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| May 2006 São Paulo violence | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 Sites inSão Paulo State attacked by PCC in 2006 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
Divisão Anti Sequestro DAS/DEIC - Ronda Operacional "FÊNIX" | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Cláudio Lembo Col. Elizeu Eclair Teixeira Borges | Marcola | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
50,000 Brazilian Armed Force 100,000 police (military and civil) | unknown | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 30 police dead 28 police wounded 3 municipal guards dead and 8 wounded. | 79 dead suspects | ||||||
| 21 civilian deaths | |||||||
The2006 São Paulo violence outbreak began on the night of May 12, 2006 inSão Paulo,Brazil, the largest city inSouth America. It was among the worst outbreaks of violence in recordedBrazilian history and was directed against security forces and a few civilian targets. By May 14 the attacks had spread to other Brazilian states includingParaná,Mato Grosso do Sul,Minas Gerais andBahia (this without direct links to thePCC criminal organisation).
The violence began after forty São Paulo police officers were killed by gang violence. Subsequently, the police officers sought to find the gang members behind the criminal acts. In the process, a violent situation arose, creating a clash between law enforcement officials and criminals and taking the lives of 564 people, and left another 110 injured.
The wave of violence, amongst the worst in Brazil's history, received broad national and international media coverage, and this fact allied to the lack of information from theSão Paulo state government caused mass panic among the population. The state governor,Cláudio Lembo, was harshly criticized by the press for the slow response to the violence, for the absence of communication between the security forces, for the lack of information, to the press and the general public, and for poor management of the crisis.
| Casualties* | |
|---|---|
| Military Police | 23 dead / 22 wounded |
| State Civil Police | 7 dead / 6 wounded |
| Municipal Guards | 3 dead / 8 wounded |
| Prison Guards | 8 dead / 1 wounded |
| Prisoners | 17 dead |
| Civilians | 4 dead / 16 wounded |
| Criminals | 79 dead |
| Total | 141 dead / 53 wounded[1][2] |
| *as of 5/24/06 | |
Since early Friday May 12, 2006 there were 299 attacks against public establishments such as police stations, justice forums, buses, etc.; which are allegedly organized by thePrimeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) criminal organization.
The violence represented the bloodiest assault, worse than Rio de Janeiro, of its kind in the history of Brazil's richest state, São Paulo, and the news has reached the international media.[3][4][5][6] Related uprisings at 20 prisons across São Paulo were taking place Saturday, May 13. The attacks were not limited, however, to the state of São Paulo, as they have reached other states, such asBahia,Mato Grosso do Sul andParaná.
The attacks came in response to 7 imprisonedPCC leaders, among them, Marcos "Marcola" Willians Herbas Camacho, the leader of the criminal organization who allegedly ordered the attacks, being transferred and placed in solitary confinement in thePresidente Venceslau penitentiary. The practice was used by authorities to sever prisoners' ties to gang members outside prison.
The power of the PCC has been heightened in recent years by the availability ofmobile phones inside their jail cells. The lack of surveillance to prevent prisoners from communicating with criminals on the outside allowed them a powerful tool to spread information and coordinate uprisings and attacks in the state. Measures are being discussed, in the future, they might either remove mobile phone service antennas from the districts with penitentiaries, or increase the quality of surveillance inside jail cells, with metal detectors and other tools that would assist in locating cell phones.
The waves of attacks were orchestrated by PCC leaders supposedly in jail, using said mobile phones, but it is arguable that the general chaos encouraged other criminals to take advantage of the situation.
The ministry of Justice, led byMárcio Thomaz Bastos, offered assistance by making available all federal security forces and thearmy, butSão Paulo State GovernorCláudio Lembo said this is not necessary at the moment and thatSão Paulo can handle the situation without assistance.
May 15 was a very unusual day in São Paulo. This was the first work day after the attacks had been reported in the media, so the effects were now apparent as ever, with chaos marking the height of the attacks. On one hand, many people decided to stay home in fear of becoming a victim of violence. Also, one third of the public bus fleet stayed in the garages as they are a frequent target for attacks, being burned down and used to barricade streets and establishments. Consequently, the residential neighborhoods were ghost towns, whilst the avenues were choked with traffic because of the lack of public transportation. The compulsorycarpool law was lifted for the day. Those who did go to work decided to go home early and the roads were congested long before peak hours. The ensuingtraffic jams is the greatest of this year (195 km or 122 miles) and that fear was spread to the population mostly due to the massive coverage by the media, who may have exaggerated the situation. In addition, many rumors of attacks and riots are being created by civilians. The situation now is "under control."
The city suffered new attacks and riots by the PCC two months later.[7][8][9]
