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Nur Muhammad Taraki

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Afghan politician (1917–1979)

De khalq khidmatkar
Nur Muhammad Taraki
نور محمد ترکی
Taraki in 1978
General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
In office
1 January 1965 – 14 September 1979
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded byHafizullah Amin
Chairman of theRevolutionary Council of Afghanistan
Head of State
In office
30 April 1978 – 14 September 1979
Preceded byMohammad Daoud Khan(asPresident)
Abdul Qadir (acting)
Succeeded byHafizullah Amin
2nd President of Afghanistan
In office
1 May 1978 – 27 March 1979
Vice PresidentBabrak Karmal
Hafizullah Amin
Preceded byMohammad Musa Shafiq or Mohammad Daoud Khan (asPrime Minister)
Succeeded byHafizullah Amin
Personal details
Born(1917-07-14)14 July 1917
Died9 October 1979(1979-10-09) (aged 62)
Manner of deathAssassination by suffocation
PartyPeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Khalq)
SpouseNur Bibi
EducationKabul University[1]
OccupationPolitician
ProfessionPolitician, revolutionary, journalist, writer, poet
This article is part ofa series on
Communism in Afghanistan

Nur Muhammad Taraki (Pashto:نور محمد ترکی‎; 14 July 1917 – 9 October 1979) was an Afghancommunist politician, revolutionary, journalist and writer. He was a founding member of thePeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) who served as itsGeneral Secretary from 1965 to 1979 andChairman of theRevolutionary Council from 1978 to 1979.

Taraki was born inNawa,Ghazni Province, and he got his primary and secondary education from districtPishin inBalochistan and graduated fromKabul University, after which he started his political career as a journalist. From the 1940s onward Taraki also wrote novels and short stories in thesocialist realism style.[2] Forming the PDPA at his residence inKabul along withBabrak Karmal, he was elected as the party's General Secretary at its first congress. He ran as a candidate in the1965 Afghan parliamentary election but failed to win a seat. In 1966 he published theKhalq, a party newspaper advocating forclass struggle, but the government closed it down shortly afterward. In 1978 he,Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal initiated theSaur Revolution and established theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Taraki's leadership was short-lived and marked by controversies. The government was divided between two PDPA factions: theKhalqists (led by Taraki), the majority, and theParchamites, the minority. Taraki along with his "protégé" Amin started a purge of the government and party that led to several high-ranking Parchamite members being sent into de facto exile by being assigned to serve overseas as ambassadors, and later started jailing domestic Parchamites. His regime locked up dissidents and oversaw massacres of villagers, citing the necessity ofRed Terror by theBolsheviks in Soviet Russia, that opponents of the Saur Revolution had to be eliminated.[3] These factors, among others, led to a popular backlash that initiated a rebellion. Despite repeated attempts, Taraki was unable to persuade theSoviet Union to intervene in support of the restoration of civil order. Amin initiated most of these policies behind the scenes.[4]

Taraki's reign was marked by acult of personality centered around him that Amin had cultivated. The state press and subsequent propaganda started to refer to him as the "Great Leader" and "Great Teacher", and his portrait became a common sight throughout the country.[5] His relationship with Amin turned sour during his rule, ultimately resulting in Taraki's overthrow on 14 September 1979 and subsequent murder on 8 October,[6] on Amin's orders, with Kabul press reporting that he died of illness. His death was a factor that led to theSoviet intervention in December 1979.

Early life and career

[edit]

Taraki was born on 14 July 1917 to aGhiljiPashtunTarakai peasant family in theNawa District ofGhazni Province, part of what was then theEmirate of Afghanistan.[7] He was the oldest of three children and attended a village school in Nawa,[8] before leaving in 1932 what had become theKingdom of Afghanistan, at the age of 15, to work in the port city ofBombay,India. There, he met aKandahari merchant family who employed him as a clerk for the Pashtun Trading Company. Taraki's first encounter with communism was during his night courses, where he met severalCommunist Party of India members who impressed him with their discussions onsocial justice and communist values. Another important event was his encounter withKhan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Pashtun nationalist and leader of theRed Shirt Movement in neighbouring India, who was an admirer of the works ofVladimir Lenin.[9]

