Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Skip to main content
Cornell University
We gratefully acknowledge support from the Simons Foundation,member institutions, and all contributors.Donate
arxiv logo>cs> arXiv:2407.03521
arXiv logo
Cornell University Logo

Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:2407.03521 (cs)
[Submitted on 3 Jul 2024 (v1), last revised 19 Mar 2025 (this version, v3)]

Title:Algorithmic Collusion And The Minimum Price Markov Game

View PDFHTML (experimental)
Abstract:This paper introduces the Minimum Price Markov Game (MPMG), a theoretical model that reasonably approximates real-world first-price markets following the minimum price rule, such as public auctions. The goal is to provide researchers and practitioners with a framework to study market fairness and regulation in both digitized and non-digitized public procurement processes, amid growing concerns about algorithmic collusion in online markets. Using multi-agent reinforcement learning-driven artificial agents, we demonstrate that (i) the MPMG is a reliable model for first-price market dynamics, (ii) the minimum price rule is generally resilient to non-engineered tacit coordination among rational actors, and (iii) when tacit coordination occurs, it relies heavily on self-reinforcing trends. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate about algorithmic pricing and its implications.
Subjects:Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); General Economics (econ.GN)
Cite as:arXiv:2407.03521 [cs.GT]
 (orarXiv:2407.03521v3 [cs.GT] for this version)
 https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2407.03521
arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Igor Sadoune [view email]
[v1] Wed, 3 Jul 2024 21:40:34 UTC (1,261 KB)
[v2] Tue, 12 Nov 2024 14:46:52 UTC (5,646 KB)
[v3] Wed, 19 Mar 2025 16:19:22 UTC (5,601 KB)
Full-text links:

Access Paper:

Current browse context:
cs.GT
Change to browse by:
export BibTeX citation

Bookmark

BibSonomy logoReddit logo

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Bibliographic Explorer(What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers(What is Connected Papers?)
scite Smart Citations(What are Smart Citations?)

Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article

CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers(What is CatalyzeX?)
Hugging Face(What is Huggingface?)
Papers with Code(What is Papers with Code?)

Demos

Hugging Face Spaces(What is Spaces?)

Recommenders and Search Tools

Influence Flower(What are Influence Flowers?)
CORE Recommender(What is CORE?)

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community?Learn more about arXivLabs.

Which authors of this paper are endorsers? |Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp