| 51st Troop Carrier Wing | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Active | 1942–1948; 1954–1969; 2004–2010 |
| Country |  United States |
| Branch |  United States Air Force |
| Type | Wing |
| Role | Airlift (1942-1948), Air defense warning and control (1954-1969) Development of air and ground electronic systems (2004-2010) |
| Motto | Videre est Parari (Latin: "To See is to be Prepared")[1] |
| Engagements | Operation Husky;Operation Dragoon |
| Decorations | Air Force Outstanding Unit Award[2] |
| Insignia | |
| 551st Electronic Systems Wing emblem[2] |  |
| 551 Airborne Early Warning & Control Wg emblem[note 2] |  |
The51st Troop Carrier Wing is an inactiveUnited States Air Force unit. Thewing was formed duringWorld War II and was the first troop carrier wing in theArmy Air Forces (AAF) organized for deployment overseas. During the war, it served in theMediterranean Theater of Operations, and its elements participated in every airborne assault in the theater. The wing also transported personnel and supplies within the theater. Its units also performed the majority ofspecial operations flights by AAF units in the theater. FollowingV-E Day, the wing moved to Germany, where it became part of theoccupation forces, operating as the European Air Transport Service until inactivating in January 1948. In August 1946, two of its planes were shot down byYugoslav Air Force fighters near Yugoslavia's border with Austria and Italy.
In 1985, the wing was consolidated with the551st Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing, which provided airborne surveillance off the eastern coast of the United States from December 1954 through December 1969. During theCuban Missile Crisis, this wing's aircraft providedair defense warning and control between Florida and Cuba. The consolidated unit remained inactive until it was consolidated with theBattle Management Systems Wing in 2006, with the unit receiving its most recent name, the551st Electronic Systems Wing, a few days afterward. From 2004 to 2010, it was responsible for development of battle management systems.
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Thewing was activated on 1 June 1942 atPope Field, North Carolina as the51st Transport Wing, becoming the51st Troop Carrier Wing a few weeks later.[2] Its first elements were the60th,61st,62d and64th Transport Groups, flyingDouglas C-47 Skytrains and C-53 Skytroopers. The wing was the first airlift wing in theArmy Air Forces (AAF) expressly organized for service overseas, initially for support ofOperation Bolero, the planned cross-Channel invasion of Europe.[3][note 3] When the wing was activated, the 60th and 64th Groups were atWestover Field, Massachusetts,[4][5] having already begun their deployment to Europe, while the 61st and 62d Groups were still stationed in the Carolinas, near wing headquarters.[6][7]
The wing and its combat groups were all in England by the end of September 1942, where they initially became part ofEighth Air Force. The first elements to arrive, had been used to haul supplies between depots in the United Kingdom, but in the fall, 60th Group operations turned to training for airdroppingparatroopers and preparing forOperation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa.[8] In October, the wing became part ofTwelfth Air Force, and the 60th, 62d and 64th Groups, which had been assigned to Twelfth Air Force on 14 September, were returned to its control.[2][4][5][7]
It was critical for Operation Torch that the airfields nearOran, Algeria,Tafaraoui Airfield andLa Senia Airfield, be seized immediately. The wing's most experienced group, the 60th, was tasked with transporting elements of the503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, flying across Spain, with plans to drop the paratroopers on Tafaraoui shortly after midnight if French resistance was expected, or to land them at La Senia early in the morning if a friendly reception was expected. In either case, the distance involved made this a one-way mission and the C-47s would have to land on the seized airfields. In the event, the force departed on 8 November 1942, expecting to land at La Senia, but was scattered while penetrating clouds associated with a weather front over Spain. Unexpected winds over southern Spain blew many aircraft off course. Navigational assistance expected toward the end of the 1,000 miles (2,000 km) mission evaporated. A Britishdestroyer transmitted its navigational aid on the wrong frequency and a covert agent transmitting from a site near the airfields was not informed of the delay and destroyed his equipment when planes did not arrive after midnight. Planes were scattered over Morocco and Algeria, and this, the first combat drop of American paratroopers, occurred nearLourmel Airfield, not in the planneddrop zone (DZ). The paratroopers proceeded to Tafaraoui by foot and by the time they and the wing's C-47s arrived there, other allied forces were approaching the field, so the airborne operation had little impact on the invasion of North Africa. Despite the expectation of a friendly reception, bothfighter andantiaircraft artillery opposition was encountered, with several group planes forced to land, although none were lost to enemy action.[9]
