TheAustralia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS orANZUS Treaty) is a 1951collective security agreement initially formed betweenAustralia,New Zealand, and theUnited States.[1] It requires the parties to maintain their "capacity to resist armed attack", consult with each other on security matters in thePacific and declares that an armed attack on any of the parties "would be dangerous to [each signatories] peace and safety" and that each signatory "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes".[2] It also provides for a council of the signatories foreign ministers, in which the implementation of the treaty can be discussed.
The treaty was one ofa series that the United States formed in the 1949–1955 era as part of its collective response to the threat ofcommunism during theCold War.[3] New Zealand was suspended from ANZUS in 1986 as it initiated anuclear-free zone in its territorial waters. In late 2012, the United States lifted a 26-year-old ban on visits by New Zealand warships to US Department of Defense and US Coast Guard bases around the world. New Zealand maintains a nuclear-free zone as part of its foreign policy and is partially suspended from ANZUS, as the United States maintains an ambiguous policy whether or not the warships carry nuclear weapons and operates numerous nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines; however New Zealand resumed key areas of the ANZUS treaty in 2007.[4][5]
The treaty was previously a full three-way defence pact, but was disrupted following a dispute betweenNew Zealand and theUnited States in 1984 over visiting rights for ships and submarines capable of carrying nuclear arms[6] or nuclear-powered ships of theUS Navy to New Zealand ports. The treaty became betweenAustralia and New Zealand, and between Australia and the United States. While the treaty has lapsed between the United States and New Zealand, it remains separately in force between both of those states and Australia.[7] In 2000, the United States opened its ports to theRoyal New Zealand Navy once again, and under thepresidency of Bill Clinton in the US and thegovernment of Helen Clark in New Zealand, the countries have since reestablished bilateral cooperation on defence and security.[8]
While ANZUS is commonly recognised to have split in 1984, the Australia–US alliance remains in full force. Heads of defence of one or both states often have joined the annual ministerial meetings, which are supplemented by consultations between the US Combatant Commander Pacific and the Australian Chief of Defence Force. There are also regular civilian and military consultations between the two governments at lower levels.
Annual meetings to discuss ANZUS defence matters take place between the United States Secretaries of Defense and State and the Australian Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs are known by the acronymAUSMIN. The AUSMIN meeting for 2011 took place in San Francisco in September. The 2012 AUSMIN meeting was inPerth, Western Australia in November.[9] AUSMIN continues to meet annually, most recently in 2023.[10]
Unlike theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ANZUS has no integrated defence structure or dedicated forces. Nevertheless, Australia and the United States conduct a variety of joint activities. These include military exercises ranging from naval and landing exercises at the task-group level to battalion-level special forces training, assigning officers to each other's armed services, and standardising equipment and operational doctrine. The two countries also operate several joint-defence facilities in Australia, mainly ground stations forspy satellite, andsignals intelligenceespionage inSoutheast andEast Asia as part of theECHELON network.
During the 2010s, New Zealand and the US resumed a close relationship, although it is unclear whether the revived partnership falls under the aegis of the 1951 trilateral treaty. The Wellington Declaration of 2010 defined a "strategic partnership" between New Zealand and the US, and New Zealand joined the biennialRim of the Pacific military exercise offHawaii in 2012, for the first time since 1984. The US prohibition on New Zealand ships making port at US bases was lifted after the 2012 exercise.[8]
Following theFall of Singapore and the decline of British power in Asia, Australia began to search for other partners to ensure its security. Australia and New Zealand also felt threatened by the possibility of a resurgent Japan and the spread of communism to their North.[11][12]Percy Spender, Australia's minister for external affairs, sought a broader Pacific security agreement in 1950 which would include Australia, the UK, otherCommonwealth countries and the United States. The latter's participation was essential, with Spencer stating the agreement "would be meaningless without the United States".[13] At this point however, both the UK and the US were disinterested in such an agreement, with both seeking to limit their engagement with Asia.[14]
The beginning of theKorean War in mid-1950 changed American views. Australia committed to the Korean War before the United Kingdom and continued to further court the Americans. While Australia could not convince the US to sign a harsher peace treaty with Japan to restrain future military aggression, they did press for further assurances that they would retain a voice in Pacific security decisions and for an American security commitment in return for their approval of the treaty. The United States was initially reluctant, but the need to strengthen the West against communism grew with thecommunist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the 1950-1953Korean War. The treaty allayed antipodean fears that such a peace would allow Japan to threaten them again.[15][16][14]
The United States was initially reluctant, with the president instead offering an informal guarantee of protection. However, Australia pushed for a more formal agreement, with Spender noting that "Presidents come and presidents go." However, the treaty did not include an automatic commitment to armed assistance like inNATO, with Spender expecting that this could not be ratified by theUS Senate who would wish to retain the congressional power to declare war. Instead, the text of the treaty mirrored the text of theMonroe Doctrine which stated that attacks on theAmerican continent would be seen as "dangerous to its own peace and security".[14]
The resulting treaty was concluded at San Francisco on 1 September 1951, and entered into force on 29 April 1952.[17]
Korea, Malaysia, Borneo, Vietnam, and the War on Terror
U.S. General Westmoreland talks to the commander of the New Zealand artillery battery alongside Australian senior officers in Vietnam, in 1967.
