• 3“China’s Wen Jiabao calls for `urgent’ political reform,”The Telegraph, Thursday, 5 April 2012, ht(...)

2So deeply is Mao identified with the Cultural Revolution in contemporary consciousness that observers of recent developments rarely draw a distinction between a Mao revival and a cultural revolutionary revival. Symbolic it may have been, but Bo’s revival of Red Culture was most importantly reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, which despite some relaxation is still a taboo subject in the People’s Republic of China. Whether or not it was directed at Bo, Premier Wen Jiabao’s (温家宝) recent warning of a possible recurrence of the Cultural Revolution unless problems of development – mainly political and economic inequality and corruption – were resolved offered a tacit recognition of at least one important reason for the anxiety that is usually ignored these days in discussions of the Cultural Revolution: the Cultural Revolution as an attack on the inequalities created by the Communist Party, whose reason for existence theoretically was to abolish inequality.3 To recall the Cultural Revolution if only symbolically is to draw attention to a problem that is far more severe at present than it was in the 1960s. And that is not permissible; talk of class difference and division has been largely silenced in the PRC as it has in other contemporary societies, and perhaps for more easily understandable reasons.

• 4There is a resonance between my argument here and some of the contributions to the recently publish(...)
• 5In the 1980s, the distinguished literary critic coined the term “Mao style” to refer to a kind of w(...)

3The same, however, is not the case with Mao – not the Mao of the Cultural Revolution but the Mao of the Chinese revolution and founding of the PRC. I argue in this essay that salvaging Mao from the Cultural Revolution to appropriate him for “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been one of the strategic ideological concerns of the post-Mao leadership from Deng Xiaoping to the present. My analysis is based on the contemporary construction of Communist Party history and its ideological articulation in a “Chinese Marxism,” which are structured around a distinction between a Mao of the New Democratic Revolution and a Mao of the Cultural Revolution. These texts condemn Mao the Cultural Revolutionary but assign to the Mao of New Democracy a foundational historical role, and to Mao Zedong Thought a living historical significance as an expression of collective Party identity. The distinction is ideological, made possible by the denial of the history that links the two Maos. The texts point to a contradiction that may be essential to grasping the political and ideological dynamics of the Party. The appropriation of Mao for the reforms (to the point at the popular level of making him into an object of consumption) suggests the possibility of the return of the more radical Mao should the reforms run into trouble. This may very well be the significance of the Chongqing experiment, as well as what Wen Jiabao had in mind in his observations on a possible return of Cultural Revolution‑type disorder. What Wen did not say was that the contradiction is inherent in the ideology that keeps Mao alive in the legitimation of the Party, therefore risking the return of the radical Mao should it lose its ability to sustain the distinction upon which it has gambled its ideological credentials.4 Being products of Party culture, Chinese leaders are quite aware of the risks, even if the same culture might hold them back from doing anything about it.5

• 6Deng Xiaoping, “Remarks on Successive Drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History(...)

6Continued fealty to Mao’s legacy despite the reversal of his radical policies may be attributed at the most obvious level to the legitimacy needs of the Communist Party. This no doubt is not far from the truth, but calls for more in-depth exploration for what it may have to say about the Party’s ideological self-representation. The Party claims the mantle of the revolution. Given the prominent part Mao played in the revolution as its leader and chief theoretician, it would be rather a difficult task to uphold the historical significance of the revolution and its achievements while repudiating his legacies. The examples of Russia and Eastern Europe provide ample testimony of what happens to the legacies of socialist revolutions once their founding leaders have been discredited. The post-Mao leadership in China has avoided this mistake despite, or perhaps because of, the upheaval it experienced during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, which made Party loyalty an over-whelming consideration. As Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) would warn in 1980, “When we write about his mistakes, we should not exaggerate, for otherwise we shall be discrediting Chairman Mao Zedong, and this would mean discrediting our Party and state.”6

Bronze statue at Yangjia Ling, Yan’an of the five party leaders who set out from the Communist base at Yan’an to take power as New China’s rulers

© G.R. Barmé

• 7Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (中共中央党史研究室) (CCP Central Party History Office),Zhongguo gong(...)