By 11 November, the available planes of the 60th Group, and some from the 64th Group, flew paratroopers to occupyMaison Blanche Airport, nearAlgiers. The 64th Group had been operating fromGibraltar with British paratroops from the3rd Parachute Battalion. Two days later, the 60th Group was ordered to occupyTebessa, near the Tunisian border. On 15 November, the same day the 62d Group arrived in Algeria, the wing's forces at Maison Blanche flew an "ad hoc" mission transporting 300 troops of the 503rd Regiment toYouks-les-Bains Airfield, 10 miles (16 km) from Tebessa, where they were successfully dropped.[10] Wing headquarters was established at Tafaraoui on 14 November, so the entire wing was now operating in Algeria.[2][note 4] On 12 November, the 64th carried British paratroopers from Maison Blanche to seizeBône Airfield, to use as a base to takeBône, which provided the best port facilities in eastern Algeria.[11]
The remainder of the British1st Parachute Brigade had arrived in Algiers by water transport, and were tasked with takingSouk-el-Arba Airfield, which was located on a major junction on the main road toTunis. The only map available for planning was a road map, and the DZ had to be selected by the paratroop commander, who rode in the cockpit of the lead plane of the 64th Group formation. After an aborted mission due to fog on 15 November, on 16 November 384 British paratroopers were dropped successfully and no planes were lost on this mission. By late November,Allied forces were approaching Tunis, and a plan was drawn up to dropairborne forces into Tunis, behind the German lines. Planners presumed that resistance would be light, with enemy forces deployed to meet troops advancing from Algeria. British paratroopers were to be dropped onPont du Fahs Airfield. On 29 November, the day of the drop, intelligence indicated that Pont du Fahs andDepienne Airfields were unoccupied, and the decision was made to switch the drop to Depienne, which was about 10 miles (16 km) closer to Tunis that Pont du Fahs.[11] A formation of planes from the wing's 62d and 64th Groups with over 500 paratroopers of the British2nd Parachute Battalion and led by the 51st Wing commander flew the mission. The drop was successful, and no planes were lost, although the inexperienced 62d Group dropped paratroopers over a widely dispersed area. Unfortunately for the paratroopers, the Germans halted theFirst Army's advance and they were trapped 40 miles (64 km) behind German lines. Only half thebattalion was able to fight their way back to friendly forces.[12]
For the next four months, the Allies would be on the defensive and no major air assaults were planned. The long distances involved in the theater and primitive communications made air transport vital for logistics and communications, and the wing concentrated on missions in these areas. However, the demand for theater airlift was so great that the wing was unable to even temporarily withdraw any of its squadrons to maintain proficiency in dropping paratroops.[13]
In January 1943, at theCasablanca Conference, the Allies determined that the next objective would beSicily.[14][note 5] Detailed planning for what would be calledOperation Husky began the following month. By April it was determined that both the American landings in the west and the British landings in the southeast of the island would be supported by airborne operations. By May, the52d Troop Carrier Wing had arrived in the theater from the United States to reinforce the 51st. The 52d was tasked with dropping the American airborne forces, while the 51st and elements of theRoyal Air Force's (RAF)No. 38 Wing would support the British paratroopers. The 64th Group was detached to the 52d Wing for the initial operation, but would return to the 51st Wing for followup drops. The 51st would towWaco CG-4 (known as the Hadrian in British service) gliders with British troopers to a point nearSyracuse. This operation was namedOperation Ladbroke. The wing had not usedgliders before, and when enough had arrived in Tunisia, it began training with them in June.[15]
On the night of 9 July 1943, 137 planes launched for Sicily. Between 109 and 119 of the airplanes, with over 1,000 troopers in tow, released their gliders within sight of their objective, the Ponte Grande, south of Syracuse but only one in five troopers was able to reach the objective that night. Although searchlights and anti-aircraft fire did little damage to the wing's aircraft, they disrupted the release of the gliders to a point that only about 58 of the gliders were released near Syracuse, while 69 landed in the water. In addition, strong headwinds reduced the distance gliders were able to glide to reach their landing zones. All wing airplanes returned safely, but casualties in the landing force reached 60%, although they were able to keep the Germans from destroying the bridge before reinforcements arrived.[16]