In 1937, Taraki started working forAbdul Majid Zabuli, theMinister of Economics, who introduced him to several Russians. Later Taraki became Deputy Head of theBakhtar News Agency and became known throughout the country as an author and poet. His best known book, theDe Bang Mosaferi, highlights the socio-economic difficulties facing Afghan workers and peasants.[9] His works were translated into Russian language in the Soviet Union, where his work was viewed as embodying scientific socialist themes. He was hailed by theSoviet Government as "Afghanistan'sMaxim Gorky".[10] On his visit to the Soviet Union Taraki was greeted byBoris Ponomarev, the Head of theInternational Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and otherCommunist Party of the Soviet Union members.[11]

A younger Taraki

UnderSardarMohammad Daoud Khan's prime ministership, suppression of radicals was common. However, because of his language skills, Taraki was sent to theAfghan Embassy in the United States in 1952. Within several months, Taraki began denouncing the Royal Afghan Government underKing Zahir, and accused it of beingautocratic anddictatorial. His denunciation of the Royal Afghan Government earned him much publicity in the United States. It also attracted unfavourable attention from authorities back home, who relieved him of his post and ordered him repatriated but stopped short of placing him under arrest. After a short period of unemployment, Taraki started working for the United States Overseas Mission in Kabul as aninterpreter. He quit that job in 1958 and established his own translation company, theNoor Translation Bureau. Four years later, he started working for theU.S. Embassy in Kabul, but quit in 1963 to focus on the establishment of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), acommunist political party.[11]

At the founding congress of the PDPA, held in his own home in Kabul'sKarte Char district,[12] Taraki won a competitive election againstBabrak Karmal to the post of general secretary on 1 January 1965. Karmal became second secretary.[13] Taraki ran as a candidate for the PDPA during theSeptember 1965 parliamentary election but did not win a seat.[14] Shortly after the election, he launchedKhalq, the first major left-wing newspaper in Afghanistan. The paper was banned within one month of its first printing. In 1967, less than two years after its founding, the PDPA split into several factions. The largest of these included Khalq (Masses) led by Taraki, andParcham (Banner) led by Karmal. The main differences between the factions were ideological, with Taraki supporting the creation of aLeninist-like state, while Karmal wanted to establish a "broad democratic front".[15]

On 17 April 1978, a prominent leftist namedMir Akbar Khyber was assassinated and the murder was blamed onMohammed Daoud Khan'sRepublic of Afghanistan. His death served as a rallying point for the pro-communist Afghans. Fearing a communist coup d'état, Daoud ordered the arrest of certain PDPA leaders, including Taraki and Karmal, while placing others such asHafizullah Amin under house arrest.[16] On 27 April 1978, theSaur Revolution was initiated, reportedly by Amin while still under house arrest. Khan was killed the next day along with most of his family. The PDPA rapidly gained control and on 1 May Taraki becameChairman of theRevolutionary Council, a role which subsumed the responsibilities of both president andChairman of theCouncil of Ministers (literally prime minister in Western parlance). The country was then renamed theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), installing a regime that would last until April 1992.[17]

Leadership

[edit]

Establishment and purge

[edit]
Taraki cabinet (1978–1979)[18]
OfficeIncumbentTook officeLeft office
Deputy Chairman of theCouncil of MinistersBabrak Karmal30 April5 July 1978
Hafizullah Amin30 April27 March 1979
Muhammad Aslam Watanjar30 April27 March
Minister of Foreign AffairsHafizullah Amin30 April27 March
Minister of CommunicationsMuhammad Aslam Watanjar30 April27 March
Minister of National DefenceAbdul Qadir30 April17 August 1978
Nur Muhammad Taraki (de facto, notde jure)17 August27 March
Minister of HealthShah Wali30 April27 March
Minister of InteriorNur Ahmad Nur30 April5 July 1978
Minister of EducationGhulam Dastagir Panjsheri30 April28 August 1978
Abdul Rashid Jalili28 August27 March
Minister of PlanningSultan Ali Keshtmand30 April23 August 1978
Muhammad Siddiq Alemyar23 August27 March
Minister of Radio, TelevisionSulaiman Layeq30 April27 March
Minister of AgricultureSaleh Muhammad Zirai30 April27 March
Minister of FinanceAbdul Karim Misaq30 April27 March
Minister of Information, CultureMuhammad Hasan Bareq-Shafi'30 April27 March
Minister of Justice,Attorney GeneralAbdul Hakim Shara'i30 April27 March
Minister of Social AffairsAnahita Ratebzad30 April27 March
Minister of CommerceAbdul Quddus Ghorbandi30 April27 March
Minister of Mines, IndustriesMuhammad Isma'il Danesh30 April27 March
Minister of Public WorksMuhammad Rafie30 April28 August 1978
Dastagir Panjsheri28 August27 March
Minister of Water, PowerMuhammad Mansur Hashimi30 April27 March
Minister of Higher EducationMahmud Suma30 April27 March
Minister of Tribal AffairsNizamuddin Tahzib30 April27 March
Minister of Border AffairsSahibjan Sahrayi28 August27 March

