Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Battle of the River Plate

Coordinates:34°S49°W / 34°S 49°W /-34; -49
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
First naval battle of the Second World War
This article is about the naval battle. For the film depiction, seeThe Battle of the River Plate (film).

Battle of the River Plate
Part of theAmerican Theatre ofWorld War II

HMS Achilles as seen fromHMS Ajax during the battle
Date13 - 17 December 1939
Location34°S49°W / 34°S 49°W /-34; -49
ResultAllied victory
Belligerents
 United Kingdom
 New Zealand
 Germany
Commanders and leaders
Henry HarwoodHans Langsdorff 
Strength
Heavy cruiserExeter
Light cruiserAchilles
Light cruiserAjax
PanzerschiffAdmiral Graf Spee
Casualties and losses
72 killed
28 wounded
36 killed
60 wounded
Admiral Graf Spee scuttled
Map

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

TheBattle of the River Plate was fought in theSouth Atlantic on 13 December 1939 as the first British naval battle of theSecond World War.

TheKriegsmarine heavy cruiserAdmiral Graf Spee, commanded by CaptainHans Langsdorff, engaged aRoyal Navy squadron,[1][2] commanded by CommodoreHenry Harwood,[3] comprising thelight cruisersHMS Ajax,HMNZS Achilles (on loan to theNew Zealand Division) and theheavy cruiserHMS Exeter.[4]

Graf Spee had sailed into the South Atlantic in August 1939, before the war began, and had beguncommerce raiding after receiving the appropriate authorisation on 26 September 1939.[5] Harwood's squadron was one of several search groups sent in pursuit by theBritish Admiralty and sightedGraf Spee off theestuary of theRiver Plate (a.k.a. theRío de la Plata) near the coasts ofArgentina andUruguay.[6]

In the ensuing battle,Exeter was severely damaged and forced to retire, making for theFalklands;Ajax andAchilles suffered moderate damage. Damage toGraf Spee, although not extensive, was critical because her fuel system was crippled.Ajax andAchilles shadowed the German ship until she entered the port ofMontevideo, the capital ofneutral Uruguay, to effect urgent repairs. Langsdorff was told that his stay could not be extended beyond 72 hours. Apparently believing that the British had gathered a superior force to await his departure, he ordered for the ship to bescuttled on 17 December.[7][8][9] Langsdorff then committed suicide two days later.[10][11]

Background

[edit]

Admiral Graf Spee had been at sea at the start of theSecond World War in September 1939 and had sunk several merchantmen in theIndian Ocean andSouth Atlantic Ocean without loss of life because of her captain's policy of taking all crews on board before sinking the victim.[12][13]

Admiral Graf Spee

TheRoyal Navy assembled nine forces to search for the surface raider:[14] Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron, comprised theCounty-class heavy cruiserHMS Cumberland of 10,570long tons (10,740 t) with eight 8-inch (203 mm) guns in four turrets, theYork-class heavy cruiser HMSExeter of 8,390 long tons (8,520 t) with six 8-inch (203 mm) guns in three turrets, and twoLeander-classlight cruisers, HMSAjax and HMNZSAchilles, both of 7,270 long tons (7,390 t) with eight 6-inch (150 mm) guns. Although technically a heavy cruiser because of the calibre of her guns,Exeter was a scaled-down version of the County class. The force was commanded by CommodoreHenry Harwood whose flagship wasAjax, captained byCharles Woodhouse.[3]Achilles was on loan to the New Zealand Division (precursor to theRoyal New Zealand Navy) and captained byEdward Parry.Exeter was commanded byCaptain Frederick Secker Bell.

During the period before and at the immediate time of the battle,Cumberland (commanded by Captain Walter Herman Gordon Fallowfield) was refitting in theFalkland Islands but was available for sea at short notice. Force G was supported by theoilers RFAOlna, RFAOlynthus, and RFAOrangeleaf.Olynthus replenished HMSAjax andAchilles on 22 November 1939, andExeter on 26 November, atSan Borombon Bay.Olynthus was also directed to keep observation between Medanos andCape San Antonio, off Argentina south of the River Plate estuary (see chart below).[4]

The route ofAdmiral Graf Spee's cruise, from the British HMSO report.

Following a raider-warning radio message from the merchantmanDoric Star, which was sunk byAdmiral Graf Spee off South Africa, Harwood suspected that the raider would try to strike next at the merchant shipping off the River Plate estuary between Uruguay and Argentina. He ordered his squadron to steam toward the position32° south,47° west.[15] Harwood chose that position, according to his dispatch, because it was the most congested part of the shipping routes in the South Atlantic and therefore the point at which a raider could do the most damage to enemy shipping. A Norwegian freighter sawAdmiral Graf Spee practising the use of her searchlights and radioed that her course was toward South America;[16] the three available cruisers of Force G rendezvoused off the estuary on 12 December and conducted manoeuvres.[7]

Regarding strategy, the British combat instructions for engaging a pocket battleship with a cruiser squadron had been devised by Harwood himself during his period at theRoyal Naval War College between 1934 and 1936. The strategy specified an attack at once, day or night. During the day, the ships would attack as two units, in this case withExeter separate fromAjax andAchilles.[6] At night, the ships would remain in company, but in open order. By attacking from two sides, Harwood hoped to give his lighter warships a chance of overcoming the German advantage of greater range and heavier broadside by dividing the enemy's fire. By splitting his force, Harwood would force the Germans to split their fire and reduce its effectiveness, or to keep it focused on one opponent and allow the other vessels to attack with less fear of return fire.[7][16]

Although outgunned byAdmiral Graf Spee and therefore at a tactical disadvantage, the British had the upper hand strategically since any raider returning to Germany would have to run the blockade of theNorth Sea and might reasonably be expected to encounter theHome Fleet.[6] For victory, the British had only to damage the raider enough so that she was either unable to make the journey or unable to fight a subsequent battle with the Home Fleet (by contrast, the Germans would have to destroy the British force without being severely damaged). Because of overwhelming numerical superiority, the loss of even all three cruisers would not have severely altered Britain's naval capabilities, butAdmiral Graf Spee was one of theKriegsmarine's fewcapital ships. The British could, therefore, afford to risk a tactical defeat if it brought strategic victory.[7]

Battle

[edit]
HMSAchilles

On 13 December at 05:20, the British squadron was proceeding on a course of 060° at 14 knots withAjax at34°34′S48°17′W / 34.567°S 48.283°W /-34.567; -48.283, 390 nmi (720 km) east of Montevideo. At 06:10, smoke was sighted on a bearing of Red-100, or 320° (to the north-west). Harwood ordered theExeter to investigate. She swung out of line, and at 06:16, she signaled by lamp: "I think it is a pocket-battleship". Captain Bell ordered Flag N hoisted to the yard arm – "Enemy in sight".[17]Graf Spee had already sighted mastheads and identifiedExeter but initially suspected that the two light cruisers were smaller destroyers and that the British ships were protecting a merchant convoy, the destruction of which would be a major prize. SinceGraf Spee's reconnaissance aircraft was out of service, Langsdorff relied on his lookouts for that information. He decided to engage despite having received a broadly accurate report from the German naval staff on 4 December. It outlined British activity in the River Plate area and included information thatAjax,Achilles,Cumberland andExeter were patrolling the South American coast.[18]

HMSAjax

Langsdorff realised too late that he was facing three cruisers.[7] Calling on the immediate acceleration of his diesel engines, he closed with the enemy squadron at 24 kn (28 mph; 44 km/h) in the hope of engaging the steam-driven British ships before they could work up from cruising speed to full power.[17] An alternative strategy would have been keeping the British ships at a distance to destroy them with his 283 mm (11.1 in) guns and remaining out of range of their smaller 6-inch and 8-inch guns. However, Langsdorff knew the British cruisers had a 4–6 kn (4.6–6.9 mph; 7.4–11.1 km/h) speed advantage overGraf Spee and could stay out of range while calling for reinforcements.[16]

HMSExeter

The British executed their battle plan:Exeter turned north-west, andAjax andAchilles, operating together, turned north-east to spreadGraf Spee's fire.[19]Graf Spee opened fire onExeter at 19,000 yd (17,000 m) with her six 283 mm (11.1 in) guns at 06:18.Exeter opened fire at 06:20,Achilles at 06:21,Exeter's aft guns at 06:22 andAjax at 06:23. Lieutenant-Commander Richard Jennings,Exeter's gunnery officer remembers:[20][21]

As I was crossing the compass platform [to his Action Station in the Director Control Tower], the captain hailed me, not with the usual rigmarole of "Enemy in sight, bearing, etc", but with "There's the fuckingScheer! Open fire at her!" Throughout the battle the crew of theExeter thought they were fighting the [sister ship]Scheer. But the name of the enemy ship was of course theGraf Spee.

From her opening salvo,Graf Spee's gunfire proved fairly accurate, her third salvo straddlingExeter. At 06:23, a 283 mm (11.1 in)shell burst just short ofExeter, abreast the ship. Splinters from the shell killed the torpedo tubes' crews, damaged the ship's communications, riddled the ship's funnels and searchlights and wrecked the ship'sWalrus aircraft just as it was about to be launched for gunnery spotting. Three minutes later,Exeter suffered a direct hit on her "B" turret, putting it and its two guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge, killing or wounding all bridge personnel except the captain and two others.[22] Captain Bell's communications were wrecked. Communications from theaft conning position were also destroyed. The ship had to be steered via a chain of messengers for the rest of the battle.[20]

Painting depicting the cruisers HMSExeter (foreground) and HMSAchilles (right centre background) in action with the German heavy cruiserGraf Spee (right background)

Meanwhile,Ajax andAchilles closed to 13,000 yd (12,000 m) and started making in front ofGraf Spee, causing her to split her main armament at 06:30 and otherwise use her 150 mm (5.9 in) guns against them. Shortly after,Exeter fired twotorpedoes from herstarboard tubes but both missed. At 06:37,Ajax launched herFairey Seafox spotterfloatplane from hercatapult. At 06:38,Exeter turned so that she could fire herport torpedoes and received two more direct hits from 283 mm (11.1 in) shells. One hit "A" turret and put it out of action, the other entered the hull and started fires.Exeter was severely damaged, having only "Y" turret still in action under "local" control, with Jennings on the roof shouting instructions to those inside.[23] She also had a 7°list, was being flooded and being steered with the use of her small boat'scompass. However,Exeter dealt the decisive blow; one of her 8-inch shells had penetrated two decks before exploding inGraf Spee's funnel area, destroyed her raw fuel processing system and left her with just 16 hours fuel, insufficient to allow her to return home.

At this point, nearly one hour after the battle had started,Graf Spee was doomed since she could not make fuel system repairs of that complexity under fire. Two thirds of her anti-aircraft guns were knocked out, as well as one of her secondary turrets. There were no friendly naval bases within reach or reinforcements available. She was not seaworthy and could make only the neutral port of Montevideo.[24]

HMSO chart of the engagement

Graf Spee hauled round from an easterly course, now behindAjax andAchilles, towards the north-west andlaid smoke. That course brought Langsdorff roughly parallel toExeter. By 06:50,Exeter listed heavily to starboard and took water forward. Nevertheless, she still steamed at full speed and fired with her one remaining turret. Forty minutes later, water splashed in by a 283 mm (11.1 in) near miss short-circuited her electrical system for that turret. Captain Bell was forced to break off the action.[25] That would have been the opportunity to finish offExeter. Instead, the combined fire ofAjax andAchilles drew Langsdorff's attention as both ships closed the German ship.[18]

Twenty minutes later,Ajax andAchilles turned to starboard to bring all their guns to bear, causingGraf Spee to turn away and lay asmoke screen. At 07:10, the two light cruisers turned to reduce the range from 8 mi (7.0 nmi; 13 km) even though that meant that only their forward guns could fire. At 07:16,Graf Spee turned to port and headed straight for the badly damagedExeter,[22] but fire fromAjax andAchilles forced her at 07:20 to turn and fire her 283 mm (11.1 in) guns at them, while they turned to starboard to bring all their guns to bear.Ajax turned to starboard at 07:24 and fired her torpedoes at a range of 4.5 miles (3.9 nmi; 7.2 km), causingGraf Spee to turn away under a smoke screen. At 07:25,Ajax was hit by a 283 mm (11.1 in) shell that put "X" turret out of action and jammed "Y" turret, causing some casualties. By 07:40,Ajax andAchilles were running low on resources, and the British decided to change tactics and move to the east under a smokescreen. Harwood decided to shadowGraf Spee and try to attack at night, when he could attack with torpedoes, better use his advantages of speed and manoeuvrability and minimise his deficiencies in armour.Ajax was again hit by a 283 mm (11.1 in) shell that destroyed her mast and caused more casualties.Graf Spee continued to the south-west.[12]

Pursuit

[edit]
Damage received byExeter during the Battle of the River Plate

The battle now turned into a pursuit.Captain Parry ofAchilles wrote afterwards: "To this day I do not know why theAdmiral Graf Spee did not dispose of us in theAjax and theAchilles as soon as she had finished with theExeter".[26] The British and New Zealand cruisers split up, keeping about 15 mi (13 nmi; 24 km) fromAdmiral Graf Spee.Ajax kept to the German's port andAchilles to the starboard. At 09:15,Ajax recovered her aircraft. At 09:46, Harwood signalled toCumberland for reinforcement and the Admiralty also ordered ships within 3,000 mi (2,600 nmi; 4,800 km) to proceed to the River Plate.[27]

At 10:05,Achilles had overestimatedAdmiral Graf Spee's speed and came into range of the German guns.Admiral Graf Spee turned and fired two three-gun salvoes with her fore guns.Achilles turned away under a smokescreen.[28]

According toDudley Pope, a merchant ship was sighted at 11:03 close toAdmiral Graf Spee.[26] After a few minutes,Admiral Graf Spee calledAjax on W/T, probably on the international watchkeeping frequency of 500 kHz, and used both ships' pre-war call signs, with the signal: "please pick up lifeboats of English steamer".[29] The German call sign was DTGS, confirming to Harwood that the pocket-battleship he had engaged was indeedAdmiral Graf Spee.Ajax did not reply, but a little later, the British flagship closed with SSShakespeare with her lifeboats still hoisted and men still on board.Admiral Graf Spee had fired a gun and ordered them to stop but when they did not obey orders to leave the ship, Langsdorff decided to continue on his way, andShakespeare had a lucky escape. The shadowing continued for the rest of the day until 19:15, whenAdmiral Graf Spee turned and opened fire onAjax, which turned away under a smokescreen.[29]

It was now clear thatAdmiral Graf Spee was entering the River Plate estuary. Since the estuary hadsandbanks, Harwood orderedAchilles to shadowAdmiral Graf Spee whileAjax would cover any attempt to double back through a different channel. The sun set at 20:48, withAdmiral Graf Speesilhouetted against the sun.Achilles had again closed the range andAdmiral Graf Spee opened fire, forcingAchilles to turn away. During the battle, a total of 108 men had been killed on both sides, including 36 onAdmiral Graf Spee.[12]

Admiral Graf Spee entered Montevideo inneutral Uruguay and dropped anchor at about 00:10 on 14 December.[30] That was a political error since Uruguay, while neutral, had benefited from significant British influence during its development and favoured the Allies.[31] TheBritish Hospital, for example, where the wounded from the battle were taken, was the leading hospital in the city. The port ofMar del Plata on the Argentine coast and 200 mi (170 nmi; 320 km) south of Montevideo would have been a better choice forAdmiral Graf Spee.[32] Also, hadAdmiral Graf Spee left port at the time, she would have encountered no British warships in the area except for the damagedAjax andAchilles.

Trap of Montevideo

[edit]
Admiral Graf Spee inMontevideo, with battle damage
Map of theRiver Plate showing possible exit channels.

