| Part of the2025–2026 Iranian protests and the2026 Iran massacres | |
 During the blackout, almost all Iran-hosted websites are inaccessible from abroad, showingTIMEDOUT orNXDOMAIN errors, or returningHTTP 504 Gateway Timeout responses. | |
| Date | 8 January 2026 – present (1 month and 9 days) |
|---|---|
| Location | Iran |
| Type | Internet blackout |
| Motive |
|
| Target | Iranian Internet users |
| Perpetrator | SNSC,MICT |
Since 8 January 2026, the twelfth day of the2025–2026 protests in Iran, Iranian authorities imposed anInternet blackout starting in the evening. Reports from Iran described widespread telephone and internet blackouts in Tehran, with additional disruptions reported inIsfahan,Lordegan,Abdanan, parts ofShiraz, andKermanshah. Cybersecurity experts reported that Iran'sNational Information Network was also fully disconnected, even internally within Iran.[1]
Although the blackout had been relaxed on 28 January, severe restrictions are still in place.[2] The Iranian Minister of Communications acknowledged that the shutdown was costing the economy $35.7 million a day.[3] Online sales fell by 80% during the Internet shutdown, while theTehran Stock Exchange overall index lost 450,000 points over a four day period, and 130 trilliontomans daily.[4][5][6] In January 2026, the number of financial transactions in Iran had dropped by 185 million.[7]
The Internet blackout, which initially did not affectsatellite Internet connections withStarlink, has resulted in increased efforts by the Iranian government to shut down the Starlink Internet, alongside operations to seizesatellite dishes to hinder access to the Internet. The Internet blackout has been described by human rights organisations as an attempt by the regime to cover up theIran massacres.[8][9]
Iran has historically blocked theinternet to suppress protests, having done so in 2019 as well as in 2022 and 2025.[10] From 2022 to 2024, Iran also bannedWhatsApp andGoogle Play during theMahsa Amini protests.[11] Iran's use of internet censorship to suppress dissent allowed the government to impede the Iranian opposition, but damaged the nation's economy.[12]
Internet shutdowns and filtering have long been central for the Islamic Republic's control over information flows in Iran,[13] and the government regularly shuts down or limits internet access in anticipation of protests.[14] During theprotests of November 2019, the Iranian government imposed a fullsix-day internet blackout,[15] shielding the regime from criticism over its mass killing of protesters.[16]Protests in 2020 over the regime'sshootdown of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, as well as protests over the increase of fuel prices, were followed by complete internet blackouts imposed by the government.[13]
During theTwelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025,the Iranian government cut off Internet and telecommunications, claiming reasons of national security; the shutdown also halted the flow of information from the country to the outside world.[17]The Iranian government blocked access to the internet, leading to a 97% fall in internet usage in Iran.[18] This led to Iranians being disconnected from the outside world.[15] According to cybersecurity expert Amir Rashidi, the internet is viewed as "an enemy" by the Iranian government which seeks to "control and suppress it".[19] During the war, the Iranian government had opened a fakeStarlink app as bait to spy on citizens. It has also spread certain disinformation to prevent defection within its ranks.[19] The government had urged Iranian citizens to blockWhatsApp, claiming that it was Israeli spyware, a claim that WhatsApp denied.[18]
According to one report, the Iranian government has received extensive assistance from the Chinese government in censoring the internet over the last more than a decade.[20]
Large-scale street protests in Iran emerged in December 2025 and continued into January 2026. The protests had been called for by variedopposition groups, includingReza Pahlavi, the exiled son of thedeposed Shah;Kurdish organizations, and the Coordination Council ofAzerbaijani Parties; and the traditional shopkeepers of thebazaars ofTehran,Tabriz,Isfahan,Mashhad, andKerman closed in support of the demonstrations.[17]BBC Persian reported that initially, the government had restricted internet information (by slowing speeds and imposing targeted disruptions, aimed at disruptingmobile networks in locations where protests had taken place, such as theTehran's Grand Bazaar), but left other areas, as well as fixed-line internet, comparably unaffected.[13] The project Filterwatch reported that, "From the onset of the protests through 8 January 2026, the pattern of internet disruptions can be characterized as localized, urban-centric, volatile, and layered."[21]
Internet traffic data collected by global monitoring services, such asCloudflare, indicate that usage levels in Iran were decreased in traffic since protests began, though it has remained above zero.[13] Research by the organization Filterwatch indicated that connections in Iran (includingVPN connections) suffered disruptions in the evening, timed to coincide with planned protest hours,[21][13] with major traffic drops seen during those hours overTelecommunication Company of Iran (TCI),MCI, andIrancell networks.[21]
