Strategic reset was a policy framework designed to stop counterproductive U.S. engagement in a fragmentingIraq and to strengthen theUnited States' stance throughout theMiddle East. Inmilitary terms, "reset" refers to "a series of actions to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with future mission requirements."[1]
The proposal advocates harnessing U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic power to protect criticalnational security interests rather than expending this power in efforts to accommodate political progress amid multipleinternal andexternal conflicts inIraq. The plan for strategic reset entails four key measures:
The framework was set forth in a 2007 report by theCenter for American Progress, aprogressivethink tank based inWashington, D.C.[2]
TheCenter for American Progress developed the framework for strategic reset on the premise that "with theIraq War well into its fifth year, theBush administration still lacks a realistic plan for the Middle East and Iraq."[3] Senior Fellows Brian Katulis andLawrence J. Korb, together with Peter Juul, laid out the plan in the form of a 64-page report releasedJune 25, 2007.
In 2007, when retiredU.S. Marine Corps Gen.John J. Sheehan published a newspapereditorial explaining his decision not to accept the position of "War Czar" orWhite House implementation manager for the conflicts in Iraq andAfghanistan, he wrote:
Citing Gen. Sheehan, the report gives examples from what are described as seven years of relative progress in the Middle East (1994–2000) followed by seven years of setbacks (2001–2007), such as:[5]
U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007 relied on Iraqipolitical progress, increased numbers of U.S. troops in the country, and diversification of tactics for political and economic support.[6] While proponents of strategic reset supported diversification, particularly as it regards "situat[ing] the strategy in a regional approach,"[6] they strongly oppose sending more U.S. troops to Iraq, and they maintain that the "fundamental premise of Bush's surge strategy—that Iraq's leaders will make key decisions to advance their country's political transition and national reconciliation—is at best misguided and clearly unworkable."[7]
In 2006, the bipartisanIraq Study Group released areport stressing the need for troop withdrawal and for redoubled diplomatic efforts, including efforts to address the Arab–Israeli conflict.[8] The report also said that the Iraqi government "should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security," and that the "primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting theIraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations."[9] Supporters of the strategic reset framework disagree with the latter terms, claiming that "the ISG was examining an Iraq that simply does not exist anymore," and that embedding U.S. forces to support Iraqi ones "would create unmanageable force protection problems for U.S. troops."[10] Strategic reset emphasizes makingcounterterrorism the primary role of U.S. troops, rather than engaging them insectarian conflict.[11] It also emphasizes the necessity of recognizing Iraq's failed national reconciliation and adapting U.S.policy to the inevitable decentralization of Iraqi politics.[12]
In 2007,The Washington Post described as "strategic reset" a proposal by U.S. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice that took the form of "an unusually detailed public explanation of the new American effort to create a de facto alliance between Israel and moderate Arab states against Iranian extremism."[13]
Advocates of strategic reset maintain that the current administration's misjudgments regarding Iraq policy have jeopardized the United States'national security interests and that it must act now in order to prevent furtherattrition of its military and to effectively confront a growing global terrorist threat. The strategy requires that U.S. troops rapidly be withdrawn from Iraq and enlisted in efforts to counter this threat, while available political resources are deployed throughout the Middle East in order to minimize conflict in Iraq and to ensure stability in the region at large. It also requires the U.S. to take action on several fronts, especially the Arab–Israeli conflict, in order to build international support and promote regional commitment to this stability. A further requirement is that the international community cooperate to promoterule of law and to encourage legitimate, non-aggressive governments in the Middle East, preventing the formation of "security vacuums" exploited byAl Qaeda.[14]
Since 2005, Iraq's major sectarian conflicts have continued to generate violence at high levels, and Iraq has failed to engineer a political solution to the problems that fuel them.[15] In northern Iraq,Turkmen,Kurds, andArabs are fighting over the jurisdiction of theKurdistan Regional Government, andTurkey is conducting raids on theKurdistan Workers Party.[16] In the south and west, respectively, there is intra-Shi'a violence and violence betweenIraqiSunnis and Sunnis linked toAl-Qaeda;Baghdad and surrounding areas host the deadliest violence in the form ofcivil war between Sunni and Shi'a.[17] Proponents of strategic reset point out that no significant progress has been made on "benchmarks" established by U.S. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice such as constitutional reform or laws regulating provincialelections, distribution ofoil revenue, or treatment of citizens subject tode-Baathification; they argue that no realistic policy can predicate the resolution of Iraq's sectarian conflicts on the rule of a unified Iraqi governing authority. On June 26, 2007, for example, Iraqicommandos raided the house of Culture Minister Asad Kamal al-Hashimi, who is believed to have ordered an assassination attempt fatal to both sons of Mithal al-Alusi, a member of Iraq'sparliament.[18] According to the CAP, "Iraq's leaders fundamentally disagree on what kind of country Iraq is and should be, and Iraq's political transition has not succeeded in bridging these divides. This lack of political consensus among Iraq's leaders has resulted in a violent struggle for power."[17]
