Moro served asItalian Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1969 to July 1972 and again from July 1973 to November 1974. During his ministry, he implemented a pro-Arab policy. He was Italy'sMinister of Justice and ofPublic Education during the 1950s. From March 1959 until January 1964, he served as secretary of the DC.[3] On 16 March 1978, he waskidnapped by the far-left terrorist groupRed Brigades; he was killed after 55 days of captivity.[4]
Moro was one of Italy's longest-serving post-war prime ministers, leading the country for more than six years. Moro implemented a series of social and economicreforms that modernized the country.[5] Due to his accommodation with theItalian Communist Party leaderEnrico Berlinguer, known as theHistoric Compromise,[6] Moro is widely considered to be one of the most prominent fathers of the modernItalian centre-left.[7][8]
Aldo Romeo Luigi Moro was born on 23 September 1916 inMaglie, nearLecce, into a family fromUgento in theApulia region of theKingdom of Italy. His father, Renato Moro, was a school inspector, while his mother, Fida Sticchi, was a teacher. At the age of 4, he moved with his family toMilan; they soon moved back to Apulia, where he gained a classical high school degree at Archita lyceum inTaranto.[9] In 1934, his family moved toBari. There, he studied law at theUniversity of Bari and graduated in 1939. After graduation, he became a professor of philosophy of law and colonial policy (1941) and ofcriminal law (1942) at the University of Bari.[10]
In 1935, Moro joined theItalian Catholic Federation of University Students (FUCI) of Bari. In 1939, under the approval ofGiovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI, whom he had befriended, Moro was chosen as president of the association. He kept the post until 1942 when he was forced to fight inWorld War II and was succeeded byGiulio Andreotti, who at the time was a law student fromRome.[11] During his university years, Italy was ruled by thefascist regime ofBenito Mussolini, and Moro took part in student competitions known as Lictors of Culture and Art organized by the local fascist students' organization, the University Fascist Groups.[12][13] In 1943, along with other Catholic students, he founded the periodicalLa Rassegna, which was published until 1945.[14]
In July 1943, Moro contributed, along with Andreotti, Mario Ferrari Aggradi,Paolo Emilio Taviani, Guido Gonella,Giuseppe Capogrossi, Ferruccio Pergolesi,Vittore Branca,Giorgio La Pira, andGiuseppe Medici, to the creation of theCode of Camaldoli, an economic policy plan drawn up by members of the Italian Catholic forces.[15] It served as inspiration and guideline for the economic policy of the futureChristian democrats.[16][17][18] In 1945, he marriedEleonora Chiavarelli (1915–2010), with whom he had four children: Maria Fida (born 1946), Anna (born 1949), Agnese (born 1952), and Giovanni (born 1958).[19] In 1963, Moro was transferred toLa Sapienza University of Rome as a professor of the institutions of law and criminal procedure.[20]
In the1953 Italian general election, Moro was re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies, where he held the position of chairman of the DC parliamentary group.[30] In 1955, was appointed asItalian Minister of Grace and Justice in thefirst Segni government led by Segni asPrime Minister of Italy.[31] In 1956, he was among the most popular candidates, receiving the most votes during the party's congress. In May 1957, the PSDI withdrew its support to the government and Segni resigned on 6 May 1957.[32]
On 20 May 1957,Adone Zoli was sworn in as the new head of government and Moro was appointedItalian Minister of Education.[33] After the1958 Italian general election, Zoli resigned. On 1 July 1958, Fanfani was sworn in as the new prime minister at the head of a coalition government with the PSDI and case-by-case support by theItalian Republican Party (PRI).[34] Moro was confirmed as the head of Italian education and remained in office until February 1959. During his tenure, he introduced the study ofcivic education in schools.[35][36][37]
In March 1959, after Fanfani's resignation as prime minister, a new congress was called. The leaders of the Democratic Initiative faction reunited themselves in the Convent of Dorothea of Caesarea, where they abandoned the leftist policies promoted by Fanfani and founded theDorotei (Dorotheans) faction.[38] In the party's national council, Moro was elected secretary of the DC and was then confirmed in the October's congress held inFlorence.[39] After the brief right-wing government led byFernando Tambroni in 1960, supported by the decisive votes of the neo-fascistItalian Social Movement (MSI), the renovated alliance between Moro as secretary and Fanfani as prime minister led the subsequent National Congress, held inNaples in 1962, to approve with a large majority a line of collaboration with theItalian Socialist Party (PSI).[40]
