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| Author | Samantha Power |
|---|---|
| Subject | Genocide,U.S. foreign policy |
| Genre | Nonfiction |
| Publisher | Basic Books |
Publication date | February 20, 2002 |
| Publication place | United States |
| Media type | Hardcover |
| Pages | 640 |
| ISBN | 978-0465061501 |
| Followed by | Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World |
"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (2002) is a book by AmericanSamantha Power, at that time Professor of Human Rights Practice at Harvard'sJohn F. Kennedy School of Government, which explores the United States's understanding of, response to, and inaction ongenocides in the 20th century, from theArmenian genocide to the "ethnic cleansings" of theKosovo War. It won theJ. Anthony Lukas Book Prize and thePulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction in 2003.
Power observes that American policymakers have been consistently reluctant to condemn mass atrocities as genocide or to take responsibility for leading an international military intervention. She argues that without significant pressure from the American public, policymakers have avoided the term "genocide" altogether, which came into more widespread use after theHolocaust ofWorld War II. Instead, they appeal to the priority of national interests or argue that a U.S. response would be futile and accelerate violence, as a justification for inaction. She thinks such justifications are usually ill-founded.[1]
Power begins with an outline of the international response to theArmenian genocide (Chapter 1). She next describesRaphael Lemkin's efforts to lobby for American action againstNazi atrocities in Europe (Chapter 2). She expands on the difficulties encountered by individuals who tried to convince US representatives and other members of theAllied Powers to recognize theHolocaust. She says this difficulty was compounded by the Allies focus onWorld War II and suggests that much indifference was based in anti-Semitic attitudes (Chapter 3).
She recounts how Lemkin brought genocide to the forefront of foreign policy issues after the war, leading to the 1948 U.N.Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Lemkin had mounting disappointments and multiplying adversaries until his death in 1959. SenatorWilliam Proxmire (D-Wisconsin) and others took over fighting for preventing genocides and encouraging US leadership on this issue. Senator Proxmire and Republican PresidentRonald Reagan worked to gain support during his administration for the ratification of theGenocide Convention (Chapter 7). In the rest of the book, she focuses on genocides in individual nations and the U.S. response to such crises in Algeria, Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.
Martin Woollacott reviewed the book, along withWe Did Nothing byLinda Polman, forThe Guardian. He concluded:
"We have yet to work out properly how the post-twin towers interventions relate to those that went before. But there is obvious irony in the fact that while previously, as these books illustrate so clearly, determination was often lacking to deal with crises that most people agreed were serious, there was no shortage of it when the Bush administration moved to deal with a crisis on which there was no global consensus at all."[2]
Stephen Holmes reviewed the book, along withWar in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals byDavid Halberstam, for the 'London Review of Books. Holmes wrote:
"Putting an end to atrocities is a moral victory. But if the intervening force is incapable of keeping domestic support back home for the next phase, for reconstructing what it has shattered, the morality of its intervention is ephemeral at best. If political stability could be achieved by toppling a rotten dictator or if nations could be built at gunpoint, this problem would not be so pressing. Human rights cannot be reliably protected unless a locally sustained political authority is in place."[3]
Charles V. Peña, then affiliated with theCato Institute, reviewed the book forReason, concluding:
"That is exactly the point of Power’s compelling narrative: The horror and tragedy of genocide is a moral issue that transcends national interest. But to prevent anotherRwanda, the United States must also have the wisdom to avoid anotherSomalia."[4]
Laura Secor reviewed the book forThe New York Times.[5] The book was also reviewed inPublishers Weekly.[6]