The treaty itself was not a source of debate for over 30 years, with New Zealand participating as part of theBritish Commonwealth Forces in the Korean War and theMalayan Emergency, followed by theIndonesia–Malaysia confrontation, and directly as part of ANZUS in theVietnam War. The Vietnam War was the first conflict New Zealand entered that did not involve the British or any other Commonwealth countries outside of Australia. As an ANZUS member New Zealand contributed military and non military assistance to the United States war effort in Vietnam from 1963 until 1975. New Zealand and Australian combat forces were withdrawn in 1972 and New Zealand non-military medical aid continued until 1975.[18]
In response to theWar in Afghanistan, New Zealand sent transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, and frigates to the Persian Gulf, as well as a very small number of soldiers,SAS soldiers, medical and assorted and peace-keeping forces, to Afghanistan in 2001. Despite Prime MinisterHelen Clark being openly critical of American justifications for the2003 Iraq war, New Zealand did send engineer troops to Iraq following the2003 invasion.[19] These troops were however officially engaged in reconstruction under UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and were non-combatant.
In 1983, the Reagan Administration approached Australia with proposals for testing the new generation of Americanintercontinental ballistic missiles, theMX missile. American test ranges in the Pacific were insufficient for testing the new long-range missiles and the United States military wished to use theTasman Sea as a target area.AustralianPrime MinisterMalcolm Fraser of theLiberal Party had agreed to provide monitoring sites nearSydney for this purpose.[20] However, in 1985, the newly elected Prime MinisterBob Hawke, of theLabor Party, withdrew Australia from the testing programme, sparking criticism from the Reagan Administration. Hawke had been pressured into doing so by the left-wing faction of the Labor Party, which opposed the proposed MX missile test in the Tasman Sea. The Labor left-wing faction also strongly sympathized with the New ZealandFourth Labour Government's anti-nuclear policy and supported aSouth Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.[21][22][23]
To preserve its joint Australian-US military communications facilities, the Reagan Administration also had to assure the Hawke Government that those installations would not be used in theStrategic Defense Initiative project, which the Australian Labor Party strongly opposed. Despite these disagreements, the Hawke Labor Government still remained supportive of the ANZUS security treaty. It also did not support its New Zealand counterpart's ban on nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships. Following the ANZUS Split in February 1985, the Australian government also endorsed the Reagan Administration's plans to cancel trilateral military exercises and to postpone the ANZUS foreign ministers conference. However, it still continued to maintain bilateral military ties and continued to share intelligence information with New Zealand.[23] Unlike New Zealand, Australia continued to allow US warships to visit its ports and to participate in joint military exercises with the United States.[24][25]
Given that the United States Navy had a policy of deliberate ambiguity during theCold War andrefused to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its warships and support ships,[27] these laws essentially refused access to New Zealand ports for all United States Navy vessels. In February 1985, a port-visit request by the United States for the guided-missile destroyerUSSBuchanan was refused by New Zealand, as theBuchanan was capable of launchingRUR-5 ASROCnuclear depth bombs. As this occurred after the government unofficially invited the United States to send a ship, the refusal of access was interpreted by the United States as a deliberate slight.
