Armoured warfare orarmored warfare (American English;see spelling differences), is the use ofarmoured fighting vehicles inmodern warfare. It is a major component of modernmethods of war.^[1] The premise of armored warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventionaldefensive lines through use ofmanoeuvre by armoured units.^[2]

Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use oftanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such asinfantry fighting vehicles,self-propelled artillery, and othercombat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units.^[3] Thedoctrine of armored warfare was developed to break the static nature ofWorld War Itrench warfare on theWestern Front, and return to the 19th century school of thought that advocated manoeuvre anddecisive battle outcomes inmilitary strategy.^[2]

Modern armored warfare began during theFirst World War of 1914–1918. Strategists wanted to break thetactical,operational andstrategicstalemates forced on commanders on theWestern Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed withmachine guns – known astrench warfare. Under these conditions, attacks usually advanced very slowly and incurred massive casualties. The developers of tanks aimed to return manoeuvre to warfare, and found a practical way to do so: providing caterpillar traction to machine guns allowing them to overcome trenches, while at the same time offering them armour protection againstsmall arms as they were moving.

Britain and France first developed tanks in 1915 as a way of navigating thebarbed wire and other obstacles ofno-man's land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire. BritishMark I tanks first went into actionat the Somme on 15 September 1916,^[4] but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare. The first French employment of tanks, on 16 April 1917, using theSchneider CA, also failed to live up to expectations. In theBattle of Cambrai (November to December 1917) British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system, theHindenburg Line.^[5]

Despite the generally unpromising beginnings, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France during 1917 backed large investment into armoured-vehicle production. This led to a sharp increase in the number of available tanks for 1918. TheGerman Empire, on the contrary, produced only a few tanks, late in the war. Twenty GermanA7V tanks were produced during the entire conflict, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various kinds. Nonetheless, World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during theSecond Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three BritishMark IV tanks which they met accidentally.

After the finalGerman spring offensives of 21 March to 18 July 1918, the Entente deployed tanksen masse at theBattle of Soissons (18 to 22 July 1918) andBattle of Amiens (August 1918), which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, and thus effectively ended the war.

Tactically, deployment plans for armour during the war typically placed a strong emphasis on direct support for infantry. The tank's main tasks were seen as crushing barbed-wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers. Theoretical debate largely focused on the question of whether to use a "swarm" of light tanks for this, or a limited number of potent heavy vehicles. Though in the Battle of Cambrai a large concentration of British heavy tanks effected a breakthrough, it was not exploited by armour. The manoeuvrability of the tank should at least in theory regain armies the ability toflank enemy lines. In practice, tank warfare during most of World War I was hampered by the technical immaturity of the new weapon system, limiting speed, operational range, and reliability, and a lack of effective armoured tactics.

Strategic use of tanks developed only slowly during and immediately after World War I, partly due to these technical limits but also due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry. An exception, on paper, was thePlan 1919 of the British Army's ColonelJ. F. C. Fuller, who envisaged using the expected vast increase in armour production during 1919 to execute deep strategic penetrations by mechanised forces consisting of tanks and infantry carried by trucks, supported by aeroplanes, to paralyse the enemy command-structure.^[6]

Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought.

During the 1920s, a very limited number of tanks were produced. There were however, important theoretical and technical developments. Various British and French commanders who had contributed to the origin of the tank, such asJean Baptiste Eugène Estienne,B. H. Liddell Hart andJ. F. C. Fuller, theorised about a possible future use of independent armoured forces, containing a large concentration of tanks, to execute deep strategic penetrations. Especially Liddell Hart wrote many books about the subject, partly propagating Fuller's theories. Such doctrines were faced with the reality that during the 1920s the armoured vehicles, as earlyroad transport in general, were extremely unreliable, and could not be used in sustained operations. Mainstream thought on the subject was more conservative and tried to integrate armoured vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organisation and tactics.

Technical development initially focused on the improvement of the suspension system, transmission and engine, to create vehicles that were faster, more reliable and had a better range than their WW I predecessors.^[7] To save weight, such designs had thin armour plating and this inspired fitting small-calibre high-velocity guns in turrets, giving tanks a good antitank capacity.^[8] Both France and Britain eventually built specialised infantry tanks, more heavily armoured to provide infantry support, and cavalry tanks that were faster and could exploit a breakthrough, seeking to bring about defeat of the enemy by severing his lines of communication and supply, as cavalry had done during the previous century.

The British were the first to create a larger fully mechanised unit when theWar Office sanctioned the creation of theExperimental Mechanized Force,^[9] which was formed on 1 May 1927, under infantry Colonel R. J. Collins, after Fuller (was) refused the function. Its sub-units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissancetankettes andarmoured cars, a battalion of forty-eightVickers Medium Mark I tanks, a motorised machine-gun battalion, a mechanised artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelledBirch guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery, and a motorised company of field engineers.^[10] The unit carried out operations onSalisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, theUnited States,Germany, and theSoviet Union. Although its performance was recognised, it was disbanded in 1928.

In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S.Naval War College, argued that the British army, under budget and over-stretched during the interwar period, pursued innovation recklessly by betting on the combat effectiveness of armoured units operating with little infantry or artillery support. Doing so led to its initial setbacks inNorth Africa during the Second World War.^[11]

All major European states (with the exception of Germany that was forbidden to possess armoured vehicles under theTreaty of Versailles), the US, and Japan, would create their own experimental mechanised forces during the late 1920s, many using either French or British vehicle designs or even directly purchased vehicles, but largely borrowing from both to develop their own doctrines.

During the 1930s, political tensions between the world powers quickly increased. TheSoviet Union and France began to rearm in the early thirties. In the Soviet Union, the mechanisation of the armed forces was part of a massive general industrialisation programme, the successiveFive Years Plans, and the country soon had more tanks than the rest of the world combined, thousands of them being produced per year. In this period, before the rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, German officers were sent to observe and participate in development of armoured doctrine in the USSR.Red Army and German experts collaborated in developing the use of tanks based on second generation vehicles with turreted main weapons, and experimenting to design different chassis configurations and drive trains. One important acquisition for the Red Army turned out to be the purchase of a T3 chassis, using theChristie suspension, from US designerJohn Walter Christie, which served as the basis of the SovietBT series of fast tanks.^[12] The Red Army tactics were influenced by the theoretical works of MarshalMikhail Tukhachevsky who advocated "large scale tank warfare" as part of thedeep battle doctrine.^[13]

In France, the second largest tank producer, mechanisation was motivated by a need to compensate for severe manpower shortages due to a collapsed birth rate during World War I. This led to the development of a vast range of specialised armoured vehicles, not just tanks but alsoarmoured cars,self-propelled guns,mechanised artillery, armoured tractors, armoured supply vehicles, armoured artillery observation vehicles, armoured command vehicles,half-tracks, and fully trackedarmoured personnel carriers. As the mechanisation progressed, slowly the French armour doctrine began to reflect the increased capacity, evolving from direct infantry support, to independent breakthrough and eventually envelopment with the Infantry, and to deep strategic exploitation with the Cavalry.^[14]Despite the increase in tank numbers, in all countries financial constraints prohibited a full mechanisation of the entire armed ground forces. Necessarily, most of the divisions still consisted of infantry that was not even motorised. As a result, tanks tended to be allotted to special armoured units, where the limited and expensive expert maintenance and training capacity could be concentrated. Only the Soviet Union had enough tanks to equip an organic tank battalion in each infantry division. Nevertheless, France was the first to create large armoured units: in 1934 two Mechanised Corps were formed of 430 tanks each.^[15] In July 1935, in France the 4th Cavalry Division was transformed into the1e Division Légère Mécanique, the first French armoured division of the Cavalry. In Germany, after theNazi Regime started open rearmament in March 1935, on 15 October 1935 threePanzerdivisionen were formed. Though some tank brigades were part of the Cavalry or Infantry arm, most German tanks were concentrated into a special branch, from 1936 called thePanzerwaffe. The precise interpretation of this phenomenon has proven controversial among military historians. Traditionally, it has been seen as part of a "Blitzkrieg strategy" of swift world conquest by means of armoured forces. Later it has been argued, among others byKarl-Heinz Frieser, that the German army in the 1930s did not even possess an explicit Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine, let alone strategy. This would have been reflected by the relatively unimpressive rate of tank production and development.^[16] During the 1930s theUnited Kingdom gave priority to theRoyal Air Force andRoyal Navy. TheBritish Army began the conversion of its cavalry from horse to tanks and all but a few regiments were fully converted by 1939. TheBritish 1st Armoured Division was formed, as the "Mobile Division", in November 1937.

Before theSecond World War actual use of armoured fighting vehicles was limited. Both sides used Italian, German and Soviet tanks during theSpanish Civil War but these proved to be vulnerable to antitank guns due to their thin armour. Traditionalist elements within the Red Army used this to diminish the influence of proponents of mechanisation.^[17] Tukhachevsky himself was executed in 1937. Nevertheless, during theSoviet-Japanese Border Wars of 1938 and 1939, the Soviet forces tested modern armoured warfare tactics.GeneralGeorgy Zhukov in the summer of 1939 combined mass tank manoeuvres with artillery and air attacks, to defeat theJapanese Imperial Army at theBattles of Khalkhin Gol atNomonhan inMongolia.^[18] Partly as a result of the experiences in Spain, the Soviet Union began the development of a new generation of medium and heavy tanks, sporting much stronger armour and armament.^[19]

