Although elected to the post of Croat member of the tri-partitive Presidency, the vast majority of Bosnian Croats consider Komšić to be an illegitimate representative of their interests as he was elected almost exclusively by Bosniak voters in theFederation,[1] a Bosniak-Croatpolitical entity which forms a majority of the country's territory and whose residents are eligible to cast ballots for both the Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency (while the Serb member is elected by residents of theRepublika Srpska entity). His legitimacy has been widely contested among the Bosnian Croat population during his third and fourth terms in particular as his support from Bosnian Croats is negligible.
After the war, Komšić embarked on a political career as a member of theSocial Democratic Party (SDP BiH). He was a councilman of the municipality ofNovo Sarajevo and in thecity council ofSarajevo, before being elected the head of the municipal government of Novo Sarajevo in 2000. He then also served as the deputymayor of Sarajevo for two years. When the "Alliance for Democratic Change" coalition came to power after the2000 parliamentary election, Komšić was named the ambassador to the now defunctFR Yugoslavia inBelgrade. He resigned this commission after the2002 general election when the SDP BiH went back into opposition.
Komšić's victory was widely attributed[by whom?][dubious –discuss] to asplit in the HDZ BiH party, enabling the SDP BiH to win a majority of the Bosniaks votes. Croats saw Komšić as an illegitimate representative of the Bosnian Croats because he was elected mostly by Bosniak voters.[1] Croat leaders andCatholic Church figures urged Komšić to relinquish the seat, framing it as an illegitimate circumvention of ethnic quotas designed to protect minority interests amid Bosnia and Herzegovina's fragile power-sharing framework, though legal challenges did not overturn the certified results.[7] Nonetheless, Komšić and the other two members of the presidency were sworn in on 6 November.
Komšić's electoral win in 2010 was highly contested by Croat political representatives and generally seen as electoral fraud. Namely, every citizen in theFederation can decide whether to vote for a Bosniak or a Croat representative. However, since Bosniaks make up 70% of Federation's population and Croats only 22%, a candidate running to represent Croats in the Presidency can be effectively elected even without a majority among the Croat community - if enough Bosniak voters decide to vote on a Croat ballot. This happened in2006 and in2010, when Komšić, an ethnic Croat, backed by the multiethnicSocial Democratic Party, won the elections with very few Croat votes.[9][10]
In 2010, Komšić didn't win in a single municipality that had Croat-majority or plurality; nearly all of these went to Borjana Krišto. The bulk of the votes Komšić received came from predominantlyBosniak areas and he fared quite poorly in Croat municipalities, supported by less than 2,5% of the electorate in a number of municipalities in Western Herzegovina, such asŠiroki Brijeg,Ljubuški,Čitluk,Posušje andTomislavgrad, while not being able to gain not even 10% in a number of others.[11] Komšić received over seven thousand votes from the Bosniak-majority municipalityKalesija, where a total of 20 Croats live. Furthermore, total Croat population in whole of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was then estimated around 495,000;[12]
Komšić received 337,065 votes alone, while all the other Croat candidates won 219,046 votes altogether. After the election, Croats considered him to be an illegitimate representative and generally treated him as a second Bosniak member of the presidency.[13][14][15][16] This raised frustration among Croats, undermined their trust in federal institutions and empowered claims for their own entity or a federal unit.[17]
Komšić during a press conference with Polish PresidentLech Kaczyński, 17 December 2007
Collaboration within the Presidency proved challenging, marked by frequent deadlocks between Komšić and Serb memberNebojša Radmanović, who often aligned withRepublika Srpska's separatist-leaning positions, and varying alignments with Bosniak membersHaris Silajdžić (2006–2010) andBakir Izetbegović (2010–2014). These tensions stemmed from fundamental disagreements over centralizing state institutions, reforming electoral laws, and countering entity-level obstructions to national decision-making, resulting in stalled initiatives on constitutional amendments andEU accession prerequisites.[18]
In May 2008, Silajdžić stated during his visit toWashington, D.C. that there is only one language in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it goes by three names. His statement created negative reactions from Croat political parties and, at the time,Prime Minister of Republika Srpska,Milorad Dodik. Komšić replied to Silajdžić that he was not the one who would "decide how many languages are being spoken in Bosnia and Herzegovina."[19]
According to a study conducted by theNational Democratic Institute in 2010, Komšić was the most popular politician among the Bosniaks.[20]
Komšić's ideological approach drew support from non-nationalist voters, but criticism from Croat parties viewing it as underminingconstituent people protections. Toward the end of his second term, internal party strife culminated in Komšić's departure from the SDP BiH in July 2012, triggered by disagreements over proposed constitutional changes that he claimed sidelined his input on civic reforms.[21] He and other dissidents subsequently formed theDemocratic Front (DF) in April 2013 as a platform for anti-corruption and civic unification efforts.[22] The DF operates predominantly among Bosniak and pro-Bosnian voters in the Federation, and is characterized as aunitary,social democratic, andcivic-nationalistcenter-left party.
Results of the2018 general election by municipality for the Croat member of the Presidency; Komšić failed to win in a single Croat-majority municipality
Komšić announced his candidacy in theBosnian general election on 11 January 2018, running once again for Bosnia's three-personPresidency member, as the Croat member of the Presidency.[23] In the general election, held on 7 October 2018, he was again elected to the Presidency, having obtained 52.64% of the vote. The incumbent Bosnian Croat presidency member,Dragan Čović, was second with 36.14%.[24]
Komšić's win reignited longstanding controversies over the legitimacy of ethnic representation in the Presidency, as his electoral base was predominantly Bosniak voters in the Federation rather than a majority from Croat communities. Croatian Prime MinisterAndrej Plenković, who endorsed the incumbent Čović, criticized Komšić's victory: "We are again in a situation where members of one constituent people are electing a representative of another, the Croat people".[25] Komšić responded that theCroatian Government was undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina and its sovereignty.[26]
Protests against Komšić's election drew thousands in Croat-stronghold cities includingMostar andŠiroki Brijeg on 11–12 October 2018, organized by Croat nationalist groups who denounced him as a "second Bosniak member" unfit to represent Croat interests.[27] Demonstrators highlighted the disparity in vote distribution, with Komšić underperforming in core Croatcantons yet prevailing due to Federation-wide tallies.[28]
In August 2021, Komšić and Džaferović, without including Dodik, instructed theMinistry of Security to be available for putting out thewildfires inHerzegovina which had formed a few days before.[33] This came after Dodik, as the third member of the Presidency, refused to give consent on the Bosnian Armed Forces to use itsmilitary helicopters to help in putting out the fires, because the consent of all three members of the Presidency is required for the military force's helicopters to be used.[34]
Komšić with Spanish Prime MinisterPedro Sánchez, 9 February 2022
In the2022 general election, Komšić was re-elected to the Presidency for a record fourth term, obtaining 55.80% of the vote. TheCroatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) candidateBorjana Krišto, was second with 44.20%.[36] With his support once again deriving substantially from Bosniak-majority areas, HDZ BiH leaders contended that the outcome disenfranchised genuine Croat interests by allowing cross-ethnic bloc voting, echoing prior election disputes without successful legal annulment.[37] Komšić was sworn in as Presidency member for a fourth time on 16 November 2022, alongside newly elected membersDenis Bećirović andŽeljka Cvijanović.[38]
Following the 2022 general election, a coalition led by theAlliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the HDZ BiH and the liberal allianceTroika reached an agreement on the formation of a newgovernment, designating Borjana Krišto as the newChairwoman of the Council of Ministers.[39] The Presidency officially nominated her as chairwoman-designate on 22 December; Denis Bećirović (SDP BiH) and Željka Cvijanović (SNSD) voted for, while Komšić voted against.[40] Komšić said his reason for voting against was that "Krišto did not outline her programme as designate."[41]
As theCOVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in March 2020, the Presidency announced Armed Forces' placement of quarantine tents at the country's borders intended for Bosnian citizens returning home. Every Bosnian citizen arriving to the country was obligated to self-quarantine for 14 days starting from the day of arrival. Tents were set up on the northern border withCroatia.[42]
On 2 March 2021, Serbian presidentAleksandar Vučić came toSarajevo and met with Komšić, Džaferović and Dodik, and donated 10,000 dozes ofAstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines for the COVID-19 pandemic.[43] Three days later, on 5 March, Slovenian presidentBorut Pahor also came to Sarajevo and met with Komšić, Džaferović and Dodik, and stated that Slovenia will also donate 4,800 AstraZenecaCOVID-19 vaccines for the pandemic.[44]
Komšić alongside Lithuanian PresidentGitanas Nausėda, 13 December 2023
In October 2018, Komšić announced that Bosnia and Herzegovina might sue Croatia over the construction of thePelješac Bridge.[45] The construction of the bridge, paid largely withEU funding, began on 30 July 2018 to connect Croatia's territory and was supported by Komšić's main election opponent Dragan Čović.[46]
In December 2020, right before a state visit of Russian foreign ministerSergey Lavrov, Komšić refused to attend the visit because of Lavrov's disrespect to Bosnia and Herzegovina and decision to firstly visit only Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and later on the presidency consisting of Šefik Džaferović, Dodik and Komšić.[47] Shortly later, Džaferović too refused to attend Lavrov's visit because of the same reasons as Komšić.[48]
On 17 January 2022, he met withPope Francis inVatican City.[55] Following their meeting, Francis praised Komšić, saying that "he is a good person."[56] On 9 February 2022, Komšić went toMadrid, where he held a bilateral meeting with Spanish Prime MinisterPedro Sánchez and also spoke with KingFelipe VI.[57][58]
Following Russia recognizing theDonetsk People's Republic and theLuhansk People's Republic as independent states on 21 February, which are disputed territories in the Ukrainian region ofDonbas, Komšić strongly condemned "Russia’s attack on the territory of Ukraine."[59] On 24 February, Russian presidentVladimir Putin ordered a large-scaleinvasion of Ukraine, marking a dramatic escalation of theRusso-Ukrainian War that began in 2014. Regarding the invasion, Komšić said Bosnia and Herzegovina would support Ukraine within its capacity.[60]
Komšić with Slovenian Prime MinisterJanez Janša in October 2021, six months after the publishing of thenon-papers
In April 2021, Komšić sent anon-paper to EU foreign ministers, fiercely criticizing EU Delegations for their too good attitude towards the nationalistic Bosnian parties SNSD and the HDZ BiH. His paper focuses on Russian influence, interference of Croatia and Serbia in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the combination of relations between the HDZ BiH and the SNSD, but also criticism of the poor behavior of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[61] The same month, Komšić reacted toa supposed non-paper sent by Slovenian Prime MinisterJanez Janša, regarding possible border changes in theWestern Balkans, saying that it was "all already orchestrated and only God knows what the outcome will be."[62]
The first non-paper's plans and ideas were heavily criticized and reacted to by many political leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, North Macedonia, as well as by politicians from the European Union and Russia. A second non-paper, which first appeared in Kosovo's Albanian-language media in April 2021, proposed that Serbia recognize Kosovo's independence by February 2022 and that Serb-majorityNorth Kosovo be granted autonomy in return for Serbia's recognition.[63]
AfterHamas attacked Israel in October 2023, Komšić remarked that Hamas' actions are the actions of desperate people and that their actions should be observed within a wider context. He accused the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers Borjana Krišto for expressing her support for Israel, calling her statement "hasty and selfish".[64] Israeli ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina Galit Peleg criticised Komšić's statement and defended Krišto, to which Komšić responded by calling Israel's ambassador "a malicious lying fool or a manipulated but also malicious fool" and said "that pervert", referring to Israeli businessmanAmir Gross Kabiri, "who persuaded you to this lie and stupidity, because you obviously neither looked at nor listened to my statement and to whom money is more important than the fact that earning it with the followers of the same policy and ideology that participated in theholocaust of your people, is the problem of your country."[65]
In October 2025, following the brokering of theGaza peace plan and the start of a third ceasefire in theGaza war, the Bosnian Presidency unanimously decided to nominate U.S. presidentDonald Trump for theNobel Peace Prize for his "commitment to establishing lasting peace inGaza" and theMiddle East.[66] This marked the first official nomination for the 2026 edition of the award.[67]
Komšić is a prominent advocate of acivic model of the state, arguing that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized primarily around individual citizenship rather than ethnic affiliation. He has frequently criticized the constitutional and political framework established by theDayton Peace Agreement, claiming that its system of ethnic power-sharing entrenches divisions, enables political blockades, and discriminates against citizens who do not identify with one of thethree constituent peoples.[18]
Komšić supportsconstitutional and electoral reforms aimed at strengthening state institutions and reducing the role of ethnic veto mechanisms. His views have often placed him in opposition to ethnonationalist parties in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[68] Economically and socially, Komšić and theDemocratic Front are generally positioned on thecenter-left, advocating social justice, workers' rights, and a stronger role for the state in ensuringsocial welfare.[69]
Komšić has generally supported closerelations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States, viewing the U.S. as a key international partner in safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and post-war stability.[70] He has acknowledged the role of the United States in brokering the Dayton Agreement, while also arguing that continued U.S. engagement is important for advancing democratic and constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has publicly aligned himself with U.S. policies that emphasize the strengthening of state institutions and opposition to secessionist or destabilizing political initiatives.[70]
Komšić has also expressed support for U.S. sanctions imposed on political actors accused of undermining the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing such measures as instruments for preserving peace and stability.[71] His positions have often contrasted with those of political leaders in the country who opposeNATO integration or advocate greater ethnic autonomy.
Conversely, Komšić's commentary has occasionally also included criticism of perceived shifts in U.S. policy; in a January 2024 interview, he suggested that aspects of U.S. policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina "seemed aligned with the strategic interests of Croatia rather than exclusively promoting Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional stability."[72]
On 16 March 2021, Komšić went on a state visit to Turkey to meet with Turkish PresidentRecep Tayyip Erdoğan.[73] While there, Erdoğan promised to donate Bosnia and Herzegovina 30,000COVID-19 vaccines for the COVID-19 pandemic.[74] Also on the meeting, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey agreed on mutual recognition and exchange ofdriving licenses, as well as signing an agreement on cooperation in infrastructure and construction projects, which also refers to the construction of a highway from Bosnia and Herzegovina's capital Sarajevo to Serbia's capitalBelgrade; the agreement being signed by Minister of Communication and TrafficVojin Mitrović.[75]
On 27 August 2021, Erdoğan came to Sarajevo on astate visit in Bosnia and Herzegovina and met with all three Presidency members, having talks about more economic and infrastructural cooperation, as well as looking into the construction of the highway from Sarajevo to Belgrade.[76] Also, a trilateral meeting between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was agreed on.[77]
Komšić greeting European Council PresidentCharles Michel, 16 February 2020
In September 2020, Komšić and his fellow Presidency members said that anEU candidate status for Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible in the year 2021 if the country "implements successful reforms."[78]
On 1 December 2021, Komšić met with German Minister of State for EuropeMichael Roth, with the main topics of discussion being the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reform processes and activities on the country's EU path.[81]
In December 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the European Union as a candidate country for accession following the decision of theEuropean Council, which Komšić strongly supported.[82] On 8 February 2024, the Presidency unanimously adopted the decision to start negotiations withFrontex, one of the country’s key conditions for opening negotiations with the EU.[83] On 21 March 2024, at a summit inBrussels, all 27 EU leaders, representing the European Council, unanimously agreed to open EU accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina after theCouncil of Ministers adopted two more European laws.[84][85] Talks are set to begin following the impeding of more reforms.[85][86]
In September 2023, during theseventy-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Komšić criticized aspects of international migration management, arguing that large and powerful countries "tend to attract the most educated and skilled migrants, thereby weakening the human capital base of smaller countries."[87]
In September 2019, Komšić supported the firstBIH Pride March, theLGBTQpride parade in Sarajevo, stating that "Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country where everybody can live their life as they wish", and adding that the march "is not an ordinary, but a first-class political event."[88]
Komšić's maternal grandfather Marijan Stanić, who was aChetnik duringWorld War II, died two years before Komšić was born.[89][unreliable source?][failed verification] The Stanić family hailed from the village ofKostajnica, nearDoboj.[90] Komšić's paternal family hails fromKiseljak. His paternal uncle was anUstasha who disappeared during World War II.[91] Komšić was baptised aCatholic, like his father. However, being areligious-skeptic, he left the Catholic Church. He is a self-describedagnostic.[92] His wife, Sabina, is an ethnicBosniak. The couple has a daughter named Lana.[93]
^Arnautović, Suad (2018). "The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Mitigated Presidentialism". In Passarelli, Gianluca (ed.).The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans.Palgrave Macmillan. p. 88.ISBN978-3-319-97352-4.