On 13 July, wing aircraft took off onOperation Fustian, intended to capture the Primasole Bridge over theSimeto River nearCatania. Over 100 planes from the 60th and 62d Groups were joined by a handful that had returned to wing control from the 64th Group carrying 1,856 troops from the British 1st Parachute Brigade. Nineteen gliders towed by elements of No. 38 Wing would follow with vehicles and artillery. Although a course to Sicily was designed to avoid naval convoys, the planes, flying at 500 feet (150 m) came near several concentrations of Allied ships, and about half of them came under friendly fire en route. Although escorting destroyers had been briefed on the operation, troop transports and cargo ships had not, and took the low flying troop carriers for attacking German planes. Two planes were shot down and nine others were forced to turn back because of wounded crew or damage to the planes. Over the DZ, German fire accounted for an additional nine shot down while dropping their paratroopers, although four of these were able to make emergency landings off the coast. Overall, about 10% of the planes involved in the operation were lost. Only 39 planes were able to place their paratroopers within a mile of the briefed DZs, but ten planes of the7th Troop Carrier Squadron dropped all their troops as briefed. Only fourAirspeed Horsa gliders played an active role in the operation. Although the bridge was secured, a German counterattack drove the British away until reinforcements arrived on the 16th.[17] In late August 1943, the wing moved its headquarters to Sicily, moving toGela Airfield at the end of August.[2]
Although planning had gone forward for airborne operations to supportOperation Avalanche, including one in which the wing operations officer engaged in a secret meeting with Italian government officials about a possible operation inRome, the landings atSalerno went forward without immediate airborne support. However, on the night of 14 September 1943, the 51st Wing assembled a force of 40 planes for an attack onAvellino with 590 troopers from the509th Regimental Combat Team. This was the first operation in which the wing used pathfinders (flown in a plane of the35th Troop Carrier Squadron), to mark the DZ ahead of the main force. Heavy flak was encountered by the pathfinder near the front lines, but the only plane lost was shot down by a British night fighter. Despite the beacon set by the pathfinder, eight of the wing's planes made their drops more than 8 miles (13 km) from the planned DZ. This dispersal prevented any of the paratroops from reaching their objective, a bridge on the road toMontecorvino until 19 September.[18]
In February 1944, the 52d Troop Carrier Wing moved to England[19] to prepare forOperation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy.[20] This made the existence of a separate troop carrier command superfluous, and XII Troop Carrier Command was discontinued, making the 51st once again the headquarters for American troop carrier units in the Mediterranean. During February, the functions of XII Troop Carrier Command were gradually transferred to the wing, including planning for Operation Anvil (laterOperation Dragoon), the invasion of southern France.[20] The greater part of the 64th Troop Carrier Group was sent to theChina Burma India Theater in April, where its squadrons supported the offensive in Burma, operating from separate bases. This deployment lasted through June, when the detached squadrons returned to Sicily.[5]
In June 1944, the wing moved its headquarters from Sicily toLido di Roma, on the Italian peninsula.[2] The 60th and 62d Groups had preceded it, and with the move of the 64th Group in July, the wing was entirely located on the mainland.[4][5][7] The glider detachments of the three groups were all concentrated at Marcigliana. To coordinate airborne assaults in connection with Operation Dragoon, an operational and planning staff arrived fromIX Troop Carrier Command. This staff formed the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division, although Twelfth Air Force referred to it as "IX Troop Carrier Command (Provisional)". In July, the50th and53d Troop Carrier Wings arrived in Italy along with twelve pathfinder planes to fill out the troop carrier task force. The wing's groups engaged in refresher training in airborne operations, having been dedicated to transportation of personnel and freight andaeromedical evacuation missions for nearly a year. The 62nd Group did so poorly on practice jumps that it was decided that a flight from the435th Troop Carrier Group would lead their formation in the operation.[21]
On 15 August, the 51st Wing dropped about 1700 paratroops near dawn. To identify the aircraft in the operation, the wing addedinvasion stripes to its aircraft to match the markings of the wings that had participated in the Normandy invasion. The operation went smoothly with no enemy opposition until approaching the coast, which was enveloped in fog. The use of pathfinders usingEureka beacons permitted the 62nd Group to drop paratroopers of the British2nd Parachute Brigade through the fog and on the designated DZ. The first serial of the 64th Group had similar results and the fog began to clear as its second serial arrived, permitting visual identification of the DZ. However, other elements of the 64th Group did not fare as well, and the5th (Scottish) Parachute Battalion was dropped some distance from its intended site. All planes returned safely, although there were some aircrew casualties from antiaircraft fire. In the afternoon, the wing returned, this time with gliders, carrying artillery, support troops and supplies. Glider releases were made visually, except for the 64th Group, which relied on Eureka due to smoke in the area of the landing zone. However, the Germans had erected defenses, including poles, wires and mines on the designated landing ground, forcing the gliders to scatter to land where they could. The wing flew additional drops of emergency supplies on 17 August.[22]