In theirInvasion of Poland during September 1939, German forces applied a narrow cooperation between large armoured units – of thePanzerwaffe and the Cavalry – and "active" infantry divisions to break the Polish defensive lines and pursue the defeated enemy forces. The more limited and dispersed Polish armoured units were quickly destroyed. The Red Army,invading the east of Poland, also deployed armoured divisions. At the time, the swift collapse of the Polish army was seen as the result of an armoured Blitzkrieg. However, later it has been argued that the campaign was largely an instance of the classical nineteenth century German concept of the "Annihilation Battle", in which the role of deep strategic armoured penetrations was limited.^[20]

In the wake of the Polish campaign, during thePhoney War French, British and German tank production sharply increased, with both western allies out-producing Germany. However, the Anglo-French coalition proved unable to match the Germans in the number of armoured divisions, as it was impossible to quickly raise such large units. Though the French possessed a superior number of tanks, often better armoured and armed, half of these were allotted at army-level to independentBataillons de Chars de Combat ("battle tank battalions") for infantry support.^[21] In early 1940, the German command had concluded that it could not win a war of attrition and embarked on a high-risk strategy. They approved theManstein Plan, envisaging an advance through theArdennes by the main mass of German infantry divisions, spearheaded by seven armoured divisions, while the main mobile French reserve consisting of three Cavalry armoured divisions (Divisions Légères Mécaniques or Mechanised Light Divisions) – the only armoured units organised on the lines of the German armoured divisions – would be lured into theLow Countries by a feint attack with a lesser force, including three armoured divisions. In May 1940, during theBattle of France, the German feint resulted in a number of undecided armour engagements, among them theBattle of Hannut, the largest tank battle fought until that date. At the same time, German motorised infantry west of the Ardennes forced the crossings over the riverMeuse, assisted by massivecarpet bombing of the crossing points. In the original plan, the armoured divisions were again supposed to closely cooperate with the infantry divisions. In reality, armour commanders likeErwin Rommel andHeinz Guderian immediately broke out of the bridgeheads, initiating a drive towards theEnglish Channel, which was reached within a week. The French reserve of four Infantry armoured divisions, theDivisions cuirassées, lacked sufficient strategic mobility to prevent this. The strategic envelopment surrounded the Belgian army, theBritish Expeditionary Force and the best French troops. It led to theEvacuation of Dunkirk and the ultimate fall of France in operationFall Rot.

The spectacular and unexpected success not only caused a sudden change in the globalgeostrategic situation, gaining Germany a position ofhegemony on the European continent, but also seemed to vindicate the theories of Fuller and Liddell-Hart. Confronted with the undeniable potential of armoured manoeuvre warfare, from the summer of 1940 onwards the armed forces of all surviving major powers adapted their tactical doctrine, unit organisation, strategic planning and tank production plans. According to Frieser, this was even true for Germany itself, that only now officially adopted Blitzkrieg tactics.^[16]

In the deserts of North Africa, the British developed the alternative approach of combining the armoured, infantry and artillery together to form a 'balanced, combined arms team'. The10th Italian Army of Maresciallo (Marshal)Rodolfo Graziani, being ill-armed and inadequately led, soon gave way to this approach by the Commonwealth troops of the BritishWestern Desert Force.

The arrival of the GermanAfrika Korps under command ofGeneral der PanzertruppeErwin Rommel highlighted the weaknesses of the British approach: the small number of infantry and artillery in each armoured division was sufficient when attacking the immobile and uncoordinated Italian troops, but against the highly mobile, well-coordinated German units, the undermanned Commonwealth formations were proving inadequate.^{[citation needed]}

Between 1941 and 1942, the Allies struggled in armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions; however, they achieved some notable successes atCrusader,1st Alamein and under Montgomery finally achieved decisive victories, in particular at theSecond Battle of El Alamein.^{[citation needed]}

In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote that due to factors emanating from theinterwar period, the British army in North Africa initially operated their armoured units with little infantry or artillery support. Meanwhile, the Germans had integrated their armour with mechanised infantry and artillery. Only after undoing their misplaced emphasis on armour were the British able to restore their combat effectiveness.^[11]

Much of the Red Army development in tank use was based on the theoretical work carried out by such officers asTukhachevsky andTriandafillov in the mid to late 1930s. This was as part of the two-directioned concepts, one being infantry-centred "broad front" and the other being a "shock army".^[22]

While the infantry based part of the doctrine demanded "powerful tanks" (heavy tanks armed with infantry guns and machineguns) and "tankettes" (light, often amphibious tanks with machineguns), the shock army demanded "manoeuvre tanks" (fast tanks with medium guns) used in conjunction with motorised forces and "mechanised cavalry" that would operate in depth as "strategic cavalry" combined with nascent airborne troops.These ideas culminated in the "PU-36" or the 1936 Field Service Regulations.