The1963 Italian general election was characterized by a lack of consensus for the DC;[41] in fact, the election was held after the launch of thecentre-left formula by the DC, a coalition based upon the alliance with the PSI, which had left their alignment with theSoviet Union. Some rightist electors abandoned the DC for theItalian Liberal Party (PLI), which was asking for acentre-right government and received votes also from the quarrelsome monarchist area. Moro refused the office of prime minister, preferring to provisionally maintain his more influential post at the head of the party. Initially, the DC decided to replace Fanfani with a provisional administration led by an impartialpresident of the Chamber of Deputies,Giovanni Leone.[42] When the congress of the PSI in autumn authorized a full engagement of the party into the government, Leone resigned and Moro became the new prime minister.[43]
During Moro's premiership, a wide range ofsocial reforms was carried out. This included the 1967 Bridge Law (Legge Ponte).[45] A bill approved on 21 July 1965 extended the program ofsocial security.[46]
Despite mistrust and opposition, particularly when theItalian economic miracle came to an end and the government had to control the rise ofinflation,[47] the reforms continued. There was an increase inminimum wage. Two 1966 laws provided traders with insurance.[48][49]
The destroyed town ofLongarone after the megatsunami
During his premiership, Moro had to face the outcome of one of the most tragic events in Italian republican history, theVajont Dam disaster.[50] On 9 October 1963, a few weeks before his oath as prime minister, a landslide occurred onMonte Toc, in the province ofPordenone. The landslide caused amegatsunami in the artificial lake in which 50 million cubic metres of water overtopped the dam in a wave of 250 metres (820 ft), leading to the complete destruction of several villages and towns, and 1,917 deaths.[51] In the previous months, the Adriatic Society of Electricity (SADE) and the Italian government, which both owned the dam, dismissed evidence and concealed reports describing the geological instability of Monte Toc on the southern side of the basin and other early warning signs reported prior to the disaster.[52]
Immediately after the disaster, government and local authorities insisted on attributing the tragedy to an unexpected and unavoidable natural event. Numerous warnings, signs of danger, and negative appraisals had been disregarded in the previous months and the eventual attempt to safely control the landslide into the lake by lowering its level came when the landslide was almost imminent and was too late to prevent it.[53] The PCI newspaperL'Unità was the first to denounce the actions of management and government.[54] The DC accused the PCI of political profiteering from the tragedy, promising to bring justice to the people killed in the disaster.[55][56]
Differently from Leone, who was his predecessor and became the head of SADE's team of lawyers, Moro acted strongly to condemn the managers of the society. He immediately dismissed the administrative officials who had supervised the construction of the dam.[57]
On 25 June 1964, the government was beaten on the budget law for theItalian Ministry of Education concerning the financing of private education. On the same day, Moro resigned. During the presidential consultations for the formation of a new cabinet, Segni, the then moderate DC member andpresident of Italy, asked the PSI leaderPietro Nenni to exit from the government majority.[58]
On 16 July 1964, Segni sent theCarabinieri general Giovanni de Lorenzo to a meeting of representatives of DC, in order to deliver a message in case the negotiations around the formation of a new centre-left government would fail. According to some historians, De Lorenzo reported that Segni was ready to give a subsequent mandate to thepresident of the Senate of the Republic,Cesare Merzagora, and would ask him to form a president's government composed by all the conservative forces in theItalian Parliament.[59][60] This attemptedcoup, which came to be known as thePiano Solo,[61] only became public in 1967 through the investigative reporting ofL'Espresso.[62] Ultimately, Moro managed to form another centre-left majority. During the negotiations, Nenni had accepted the downsizing of his reform programs. On 17 July 1964, Moro went to theQuirinal Palace, with the acceptance of the assignment and the list of ministers of his second government.[63]
