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Aaron Wildavsky (May 31, 1930 – September 4, 1993)[1] was an Americanpolitical scientist known for his pioneering work inpublic policy,government budgeting, andrisk management.
A native ofBrooklyn in New York, Wildavsky was the son ofUkrainian Jewish immigrants. After graduating fromBrooklyn College, he served in theU.S. Navy and then won aFulbright Fellowship to theUniversity of Sydney for 1954–55. Wildavsky returned to the U.S. to attendgraduate school atYale University. His PhDdissertation, a study of the politics of the Dixon-Yatesatomic energy controversy, was completed in 1958.
Wildavsky taught atOberlin College from 1958 until 1962, then lived and worked in Washington D.C for a year before moving to theUniversity of California, Berkeley, where he worked as a professor ofpolitical science for the rest of his life. At Berkeley, he was chairman of thepolitical sciencedepartment (1966–1969) and founding dean of theGraduate School of Public Policy (1969–1977).
Wildavsky was president of theAmerican Political Science Association for 1985–86. He was also a fellow of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration.
Wildavsky was a scholar onbudgeting andbudget theory. He is associated with the idea ofincrementalism in budgeting, meaning that the most important predictor of a future political budget is the prior one; not a rational economic or decision process undertaken by the state. His bookPolitics of the Budgetary Process was named by theAmerican Society for Public Administration as the third most influential work inpublic administration in the last fifty years.InSearching for Safety (1988), Wildavsky argued thattrial and error, rather than theprecautionary principle, is the best way to manage risks. He noted that rich, technologically advanced societies were the safest, as measured bylife expectancy andquality of life. Precautionary approaches to approving new technology are irrational, he said, because they demand that we know whether something is safe before we can do the very tests that would demonstrate its safety or dangerousness. Furthermore, precaution eliminates the benefits of new technology along with the harms. He advocated enhancing society's capacity to cope with and adapt to the unexpected, rather than trying to prevent all catastrophes in advance.
Wildavsky was a prolific author, writing or co-writing thirty-nine books and numerous journal articles, including important works on the budgetary process, policy analysis, political culture, foreign affairs, public administration, and comparative government. Five more books were published posthumously—bringing the total to forty-four. Wildavsky was the recipient of the 1996University of LouisvilleGrawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, with Max Singer.[2]
Wildavsky was awarded multiple honorary degrees over the course of his life, including degrees fromYale University and theUniversity of Bologna.[3]
He died of lung cancer on September 4, 1993, in Oakland, California.[3]
Wildavsky argued that a mixed strategy of anticipation and resilience is optimal for managing risk. Anticipation is beneficial, but if employed as the sole strategy the law of diminishing returns makes it unattractive, impractical, impossible and even counter productive (it consumes resources better spent on resilience). We should accept to live with small accidents and mishaps and not try to preventall future hazards. He argued that adding safety devices to nuclear power plants beyond a certain point would be detrimental to safety.[4] This critique is a fundamental attack on theprecautionary principle.
The question, as always, is one of proportion (How much of each strategy?) and relevance (What kinds of dangers deserve the different strategies?), and ultimately, given uncertainty, of bias (When in doubt, which strategy should receive priority?). ... Trial and error is a device for courting small dangers in order to avoid or lessen the damage from big ones. Sequential trials by dispersed decision makers reduce the size of that unknown world to bite-sized, and hence manageable, chunks. An advantage of trial and error, therefore, is that it renders visible hitherto unforeseen errors. Because it is a discovery process that discloses latent errors so we can learn how to deal with them, trial and error also lowers risk by reducing the scope of unforeseen dangers. Trial and error samples the world of as yet unknown risks; by learning to cope with risks that become evident as the result of small-scale trial and error, we develop skills for dealing with whatever may come our way from the world of unknown risks.[5]
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During theCold War, Wildavsky proposed "The Dual Presidency Theory" (also sometimes referred to as the Two Presidencies Thesis). Influenced by the time period of 1946–1964, the Dual Presidency Theory is based on the principle that there are two versions of the American President: one who is concerned with domestic policy and one concerned with foreign policy. Wildavsky claims that presidents would prefer to focus foremost on foreign policy because they are granted more traditional, constitutional, and statutory authority when compared to their domestic policy powers. Wildavsky argues that presidents have assumed a more active role with regard to foreign policy because they are able to act more quickly than theUnited States Congress when pursuing foreign policy. Also, a lack ofinterest groups active in foreign policy allows the president more discretion when making a decision.
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