At the start of the Second World War much of the Red Army, including its armoured forces, was in transition and recovering from the1937 repression of the officer corps. The Red Army ignored the lessons fromNomonhan, which had been successfully conducted by GeneralZhukov, and relied instead on lessons from politically selected officers who were veterans of theSpanish Civil War. The result was a poor showing during theWinter War.^[23] The Red Army tank fleet was extremely large, consisting of some 24,000 vehicles, but many were obsolete or unfit for service due to difficulties with supplying spare parts and lack of qualified support staff.

One important development took place shortly before the war, which influenced Soviet armoured doctrine and tank design for a decade: the creation of theT-34. Developed on theChristie suspension chassis and usingsloped armour for the first time, the T-34 proved a shock to the German forces in the firstGerman encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The T-34 had an excellent combination of mobility, protection and firepower.^{[citation needed]} Using wide tracks, the T-34 was also able to negotiate terrain in difficult weather conditions, something that persistently dogged the German designs.^{[citation needed]}

Assessing the success of the GermanBlitzkrieg strategy, operational methods and tactics, the Red Army concluded that it should return to the use of operational methods developed before the war, so theTank Armies were eventually created.^{[citation needed]} To complement the T-34, heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and tank destroyers were also designed.^{[citation needed]} The Red Army's armoured forces were used in concentrations during allstrategic operations of the Red Army in World War II, initiated under strict secrecy and using the Principle of Surprise.^[24] Furthermore, to improve the fighting capabilities of armoured units, all heavy and medium tanks are to be commanded by officers and crewed by NCOs.^[25]

In Germany, in-depth research through theoretical approaches, wargaming and exercises developed a confidence within thePanzertruppe itself (and political support by Hitler) in the armoured formation as the key battlefield formation – although this view was before 1940 not shared by the other Arms of Service.^{[citation needed]} A key part of this doctrine was improved communications by having radios in all tanks, although this ideal suffered from technical limits as most tanks had receiver sets only.^{[citation needed]}

At the outbreak of World War II, the German armoured forces benefited from a much more profound and more flexible training than that of the Allies on the tactical and operational level. German tanks operated while directed by radio communication, which allowed tank commanders to take greater advantage of the manoeuvrability of their vehicles.^[26]

Even after theconquest of Poland, "Blitzkrieg" was not defined on the strategic level. Guderian and von Manstein devised a strategy that entailed what later would be seen as the essence of Blitzkrieg: concentrated panzer divisions performing swift deep penetrations. This strategy was not initially accepted by German High Command. Nevertheless, the finalplans for the invasion of France in 1940 hinged on the element of aSchwerpunkt at Sedan, and was assigned to such forces. The great success of this operation led to Blitzkrieg being integrated with strategic planning for the rest of the war.

German tanks could carry with them enough fuel and supplies to go almost two hundred kilometers, and enough food to last three to nine days.^[26] This relative independence from supply lines proved effective, and allowed them to advance on critical targets much faster and without hesitation. Another factor was the ability of commanders to make strategic decisions in the field and without much consultation with their headquarters, the orders of which were often simply ignored. A prime example isErwin Rommel's lead-from-the-front approach while commanding7.Panzer-Division which allowed him a flexible response to the battlefield situation, an instance of theAuftragstaktik (reliance on subordinates to make their own decisions).^[27]

The effect of GermanPanzer's speed, mobility, and communication shocked the French, and ultimately were the deciding factors in the battle. It overcame their inferiority in armour and armament relative to the main French materiel such as theChar B1bis.^[28] The superior tactical and operational praxis, combined with an appropriate strategic implementation, enabled the Germans to defeat forces superior in armour (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in the battles of 1940,^[28] but just as Blitzkrieg became a deliberate military doctrine, in 1941,^{[citation needed]} it ultimately failed on the eastern front, though initially attaining spectacular successes.

Before the war,Heinz Guderian had in hisAchtung–Panzer! propounded a thorough mechanisation of the German forces. By 1942, increased AFV-production allowed a fuller implementation of this ideal. Now extensive armoured combined arms team could be formed, distinct from a purelyinfantry orcavalry formation.^[29] The panzer divisions integrated tanks withmechanised infantry (riding inhalftracks to be protected from small-arms fire while being transported) andself-propelled artillery (howitzers fitted on a tank chassis).^{[citation needed]} This allowed the panzer division to become an independent combat force, in principle able to overcome the problems of attaining abreakthrough against entrenched enemy infantry, equipped with large numbers of antitank-guns, with the potential to completely halt tank assaults inflicting devastating losses to armoured units without infantry support.^[30] However, much of the AFV production was increasingly diverted away from thePanzertruppe. The Artillery formed its ownSturmgeschütz units and infantry divisions were given their ownPanzerjäger companies. Despite lowering their formal organic strength, from the summer of 1943 onwards, the armoured divisions were structurally short of tanks.