In August 1964, Segni had a seriouscerebral haemorrhage and resigned after a few months.[64] In the1964 Italian presidential election, which was held in December, Moro and his majority tried to elect a leftist politician at the Quirinal Palace. On the twenty-first round of voting, the leader of the PSDI and former president of the Constituent Assembly,Giuseppe Saragat, was elected with 646 votes out of 963. Saragat was the first left-wing politician to become president of Italy.[65][66]
Despite the opposition by Segni and other prominent rightist members of the DC, the centre-left coalition, the first one for the Italian post-war political life, stayed in power for nearly five years until the1968 Italian general election, which was characterized by a defeat for DC's centre-left allies.[67] The PSI and PSDI ran in a joint list namedUnified Socialist Party (PSU), which lost many votes compared to the previous election, while the PCI gained ground, achieving 30% of votes in the Senate.[68] The PSI and PSDI decided to exit from the government and Saragat appointed Leone at the head of the new cabinet composed only by DC members.[69]
During his ministry, Moro continued the pro-Arab policy of his predecessor Fanfani.[72] He forcedYasser Arafat to promise not to carry outterrorist attacks in Italian territory, with a commitment that was known as the Moro pact (lodo Moro).[73][74] The existence of this pact and its validity was confirmed byBassam Abu Sharif, a long-time leader of thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Interviewed by Italian newspapers, such asCorriere della Sera andLa Stampa, he confirmed the existence of an agreement between Italy and the PFLP, thanks to which the PFLP could "transport weapons and explosives, guaranteeing immunity from attacks in return".[75]
About the pact, Abu Sharif commented: "I personally followed the negotiations for the agreement. Aldo Moro was a great man, a true patriot, who wanted to save Italy some headaches, but I never met him. We discussed the details with an admiral and agents of the Italian secret service. The agreement was defined and since then we have always respected it; we were allowed to organize small transits, passages, and purely Palestinian operations, without involving Italians. After the deal, every time I came to Rome, two cars were waiting for me to protect myself. For our part, we also guaranteed to avoid embarrassment to your country, that is attacks which started directly from the Italian soil."[76][77] This version was confirmed by former presidentFrancesco Cossiga, who stated that Moro was the real and only creator of the pact.[78] Moro also had to cope with the difficult situation which erupted following the coup byMuammar Gaddafi in Libya,[79] a very important country for Italian interests not only for colonial ties but also for itsenergy resources and the presence of about 20,000 Italians.[80]
In the1971 Italian presidential election, Fanfani was proposed as the DC candidate for the office. His candidacy was weakened by the divisions within his own party and the candidacy of the PSI memberFrancesco De Martino, who received votes from PCI, PSI, and some PSDI members.[81] Fanfani retired after several unsuccessful ballots and Moro was then proposed as a candidate by the left-wing faction. The right-wing strongly opposed him and the moderate conservative Leone was slightly preferred to him.[82] At the twenty-third round, Leone was finally elected with a centre-right majority, with 518 votes out of 996, including those of the MSI.[83]
On 4 August 1974, a bomb exploded on the Italicus Express, killing 12 people and injuring 48. The train was travelling from Rome toMunich; having left Florence about 45 minutes earlier, it was approaching the end of the longSan Benedetto Val di Sambro tunnel under theApennines. The bomb had been placed in the fifthpassenger carriage and exploded at 01:23, while the train was reaching the end of the tunnel.[84] The effects of the explosion and subsequent fire would have been even more terrible if the train had remained inside the tunnel.[85] According to what his daughter Maria Fida stated in 2004, Moro should have been on board. A few minutes before departure, he was joined by some officials of the ministry who made him get off to sign some important documents.[86] According to some reconstructions, Moro would have been the real target of theItalicus Express bombing.[87]