According to opinion polls taken before the 1984 election, only 30 per cent of New Zealanders supported visits by US warships with a clear majority of 58 per cent opposed, and over 66 per cent of the population lived in locally declarednuclear-free zones.[28] An opinion poll commissioned by the 1986 Defence Committee of Enquiry confirmed that 92 per cent now opposed nuclear weapons in New Zealand and 69 per cent opposed warship visits; 92 per cent wanted New Zealand to promotenuclear disarmament through the UN, while 88 per cent supported the promotion of nuclear-free zones.[29]
After consultations with Australia and after negotiations with New Zealand broke down, the United States announced that it was suspending its treaty obligations to New Zealand until United States Navy ships were re-admitted to New Zealand ports, citing that New Zealand was "a friend, but not an ally".[30] The crisis made front-page headlines for weeks in many American newspapers.[31] David Lange did not withdraw New Zealand from ANZUS, although his government's policy led to the US's decision to suspend its treaty obligations to New Zealand.
An opinion poll in New Zealand in 1991,[32] showed 54% of those sampled preferred to let the treaty lapse rather than accept visits again by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels. The policy did not become law until 8 June 1987 with the passing of theNew Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, more than two years after theBuchanan was refused entry after the US refused to declare the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, and a year after the US suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand. This law effectively made the entire country anuclear-free zone.[33] Despite the ANZUS split, US Secretary of StateGeorge P. Shultz maintained that the ANZUS structure was still in place, should NZ decide in the future to reverse its anti-nuclear policy and return to a fully operational defence relationship with the US. President Reagan also maintained inNSDD 193 (National Security Decision Directive) that New Zealand still remained a "friend, but not an ally".[34]
On 10 July 1985, agents of the FrenchDirectorate-General for External Security bombed theGreenpeace protest vesselRainbow Warrior inAuckland, causing one death. The lack of condemnation by Western leaders to this violation of a friendly state's sovereignty caused a great deal of change in New Zealand's foreign and defence policy,[35] and strengthened domestic opposition to the military application of nuclear technology in any form. New Zealand distanced itself from its traditional ally, the United States, and built relationships with small South Pacific countries, while retaining its good relations with Australia, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.[36]
The suspension of New Zealand in ANZUS has had significant effect on New Zealand–United States relations and on New Zealand domestic policy. The anti-nuclear policy has been a part of New Zealand political culture for years now. However, that has not stopped United States politicians from trying to change the policy.[citation needed]
Australia and New Zealand both provided military units, including special forces and naval ships, in support of the US-led "Operation Enduring Freedom" for support for anti-Taliban forces in response to the11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Providing 1,550 troops, Australia remains the largest non-NATO contributor of military personnel in Afghanistan. New Zealand committed 191 troops.[37]
Between 1999 and 2003, the armed forces of Australia and New Zealand deployed together in a large scale operation inEast Timor, to preventpro-Indonesian militia from overturning avote for independence on the region. The United States provided only limited logistical support but theUSS Mobile Bay provided air defence for the initial entry operation. The operation was taken over by the United Nations.
One topic that became prominent in the 2000s was the implications in the case of a hypothetical attack by the People's Republic of China againstTaiwan, who would likely receive American support. While Australia has strong cultural and economic ties with the United States, it also has an increasingly important trade relationship with mainland China.
In August 2004, Foreign MinisterAlexander Downer implied in Beijing that the treaty would likely not apply to that situation, but he was quickly corrected by Prime MinisterJohn Howard. In March 2005, after an official of the People's Republic of China stated that it may be necessary for Australia to reassess the treaty and after China passed anAnti-Secession Law regarding Taiwan, Downer stated that in case of Chinese aggression on Taiwan, the treaty would come into force, but that the treaty would require only consultations with the United States and not necessarily commit Australia to war.[citation needed]
Annual bilateral meetings between the US Secretary of State and the Australian Foreign Minister replaced annual meetings of the ANZUS Council of Foreign Ministers. The first bilateral meeting was held inCanberra in 1985. At the second meeting, in San Francisco in 1986, the United States announced that it was suspending its treaty security obligations to New Zealand pending the restoration of port access. Subsequent bilateral Australia–US Ministerial (AUSMIN) meetings have alternated between Australia and the United States.