Under the strategic reset framework, one immediate response to the politicalstalemate is cessation of the ongoing provision of weapons toIraqi security forces, whose number now exceeds 500,000. According to the CAP, these security forces—who continue to receive considerable U.S. support—exhibit divided loyalties that stem directly from divisions in the political structure; they have been implicated in corruption, militia membership, death squads, and killing American troops sent to train them. "The fundamental problem with Iraq's security forces is that they lack the allegiance and in many cases the motivation to defend their country. The United States has poured more than$20 billion into building a national army and police force that does not have the unity and support of its own leaders."[19]Supporters of the strategic reset see two dangers in allowing the current policy of arming and training these security forces to continue: the first danger is that the U.S. is providing weaponry to opposing sides of acivil war. For example,Matthew Yglesias, writing forThe Atlantic, has said,
The second danger arises from the fact that the majority of Iraq's security forces are Shi'a who constitute "some of the closest allies of America's greatest rival in the Middle East—Iran."[21]
A second response to fragmentation in Iraqi politics is decentralization of U.S. policy and power structure in Iraq. The strategic reset framework calls for reassignment of personnel from theU.S. Embassy in Baghdad into "provincial outposts" established throughout Iraq. It also calls for the U.S. to forgo building a new Baghdad embassy, one projected to be the world's largest. According to the report, the adoption of this pragmatic, localized approach to placing diplomats and intelligence employees would represent progress on three fronts: It would provide bases for intelligence operations to counterterrorism, allow U.S. officials to giveconsular support to Iraq's estimated 2 million internallydisplaced persons, and bring U.S. personnel into closer working relationships with local Iraqi institutions.[22]
Phased redeployment is the strategic reset framework's second mainstay. The plan calls for the U.S. immediately to announce "that it does not intend to maintain permanent military bases or forces in Iraq" and to initiate a new deployment structure allowing forces currently serving in Iraq to rotate home, while incoming troops conduct counterterrorism missions from locations such asTurkey,Afghanistan, andKuwait. A temporary force of 8,000–10,000 should remain in northern Iraq until 2009, but virtually all other troops are to leave Iraq by September 2008.[23] Redeployment is crucial to the reset strategy chiefly because of its potential to undermine terrorism: proponents argue that U.S. military presence in Iraq gives Al-Qaeda a powerful recruiting tool, as well as ideological justification for continued violence. The most damaging blow the U.S. can deal to such organizations in Iraq, they argue, is to withdraw.Ayman al-Zawahri said on May 5, 2007, that a proposed U.S. redeployment would "deprive us of the opportunity to destroy the American forces which we have caught in a historic trap."[24]
The reset would remove U.S. troops from Iraq while preserving the ability to strike terrorist targets there and elsewhere. The "post-redeployment U.S. force structure in the Middle East would include: anArmybrigade and a tactical airsquadron stationed in Kuwait; two light, mobile Army brigades stationed in the northern Kurdish areas [of Iraq]; a Marine Expeditionary unit afloat in the Persian Gulf; and four to five Army combat brigades stationed in Afghanistan to complete the unaccomplished mission of eradicatingAl Qaeda there.[25]
The plan combinesredeployment with initiatives to promote security and diplomacy in theMiddle East. These include:
Strategic reset requires that U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve theArab–Israeli conflict be significantly upgraded. The first major reason for this requirement is that the conflict is considered to have deep destabilizing effects on the entire region; the second is that, since the conflict is seen as a driving force behindanti-American sentiment,[31] enhanced American participation in thepeace process would leave the U.S. in a stronger political position regionally. The strategy calls forPresident Bush to appoint a Middle East envoy and two seniorambassadors as an initial step in this direction.[32] Further key steps would include:
David Gooden, writing for theDes Moines Register, has criticized the proposal as "imperial liberalism," claiming that "[F]oreign military occupations are the root cause of Islamic terrorism" and that "[t]he Center for American Progress' plan for a 'strategic reset' will not achieve a lasting or a just peace."[34]