In Montevideo, the 13thHague Convention came into play. Under Article 12, "belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours".[33][34] Under Article 14, a "belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the permissible time except on account of damage".[35] British diplomats duly pressed for the speedy departure of theGraf Spee. Also relevant was Article 16 of which part reads, "A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary".[36]

In accordance with their obligations, the Germans released 61 captive British merchant seamen who had been on board. Langsdorff then asked the Uruguayan government for two weeks to make repairs. Initially, the British diplomats in Uruguay, principallyEugen Millington-Drake, made several requests forAdmiral Graf Spee to leave port immediately.[1] After consultation with London, which was aware that there were no significant British naval forces in the area, Millington-Drake continued to demand forAdmiral Graf Spee to leave.[31] At the same time, he arranged for British and French merchant ships to steam from Montevideo at intervals of 24 hours, whether they had originally intended to do so or not, thus invoking Article 16. That keptAdmiral Graf Spee in port and allowed more time for British forces to reach the area.[9]

At the same time, the British attempted to feed falseintelligence to the Germans that an overwhelming British force was being assembled, includingForce H (theaircraft carrierHMS Ark Royal and thebattlecruiserHMS Renown) by broadcasting a series of signals, on frequencies known to be intercepted by German intelligence. In fact, the two cruisers had been joined only byCumberland, which had arrived at 22:00 on 14 December, after steaming 1,014 nautical miles (1,878 km; 1,167 mi) from the Falkland Islands in 34 hours, at an average of over 90% of her full trials speed attained over much shorter distances. The older and largerCumberland was more powerful thanExeter, with an additional aft turret containing two more 8-inch guns, but it was no match forAdmiral Graf Spee whose guns had significantly longer range and fired much heavier shells (660 lb against 256 lb). Overwhelming British forces (HMSRenown,Ark Royal,Shropshire,Dorsetshire, andNeptune) wereen route but would not assemble until 19 December although they could intercept earlier ifAdmiral Graf Spee headed north or north-east from Montevideo shadowed byCumberland and her smaller consorts. For the time being, the total force comprised the undamagedCumberland with a full ammunition load, and the damagedAjax andAchilles with depleted stocks of shells. To reinforce the propaganda effect, these ships, which were waiting just outside thethree-mile limit, were ordered to make smoke, which could be clearly seen from the Montevideo waterfront.[37]

On 15 December 1939,Olynthus refuelledAjax, which proved a difficult operation. The ship had to use hurricanehawsers to complete the replenishment. On 17 DecemberAchilles was replenished fromOlynthus off Rouen Bank.

The Germans were entirely deceived and expected to face a far superior force on leaving the River Plate.[9]Admiral Graf Spee had also used two thirds of her 283 mm (11.1 in) ammunition and had enough left for approximately only a further 20 minutes of firing.[38] Such a reduced ammunition stock was hardly sufficient for the ship to fight her way out of Montevideo against the large force expected, let alone get back to Germany. Even the only actual British newcomer, the previously unengagedCumberland, could fight at full capacity for about 90 minutes and pursue at equal or higher speed for at least another 2,000 nautical miles (3,700 km; 2,300 mi) before she required replenishment at sea.

Meanwhile, as theGraf Spee remained in the bay, British diplomatic personnel based in Montevideo and Buenos Aires carefully watched her from shore 24 hours a day, and the expectation of a potential breakout and resumption of the battle caused tensions and anxiety to surge to enormous levels among British sailors and diplomats.[39]

On the German side, while the ship was prevented from leaving the harbour, Captain Langsdorff consulted with his command in Germany.[37] He received orders that permitted some options but not internment in Uruguay. The Germans feared that Uruguay could be persuaded to join the Allied cause. Ultimately, he chose toscuttle his ship in the River Plate estuary on 17 December to avoid unnecessary loss of life for no particular military advantage, a decision that infuriatedAdolf Hitler.[40][41]

The crew ofAdmiral Graf Spee were taken toBuenos Aires,Argentina, where Captain Langsdorff shot himself on 19 December. He was buried there with full military honours, and several British officers attended. Many of the crew members made their homes in Montevideo with the help of local people of German origin.[42] The German dead were buried in theCementerio del Norte, Montevideo.[43]

Aftermath

[edit]
Admiral Graf Spee in flames after being scuttled in the River Plate estuary
Captain Langsdorff at the funeral of crew members who were killed in the battle.

The Germanpropaganda machine had reported thatAdmiral Graf Spee had sunk a heavy cruiser and heavily damaged two light cruisers and had been only lightly damaged herself.[44] The scuttling ofAdmiral Graf Spee, however, was a severe embarrassment and difficult to explain on the basis of publicly available facts. The battle was a major victory for the British, as the damage toAjax andAchilles was not sufficient to reduce their fighting efficiency, andExeter, as badly damaged as she was, had managed to reach the Falkland Islands for emergency repairs.

Lieutenant Atwill, who wrote an account of the battle in which he served onExeter, detailed the damage done and the emergency repairs to make the ship seaworthy enough to reachStanley, Falkland Islands. There were rumours that she would remain there and become a rusting hulk until the end of the war, butFirst Lord of the AdmiraltyWinston Churchill wrote to theFirst Sea Lord and others, "We ought not readily to accept the non-repair during the war ofExeter. She should be strengthened and strutted internally as far as possible . . . and come home".[45]Exeter returned toDevonport for a 13-month refit, enhancing Churchill's reputation.[46]

While highly praised for his excellent performance in battle, Harwood received criticism directed towards his lack of initiative and for not employing a more aggressive approach; those criticisms are mostly due toAdmiral Graf Spee being allowed to escape though outnumbered by ships able jointly to make a more damaging rate of fire.[47]

Prisoners taken from merchant ships captured byAdmiral Graf Spee who had been transferred to her supply shipAltmark were freed by a boarding party from the British destroyerHMS Cossack in theAltmark incident (16 February 1940) inJøssingfjord, at the time neutralNorwegian waters. Prisoners who had not been transferred toAltmark had remained aboardAdmiral Graf Spee during the battle; they were released on arrival in Montevideo.[42]

On 22 December 1939, over 1,000 sailors fromAdmiral Graf Spee were taken to Buenos Aires and interned there;[48][42] at least 92 were transferred during 1940 to a camp inRosario, some were transferred toClub Hotel de la Ventana inBuenos Aires Province and another group toVilla General Belgrano, a small town founded by Germanimmigrants in 1932. Some of these sailors later settled there.[48] After the war many German sailors settled permanently in various parts of Uruguay, some returning after being repatriated to Germany.[49] Rows of simple crosses in the Cementerio del Norte, in the north of the city of Montevideo, mark the burial places of the German dead. Three sailors killed aboardAchilles were buried in the British Cemetery in Montevideo, while those who died onExeter wereburied at sea.

Intelligence gathering and salvage

[edit]
Admiral Graf Spee's Number Four 15.0 cm/55 gun mount (second gun in the forward port side group). Twin gun barrels at upper left are those of the ship's Number Two 10.5 cm/65 anti-aircraft gun mount

Immediately after her scuttling, the wreck ofAdmiral Graf Spee rested in shallow water, with much of the ship's superstructure remaining above water level,[16] but over the years, the wreck has subsided into the muddy bottom, and only the tip of the mast remains above the surface.[50]

A radar expert was sent to Montevideo shortly after the scuttling and reported a rotating aerial, probably for gunlaying, transmitting on either 57 or 114 centimetres. In February 1940, the wreck was boarded by United States Navy sailors from the light cruiserUSS Helena.[43]

Pieces and parts of the ship have also been displayed in museums and studied by scientists who have carried out tests like metallurgical analyses of theGraf Spee.[51]

In 1964, on the 25 anniversary of the battle, a memorial to the ship was erected in Montevideo's port. Part of it isAdmiral Graf Spee's anchor.[52]

In 1997, one ofAdmiral Graf Spee's 150 mm (5.9 in) secondary gun mounts was raised and restored; it can now be seen outside Montevideo's National Maritime Museum.

In February 2004, a salvage team began work raising the wreck. The operation is being funded in part by the government of Uruguay, in part by the private sector, as the wreck is now a hazard to navigation. The first major section, the 27 long tons (27 t) heavy gunnery control station, was raised on 25 February 2004. It is expected to take several years to raise the entire wreck.James Cameron filmed the salvage operation. After she has been raised, it is planned that the ship might be restored and put on display at the National Marine Museum.[53][54]

Many German veterans did not approve of the restoration attempt, as they considered the wreck to be awar grave and an underwater historical monument that should be respected. One of them, Hans Eupel, a former specialist torpedo mechanic, 87 years old in 2005, said that "this is madness, too expensive and senseless. It is also dangerous, as one of the three explosive charges we placed did not explode".[55]

HMSAchilles; this painting by Frank Norton is part of the National Collection of War Art held byArchives New Zealand

On 10 February 2006, the 2 m (6 ft 7 in), 400 kg eagle andswastika crest ofAdmiral Graf Spee was recovered from thestern of the ship.[56] The spread-wing statue of a Nazi eagle with a wreath in its talons containing a swastika was attached to the stern, not the bow like traditional figureheads. It was a common feature of prewar German warships. In other cases, it was removed for a variety of practical reasons on the outbreak of the war, but becauseAdmiral Graf Spee was already at sea when the war began, she went into action and was scuttled with it attached, which permitted its recovery. To protect the feelings of those with painful memories ofNazi Germany, the swastika at the base of the figurehead was covered as it was pulled from the water. The figurehead was stored in a Uruguayan naval warehouse after German complaints about exhibiting "Nazi paraphernalia".[50]

Graves of the sailors from HMSAchilles in The British Cemetery, Montevideo

Legacy

[edit]
Admiral Graf Spee's salvagedrangefinder in Montevideo

In 1956, the filmThe Battle of the River Plate (US title:Pursuit of the Graf Spee) was made of the battle andAdmiral Graf Spee's end, withPeter Finch as Langsdorff andAnthony Quayle as Harwood. Finch portrays Langsdorff sympathetically as a gentleman. TheAchilles, which had been recommissioned in 1948 asHMISDelhi, flagship of the Royal Indian Navy, played herself in the film. HMSAjax (twin turrets) was "played" by HMSSheffield (triple turrets), HMSExeter (twin turrets) by HMSJamaica (triple turrets) and HMSCumberland by herself (although de-gunned as a trials platform).Admiral Graf Spee (two turrets) was portrayed by the U.S. heavy cruiserUSS Salem (three turrets).

The incompleteBattle-class destroyer HMSRiver Plate was named after the battle.