In October 1974, Rumor resigned as prime minister after failing to come to an agreement on how to deal with rising economic inflation.[88][89] In November, Leone gave Moro the task of forming a new cabinet; he was sworn in on 23 November 1974, at the head a cabinet composed by DC and PRI, and externally supported by PSI and PSDI.[90]
During Moro's second term as prime minister, the government implemented a series of other important social reforms.[91] A bill, approved on 3 June 1975, introduced various changes for pensioners.[49]
Map of the Free Territory of Trieste and its division after the treaty
During his premiership, Moro signed theOsimo Treaty with theSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, defining the official partition of theFree Territory of Trieste. The port city ofTrieste with a narrow coastal strip to the northwest (Zone A) was given to Italy, while a portion of the north-western part of the Istrian peninsula (Zone B) was given to Yugoslavia.[92] The Italian government was harshly criticized for signing the treaty, particularly for the secretive way in which negotiations were carried out, skipping the traditional diplomatic channels. Since Istria had been an ancient Italian region, dating back toRoman Italy, together with the Venetian region of theRoman Empire, asVenetia et Histria, Italian nationalists of the MSI rejected the idea of giving it up.[93]
BetweenWorld War I and the end of World War II, Istria had belonged to Italy for twenty-five years, and the west coast of Istria had long had a sizeable Italian minority population.[94] Some nationalist politicians called for the prosecution of Moro and Rumor, his long-time friend who was the then foreign affairs minister, for the crime oftreason, as stated in Article 241 of the Italian Criminal Code, which mandated a life sentence for anybody found guilty of aiding and abetting a foreign power to exert its sovereignty on the national territory.[95]
Despite the tensions within the government's majority, the close relations between Moro and the PCI leaderEnrico Berlinguer guaranteed a certain stability to Moro's governments, allowing them a capacity to act that went beyond the premises that had seen them born.[96] Thefourth Moro government, withUgo La Malfa asDeputy Prime Minister of Italy, started the first dialogue with the PCI, with the aim of beginning a new phase to strengthen the Italian democratic system.[97] In 1976, the PSI secretaryFrancesco De Martino withdrew the external support to the government and Moro was forced to resign.[98]
After the1976 Italian general election, the PCI gained a historic 34% votes and Moro became a vocal supporter of the necessity of starting a dialogue between DC and PCI.[99] Moro's main aim was to widen the democratic base of the government, including the PCI in the parliamentary majority, in which the cabinets should have been able to represent a larger number of voters and parties. According to him, the DC should have been at the centre of a coalition system based on the principles ofconsociative democracy.[100] This process was known as Historic Compromise.[101]
Between 1976 and 1977, Berlinguer's PCI broke with theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union, implementing, together with the Spanish and French Communist parties, a new political theory and strategy known asEurocommunism. Such a move made eventual cooperation more acceptable for DC voters, and the two parties began an intense parliamentary debate in a moment of deep social crises.[102] In 1977, Moro was personally involved in international disputes. He strongly defended Rumor during the parliamentary debate on theLockheed scandal, and some journalists reported that Moro himself might have been involved in the bribery. The allegation, with the aim of politically destroying Moro and avoiding the risk of a DC–PCI–PSI cabinet, failed when Moro was cleared on 3 March 1978, thirteen days before his kidnapping.[103][104]
The early 1978 proposal by Moro of starting a cabinet composed of DC and PSI members, externally supported by the PCI was strongly opposed by bothsuperpowers of theCold War era. The United States feared that the cooperation between PCI and DC might have allowed the PCI to gain information on strategicNATO military plans and installations.[105] Moreover, the participation in the government ofcommunists in a Western country would have represented a cultural failure for the United States. On the other hand, the Soviets considered the potential participation by the PCI in a cabinet as a form of emancipation from Moscow and rapprochement to the Americans.[106]
Moro photographed during his kidnapping by the Red Brigades