Though the U.S. had established theTank Corps in World War I using FrenchRenault FT light tanks andBritishMark V and Mark V* heavy tanks,^[31] and some officers likeDwight D. Eisenhower andGeorge S. Patton, Jr. emerged from that war initially as avid proponents of continuing and developing an American armoured force, the rapid reduction of the forces and apathy and even antipathy towards funding and maintaining armed forces in the inter-war years led to relative stagnation of armoured doctrine in the United States.Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., virtually alone, advocated for the future of armoured warfare and the development of appropriate training, equipment and doctrine during the late 1920s through the 1930s.

The United States Army regarded theFrench Army as the best army in Europe,^[32] and consequently the U.S. Army frequently copied French uniforms (the American Civil War) and aeroplanes. Only when France was rapidly overrun in 1940 did the U.S. Army become "shocked"^[32] into re-thinking the influences by the perceived actions of German tanks in the 1939Polish Campaign. Its Armored Combat Arm was not created until 1940 when the Armored Force was born on 10 July 1940, with the Headquarters, Armor Force and the Headquarters,I Armored Corps established atFort Knox. On July 15, 1940, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanised) became the1st Armored Division; the 7th Provisional Tank Brigade, an infantry tank unit atFort Benning, became the2nd Armored Division".^[33] The Tank Battalion was established atFort Meade, Md., and a smallArmored Force School was also established.

Under this doctrine, U.S. tank crews of both armoured divisions and GHQ tank battalions were taught to fight tanks in tank on tank engagements. Armoured force personnel during and after the war criticised the infantry for using the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions strictly as infantry support.

The U.S.combined arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component supplemented bytank destroyers formed into independenttank destroyer battalions. The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces,Lesley J. McNair. Having studied the early German successes McNair came under the belief that U.S. forces would be faced with fast moving enemy forces who would seek to bypass, isolate and reduce U.S. forces in a replay of the Fall of France.^{[citation needed]} To stem the flood of marauding panzers, fast moving powerfully armed tank destroyer battalions were created to be held back and used in the counter-attack.

It was also calculated that U.S. interests would be better served by large numbers of reliable (battle-worthiness) medium tanks rather than a smaller number of unreliable^[34] heavy tanks.^{[citation needed]} It was decided therefore to slow the production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as theM26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing theM4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as theM18 Hellcat.^{[citation needed]}

To be able get into position to counter-attack, the tank destroyers had to be fast. To achieve the desired mobility and agility from the engines available the armour protection was sacrificed, a measure of protection coming from being nimble and hopefully from being able to knock out the enemy before they could get a shot in. Although they usually had guns of either 75 mm or 76 mm calibre (theM36 used a 90mm calibre gun), the tank destroyer units were issued with the ancestor of the modernarmour-piercing discarding sabot, rounds which made their guns much more powerful than a simple comparison of calibres would suggest.

The Japanese doctrine was mainly French in concept but with some purely Japanese elements. Due to Japan's naval priorities inwarship construction^[35] and inter-service feuds (the marine branch of theIJN favoured all-around protective armour)IJA tanks were lightly armoured. As with most armour during the 1930s, the main guns were small in calibre: 37 mm^[36] for theirType 95 light tanks and 47 mm for theType 97 medium tank, but this was sometimes compensated by a high muzzle velocity. The IJA's use of tanks in China exemplifies its doctrine:light tanks were used for scouting or acted as mobile infantry support, whilemedium tanks supported the infantry and assaulted deeper objectives, but did not fight en masse.

In 1939, the Japanese Army engagedSoviet armour atNomonhan. During the three-month-long war, Japanese armour had shown their weakness against Soviet tanks; and the resulting Japanese defeat prompted a series of complaints by the Imperial Army to incorporate improvements in future Japanese armour. This is the primary reason IJA tanks were not as successful while being used with IJA tactics. The tank forces of the U.S. Army consisted of theM2A4 andM3 Stuart light tanks up until 1941,^[37] although these vehicles were five yearsnewer than the 1935 builtType 95's, the IJA and U.S. light tanks were comparable to each other, and seemingly performed well for their respective forces during jungle combat operations; during their phase of World War II.^[38]

As with all armour, maintenance was a continuous challenge; especially in tropical environments. When IJA and SNLF (Imperial marines) tanks did clash with the enemy they were quickly destroyed by concealed anti-tank guns or overwhelming numbers of hostile tanks. Japan was a naval power, and concentrated its production on warships, thus placing a low priority on armoured vehicle development,^[35] its tanks becoming quickly obsolete during the later years of the war. A number of designs that were equal to heavier foreign types were on the drawing board, but were only built in prototype or small numbers towards the end, being placed in reserve, to be deployed for the defence of the Japanese home islands.

TheRepublic of China'sNational Revolutionary Army's200th Division was the country's only mechanised division during the war. The 200th used pre-war tanks acquired from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.^{[citation needed]}

The conflict between Arab nations in the East Mediterranean region and Israel in particular would serve to become a testing ground for development in armoured warfare during the decades of the Cold War. Both sides in the Arab–Israeli series of conflicts made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles due to the practicality of tanks in the desert environment these conflicts largely took place in.

