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Theanalogy of the divided line (Ancient Greek:γραμμὴ δίχα τετμημένη,romanized: grammē dicha tetmēmenē) is presented by theGreek philosopherPlato in theRepublic (509d–511e). It is written as a dialogue betweenGlaucon andSocrates, in which the latter further elaborates upon the immediately precedinganalogy of the Sun at the former's request. Socrates asks Glaucon not only to envision this unequally bisected line but to imagine further bisecting each of the two segments. Socrates explains that the four resulting segments represent four separate 'affections' (παθήματα) of the psyche. The lower two sections are said to represent the visible while the higher two are said to represent theintelligible. These affections are described in succession as corresponding to increasing levels of reality and truth from conjecture (εἰκασία) to belief (πίστις) to thought (διάνοια) and finally to understanding (νόησις). Furthermore, this analogy not only elaborates a theory of the psyche but also presentsmetaphysical and epistemological views.
InThe Republic (509d–510a), Plato describes the divided line to Glaucon this way:
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion,[1] and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?
Yes, I understand.
Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.[2]
ThusAB represents shadows and reflections of physical things, andBC the physical things themselves. These correspond to two kinds ofknowledge, theillusion (eikasía) of our ordinary, everyday experience, andbelief (πίστιςpistis) about discrete physical objects which cast their shadows.[4] In theTimaeus, the category of illusion includes all the "opinions of which the minds of ordinary people are full," while the natural sciences are included in the category of belief.[4]
The termeikasía (Ancient Greek:εἰκασία), meaningconjecture in Greek, was used byPlato to refer to a human way of dealing with appearances.[5] Particularly, it is identified as the lower subsection of the visible segment and represents images, which Plato described as "first shadows, then reflections in water and in all compacted, smooth, and shiny materials".[6] According to the philosopher,eikasia andpistis add up todoxa, which is concerned with genesis (becoming).[7]
Eikasia has several interpretations. For instance, it is the inability to perceive whether aperception is animage of something else. It therefore prevents us from perceiving that adream ormemory or a reflection in amirror is notreality as such. Another variation posited by scholars such Yancey Dominick, explains that it is a way of understanding the originals that generate the objects that are considered aseikasia.[8] This allows one to distinguish the image from reality such as the way one can avoid mistaking a reflection of a tree in a puddle for a tree.[8]
According to some translations,[1] the segmentCE, representing the intelligible world, is divided into the same ratio asAC, giving the subdivisionsCD andDE (it can be readily verified thatCD must have the same length asBC):[9]
There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).[2]
Plato describesCD, the "lower" of these, as involvingmathematical reasoning (διάνοιαdianoia),[4] where abstractmathematical objects such asgeometric lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be confused with thedrawings of those lines, which fall within the physical worldBC). However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of philosophicalunderstanding (νόησιςnoesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses – that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole (511b).[2]
Plato here is using the familiar relationship between ordinary objects and their shadows or reflections in order to illustrate the relationship between the physical world as a whole and the world ofIdeas (Forms) as a whole. The former is made up of a series of passing reflections of the latter, which is eternal, more real and "true." Moreover, the knowledge that we have of the Ideas – when indeed we do have it – is of a higher order than knowledge of the mere physical world. In particular, knowledge of the forms leads to a knowledge of theIdea (Form) of the Good.[3]
| Segment | Correlation | Affection of the psyche | Type of object | Method of the psyche or eye | Relative truth and reality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE | Noesis (νόησις) | Knowledge (Understanding): understanding of only the Intelligible (νοητόν) | Only Ideas, which are all given existence and truth by theGood itself (τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν) | The Psyche examines all hypotheses by theDialectic making no use of likenesses, always moving towards a First Principle | Highest |
| CD | Dianoia (διάνοια) | Knowledge (Thought): thought that recognizes but is not only of the Intelligible | Some Ideas, specifically those of Geometry and Number | The Psyche assumes hypotheses while making use of likenesses, always moving towards final conclusions | High |
| BC | Pistis (πίστις) | Opinion (Belief): belief concerning visible things | Visible things (ὁρατά) | The eye makes probable predictions upon observing visible things | Low |
| AB | Eikasia (εἰκασία) | Opinion (Imagination): conjectures concerning likenesses | Likenesses of visible things (εἰκόνες) | The eye makes guesses upon observing likenesses of visible things | Lowest |
The analogy of the divided line is the cornerstone of Plato's metaphysical framework. This structure illustrates the grand picture of Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, all in one. It is not enough for the philosopher to understand the Ideas (Forms), he must also understand the relation of Ideas to all four levels of the structure to be able to know anything at all.[10][11][12] In theRepublic, the philosopher must understand the Idea of Justice to live a just life or to organize and govern a just state.[13]
The lowest level, which represents "the world of becoming and passing away" (Republic, 508d), is the metaphysical model for aHeraclitean philosophy of constant flux and forProtagorean philosophy of appearance and opinion. The second level, a world of fixed physical objects,[14][15] also becameAristotle's metaphysical model. The third level might be aPythagorean level of mathematics. The fourth level is Plato's idealParmenidean reality, the world of highest level Ideas.
Plato holds a very strict notion of knowledge. For example, he does not accept expertise about a subject, nor direct perception (seeTheaetetus), nor true belief about the physical world (theMeno) as knowledge. It is not enough for the philosopher to understand the Ideas (Forms), he must also understand the relation of Ideas to all four levels of the structure to be able to know anything at all.[16] For this reason, in most of the earlier Socratic dialogues, Socrates denies knowledge both to himself and others.
For the first level, "the world of becoming and passing away," Plato expressly denies the possibility of knowledge.[17] Constant change never stays the same, therefore, properties of objects must refer to different Ideas at different times. Note that for knowledge to be possible, which Plato believed, the other three levels must be unchanging. The third and fourth level, mathematics and Ideas, are already eternal and unchanging. However, to ensure that the second level, the objective, physical world, is also unchanging, Plato, in theRepublic, Book 4[18] introduces empirically derived[19][20][21]axiomatic restrictions that prohibit both motion and shifting perspectives.[14][22]