On 16 March 1978, on via Fani, in Rome, a unit of the militant far-left organization known asRed Brigades (BR) blocked the two-car convoy that was carrying Moro and kidnapped him, murdering his five bodyguards.[107][108] On the day of his kidnapping, Moro was on his way to a session of the Chamber of Deputies, where a discussion was to take place regarding a vote of confidence for a new government led by Andreotti, that would for the first time have the support of the PCI. It was to be the first implementation of Moro's strategic political vision.[109] Additionally, he was considered to be the frontrunner for the1978 Italian presidential election.[110][111]
In the following days, trade unions called for ageneral strike, while security forces made hundreds of raids in Rome, Milan,Turin, and other cities searching for Moro's location, as places linked to Moro and the kidnapping became centres of minor pilgrimage. An estimated 16 million Italians took part in the mass public demonstrations.[112] After a few days, evenPope Paul VI, a close friend of Moro's, intervened,[113] offering himself in exchange for Moro.[114] Despite the 13,000 police officers mobilized, 40,000 house searches, and 72,000 roadblocks, the police did not carry out any arrests.[115]
The event has been compared to theassassination of John F. Kennedy,[116] and referred to as Italy's9/11.[117] Although Italy was not the sole European country to experience terrorism, the list including France, Germany, Ireland, and Spain,[118] the murder of Moro was the apogee of Italy'sYears of Lead.[117] Many details of Moro's kidnapping remain heavily disputed and unknown.[119] This has led to the promotion of a number of alternative theories about the events,[117] includingconspiracy theories,[120][121] which remain popular in Italy,[122][123][124] where the judicial truth, which attributes responsibility for the operation exclusively to the Red Brigades, has failed to take root in the collective memory of Italians.[125] Alternative theories gained traction with the institution of a special inquiring committee by the Italian Parliament in 2014 that concluded its operations in 2018.[126] The committee concluded that the judicial truth was produced on the basis of the confession of the terrorist Valerio Morucci and that other evidence which contradicted his version was downplayed. Among these, other witness testimonies indicated that more than four people fired at Moro's convoy, multiple sources report that Moro was held captive in the apartment of Via Massimi 91 in Rome (a property of IOR), and then in Villa Odescalchi on the coast of Palo Laziale, and not in Via Camillo Montalcini 8.[127] In August 2020, about sixty individuals from the world of historical research and political inquiry signed a document denouncing the growing weight that the conspiratorial view on the kidnapping and killing of Moro has in public discourse.[128]
The Red Brigades proposed exchanging Moro's life for the freedom of several prisoners.[4] There has been speculation that during his detention many government officials, including the then interior ministerFrancesco Cossiga, knew where he was being held.[129] Italian politicians were divided into two factions: one favourable to negotiation (linea del negoziato) and the other totally opposing the idea of a negotiated settlement (linea della fermezza). The government immediately took a hardline position, namely that the state must not bend to terrorist demands. This position was openly criticized by prominent DC party members, such asAmintore Fanfani andGiovanni Leone, who at the time was serving as president of Italy.[130] All major political forces followed this hardline stance. This included the PCI, which supported democracy and was part of the Italian Parliament; the PCI was accused by the Red Brigades of being a pawn of the bourgeoisie. Exceptions were theItalian Socialist Party led byBettino Craxi and the extra-parliamentary left.[118]
On 2 April 1978,Romano Prodi,Mario Baldassarri,[131] and Alberto Clò, three professors of theUniversity of Bologna, passed on a tip about a safe-house where the Red Brigades might be holding Moro. Prodi stated he had been given the tip by the DC founders from beyond the grave in aséance through the use of aOuija board, which gave the names ofViterbo,Bolsena, andGradoli.[132] During the investigation of Moro's kidnapping, some members oflaw enforcement in Italy and of the secret services advocated for the use of torture against terrorists; prominent military members and generals, such asCarlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, were against this. Dalla Chiesa once stated: "Italy is a democratic country that could allow itself the luxury of losing Moro, [but] not of the introduction of torture."[133][134][135]