Taraki was appointed Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (head of state) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (head of government) while retaining his post as PDPA general secretary (supreme leader). He initially formed a government which consisted of bothKhalqists andParchamites;[19] Karmal became Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council[20] while Amin becameMinister of Foreign Affairs[19] and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[21] Internal problems soon arose and several prominent Khalqists accused the Parcham faction of conspiring against the Taraki government. A Khalqi purge of the Parcham then began with the faction's most prominent members being sent out of the country: Karmal became Afghan Ambassador to Czechoslovakia andMohammad Najibullah became Afghan Ambassador to Iran. Internal struggle was not only to be found between the Khalqist and Parchamites; tense rivalry between Taraki and Amin had begun in the Khalq faction with both vying for control.[19]

Karmal was recalled from Czechoslovakia but rather than returning to Afghanistan he went into hiding withAnahita Ratebzad, his friend and former Afghan ambassador to Yugoslavia, as he feared execution if he returned. Muhammad Najibullah followed them. Taraki consequently stripped them of all official titles and political authority.[22][23]

The new government, under Taraki, launched a campaign of repression against opponents of the Saur Revolution, which killed thousands,[24] mostly atPul-e-Charkhi prison. Estimates for the number executed at the prison, between April 1978 and December 1979, are as high as 27,000.[25]

Socio-economic changes

[edit]

Land reform

[edit]

Taraki's Government initiated aland reform on 1 January 1979 which attempted to limit the amount of land a family could own. Those whose landholdings exceeded the limit saw their property requisitioned by the government without compensation. The Afghan leadership believed the reform would be met with popular approval amongst the rural population while weakening the power of thebourgeoisie. The reform was declared complete in mid-1979 and the government proclaimed that 665,000 hectares (approximately 1,632,500 acres) had been redistributed. The government also declared that only 40,000 families, or 4 percent of the population, had been negatively affected by the land reform.[26]

Contrary to government expectations, the reform was neither popular nor productive. Agricultural harvests plummeted and the reform itself led to rising discontent amongst Afghans.[26] When Taraki realized the degree of popular dissatisfaction with the reform he quickly abandoned the policy.[27] However, the land reform was gradually implemented under the later Karmal administration, although the proportion of land area impacted by the reform is unclear.[28]

Other reforms

[edit]

In the months following the coup, Taraki and other party leaders initiated other radicalMarxist policies that challenged both traditionalAfghan values and well-established traditional power structures in rural areas.[29] Taraki introduced women to political life and legislated an end to forced marriage. However, he ruled over a nation with a deep Islamic religious culture and a long history of resistance to any type of strong centralized governmental control,[30] and consequently many of these reforms were not actually implemented nationwide. Popular resentment of Taraki's drastic policy changes triggered surging unrest throughout the country, reducing government control to only a limited area.[31] The strength of this anti-reform backlash would ultimately lead to theAfghan civil war.[32]

Traditional practices that were deemedfeudal—such asusury,bride price andforced marriage—were banned, and the minimum age of marriage was raised.[33][34] The government stressed education for both women and men, and launched an ambitious literacy campaign.[35]

Under the previous administration ofMohammad Daoud Khan, aliteracy programme created byUNESCO had been launched with the objective of eliminating illiteracy within 20 years. The government of Taraki attempted to reduce this time frame from 20 to four years, an unrealistic goal in light of the shortage of teachers and limited government capacity to oversee such an initiative. The duration of the project was later lengthened to seven years by the Soviets in the aftermath of theSoviet intervention. The cultural focus of the UNESCO programme was declared "rubbish" by Taraki, who instead chose to introduce a political orientation by utilizing PDPA leaflets and left-wingpamphlets as basic reading material.[31]

On 19 August 1978,Afghan Independence Day, Taraki started the broadcasts ofAfghanistan National Television, the first TV channel in the country.[36]

Afghan–Soviet relations

[edit]
Further information:Afghanistan–Soviet Union relations

We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. [...] If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things"

— Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in response to Taraki's request for Soviet presence in Afghanistan[37]