The wing's troop carrier squadrons carried most of the burden of special operations for the AAF in the Mediterranean, starting in December 1943. The8th Troop Carrier Squadron began flying missions behind enemy lines in Italy, infiltrating personnel and dropping supplies to isolated British units, flying its first mission the night of 8/9 December. Bad weather limited its operations through February 1944, although it did fly practice missions with members of the BritishSpecial Air Service. In February 1944, the7th and51st Troop Carrier Squadrons of the 62d Group began operations in the Balkans under control ofNo. 334 (Special Duties) Wing of the RAF. In March, the 60th Group replaced the 62d as the element of the wing performing special operations. The 7th and 51st Squadrons returned to special operations and formed the Balkan Detachment of the 62d Group. Operational control of wing elements involved in special operations was transferred toBalkan Air Force (BAF), which was formed in June 1944. BAF included fighter units that could provide escort in Yugoslavia, permitting some daytime landing missions, increasing the supplies provided to theYugoslav National Liberation Army.[23] The 60th Group flew the first mission to an airfield held byPartisans on the night of 2/3 April 1944. By the end of the war, 51st Wing planes had completed 846 landing missions in Yugoslavia.[24]
Wing C-47s engaged in special operations were equipped with Rebecca equipment to receive signals from Eureka transmitters, but otherwise few modifications were required. Other than practice missions to develop skills in drops at low altitude and airspeed, little specialized training was required of C-47 crews. The number of planes dispatched varied with aircraft availability and weather, but an average of 35 missions was flown daily. A single mission averaged drops on 15 different targets.[25] Supplies typically included guns and ammunition, demolition materials, clothing, food and medical supplies. All of Albania, most of Yugoslavia and Greece, and parts of Bulgaria were well within the range of the wing's C-47s. Weather proved to be a greater obstacle than enemy fighters or flak, accounting for more than half of unsuccessful sorties.[26][note 6] The peak number of missions to Yugoslavia was during the period from April to October 1944, when the 60th Group was tasked with most missions. The increase in Yugoslav missions was, however, accompanied by a reduction in the number of missions flown to Greece. Support for Bulgarian forces was even lower, with 51st Wing aircraft flying a total of 68 sorties there, with a loss of one plane.[27]
In October 1944, Soviet advances in the Balkans placed the German garrison in Greece in a position that it would have to withdraw or surrender. The 51st was tasked with dropping elements of the British 2nd Parachute Brigade in coordination with the Balkan Air Force inOperation Manna. On 12 October, planes from the10th Troop Carrier Squadron dropped a company of British paratroops onMegara Airfield. Over the next six days, the wing flew over 200 sorties to Megara andKalamaki Airfields from bases in Italy, delivering more than 2000 troops and more than 300 tons of supplies, mostly by parachute or glider.[28] In December, the 7th Squadron began concentrating on operations in northern Italy, joined by squadrons of the 60th Group until January 1945, when they were relieved by the 64th Group. By May, the 64th had completed over 1000 sorties to northern Italy.[23][29] Meanwhile, the 51st Squadron concentrated on missions to Albania. Responsibilities changed early in 1945, with 51st Wing units, except for the 51st Squadron, concentrating on aiding partisan activity in northern Italy, while the15th Special Group (Provisional) assumed responsibility for Balkan missions.[30]
Shortly after the end of hostilities, on 25 May 1945, the wing's 60th and 64th Groups were reassigned toAir Transport Command and moved to the Caribbean to participate in the Green Project, the movement of American troops back to the United States.[31][32] The wing's last operational element, the 62d Troop Carrier Group, was transferred to Mediterranean Air Transport Service in June.[33]