Means of restrictions include disabling mobile network antennas, cutting phone lines,[22] limiting the transmission of high-volume data not allowing users to send or receive large files, and deactivatingSIM cards belonging to dissident citizens and social activists.[13] Authorities attempted to deflect accusations of censorship by blaming disruptions on power outages and outdated equipment.[13]
On 8 January 2026, during twelfth day of protests, authorities cut off internet service and phones in the country, as protests intensified.[16][14][23] The shutdown occurred as demonstrators called for an end to the regime, and as the regime attempted to violently quash the protests.[17][14] Internet service was cut off nationwide as demonstrators chantedin support of Reza Pahlavi.[14] Telephone service was also affected, includingland andmobile lines.[14] Initial reports of blackouts and restrictions came from multiple cities.[14][16] By that afternoon, the nation was almost completely offline, as confirmed by monitoring organizations, such asNetBlocks and theGeorgia Institute of Technology's internet Outage Detection and Analysis database.[17] That evening, Netblocks wrote that Iran was "now in the midst of a nationwide internet blackout; the incident follows a series of escalating digital censorship measures targeting protests across the country and hinders the public's right to communicate at a critical moment."[14]
The Internet blockade disrupted everyday life, including digital transactions, as well as the functioning of hospitals, pharmacies, banks, and buros. Many businesses did not open.[citation needed]
The nationwide communications blackout has been widely described by human rights organisations, such asAmnesty International andHuman Rights Watch, as an attempt to cover up theIran massacres and the human rights violations committed during the crackdown on protests. By severely restricting access to the internet, social media, and messaging platforms, the government limited the ability of journalists, activists, and families of victims to document and share evidence of killings and other abuses, thereby reducing international scrutiny and obscuring the scale of state violence.[8][9]
Starlinksatellite internet was initially unaffected, allowing some users to bypass government-controlled internet blackouts.[13] Although some homes, hotels, and offices have Starlink, only a small percentage of Iranians have access.[13] Iran has banned Starlink and has sought to police the ground terminals needed for Starlink connections.[24] The nationwide internet blackout intensified calls forElon Musk to help expand access using the Starlink network. Iranian activistMasih Alinejad urged him to do so.[24] The subscription fees for Starlink users were reportedly waived starting on 14 January.[25]
Since 8 January, the Iranian government launched a large-scale effort tojam GPS signals to disrupt access to Starlink, resulting in an estimated 30%packet loss for connections to Starlink.[21] According to Amir Rashidi of the Miaan Group, some areas had a packet loss of 80%.[26]
By 11 January, Iran reportedly shut down the Starlink internet for the first time.[27]
On 19 January 2026, it was reported that hackers managed to break in toIran's state TV satellite feed, and broadcast supporting messages of the exiled crown princeReza Pahlavi. He urged security forces not to point their weapons at the Iranian people.[28]
As of February 2026, there were about 400,000 Iranians abroad that had usedPsiphon to allow people inside Iran to access the Internet,[29] while theTrump administration had also covertly smuggled thousands of Starlink terminals into Iran for Iranians to access the Internet.[30][31]
After the Iranian government shut down the Starlink internet, its security forces started door-to-door operations, seizingsatellite dishes amid the blackout to block any external access.[32][27] On 14 January, reports emerged that the government was finalizing their internet kill switch project, which is intended to cut the nation completely off from the global internet for extended periods; this plan is being coordinated withHuawei andChina.[33] By 16 January, after more than 200 hours of the blackout,NetBlocks reported a very slight internet connectivity increase at 2%.[34][35] Reports also indicated that the government was planning on permanently cutting internet access, with only vetted individuals being permitted filtered andcensored access.[36]
On 17 January, it was reported thatCCTV footage was being confiscated, and checkpoints were set up to detain citizens found with protest images on their phones.[37] On 18 January,Meta began hiding theInstagram followers of Iranian residents after reports indicated that Iranian security bodies were extracting large volumes of user data.[38] Aftertargeting Iranians abroad with cybersecurity threats and phishing scams, it was reported on 19 January that the Iran-linked "Handala Hack" group was routing attacks via Starlink.[39][40]
On 20 January, it was reported by an investigative watchdog that pro-government editors were active during the crackdown acrossWikipedia and other services indeleting content and sanitizing articles related to theIslamic Republic's human rights record.[41][42][43] On 20 January, it was also reported that Iranian authorities claimed they had cut off 40,000 Starlink satellite internet connections during the internet blackout.[44][45] On 21 January, it was reported that the Islamic Republic was working on a state-runintranet amid the ongoing blackout, similar to that ofNorth Korea.[46] On 23 January, NetBlocks reported the blackout was entering its third week while the Iranian government was attempting to generate false traffic in order to manufacture the narrative of a wider restoration and normalcy.[47]