Taraki signed a Twenty-Year Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union on 5 December 1978 which greatly expanded Soviet aid to his regime.[38] Following theHerat uprising, Taraki contactedAlexei Kosygin,chairman of theUSSR Council of Ministers, and asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin was unfavorable to the proposal on the basis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan.[39] Following Kosygin's rejection Taraki requested aid fromLeonid Brezhnev, thegeneral secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union andSoviet head of state, who warned him that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime.[40]

In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of theNon-Aligned Movement inHavana, Cuba. On his way back he stopped in Moscow on 20 March and met with Brezhnev,foreign ministerAndrei Gromyko and other Soviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers.[41] At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet–Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists, and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price. However, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.[42]

Taraki–Amin break

[edit]

In the first months after the April 1978 revolution, Hafizullah Amin and Taraki had a very close relationship. Taraki reportedly remarked, "Amin and I are like nail and flesh, not separable". Amin set about constructing a personality cult centered on Taraki.[43] In party and government meetings Amin always referred to Taraki as "The Great Leader", "The Star of the East" or "The Great Thinker" among other titles,[44] while Amin was given such titles as "The True Disciple and Student". Amin would later come to realize he had created a monster when theKim Il Sung-style personality cult he had created inspired Taraki to become overly confident and believe in his own brilliance.[43] Taraki began discounting Amin's suggestions, fostering in Amin a deep sense of resentment. As their relationship turned increasingly sour, a power struggle developed between them for the control of theAfghan Army.[43] Their relations came to a head later that year when Taraki accused Amin ofnepotism after Amin had appointed several family members to high-ranking positions.[45]

On 3 August 1978, a KGB delegation visited Afghanistan, and on first impression of generalOleg Kalugin, Taraki "did not have the physical strength or the backing to continue to lead the country for long", adding that Amin was a "far more impressive figure".[4]

Taraki could count on the support of four prominent army officers in his struggle against Amin:Aslam Watanjar,Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy,Sherjan Mazdoryar andAssadullah Sarwari. These men had joined the PDPA not because of ideological reasons, but instead due to their lofty political ambitions. They also had developed a close relationship withAlexander Puzanov, theSoviet ambassador in Afghanistan, who was eager to use them against Amin. After theHerat uprising on 17 March 1979, thePDPA Politburo and theRevolutionary Council established theHomeland Higher Defence Council, to which Taraki was elected its chairman while Amin became its deputy. At around the same time, Taraki left his post as Council of Ministers chairman and Amin was elected his successor. Amin's new position offered him little real influence, however; as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Amin had the power to elect every member of the cabinet, but all of them had to be approved by the head of state, Taraki. In reality, through this maneuver Taraki had effectively reduced Amin's power base by forcing him to relinquish his hold on the Afghan Army in order to take on the supposedly heavy responsibilities of his new but ultimately powerless post.[46]

During Taraki's foreign visit to the6th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cuba, hisGang of Four had received an intelligence report that Amin was planning to arrest or kill them. This report, it turned out, was incorrect.[46] Nonetheless, the Gang of Four were ordered to assassinate Amin, its leader Sarwari selecting his nephewAziz Akbari to conduct the assassination. However, Akbari was not informed that he was the chosen assassin or that it was a secret mission, and he confided the information to contacts in the Soviet embassy. The embassy responded by warning Amin of the assassination attempt, thereby saving him from certain death.[41]

Assassination

[edit]

On 11 September 1979, Chairman Taraki was greeted by Amin at the airport on his return to Kabul from Moscow. The flight was scheduled to land at 2:30, but Amin forced the delay of the landing by an hour as a demonstration to Taraki of his control over the government.[41] Shortly afterward, Taraki, instead of reporting to the cabinet about the Havana Summit, indirectly tried to dismiss Amin from his position as per the plot of the Soviets. He sought to neutralise Amin's power and influence by requesting that he serve overseas as an ambassador, but Amin turned down the proposal, shouting "You are the one who should quit! Because of drink and old age you have taken leave of your senses." The following day, Taraki invited Amin tothe Arg (the Presidential palace) for lunch with him and the Gang of Four. Amin turned down the offer, stating he would prefer their resignation rather than lunching with them. Soviet Ambassador Puzanov managed to persuade Amin to make the visit to the palace along withSayed Daoud Tarun, the Chief of Police, and Nawab Ali (an intelligence officer). Inside the palace on 14 September, bodyguards within the building opened fire on the visitors. Tarun was killed but Amin only sustained injuries and escaped to his car, driving to the Ministry of Defence. Shortly afterwards, Amin placed the Army on high alert, ordered the detainment of Taraki, and telephoned Puzanov about the incident. That evening at 6:30, tanks from the 4th Armoured Corps entered the city and stood at government positions. Amin returned to the Arg with a contingent of Army officers and placed Taraki under arrest. The Gang of Four, however, had "disappeared", taking refuge at the Soviet embassy.[47]

