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Infallibilism is theepistemological view that propositionalknowledge is incompatible with the possibility of being wrong.
Inphilosophy, infallibilism (sometimes called "epistemic infallibilism") is the view that knowing the truth of aproposition is incompatible with there being any possibility that the proposition could be false. This is typically understood as indicating that for abelief to count as knowledge, one's evidence or justification must provide one with such strong grounds that the beliefmust betrue, or equivalently, that it is completely impossible for it to be false. The infallibility of such a belief may also mean that it cannot even be doubted.
Infallibilism should not be confused with the universally accepted view that a propositionP must be true in order for someone to know thatP. Instead, the infallibilist holds that a person who knowsP could not have all of the same evidence (or justification) that one currently has ifP were false, and therefore that one's evidence/justification offers a guarantee of the truth ofP. Thus, in cases where a person could have held the same true beliefP with the same level of evidence (or justification) and still been wrong, the infallibilist holds that the person does not knowP.
The infallibilist defines knowledge in the following way:[1] A person (henceforthS) knows that a proposition (henceforthP) is true if and only if:
According to the infallibilist, fallible beliefs may be rationallyjustified, but they do not rise to the level ofknowledge unless their truth is absolutely certain given one's evidence. The contrary view to infallibilism, known asfallibilism, is the position that a justified true belief may be considered knowledge even if one's evidence does not guarantee its truth, or even if one can rationally doubt it given one's current evidence.
Infallibilism should not be confused withskepticism, which is the view that knowledge is unattainable for rational human beings. While numerous critics of infallibilism claim that defining knowledge according to such high standards collapses into epistemic skepticism, many proponents of infallibilism (although not all) deny that this is the case.[2][3]
René Descartes, an early proponent of infallibilism, argued, "my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false".[4]
Infallibilism is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists, who generally accept that one can have knowledge based on fallible justification.[2][3] Baron Reed has provided an account of the reasons why infallibilism is so widely regarded as untenable today.[5]
Broad consensus notwithstanding, some contemporary philosophers have presented arguments in defense of infallibilism and have therefore come to reject fallibilism. For instance, Mark Kaplan defends such a view in a 2006 paper entitled "If You Know You Can't Be Wrong".[6] Other notable contemporary proponents of infallibilism include Andrew Moon, Julien Dutant, and Matthew Benton.[7]
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