During the1956 Suez War andSix-Day War (1967), Israeli armoured units typically had the advantage, mainly due to good tactics andunit cohesion.

Conversely, theYom Kippur War (1973) illustrated the problems that can arise if armoured and infantry units do not work closely together.Israeli tanks, operating independently in large numbers, were decimated by Egyptian anti-tank teams, well-distributed amongst regular infantry, and often equipped with new, first-generation portableanti-tank guided missiles. This is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the Second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses.

In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this a dangerous practice. Theturboshaft-poweredM1 Abrams, for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimedartillery; well-coordinated air support andcounter-battery artillery units can help overcome this.

While attempts to defeat the tank were made before and during the Second World War, through the use of conventional high velocityanti-tank artillery, this proved increasingly difficult in the post-war period due to increased armour protection and mobility of tanks.

In response, the Soviet Union, the country with the largest armoured fleet in the world, strove to incorporate some anti-tank capability into almost every infantry weapon. By the 1960s, Soviet defense scientists were designing portableanti-tank guided missiles. These new weapons were to be either carried by infantry, or fired from the newly developedBMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle. They were in use with Soviet forces before the end of the decade.

In 1973, the Israeli Army failed to anticipate the importance of these new weapon systems. Hundreds ofAT-3 Sagger man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), supplied toEgypt by theSoviet Union and could be operated by infantry without having extensive training, inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli armoured formations. Since then, ATGMs have played an important role within the Israeli Army, having developed advanced domestic-made versions (seeSpike/Gil missile), which have been widely exported throughout the world.

In the recent2006 conflict with Hezbollah, while Israeli infantry were able to easily defeat opposing ATGM teams, tanks operating on their own suffered several hits from the latest advanced Russian tandem-warhead types (such as theKornet). This highlighted that tanks operating solely, in the era of ATGMs, are extremely vulnerable.

Responding to the serious tank losses suffered against Hezbollah,Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in cooperation withIsrael Aircraft Industries developed a missile defence system for tanks, calledTrophy, to intercept and destroy anti tank missiles.^[39][40] The system was successfully deployed in combat on March 1, 2011, when it intercepted an anti tank missile during an engagement on theGaza border.^[41]

During theCold War,NATO assumed armoured warfare to be a dominant aspect of conventional ground warfare in Europe. Although the use of light tanks was largely discontinued, and heavy tanks were also mostly abandoned, the medium tank design evolved into heavier models due to increase in armour and larger sized main weapon resulting in themain battle tank (MBT) which came into existence, combining most of the different types of tanks duringWorld War II.

For the most part the NATO armoured doctrine remained defensive, and dominated by use of nuclear weapons as deterrence. Although most NATO nations began the Cold War period with a large number of U.S.-designed tanks in their fleets, there was a considerable degree of disagreement on the design of future MBTs among the NATO major nations. Both the U.S. and Germany experimented with, but abandoned the missile-armedMBT-70. TheM26 Pershing basic design of the United States would evolve until theM60^[42] main battle tank was replaced with the gas-turbine poweredM1 Abrams in the 1980s. The British Army also retained a World War II tank design, theCenturion, which proved to be highly successful and was not fully replaced until the 1970s.

TheWest GermanBundeswehr decided to develop their own tank in the 1960s, and in the 1970s produced theLeopard I, which was a somewhat lighter design, conforming to German doctrine that emphasised speed over protection. From the same initial collaborative project as the Leopard I, the French series ofAMX tanks also emphasised manoeuvre over protection. By the 21st century, most advanced western main battle tanks were built around powerful engines, large 120 mm guns andcomposite armour.

TheWarsaw Pact armoured doctrine was substantially influenced by the developments in the Soviet Army which sought to adopt its existing doctrine evolved during World War II to the nuclear battlefield. In the early 1960s this led to a number of important developments in the armoured forces and their supporting Arms. One important development was the transition of the Second World War use of Cavalry-Mechanised Group (CMG) into the Cold War Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) that was designed to exploit breakthroughs to penetrate NATO's defences in depth. This was a culmination of the Deep Battle theory dating to the 1930s.^[43]

In 1964 a significant breakthrough in tank design was achieved in the Soviet Union when theT-64 was produced which for the first time used an automatic loader, reducing the crew of the tank to three crewmen. Subsequently, this model, and the laterT-72 andT-80 tanks introduced further innovations that influenced armoured warfare by introducing guided missiles into the tank ammunition mix, allowingATGW fire from standard tank guns. The Soviet Union was also one of the countries that used two Main Battle Tanks: The high-quality T-80s and lower quality T-72s. Modern Soviet tanks, like the ones mentioned, are typically armed with 125 mm (5 in) smooth bore guns. Advancements in Soviet tanks include improved Fire Control Systems, strong armour protected byERA, and defensive countermeasures (such as Shtora-1 and Arena). The most advanced Soviet tank, up until the end of the Cold War, was the T-80U, which shared similar characteristics with the M1A1(Turbine engine, advanced Fire Control Systems, strong armour, and firepower)

Infantry fighting vehicles were first developed in the 1960s with theSoviet Union'sBMP-1, for the first time allowing supporting infantry to accompany tanks on a battlefield when nuclear weapon use was expected.

The T-64s and BMP-1s were also joined by the self-propelled guns and more importantlyMi-24Rotary-wing aircraft capable of firing anti-tank missiles entering production in 1970 which were built and theorised as "flying tanks".

The Soviet tank troops, as they were known in the USSR, included armoured units,armoured training regiments and other formations and units.

M113armoured personnel carriers proved effective in the terrain of Vietnam against enemy forces which, until 1968, rarely deployed their armour.^[44] Though they were soon countered with mines and RPGs, M-113's continued service during the war, primarily evolving intoinfantry fighting vehicles, known as theACAV^[45] (Armoured Cavalry Assault Vehicle); and functioning as a "light tank."^[46]

More heavily armedinfantry fighting vehicles such as theM2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle would be based on experience with the M113.Gun trucks were also introduced as M35 trucks fitted with armour and guns to protect convoys. In 1968, Communist forces primarily deployed the Soviet builtPT-76 light tank.

By 1971, the largerT-54 medium tanks were fielded, proving themselves susceptible to the M-72 LAW rocket,ARVNM41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, as well as the largerM48A3 Pattons. In January 1969, U.S. armoured cavalry units began exchanging theirM48A3 Patton tanks for theM551 Sheridan Armoured Airborne Reconnaissance Assault Vehicles; by 1970 over 200 Sheridan tanks were operating in Vietnam.^[47]

Tanks rarely work alone; the usual minimum unit size is a platoon (a platoon is the smallest U.S. Army/Marine unit led by an officer, and a component of a company or troop) of three to five tanks. The tanks of the platoon work together providing mutual support: two might advance while covered by the others then stop and provide cover for the remainder to move ahead.^[48]

Normally, multiple platoons coordinate withmechanised infantry and use their mobility and firepower to penetrate weak points in enemy lines. This is where the powerful engines, tracks and turrets come into play. The ability to rotate the turret by a full 360° allows coordinated movement within and between platoons, while defending against attacks from multiple directions and engaging troops and vehicles without stopping or slowing down.^[49]

When on the defensive, they wait in prepared positions or use any naturalterrain elements (such as small hills) for cover. A tank sitting just behind a hill crest ("hull-down") exposes only the top of its turret, with the gun and sensors, to the enemy, leaving the smallest possible target while allowing it to engage the enemy on the other side of the hill. Tanks are usually able to depress the main gun below the horizontal since modern kinetic energy (KE) rounds have nearly flat trajectories. Without this they would be unable to exploit such positions. However, upon cresting a hill, the tank may expose its thinly armoured underside to enemy weapons.^[49]

The disposition of armour around a tank is not uniform; the front is typically better armoured than the sides or rear. Accordingly, normal practice is to keep the front towards the enemy at all times; the tank retreats by reversing instead of turning around. Driving backwards away from an enemy is even safer than driving forwards towards them since driving forwards over a bump can throw the front of the tank up in the air, exposing the thin armour of the underside and taking the gun off the target due to its limited angle of depression.^[49]

The tracks, wheels and suspension of a tank are outside the armoured hull and are some of the most vulnerable spots. The easiest way to disable a tank (other than a direct hit in a vulnerable area with a full-power anti-tank weapon) is to target the tracks for a "mobility kill" (m-kill), or target all external visual aids with rubbery cohesive substances such as melted rubber or blackened high viscosity epoxy resins. Once a tank is disabled it is easier to destroy. This is why side-skirts are an important feature; they can deflect heavy machine-gun bullets and trigger the detonation ofhigh-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds before they strike the running gear. Other vulnerable parts of a typical tank include the engine deck (with air intakes, radiators, etc.) and the turret ring, where the turret joins the hull.

When used defensively, tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earthberms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.

Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time when encountering an enemy. The US doctrine calls for this round to be akinetic energy (KE) round, as the reaction time is most important when meeting enemy tanks, to get the first shot (and possibly the first kill). If troops or light vehicles are encountered, the usual response is to fire this round at them, despite it not being ideal—it is difficult and time-consuming to remove a round which is already in thebreech. In this case, after the KE round is fired, a HEAT round would normally be loaded next to continue the engagement.

Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It is much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the thin upper turret armour and even basic weapons likeMolotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limits, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.

Some analysts argue that recent conflicts, like theRussian invasion of Ukraine, highlight the growing vulnerability of tanks.^[50][51] Estimates from early 2024 indicate that Russia has lost around 3,000 tanks in the first two years of the conflict, with the actual number likely being higher.^[50] In contrast, during theGaza war, Israeli tanks equipped withactive protection systems (APS) showed improved survivability against anti-tank missiles. Additionally, using tanks in pairs with overlapping APS provided extra defense and enhanced their overall effectiveness.^[51]

Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable—the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also produces a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on aforward-looking infra-red system easy and the dust is a good visual cue during the day.

The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so ananti-tank guided missile or bomb (from anattack helicopter,unmanned combat aerial vehicle,ground-attack jet or smalldrone) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even a small automatic cannon is powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank.Loitering munition (suicide drone) is also used to attack tanks in modern warfare.

Certain aircraft have been developed to attack armoured vehicles. Most notable is the purpose-built Fairchild-RepublicA-10 Thunderbolt II, also known as the "Warthog". Although able to carry a number of different missiles and bombs (including anti-tank ordnance such as theAGM-65 Maverick), the A-10's main weapon is a 30 mmGAU-8/A AvengerGatling gun which is capable of firing 3,900depleted uranium armour-piercing rounds per minute. The Russian equivalent is theSU-25.

Similarly, a number ofhelicopter gunships have been designed mainly to engage enemy armoured vehicles. TheAH-1Z Viper,AH-64 Apache,HAL Light Combat Helicopter,Denel Rooivalk,Eurocopter Tiger,Ka-50 Black Shark,Mi-28 Havoc,A129 Mangusta andWestland Lynx are examples. Helicopters are very effective against armoured vehicles for many reasons. The AH-64D Longbow Apache, for example, is equipped with an improved sensor suite and weapon systems and the AN/APG-78 Longbow Fire Control Radar dome installed over the main rotor.

Airborne threats can be countered in several ways. One isair supremacy. This is what the United States relies on most, which is demonstrated by their distinct lack of effective short-range, mobile air defence vehicles to accompany armoured units. Most other countries accompany their armoured forces with highly mobileself-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the GermanGepard or the Soviet9K22 Tunguska, short and medium-rangesurface-to-air missile systems such as theSA-6,SA-8 andSA-11, or combine both on the same vehicle (the Tunguska for example can also hostSA-19 SAM missiles). The usage of anti-aircraft rounds fired from the main gun of a tank has been increasing over the years. An example is the HE-FRAG round from theT-90 which can be detonated at a set distance as determined by itslaser range finder.^[52]

Armoured warfare is mechanically and logistically intensive and requires extensive support mechanisms. Armoured fighting vehicles requirearmoured vehicles capable of working in the same terrain to support them. These are operated by the appropriate branches of the army, e.g. recovery and maintenance vehicles by the REME and combat engineering vehicles by the RE in the British Army. These include:

• Armoured recovery vehicles (ARV)—many of these are based on the chassis for the vehicle they support. E.g. the ARV for the UK Challenger tank is a Challenger hull onto which a winch is added.
• Armoured supply vehicles
• Combat engineering vehicles (CEV), e.g. bulldozers

For transporting tracked AFVs over highways, heavytransporters are used, since AFVs are prone to malfunction and their tracks also ruin the highways.

While tanks are integral to armoured warfare, whenpower projection is required, the inability to perform rapid deployment has always been a limit of heavymain battle tanks.

It takes a few weeks to transfer tanks and their supporting equipment by air or sea.^{[citation needed]} Some tanks and armoured vehicles can be dropped by parachute, or carried by cargo airplanes or helicopters. The largest transports can only carry one or two main battle tanks. Smaller transports can only carry or air drop light tanks and APCs such as theM113.

The desire to create air-portable armoured vehicles that can still take on conventional MBTs has usually resulted inATGM-armed light vehicles or in self-propelled gun style vehicles. The lack of armour protection is offset by the provision of a first-look/first-hit/first-kill capability through the mating of a powerful gun to superior targeting electronics, a concept similar to that of the UStank destroyers of World War II.

Vehicles which have put such considerations into practice include theStingray light tank,AMX 10 RC andB1 Centauro. Most such US projects to create such vehicles have been abortive, e.g. theM8 Armored Gun System. The most common was the flawedM551 Sheridan light tank. This was an air-portable tank capable of destroying heavier tanks using the revolutionary (for the time) 152 mmCLGP launcher. The combat effectiveness of this tank was limited by the unreliableMGM-51 missile. The latest iteration of the mobile anti-tank gun platform in American service is theM1134 anti-tank guided missile vehicle, aStryker variant equipped withTOW missiles; most modern militaries operatecomparable vehicles.

Though limited conflicts (such as theinsurgency in Iraq) rarely involve direct combat between armoured vehicles, the need to defend against insurgent attacks andIEDs has resulted in the application of armour to light vehicles and the continued use of armoured transports, fighting vehicles and tanks.

• Tanks Encyclopedia
• Japanese Tanks and Tank Tactics Chapter II: Tactics
• Historic films showing tank warfare during the First World War ateuropeanfilmgateway.eu
• Educational video of how armored vehicles are usedon the battlefield.