The wing moved toWiesbaden-Erbenheim Air Base, Germany at the end of August 1945,[34] where it became part of theoccupation forces.[2] Shortly thereafter, on 4 September, the302d Transport Wing was attached to the wing, and the 302d's flying groups were assigned to the 51st.[2] The 302d carried cargo and passengers within Great Britain and to and from continental Europe. Its passengers included war correspondents, entertainers, general officers, enlisted personnel, pilots, German prisoners, Allied exprisoners of war, and wounded personnel. It also ferried aircraft within theEuropean Theater of Operations.[35] In October, the27th Air Transport Group was returned to the 302d Wing's control, and remained so until the 302d Wing was inactivated in December 1945.[35] The31st Transport Group became the 516th Troop Carrier Group, and, along with the other three troop carrier groups assigned to the wing, operated under the 51st Wing as the European Air Transport Service (Provisional) (EATS).[36] These additions to the 51st addedCurtiss C-46 Commandos andConsolidated C-109 Liberator Express aircraft to the wing's inventory for a short time.[2] The wing also operated air terminal facilities at a number of airports in Europe, includingOrly Airport inParis andTempelhof Airport inBerlin.[37][38] The wing also maintained stations in England, Italy, Greece, Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia.[39][40][41]
On 9 August 1946, an EATS C-47 Flying fromVienna, Austria toUdine, Italy was forced down byYugoslav Air Force fighters nearLjubljana. The plane was circling near Ljubljana, when Yugoslav fighters directed it to land. The American pilot indicated he had become lost in bad weather over the Alps and believed the fighters were British until they began firing to force him down to a crash landing.[42] While negotiations were underway for release of the plane's interned crew and passengers, a second EATS C-47 was shot down under similar circumstances, with its wreckage located two miles inside Yugoslavia, nearKlagenfurt, Austria. The internees from the first incident were returned, but all aboard the second plane were killed.[43]
The EATS was reduced in size when the314th Troop Carrier Group, atVillacoublay Airfield, France returned to the United States on 15 February 1946. The service's remaining subordinate units were replaced on 30 September 1946, when the 61st Troop Carrier Group was activated atEschborn Air Base, Germany to replace the441st Troop Carrier Group and the 60th Troop Carrier Group replaced the442d Troop Carrier Group atMunich Air Base, Germany, while the313th Troop Carrier Group replaced the 516th Troop Carrier Group atTulln Air Base, Austria. However, by September 1947, the 313th had transferred its personnel and aircraft to other units and was returned to the United States as a "paper" unit.[44]
The wing's two remaining groups, the 60th and 61st, were transferred directly toUnited States Air Forces in Europe on 20 December 1947,[31][45] when EATS was discontinued.[38] The 51st was inactivated in Germany in January 1948, ironically, this was only five months before the expansion of USAFE's airlift forces required for theBerlin Airlift. The wing was disbanded in June 1983, but was reconstituted two years later and consolidated with the 551st Wing.[2]
The551st Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing was activated atOtis Air Force Base, Massachusetts in December 1954.[2] The wing was assigned to the8th Air Division, which had been formed earlier that year atMcClellan Air Force Base, California to oversee the build up ofAir Defense Command (ADC)'s airborne early warning and control force.[46] The wing was charged with tracking air and sea activity along theUnited States eastern seaboard.[47]
The961st Airborne Early Warning and Control Squadron was activated along with the wing,[48] although the wing did not receive its first mission asset until 2 March 1955,[47] when the first Lockheed RC-121D Warning Star landed at Otis. By July, the wing had added two other squadrons, the960th and962d Airborne Early Warning and Control Squadrons.[48] In August 1957, the wing took over host management of Otis from the33rd Fighter Wing.[49]
In late 1961, The wing began to deploy crews toMcCoy Air Force Base, Florida. This operation expanded to become the wing's fourth operational squadron, the966th Airborne Early Warning and Control Squadron, in January 1962. The squadron supported theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration to "chase" rocket boosters as they fell back into the ocean after they separated from the rockets being shot into space. It also flew active air defense missions to monitor Cuban aircraft off the Florida Keys. The squadron also flew Operation Gold Digger missions, monitoring and trackingLockheed U-2s flying photographic reconnaissance missions over Cuba. Four of the squadron's EC-121Ds were converted to EC-121Qs by replacing theAN/APS-45 radar with an AN/APS-103 with increased range.[50]
Prior to the beginning of theCuban Missile Crisis, the wing maintained one plane on station off the Florida coast. On 20 October 1962, six additional warning aircraft were deployed to McCoy, and two days later a second station was added. Offshore warning forces were augmented by fourUnited States Navy destroyers south ofKey West andGrumman WF Tracer aircraft fromVAW-12. This status was maintained until 3 December, whenMontgomery Air Defense Sector, which had been managingair defense in the Gulf of Mexico, released the augmenting aircraft and returned to normalDEFCON 5.[51]