During his kidnapping, Moro wrote several letters to the DC leaders and to Pope Paul VI. Some of those letters, including one that was very critical of Andreotti, were kept secret for more than a decade and published only in the early 1990s.[4] In his letters, Moro said that the state's primary focus should be saving lives and that the government should comply with his kidnappers' demands. Most of the DC's leaders argued that the letters did not express Moro's genuine wishes, arguing they were written under duress, and thus refused all negotiations. This position was held in stark contrast to the requests of Moro's family. In his appeal to the terrorists, Pope Paul VI asked them to release Moro "without conditions".[136] The specified "without conditions" is controversial; according to some sources, it was added to Paul VI's letter against his will, and that the Pope wanted to negotiate with the kidnappers to secure the safety of Moro. According toAntonio Mennini, Pope Paul VI had saved₤10 billion to pay a ransom in order to save Moro.[137]
When it became clear that the government would continue to refuse to negotiate, the Red Brigades held a summary trial, known as "the people's trial",[138] in which Moro was found guilty and sentenced to death. They then sent a last demand to the Italian authorities, stating that if 16 Red Brigades prisoners were not released, Moro would be killed. The Italian authorities responded with a large-scale manhunt, which was unsuccessful.[139] On 7 May 1978, Moro sent a farewell letter to his wife. He wrote: "They have told me that they are going to kill me in a little while, I kiss you for the last time."[140]
On 9 May 1978, after 55 days of captivity,[141][142] the terrorists placed Moro in a car and told him to cover himself with a blanket, saying that they were going to transport him to another location.[143] After Moro was covered, they shot him ten times. According to the official reconstruction after a series of trials, the killer wasMario Moretti. Moro's body was left in the trunk of a redRenault 4 on Via Michelangelo Caetani towards theTiber River near theRoman Ghetto.[144] After the recovery of Moro's body, Cossiga resigned as interior minister.[145] Pope Paul VI personally officiated at Moro's funeralmass.[146][147]
On 23 January 1983, an Italian court sentenced 32 members of the BR to life imprisonment for their role in the kidnapping and murder of Moro, among other crimes.[148] Many elements and facts have never been fully cleared up, despite a series of trials,[121] and this led to a number of other alternative theories about the events to become popularized.[117] In 1993, historianGiuseppe Tamburrano [it] expressed doubts about what was said by the Mafiapentiti in relation to the Moro affair because, comparing the two memorials (the amputee of 1978 and the complete of 1990), he said that Moro's allegations addressed to Andreotti were the same, so Andreotti had no interest to order the murder ofCarmine Pecorelli, who could not threaten him to publish things already known and publicly available.[149] Andreotti underwent a trial for his role in the assassination of Pecorelli. He was acquitted in the first instance trial (1999),[150] convicted in the second (2002),[151][152] and acquitted by Italy'sSupreme Court of Cassation (2003).[153] In a 2012 interview with Ulisse Spinnato Vega of Agenzia Clorofilla, the BR co-foundersAlberto Franceschini andRenato Curcio remembered Pecorelli. Franceschini stated: "Pecorelli, before dying, said that both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted Moro's death."[154] Additionally, that Moro was suffering from Stockholm syndrome was questioned by the two reports of the Italian Parliament's inquiry about the Moro affair. According to this view, Moro was at the height of his faculties, he was very recognizable, and at some point it was he who was leading the negotiation for his own liberation and salvation. This position was supported byLeonardo Sciascia, who discussed it in the minority report he signed as a member of the first parliamentary commission and in his bookL'affaire Moro.[155]