The battle was for many years re-enacted with large-scale model boats throughout the summer season atPeasholm Park in the English seaside resort ofScarborough. The re-enactment now portrays an anonymous battle between a convoy of British ships and an unspecified enemy in possession of the nearby shore.[57]

After the battle, the new town ofAjax, Ontario, in Canada, constructed as a Second World War munitions production centre, was named after HMSAjax. Many of its streets are named after Admiral Harwood's crewmen onAjax,Exeter andAchilles.[58] Its main street is named after Admiral Harwood, while a small street was named (after some controversy) for Captain Langsdorff. According to an article in the German language paperAlbertaner on 6 October 2007, Steve Parish, the mayor of Ajax, defended the decision, declaring that Langsdorff had not been a typical Nazi officer. An accompanying photograph (in the "Aftermath" section above) from the funeral of crew members shows Langsdorff paying tribute with a traditional naval salute, while people beside and behind him – even some clergymen – are giving the Fascist salute.[59] The street name was changed in 2021 in response to public opposition.[60]

Also in Canada, the names of the ships, and the commander of Force G, have been used for Cadet Corps. The Royal Canadian Sea Cadet Corps (RCSCC) Ajax No. 89 in Guelph, Ontario; the Navy League Cadet Corps (NLCC) Achilles No. 34 in Guelph, Ontario; the Navy League Wrenette Corps (NLWC) Lady Exeter (now disbanded) and the camp shared by all three corps, called Camp Cumberland (this camp no longer exists; it was decommissioned around 1999). RCSCC Harwood No. 244 and NLCC Exeter No. 173 are situated in Ajax, Ontario.[58]

A number of streets inNelson Bay, New South Wales, have been named after the battle including Montevideo Parade, Achilles Street, Ajax Avenue, Harwood Avenue, and Exeter Road (now called Shoal Bay Road).[61][62] InAuckland, home port of theRoyal New Zealand Navy, streets have been named forAchilles,Ajax andExeter.[58] Three streets inNorth Wollongong, New South Wales, are named Ajax Avenue, Exeter Avenue and Achilles Avenue.[63]

The battle is also significant as it was the first time theFlag of New Zealand was flown in battle, from HMSAchilles.[43][64] Also in New Zealand, four mountain peaks in theTwo Thumb Range region of the South Island are named in commemoration of the battle. These are Achilles[65] (2,544 m), Exeter (2,327 m), Ajax[66] (2,319 m) and Graf Spee (2,267 m).

