Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory
arXiv:2409.12461 (cs)
[Submitted on 19 Sep 2024]
Title:Verification with Common Knowledge of Rationality for Graph Games
View a PDF of the paper titled Verification with Common Knowledge of Rationality for Graph Games, by Rindo Nakanishi and 2 other authors
View PDFHTML (experimental)Abstract:Realizability asks whether there exists a program satisfying its specification. In this problem, we assume that each agent has her own objective and behaves rationally to satisfy her objective. Traditionally, the rationality of agents is modeled by a Nash equilibrium (NE), where each agent has no incentive to change her strategy because she cannot satisfy her objective by changing her strategy alone. However, an NE is not always an appropriate notion for the rationality of agents because the condition of an NE is too strong; each agent is assumed to know strategies of the other agents completely. In this paper, we use an epistemic model to define common knowledge of rationality of all agents (CKR). We define the verification problem as a variant of the realizability problem, based on CKR, instead of NE. We then analyze the complexity of the verification problems for the class of positional strategies.
| Subjects: | Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2409.12461 [cs.GT] |
| (orarXiv:2409.12461v1 [cs.GT] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2409.12461 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
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View a PDF of the paper titled Verification with Common Knowledge of Rationality for Graph Games, by Rindo Nakanishi and 2 other authors
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