Mawdsley and Stephen White claim that Brezhnev was unable to remove Kosygin because his removal would mean the loss of his last "capable administrator".[83] In their book,The Unknown Stalin,Roy Medvedev andZhores Medvedev called Kosygin an "outstanding organizer", and the "newVoznesensky".[19] HistorianArchie Brown, the authorThe Rise & Fall of Communism, believes the1965 Soviet economic reform to have been too "modest", and claimed that Kosygin "was too much a product of theSoviet ministerial system, as it evolved under Stalin, to become a radical economic reformer". However, Brown does believe that Kosygin was "an able administrator".[8] Gvishiani, a Russian historian, concluded that "Kosygin survived both Stalin and Khrushchev, but did not manage to survive Brezhnev."[2]
Kosygin was viewed with sympathy by the Soviet people, and is still presently viewed as an important figure in both Russian and Soviet history.[2] Because of Kosygin's popularity among the Soviet people, Brezhnev developed a "strong jealousy" for Kosygin, according toNikolai Egorychev.Mikhail Smirtyukov, the formerExecutive Officer of theCouncil of Ministers, recalled that Kosygin refused to go drinking with Brezhnev, a move which annoyed Brezhnev gravely.[83]Nikolai Ryzhkov, the lastChairman of the Council of Ministers, in a speech to theSupreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in 1987 referred to the "sad experiences of the 1965 reform", and claimed that everything went from bad to worse following the reform's cancellation.[84]
^Zubok, Vladislav M. (2009) [2007].A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 194.ISBN978-0-8078-5958-2....[T]he Soviet leader surrendered without a fight, and the plenum ratified Khrushchev's ouster without discussing his foreign policy record. As it turned out, the new leadership had no consensus on foreign affairs. [¶] The new rulers felt even less confident in foreign affairs than Stalin's lieutenants had ten years earlier. First Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin, and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny had very little experience in international affairs or the issues of international security...[¶]The role of leading Soviet statesman fell by default to Kosygin, whose background lay exclusively in domestic economy...
^Mendras, Marie (1989). "Policy Outside and Politics Inside". In Brown, Archie (ed.).Political Leadership in the Soviet Union. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. p. 143.ISBN0-253-21228-6.
^ab"Suddenly Nikita's day was done".Life. 23 October 1964. p. 35.
^Hahn, Werner G. (1982).Postwar Soviet Politics, The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53. Ithaca: Cornell U.P. p. 129.ISBN0-8014-1410-5.
^Khrushchev, Nikita (1971).Khrushchev Remembers. London: Sphere. pp. 222, 225.
^ютуба, любитель (17 December 2010)."30 лет назад умер Алексей Косыгин" [A reformer before Yegor Gaidar? Kosygin died for 30 years ago].Newsland (in Russian). Retrieved29 December 2010.
^Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla (2008)."Kosygin, Alexei".The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History [4 volumes]: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO.ISBN978-1851098422.
^Вергасов, Фатех.Организация здорового накала [The Healthy Glow of Organisation] (in Russian). pseudology.org. Retrieved4 September 2010.
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Chauhan, Sharad (2004).Inside CIA: Lessons in Intelligence. APH Publishing.ISBN9788176486606.
Colman, Jonathan (2004).A 'special relationship'?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations 'at the summit', 1964–68.Manchester University Press.ISBN0719070104.
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