In 1996, under 22 U.S. Code § 2321k, United States PresidentBill Clinton, designated New Zealand as aMajor non-NATO ally, effectively recognizing New Zealand not only as a friend but also an ally.[38][39][40]
The alliance engenders some political controversy in Australia. Particularly after Australian involvement in the2003 Iraq war, some quarters of Australian society have called for a re-evaluation of the relationship between the two nations. Nonetheless, the alliance enjoyed broad support during theCold War[41] and continues to enjoy broad support in Australia.[42] One commentator in Australia has argued that the treaty should be re-negotiated in the context of terrorism, the modern role of the United Nations and as a purely US–Australian alliance.[43]
In May 2006, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Pacific Affairs and Northern Atlantinc OceanChristopher Hill, described the New Zealand anti-nuclear issue as "a bit of a relic", and signalled that the US wanted a closer defence relationship with New Zealand. He also praised New Zealand's involvement in Afghanistan and reconstruction in Iraq. "Rather than trying to change each other's minds on the nuclear issue, which is a bit of a relic, I think we should focus on things we can make work" he told an Australian newspaper.[46]
While there have been signs of the nuclear dispute between the US and NZ thawing out, pressure from the United States increased in 2006 with US trade officials linking the repeal of the ban of American nuclear ships from New Zealand's ports to a potentialfree trade agreement between the two countries.[47]
In 2010, the United States and New Zealand signed theWellington Declaration inWellington, New Zealand, during a three-day visit by US Secretary of StateHillary Clinton. The signing of the declaration ended the ANZUS dispute of the past 25 years, and it was later revealed the US and New Zealand had resumed military co-operation in eight areas in 2007.[50]
On 16 November 2011, US President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard met in Canberra, Australia to announce plans for a sustained new American presence on Australian soil. 2,500 American troops are to be deployed to Darwin, Australia.
New Zealand and the United States signed theWashington Declaration on 19 June 2012 "to promote and strengthen closer bilateral defense and security cooperation".[51] On 20 September 2012, while on a visit to New Zealand, US Secretary of DefenseLeon Panetta announced that the United States was lifting the 26-year-old ban on visits by New Zealand warships to US Department of Defense and US Coast Guard bases around the world;[52] US Marines had trained in New Zealand and New Zealand's navy took part in the RIMPAC maritime exercises alongside the US earlier that year.[53]
TheRoyal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) invited the United States Navy to send a vessel to participate in the RNZN's 75th Birthday Celebrations in Auckland over the weekend of 19–21 November 2016. The guided-missile destroyerUSS Sampson became the first US warship to visit New Zealand in 33 years. New Zealand Prime MinisterJohn Key granted approval for the ship's visit under the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, which requires that the Prime Minister has to be satisfied that any visiting ship is not nuclear armed or powered.[54] Following the7.8 magnitude Kaikōura earthquake on 14 November 2016 theSampson and other naval ships from Australia, Canada, Japan and Singapore were diverted to proceed directly toKaikōura to provide humanitarian assistance.[55]
In late 2021 Australia, the UK and the USA signed theAUKUS agreement, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. New Zealand did not participate and any nuclear submarines developed under the pact will be banned from New Zealand waters under their existing nuclear restrictions.[56]
^The test for ship access was decided as nuclear capability not actual proof of nuclear armament by a NZLP 1984 committee of President Margaret Wilson, Chair of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee and MP and former President Jim Anderton and MP Fran Wilde ,
^King M: 2003, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Penguin Books (NZ) Ltd, Auckland 1310, New Zealand. p426 and pp. 495–6
^Amy L. Catalinac, "Why New Zealand took itself out of ANZUS: observing "opposition for autonomy" in asymmetric alliances."Foreign Policy Analysis 6.4 (2010): 317-338.
^"The Operations Coordinating Board (part of President Eisenhower's National Security Council) established the US policy in 1958 of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, including aboard any US military station, ship, vehicle, or aircraft."Morgan, J.G. Jr. (3 February 2006)."Release of Information on Nuclear Weapons and on Nuclear Capabilities of U.S. Forces (OPNAVINST 5721.1F N5GP)"(PDF). Washington, DC: Department of the Navy – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. pp. 1–2. Retrieved2 July 2012.
^corporateName=Commonwealth Parliament; address=Parliament House, Canberra."Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan".www.aph.gov.au. Retrieved10 April 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^McClure, Tess (16 September 2021)."Aukus submarines banned from New Zealand as pact exposes divide with western allies".The Guardian.ISSN0261-3077. Retrieved27 March 2023.Aukus submarines banned from New Zealand as pact exposes divide with western allies: Experts say Aukus military deal underlines Australia's increasingly close alignment with the US on China – and New Zealand's relative distance.
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