In 2005,Sergio Flamigni, a leftist politician and writer who had served on a parliamentary inquiry on the Moro case, suggested the involvement of theOperation Gladio network directed byNATO. He asserted that Gladio had manipulated Moretti as a way to take over the Red Brigades to effect astrategy of tension aimed at creating popular demand for a new, right-wing law-and-order regime.[156] In 2006,Steve Pieczenik was interviewed by Emmanuel Amara in his documentary filmLes derniers jours d'Aldo Moro ("The Last Days of Aldo Moro"). In the interview, Pieczenik, a conspiracy theorist, and expert on international terrorism and negotiating strategies who had been brought to Italy as a consultant to Cossiga's Crisis Committee, stated: "We had to sacrifice Aldo Moro to maintain the stability of Italy."[157][158] Pieczenik maintained that the United States had to "instrumentalize the Red Brigades". According to him, the decision to have Moro killed was taken during the fourth week of his detention, when Moro was thought to be revealing state secrets in his letters,[159] namely the existence of Gladio.[158] In another interview, Cossiga revealed that the Crisis Committee had also leaked, in a form ofblack propaganda, a false statement attributed to the Red Brigades that Moro was already dead. This was intended to communicate to the kidnappers that further negotiations would be useless since the government had written Moro off.[160][161]
Moro and his family in the Vatican withPope Paul VI
As a Christian democrat with social-democratic tendencies, Moro is widely considered one of the ideological fathers of modernItalian centre-left, having led the first centre-left government in thehistory of the Italian Republic, theOrganic centre-left.[7] He was the leading figure of the left wing of the DC, which he steered towards the left as the party's secretary-general from 1959 to 1964. While he was prime minister, aland reform was implemented in 1964; it has been described as the first step towards abolishingsharecropping (Mezzadria). Landless tenants were given cheap credit in order to allow them to own the land. Economically, Moro's policies are seen as a response tosocialist influence. Althoughcentral planning instruments were never used, a five-year economic programme was established in 1965.[162]
During his political life, Moro implemented numerous reforms that deeply changed Italian social life; along with his long-time friend and at the same time opponent,Amintore Fanfani, he was the protagonist of a long-standing political phase, which brought the DC towards more left-wing politics through a cooperation with theItalian Socialist Party first and theItalian Communist Party later.[163] Due to hisreformist stances but also for his tragic death, Moro has often been compared toJohn F. Kennedy andOlof Palme.[164]
According to media reports on 26 September 2012, theHoly See received a file onbeatification for Moro; this is the first step to becoming a saint in theCatholic Church.[165] In April 2015, it was reported that the process of beatification might be suspended or closed following the recent controversies. Thepostulator stated that the process would continue when the discrepancies were cleared up.[166] The halting of proceedings was due to Mennini, the priest who heard his last confession,[167] being allowed to provide a statement to a tribunal in regards to Moro's kidnapping and confession.[168][169] Following this, the beatification process was resumed.[170]
In January 2022, a note claiming responsibility for the abduction of Moro was auctioned despite widespread condemnation.[171]
Good Morning, Night (Buongiorno, notte, 2003), directed by Marco Bellocchio, portrays the kidnapping largely from the perspective of one of the kidnappers.
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^Holmes, J. Derek, and Bernard W. Bickers.A Short History of the Catholic Church. London: Burns and Oates, 1983. 291.
^Sadurní, J. M. (8 May 2022)."L'omicidio di Aldo Moro".Storica (in Italian).Archived from the original on 14 September 2023. Retrieved9 September 2023.
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^"Il prof. De Tormentis e la pratica della tortura in Italia".Insorgenze (in Italian). 9 April 2014.Archived from the original on 15 March 2018. Retrieved7 August 2023. This is the widely cited translation. Original Italian: "L'Italia è un Paese democratico che poteva permettersi il lusso di perdere Moro non di introdurre la tortura" ("Italy is a democratic country that could allow itself the luxury of losing Moro, [but] not of the introduction of torture").{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: postscript (link)
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Vedovato, Giuseppe (1978)."Aldo Moro".Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali (in Italian).45 (2 (178)). Maria Grazia Melchionni:163–168.ISSN0035-6611.JSTOR42734233. Retrieved20 October 2023.
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