The 966th Squadron was transferred to the552d Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing in May 1963.[2] This reassignment was because the rest of the wing had begun to replace its EC-121Ds[note 8] withLockheed EC-121H Warning Stars in 1963. The D models relied on voice and manual teletype data relay systems to transmit information to command centers. The H models were equipped withdata link systems compatible with theSemi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) and could instantly transmit air defense surveillance and early-warning information to ADC command and control computers and theNorth American Air Defense Command Combat Operations Center in theCheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado, for evaluation and action.[47] Because the Montgomery Air Defense Sector lacked SAGE equipment, there was no need to make this upgrade to the airplanes at McCoy.[52]
Three EC-121Hs from the wing were lost—on11 July 1965,11 November 1966 and25 April 1967—resulting in a total of 50 deaths (16, 19, and 15, respectively), including wing commander Col James P. Lyle in the 1967 crash.[53]
In its first 10 years, the wing flew continuous missions over the Atlantic Ocean 24 hours a day, seven days a week, compiling more than 350,000 flying hours.[47] The 551st deployed aircraft toKeflavik Air Base to provide surveillance of Soviet aircraft and naval vessels off Iceland. The wing also provided surveillance overJohnston Atoll andChristmas Island during nuclear testing by theAtomic Energy Commission.[47] The 966th Squadron briefly returned to the wing's control in 1969. Along with this return came a commitment to augmentOperation College Eye in Southeast Asia.[50] The wing was inactivated on 31 December 1969. It was consolidated with the 51st Wing in 1985, but remained inactive.[2]
Prior to 2005, Program Executive Officers (PEO)s managing Air Force systems were generally located in Washington. Program managers in field units reported to the PEO for each program. As a result of a study begun in 2003 the Air Force decided to consolidate PEOs and locate them at theAir Force Materiel Command (AFMC) centers. The reorganization was known as the Air Force Materiel Command Transformation.[54] In conjunction with the new organization, the traditional center directorates were replaced by wings and groups. As a result, theBattle Management Systems Wing was activated atHanscom Air Force Base Massachusetts in December 2004,[2] replacing several offices in theElectronic Systems Center. The wing was responsible for development and fielding of airborne battle management command, control and communications systems in support of combatant commanders, special operations forces and worldwide allies. While acquiring and fielding ground based weather collecting and forecasting systems and systems delivering environmental information to Air Force and Army commanders were retained in the wing headquarters' Weather Systems Division four subordinate groups were organized for other systems.[55]
The wing was redesignated on 17 April 2006, becoming the551st Electronic Systems Wing after consolidating with the 551st Wing a few days previously,[2] while its subordinate groups also received numbers.[55] After analyzing the results of its 2004 reorganization, the Air Force decided PEOs that were even closer to the persons managing programs on a day-to-day basis would improve the system. It announced the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan in May 2009 and four months later announced the initiative would include a return to the Directorate organizational model.[54] The wing and its groups were inactivated on 30 June 2010.[56]
|
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| Award streamer | Award | Dates | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
 | Air Force Outstanding Unit Award | 1 July 1957 – 31 October 1958 | 551st Airborne Early Warning & Control Wing[2] |
| Air Force Outstanding Unit Award | 1 July 1961 – 30 June 1963 | 551st Airborne Early Warning & Control Wing[70] |
| Air Force Outstanding Unit Award | 15 April 1965 – 1 July 1966 | 551st Airborne Early Warning & Control Wing[70] |
| Campaign Streamer | Campaign | Dates | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
 | Tunisia | 12 November 1942 – 13 May 1943 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
| Sicily | 14 May 1943 – 17 August 1943 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
| Naples-Foggia | 18 August 1943 – 21 January 1944 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
| Rome-Arno | 22 January 1944 – 9 September 1944 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
| North Apennines | 10 September 1944 – 4 April 1945 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
| Po Valley | 3 April 1945 – 8 May 1945 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing[2] |
 | World War II Army of Occupation (Germany) | 30 August 1945 – 5 January 1948 | 51st Troop Carrier Wing |
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
This article incorporatespublic domain material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency
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