Anuclear briefcase is a specially outfittedbriefcase used to authorize the use of nuclear weapons and is usually kept near the leader of anuclear weapons state at all times.
InFrance, the nuclear briefcase does not officially exist.[1] A black briefcase called the "mobile base"[2] follows thepresident in all his trips, but it is not specifically devoted to nuclear force.[3]
India does not have a nuclear briefcase. In India, the Political Council of theNuclear Command Authority (NCA) must collectively authorize the use of nuclear weapons.[4][5] The NCA Executive Council gives its opinion to the Political Council, which authorises a nuclear attack when deemed necessary. While the Executive Council is chaired by theNational Security Advisor (NSA), the Political Council is chaired by thePrime Minister. This mechanism was implemented to ensure thatIndian nuclear weapons remain firmly incivilian control and that there exists a sophisticatedcommand-and-control mechanism to prevent their accidental or unauthorised use.[6]
The Prime Minister is often accompanied bySpecial Protection Group personnel carrying a black briefcase. It contains foldableKevlar protectionarmor, essential documents and has apocket that can hold apistol.[5][7]
Russia's "nuclear briefcase" is code-namedCheget. It "supports communication between senior government officials while they are making the decision whether to use nuclear weapons, and in its own turn is plugged into the specialKazbek communication system, which includes all the individuals and agencies involved in command and control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces." It is usually assumed, although not known with certainty, that the nuclear briefcases are also issued to theMinister of Defence and theChief of the General Staff.[8][9]
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In his 1980 bookBreaking Cover,[10]Bill Gulley, former director of theWhite House Military Office, wrote:[11]
There are four things in the Football. The Black Book containing the retaliatory options, a book listing classified site locations, amanila folder with eight or ten pages stapled together giving a description of procedures for theEmergency Broadcast System, and a three-by-five-inch [7.5 × 13 cm] card withauthentication codes. The Black Book was about 9 by 12 inches [23 × 30 cm] and had 75 loose-leaf pages printed in black and red. The book with classified site locations was about the same size as the Black Book, and was black. It contained information on sites around the country where the president could be taken in an emergency.
The president is always accompanied by a military aide carrying the nuclear football withlaunch codes fornuclear weapons.[12] It has been described both as a metalZero Halliburton briefcase[13] and as a leather briefcase weighing about 45 pounds (20 kg), with photographic evidence existing of the latter.[11] A smallantenna protrudes from the bag near the handle, suggesting that it also contains communications equipment of some kind.[11]
A popular misconception, sometimes deriving from pop culture, is that the football contains alarge red button, which when pressed, launches a nuclear attack.[14][15][16]
If the U.S. president, who is thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces, decides to order the use of nuclear weapons, the briefcase would be opened. A command signal, or "watch" alert, would be issued to theUnited States Strategic Command and perhaps theJoint Chiefs of Staff. The president would review the attack options with others such as the secretary of defense and thechairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and decide on a plan, which could range from the launch of a singleICBM or nuclear-armed bomber to options for multiple, even hundreds of ICBMs or bombers. These are among the preset war plans developed under OPLAN 8010 (formerly theSingle Integrated Operational Plan).[17] A two-person verification procedure would precede the entering of the codes into aPermissive Action Link.[citation needed]
Before the order can be followed by the military, the president must be positively identified using a special code issued on a plastic card, nicknamed the "biscuit".[18] The authentication is conducted between the president and the National Military Command Center deputy director of operations, using a challenge code of twophonetic letters. The president will read, from the biscuit, the daily phonetic letters, and the deputy director will confirm or deny that it is correct, confirmation indicating the person is the president and the attack orders can be given.[19] Down the chain of command, the United States has atwo-man rule in place at nuclear launch facilities. This verification process ensures the order came from the actual president. Many sources indicate that the president has sole launch authority, and the defense secretary has noveto power.[20][21][22] ACongressional Research Service provides a detail reason: There is a short time before nuclear weapons from adversaries will strike US soil and a similar short time when advisers relay options to the US President. During theCold War, some analysts argued that a launch under attack was the preeminent option, and that the command and control system was designed to permit such a prompt launch of U.S. nuclear weapons. The time for any US response was noted as thirty minutes. Secondly, the US may conduct a pre-emptive strike if the assessment was its territory or allies were facing an imminent nuclear attack.[23] TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also be an advisor to the President, but is by law only allowed to advise, and has no operational control over US forces.[24] The secretary of defense also advises but theGoldwater–Nichols Act Section 162(b) states the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs "from the president to the secretary of defense," and "from the secretary of defense to the commander of the combatant command".[25]
However, it has been argued that the president may not have sole authority to initiate a nuclear attack because the defense secretary is required to verify the order but cannot veto it.[26][27][28]U.S. law dictates that the attack must be lawful; military officers are required to refuse to execute unlawful orders, such as those that violateinternational humanitarian law.[29]
Some military officials, includingGeneral John Hyten, have testified to theU.S. Congress that they would refuse to carry out an unlawful order for a nuclear strike.[30] In addition, off-the-shelf strike packages are pre-vetted by lawyers to confirm that they are legal and, thus, such a strike would be presumed to be a lawful order.[31]
Military service members have been reprimanded for questioning U.S. protocols for nuclear strike authority. In 1975,Major Harold Hering was discharged from theAir Force for asking, "How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?"[32] Nevertheless, the president, once in office, as noted by former Defense SecretaryWilliam Perry and Tom Z. Collina, retains the sole authority to launch a nuclear strike or attack.[33]
The football is carried by one of the rotating presidential military aides (one from each of the sixarmed forces service branches), whose work schedule is top-secret. This person is acommissioned officer in theU.S. military, pay-gradeO-4 or above, who has undergone the nation's most rigorousbackground check (Yankee White).[34] These officers are required to keep the football readily accessible to the president at all times. Consequently, this officer carries the football either standing or walking near the president at all times, including riding onAir Force One, onMarine One, or in thepresidential motorcade with the president.[34]
There are three nuclear footballs in total; two are allocated to the president and vice president, with the last being stored in theWhite House.[35] The practice of also providing an aide with a football to the vice president, to whom command authority would devolve if the president is disabled or deceased, began during theCarter administration.[36] Inpresidential transitions, thepresident-elect does not receive the actual nuclear code card until after the nuclear briefing, which usually occurs when "he meets with the outgoing president at the White House just before the actualinauguration ceremony. The code card is activated electronically right after the president-elect takes the oath at noon".[37]
If the outgoing president is not present at the inauguration — as happened in 2021 whenDonald Trump did not attend theinauguration of Joe Biden but stayed in Florida[38] — one football is kept with him and remains active until 11:59:59 a.m. on inauguration day. After that point, the now-former president is denied access to the football, its codes are automatically deactivated, and the aide carrying the football returns to Washington, D.C. In the meantime, the incoming president receives one of the spare footballs at the pre-inauguration nuclear briefing, as well as a "biscuit" with codes that become active at 12:00:00 noon.[39]
According to military analyst and whistleblowerDaniel Ellsberg, presidents beginning withEisenhower have in fact delegated nuclear launch authority to military commanders who may then sub-delegate authority further. In Ellsberg's view, the nuclear football is primarily a piece ofpolitical theater, a hoax that obscures the real chain of nuclear command and control.[40]
In the United States, the president has the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, for any reason and at any time.
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