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arxiv logo>cs> arXiv:2503.12192
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Computer Science > Software Engineering

arXiv:2503.12192 (cs)
[Submitted on 15 Mar 2025]

Title:Closing the Chain: How to reduce your risk of being SolarWinds, Log4j, or XZ Utils

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Abstract:Software supply chain frameworks, such as the US NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), detail what tasks software development organizations should adopt to reduce security risk. However, to further reduce the risk of similar attacks occurring, framework adopters (i.e., software organizations) would benefit from knowing what tasks mitigate attack techniques the attackers are currently using to help organizations prioritize and to indicate current framework task gaps that leave organizations vulnerable to attacks. The goal of this study is to aid software supply chain framework adopters in reducing the risk of attacks by systematically mapping the attack techniques used in the SolarWinds, Log4j, and XZ Utils attacks to mitigating framework tasks. We qualitatively analyzed 106 Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports of the 3 attacks to gather the attack techniques. We then systematically constructed a mapping between attack techniques and the 73 tasks enumerated in 10 software supply chain frameworks. Afterward, we established and ranked priority tasks that mitigate attack techniques. The three mitigation tasks with the highest scores are role-based access control, system monitoring, and boundary protection. Additionally, three mitigation tasks were missing from all ten frameworks, including sustainable open-source software and environmental scanning tools. Thus, software products would still be vulnerable to software supply chain attacks even if organizations adopted all recommended tasks.
Subjects:Software Engineering (cs.SE); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as:arXiv:2503.12192 [cs.SE]
 (orarXiv:2503.12192v1 [cs.SE] for this version)
 https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2503.12192
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Sivana Hamer [view email]
[v1] Sat, 15 Mar 2025 16:22:09 UTC (1,220 KB)
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