During the blackout, Iranian diaspora internet users ran applications to share part of their bandwidth in an attempt to help users inside Iran circumvent the blackout.[48] Separately, an independent research group stated the Islamic Republic had coordinated a large social media influence operation aimed at shaping global narratives.[49]The Guardian also reported the Islamic Republic used Chinese technology during the internet blackout and suppression of protests, such as facial recognition and surveillance tools.[50]
According toIran International, internet connections from Iran were briefly reported on 24 January 2026, but it was only on 28 January when the blackout was relaxed. However severe restrictions remain in place, with most users only being allowed to access pre-approved websites under awhitelist system.[51][52]
On 15 January 2026, Filterwatch, an internet monitoring organization, published a report detailing the confidential long-term plan of the Iranian government for "Absolute Digital Isolation," stating that "state media and government spokespersons have already signaled that this is a permanent shift, warning that unrestricted access will not return after 2026."[53][36]
According to the report, the plan dictates the transformation of Iran's internet infrastructure into a "Barracks Internet", allowing access to the outside world only to individuals and organizations with security clearance, through a strictly monitored "white list".[53][36] Communications will be limited to intra-team (Enterprise Messenger) and peer-to-peer (P2P) interactions, while any attempt to breach the organizational network will be blocked.[53] In other words, it will limit all Iranians to the use of only a handful of regime-built websites and applications with no links to the World Wide Web.[36] This model will ensure that all channels of private sector communications will be fully monitorable by the regime,[53] while replacing the former goal of blocking inappropriate content with that which completely disconnects all users from the internet, granting access only to specific groups with "security guarantees".[53]
Although the existence of an isolatedIranian internet infrastructure was proven in 2012,[36][54] the implementation of the plan for permanent shutdown is seen to have begun with the identification and blocking of Starlink terminals as well as confiscation of TV and satellite dishes to prevent frequency overlaps and alternative usage.[53] During the 2025–2026 protests foreign telecom service providers were seen leaving Iran under heavy security measures and media silence, possibly to be replaced by Iranian institutions such asKhatam al-Anbia.[53]
The plan was reportedly orchestrated by high-level officials Mohammad Amin Aghamiri and Mehdi SeifAbadi, with the assistance of former head of the Information Technology Organization, and prominent security figure, Ali Hakim-Javadi, while decisions are made in the infrastructure security unit.[53]
In response to the plan for permanent shutdown, an American official stated that it was "plausible and terrifying", but would also have an extremely massive cultural and economic impact on Iran.[36]
Government spokespersonFatemeh Mohajerani stated on 15 January that access to international websites would remain unavailable until at least theIranian New Year,[55] which usually occurs in late March. Limited internet access was briefly restored in Iran on 18 January, before being suspended again.[56]Ebrahim Azizi said Internet service could resume "as soon as security conditions are appropriate".[57]
The internet shutdown blocked not only instant messengers and social media sites, but also crucial work related sites, including Slack,Skype,Google Meet andJira, while VPN disruption severely hampered the operation of company emails, payment systems and authentication processes.[58] At the same time, online advertising was halted, damaging businesses that rely on it, while pedestrian traffic severely diminished due to the protests.[58] Online businesses have been unable to conduct business or to make any revenue.[59] Regarding the domestic consequences of this incident and people’s accounts of it, a website calledروایت خاموشی (“Narrative of the Blackout”) was launched so that, at that time, people who had access only to the national network and not to the international internet could share a few lines describing the problems caused by the lack of internet access. The response to this website, called “Narrative of the Blackout,” was very high, and many reputable media outlets covered these stories.[60][61]
The Iranian Minister of Communications stated that the shutdown was costing the economy $35.7 million a day,[3] while Netblocks estimated the daily cost as $37 million.[62]
After the 2026 internet blackout started, many accounts onX (formerly Twitter), that were supportive of an independentScotland, went silent. Disinformation researchers said this suggested these accounts belonged to Iranians who were pretending to be from Scotland. The same situation occurred in 2025, when Iran had aninternet blackout and many of the same accounts went silent. Both of these internet blackouts allowed cybersecurity analysts and officials in theUK, to connect these fake Scotland accounts to Iran.[63][64]