The Soviets tried to dissuade Amin from expelling Taraki and his associates from their positions, but Amin refused. On 15 September, a Soviet battalion atBagram Air Base and the embassy were put in position in an attempt to rescue Taraki, but they were never ordered to make a move as they felt that Amin's forces had the edge.[48] At 8pm on 16 September,Radio Kabul announced that Taraki had informed thePDPA Politburo that he was no longer able to continue his duties, and that the Politburo subsequently elected Amin as the new General Secretary. After Taraki's arrest, Amin reportedly discussed the incident withLeonid Brezhnev in which he said, "Taraki is still around. What should I do with him?"[47] Brezhnev replied that it was his choice. Amin, who now believed he had the full support of the Soviets, ordered the death of Taraki. Taraki's death occurred on 9 October 1979, when he was (according to most accounts) suffocated with pillows by three men under Amin's orders. Taraki did not resist nor did he say anything as he was instructed by the men to lie down on a bed to be suffocated.[49] His body was secretly buried by the men at night. The news shocked Brezhnev, who had vowed to protect Taraki. It was also one of the factors of theSoviet intervention two months later. TheAfghan media reported two days later that the ailing Taraki had died of a "serious illness", omitting any mention of his murder.[47][50]

Post-death

[edit]

On the day that Taraki was assassinated, 28 men and women from Taraki's extended family (including his wife and brother) were jailed atPul-e-Charkhi prison.[51] After Karmal came into power, Taraki's jailed relatives, including his widow, were released.[52]

In the 2 January 1980 edition of theKabul New Times (the day of the PDPA's 15th anniversary), the education ministerAnahita Ratebzad called Taraki "the martyred son of the country", and denounced Hafizullah Amin as "this savage despot, beastly, lunatic, and recognised spy of the imperialism of America".[53]

Books

[edit]

Novels

[edit]
  • De Bang musāfirī, his first and best-known novel, published in 1957,The Journey of Bang looks at the tribal Pashtun world throughMarxist lenses, "an imitation in Pashto of the works of theSoviet novelistMaxim Gorky"[54]
  • Ṡaṛah, criticism of feudal lords of Afghanistan
  • Sangsār
  • Spīn
  • Be tarbiyatah zoy

Short stories

[edit]
  • Mochī : da lanḍo kīso ṭolagah

Essays

[edit]
  • Pahāṛon̲ kā baiṭā : ek Pukhtun kī dāstān-i alam, written inUrdu, chiefly on socio-cultural and economical conditions inBalochistan

References

[edit]
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  48. ^Braithwaite, Rodric (2011).Afgantsy. The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989. Oxford University Press. pp. 67–68.ISBN 978-0-19-983265-1.
  49. ^Edwards, David B. (2002).Before Taliban. Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad. University of California Press. pp. 89–91.ISBN 0-520-22861-8.
  50. ^Byrne, Malcolm;Zubok, Vladislav (1995)."The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente – A Chronology [Prepared for a Nobel Symposium in 1995]"(PDF).National Security Archive. p. 26.
  51. ^My Three Lives on Earth: The Life Story of an Afghan American by Tawab Assifi
  52. ^https://www.scribd.com/document/345774276/washingtons-secret-war-against-afghanistan[permanent dead link]
  53. ^"VOL. XVII NO. 2".Kabul New Times. 2 January 1980.
  54. ^Kakar, M. Hassan (1995).The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. University of California Press. p. 317.ISBN 0-520-20893-5.

External links

[edit]
Party political offices
New political partyGeneral Secretary of thePeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
1 January 1965 – 14 September 1979
Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded byasPresident Chairman of theRevolutionary Council
30 April 1978 – 14 September 1979
Succeeded by
Vacant
Title last held by
Mohammad Musa Shafiq(1973)
asPrime Minister
Chairman of theCouncil of Ministers
1 May 1978 – 27 March 1979
Daoud Republic(President)
Democratic Republic(Chairman)
Islamic State(President)
Islamic Emirate(Supreme Leader)
Transitional Islamic State(President)
Islamic Republic(President)
Islamic Emirate(Supreme Leader)
  • * Acting
Kingdom
Democratic Republic(Chairman)
Islamic State
Islamic Emirate(1996–2001)
Islamic Emirate(since 2021)
International
National
People
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