References

[edit]
  1. ^abGotta, César; Buzzi, Alfredo E. (1 January 2008). Surur, Alberto; Mariluis, Carolina; Daher, Cristián; Simonetto, Raúl; Re, Rodrigo; Kohan, Andrés (eds.)."Samuel Stuart Pennington y la Batalla del Río de la Plata. Segunda parte"(PDF).Revista Argentina de Radiología (in Spanish).72 (1).Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sociedad Argentina de Radiología:33–40.ISSN 0048-7619. Retrieved28 August 2021 – viaRedalyc.
  2. ^Gotta, César; Buzzi, Alfredo E. (1 December 2007). Surur, Alberto; Mariluis, Carolina; Daher, Cristián; Simonetto, Raúl; Re, Rodrigo; Kohan, Andrés (eds.)."Samuel Stuart Pennington y la Batalla del Río de la Plata. Primera parte"(PDF).Revista Argentina de Radiología (in Spanish).71 (4).Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sociedad Argentina de Radiología:387–393.ISSN 0048-7619. Retrieved28 August 2021 – viaRedalyc.
  3. ^abKonstam 2016, pp. 17–20,3. Opposing Commanders.
  4. ^abKonstam 2016, pp. 17–20,4. Opposing Forces.
  5. ^Hughes, Terry; Costello, John (1977). Wade, J.;MacVeagh, Lincoln (eds.).The Battle of the Atlantic.New York City:The Dial Press.ISBN 978-0-8037-6454-5.OCLC 464381083.
  6. ^abcGrove 2013, pp. 1–56,I. The Chase and Destruction of the Graf Spee (including the Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939) – Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, 4A, 5 and 6.
  7. ^abcdeRust, Eric C. (1 October 2014). Bellamy, Martin (ed.)."Command Decisions: Langsdorff and the battle of the River Plate".The Mariner's Mirror.99 (4).London, United Kingdom of Great Britain:Society for Nautical Research/Taylor & Francis:492–494.doi:10.1080/00253359.2013.848587.ISSN 0025-3359.S2CID 110238416. Retrieved27 August 2021.
  8. ^Fischer, Diego (2015). Bonilla, Fernando (ed.).Tres hombres y una batalla: Historias desconocidas que rodearon a Millington-Drake y al Graf Spee (in Spanish) (3rd ed.).Montevideo, Uruguay: enguin Random House Grupo Editorial Uruguay.ISBN 978-9974-723-18-4. Retrieved28 August 2021 – viaGoogle Books.
  9. ^abcWoodman, Richard; et al. (Graphics by John Morris and Christopher Summerville) (2008).The Battle of the River Plate: A Grand Delusion. Campaign Chronicles Series (2nd ed.).Barnsley, United Kingdom of Great Britain:Pen & Sword Books Limited.ISBN 978-1-4738-4573-2 – viaGoogle Books.
  10. ^Grove 2013, p. 1-56,I. The Chase and Destruction of the Graf Spee (including the Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939) – Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, 4A, 5 and 6.
  11. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 132–135,Chapter 24: Langsdorff's Death.
  12. ^abcWebeneth, James P. (1 April 2018).Bennighof, Mike; Knipple, Brian (eds.)."The voyage of the Graf Spee, part 2".Avalanche Press.Irondale,Alabama, US: Avalanche Press Ltd. Retrieved27 August 2021.
  13. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 1–5,Chapter 1: The First Victim.
  14. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 6–15,Chapter 2: The Hunt Begins.
  15. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 29–30,Chapter 7: The Liner Doric Star.
  16. ^abcdHarwood, Henry;Bell, Frederick; Parry, WE (1940).Department of the Admiralty (ed.).The Battle of the River Plate: An account of events before, during and after the action up to the self-destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee(PDF) (Report). London: His Majesty's Stationery Office – via HathiTrust Digital Library.
  17. ^abThomas, David (1 January 1977). Cacutt, Len; Moore, William; Branigan, Dennis; Boywer, Chaz (eds.). "Battle of the River Plate".War Monthly. Vol. 3, no. 34. London: Marshall Cavendish Ltd. p. 3.
  18. ^abLandsborough 2016, pp. 36–44,Chapter 9: H.M.S.Exeter Sighted.
  19. ^Bennett, Seán G. (1 July 2019). Robertson, Andy; Richardson, Martin; Robertson, David (eds.)."The battle of the River Plate: Excerpts from the diary of Surgeon Commander Jack Cussen RN, PMO of HMSExeter".Journal of Military and Veterans Health.27 (3).Hobart: Australian Military Medical Association:57–63.ISSN 1835-1271. Retrieved27 August 2021.
  20. ^abArthur 2004, p. 29.
  21. ^Arthur 2012, p. 213,Part Three: Chapter 4. Convoys, submarines and battleships, 1941–42.
  22. ^abLandsborough 2016, pp. 68–74,Chapter 13: Exeter is Pounded.
  23. ^Arthur 2004, pp. 29–30.
  24. ^Maier et al. 1991, p. 166.
  25. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 75–81,Chapter 14: Ordered Out of Battle.
  26. ^abPope 1999, p. ix.
  27. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 44–46,Chapter 10: The River Plate.
  28. ^Grove, Eric; et al. (Introduction by Eric Grove, foreword by the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh) (2013) [2002]."III. The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck". In Moran, Mike (ed.).German Capital Ships and Raiders in World War II: Volume I: From Graf Spee to Bismarck, 1939–1941. Naval Staff Histories. Vol. I (3rd ed.).Routledge (Taylor & Francis). pp. 50–60.ISBN 978-1135283223 – viaGoogle Books.
  29. ^abLandsborough 2016, pp. 52–67,Chapter 12:Graf Spee Could No Longer Avoid Battle.
  30. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 88–90,Chapter 16 Battle in Uruguayan Territorial Waters.
  31. ^abLandsborough 2016, pp. 91–94,Chapter 17: Diplomatic Battle Begins.
  32. ^Millington-Drake 1965, pp. 226–228.
  33. ^(Hague XIII) Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (International treaty XIII.12, 12) (in French and English).The Hague,Netherlands: Second Hague Conference. 18 October 1907. p. 20 – via The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (Yale Law School).
  34. ^Perea Unceta, José Antonio (1 January 2013). García Moreno, Ana (ed.)."La batalla del río de la plata. Práctica de Derecho internacional público"(PDF).Reduca (Derecho Internacional Público). Serie Derecho Internacional Público (in Spanish).4 (1).Madrid: Facultad de Ciencias Biológicas de laUniversidad Complutense de Madrid:12–16.ISSN 2172-6884. Retrieved16 August 2021.
  35. ^(Hague XIII) Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (International treaty XIII.14, 14) (in French and English).The Hague,Netherlands: Second Hague Conference. 18 October 1907. p. 20 – via The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (Yale Law School).
  36. ^(Hague XIII) Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (International treaty XIII.16, 16) (in French and English).The Hague,Netherlands: Second Hague Conference. 18 October 1907. p. 20 – via The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (Yale Law School).
  37. ^abLandsborough 2016, pp. 88–90,Chapter 16: Battle in Uruguayan Territorial Waters.
  38. ^Grove 2013, pp. 1–56,I. The Chase and Destruction of theGraf Spee (including the Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939) – Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, 4A, 5 and 6.
  39. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 121–124,Chapter 22: Hysteria Ashore.
  40. ^Crossland, David (1 November 2019). Kasper-Claridge, Manuela;Limbourg, Peter (eds.)."WWII: Germany grapples with honoringGraf Spee captain".Deutsche Welle (DW).Berlin:Federal Government of Germany. Archived fromthe original on 1 October 2019. Retrieved16 August 2021.
  41. ^Hull, Michael D. (29 September 2018).Simes, Dimitri;Heilbrunn, Jacob; Kazianis, Harry (eds.)."RIPGraf Spee: How Hitler's pocket battleship was sunk".The National Interest. Warfare History Network.Washington, D.C.:Center for the National Interest.ISSN 0884-9382.OCLC 225234688. Archived fromthe original on 30 September 2018. Retrieved15 August 2021.
  42. ^abcLandsborough 2016, pp. 97–104,Chapter 19: The Prisoners are Freed.
  43. ^abcKonstam 2016, pp. 88–91,6. The Aftermath.
  44. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 105–117,Chapter 20: A Propaganda War.
  45. ^Atwill, Ron (30 March 1977)."HMS Exeter at the Battle of River Plate".Naval Historical Society of Australia.
  46. ^Landsborough 2016, pp. 136–143,Chapter 25: The Victors Return Home.
  47. ^Zimm, Alan D. (1 August 2019). Daly, Peter H.; Clift, A. Denis; Hamblet, Bill; Kane, Adam; Ripley, Mary; Stickles, Brendan (eds.)."A Battle Badly Fought".Naval History Magazine.33 (4).Newport,Rhode Island, US: Naval History and Heritage Command/United States Naval War College (United States Department of the Navy):37–41.Combining rate of fire and shell effectiveness, the British had a firepower advantage of 125 percent... the British had a 60 percent tonnage advantage.
  48. ^abDick 2014, pp. 151–158,Chapter X. Internment: The worst of times, the best of times.
  49. ^Dick 2014, pp. 176–192,Chapter XII. Return to Germany.
  50. ^abde los Reyes, Ignacio (15 December 2014).Harding, James (ed.)."What should Uruguay do with its Nazi eagle?".BBC News.British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Archived fromthe original on 15 December 2014. Retrieved16 August 2021.
  51. ^Palacios, Tulio; Nuñez Pettinari, Segundo Ismael; Epps, María Rosa; Nasti, Atilio (1 January 2012). Prieto, Albert; Nasti, Atilio; Vargas, Ernesto; Brizi Godino, Ivan; Echeverría, José; Cornejo Guerrero, Miguel Antonio; Fusco Zambetogliris, Nelsys (eds.)."Caracterización metalúrgica de una tapa de guerra del acorazado "Graf Spee"".Revista de Arqueología Americana (in Spanish).16 (26).Mexico City,Distrito Federal: Pan American Institute of Geography and History:241–253.ISSN 0188-3631.JSTOR 27768538 – viaResearchGate.
  52. ^"Graf Spee: el 17 de diciembre se cumplen 80 años del hundimiento del acorazado nazi".Fundación Nuestro Mar (in Spanish). 13 December 2019. Retrieved17 December 2025.
  53. ^Konstam 2016, pp. 32–87,5. The Campaign.
  54. ^Konstam 2016, pp. 92–93,7. The Battlefield Today.
  55. ^Rohter, Larry (25 August 2006).Sulzberger, A.G.;Baquet, Dean; Louttit, Meg (eds.)."A Swastika, 60 Years Submerged, Still Inflames Debate".The New York Times. New York City, New York, United States of America. Archived fromthe original on 19 November 2015. Retrieved16 August 2021.
  56. ^"Graf Spee's eagle rises from deep".BBC News. London: BBC. 10 February 2006. Retrieved20 January 2021.
  57. ^"Naval Warfare". Scarborough: Friends of Peasholm Park. 2017. Retrieved20 January 2021.
  58. ^abcKitts, Daniel (10 November 2015)."The Second World War created Ajax. Here's how".TVOntario (TVO).Toronto,Ontario, Canada: Ontario Educational Communications Authority (OECA). Archived fromthe original on 29 September 2019. Retrieved16 August 2021.
  59. ^"Commander Langsdorf and German ministers at the burial of the German..."Getty Images. 10 March 2004. Retrieved15 August 2021.
  60. ^"New name for Ajax street that had been named after captain of Nazi war ship".St. Catharines Standard. 12 March 2021. Retrieved25 January 2022.
  61. ^Mehrpour, Bahman; Kohan, Rachel; Muscat, Elizabeth; Nagodavithane, Asith (25 October 2017)."2. Policy and planning framework"(PDF). In Dehghan, Koosha; Miller, Larissa; Lee, Mitchell (eds.). Port Stephens Pedestrian Access and Mobility Plan – Tomaree Planning District. Port Stephens Council/Tomaree Planning District (Report).St Leonards,Australia: Cardno Pty Ltd/Council Local Government Area (LGA). pp. 5–6. Retrieved27 August 2021
    2.2 Port Stephens Council policies and plans
    {{cite report}}: CS1 maint: postscript (link)
  62. ^Loceht, Len (1 November 1989). Benet, Theo (ed.)."Battle of the River Plate NZ re-union".Vetaffairs. Vol. 57, no. 7.Canberra,Australia: Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs.ISSN 0819-8934 – via Trove (National Library of Australia).
  63. ^Mackay, Don (2 May 2021). Currie, Shayne; Wilson, Matthew; Boggs, Michael (eds.)."Poppies to adorn street signs in Whangamata".The New Zealand Herald.Auckland,New Zealand.ISSN 1170-0777. Archived fromthe original on 3 May 2021. Retrieved27 August 2021.
  64. ^"Captain Parry's Story of the Battle".Auckland Star. Vol. LXXI, no. 46.Auckland, New Zealand. 23 February 1940. p. 9. Retrieved3 November 2014 – via Papers Past (National Library of New Zealand).The "Diggers' " flag, the New Zealand Ensign, flying at the masthead of Achilles during the naval battle
  65. ^"Antarctica Detail".geonames.usgs.gov. Retrieved6 May 2021.
  66. ^"Antarctica Detail".geonames.usgs.gov. Archived fromthe original on 12 July 2020. Retrieved6 May 2021.

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
  • Churchill, Winston (1967a) [first published 1948].The Gathering Storm: From War to War, 1919–1939. The Second World War. Vol. I (9th ed.). London: Cassell & Co. Ltd.

External links

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related toBattle of the River Plate.
Events
Histories
People
See also
National
Other
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_the_River_Plate&oldid=1328354972"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2026 Movatter.jp