8The reinterpretation of Mao’s “correct” thought was especially important at the beginning of the reform period, when there still were Maoists powerful and popular enough to torpedo an abrupt reversal of the policies of the Cultural Revolution and the ideological orientation that had guided them. This consideration would gradually fade after the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989. As reforms gained speed in the 1990s, now stimulated by a new awareness of globalisation, Mao was no longer the threat he had been earlier, as suggested by the regime’s mostly tolerant response to the “Mao fever” (Mao Zedong re毛泽东热) that accompanied the celebration of the 100^th anniversary of Mao’s birth in 1993. It was also right around this time that a serious rewriting of the first three decades of PRC history got underway, culminating in the Party history published only last year, in time for the 90^th anniversary of the Party’s founding.7 This history, and works on Chinese Marxism that have appeared only during the last two or three years, have brought into focus an interpretive effort that traces its origins to the reforms that put an end to Mao’s radical policies.

• 8Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles” (30 March 1979), in SWDXP, pp. 166‑191, p. 167
• 9“Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Rep(...)
• 10In an essay published in 1986, Brantly Womack suggested that the 1981 Resolution was comparable in(...)

9Mao, it may be recalled, was never officially repudiated. Indeed, the overthrow of the “Gang of Four,” the termination of the Cultural Revolution, and the turn to “reform and opening” with the historic Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 were viewed by the Party leaders as the restoration of “the correct path of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”8 “Marxism‑Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought” were enshrined in 1979 as one of the four “cardinal principles” guiding the Party (in addition to “the socialist road,” “dictatorship of the proletariat,” and “leadership of the Communist Party”). The final verdict would be provided in the “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China” (hereafter, 1981 Resolution), which was endorsed by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11^th Central Committee in late June 1981.9 This document, and the discussions that attended it, were in hindsight among the foundational documents of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”10 Supplemented by pronouncements from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) whose policies are viewed as further developments of Chinese Marxism, they have served as a template for writing the history of Marxism in China – and Mao into that history.

• 12Deng, “Drafts,” is an invaluable testament to inner-Party negotiation in producing this important d(...)
• 13Womack, “Where Mao Went Wrong,”op. cit.; John Bryan Starr, “‘Good Mao’, ‘Bad Mao’: Mao Studies and(...)

11Deng Xiaoping’s account of the successive drafts of the 1981 Resolution leaves little question that this conclusion was reached after considerable disagreement and deliberation within the Party.12 How the “Resolution” manoeuvred its way through the Cultural Revolution, weighed Mao’s errors against his achievements, and balanced the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution against past achievements has been discussed by other scholars.13 What is of interest in the document for our purposes here is its historical delineation of Mao as the Party’s leader, and its relationship to Mao Zedong Thought and Chinese Marxism. Mao Zedong’s achievements as leader from the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties were indisputable. He had led the Party to victory in the New Democratic Revolution, opened up a new historical era by liberating China, and overseen the transition to socialism completed by 1956. Even after his radical left-turn shortly after the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, he had continued to make important contributions to China’s development right through the Cultural Revolution, when his mistakes were at their most destructive. Throughout, he had continued to produce theoretical work that was quite significant in contributing to socialist reconstruction. As the quotation above indicates, there was no questioning his role as the leader of the Chinese Revolution.

• 14See, Raymond F. Wiley,The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch’en Po-ta and the Search for Chines(...)

12The most interesting part of the 1981 Resolution related to Mao Zedong Thought. The “Resolution” reaffirmed the distinction between Mao’s thought and the Mao Zedong Thought that had been part of Party ideology since the origins of that formulation in the early 1940s.14 One referred to the thinking of an individual leader, the other to the crystallisation of the collective wisdom of the Party’s revolutionary experience as articulated by the leader of the Party. What it had to say is worth quoting at some length because of its implications not only for placing Mao in the ideological reconstruction in the past, but also for the part Mao Zedong Thought would play in the unfolding of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”:

• 16Deng, “Drafts,” in SWDXP,op. cit., p. 282.The “Resolution” stated that the “erroneous ‘Left’ these(...)
• 17See also Deng, “Drafts,” p. 281.
• 18Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi yishi (ed.), “‘Zhongguo gongchandang lishi (shangjuan)’ ruoga(...)

13The identification of Mao Zedong Thought with the collective wisdom of the Party rather than Mao the individual suggested not only that it was possible for Mao, the leader, to transgress against Mao Zedong Thought, but also that Mao Zedong Thought was a work in progress, “still in the process of development” after the passing of Mao, the leader.16 There was a danger here, too, that the Party might be culpable for the wrong turn that the ideology had taken during the two decades of deviation, which was indeed conceded by the document.17 On the other hand, Mao Zedong Thought as the expression of the collective leadership of the Party has been elevated to a plane where it leads an unblemished existence beyond the errors of individual leaders, having demonstrated repeatedly its ability to correct its mistakes. Making mistakes was inevitable for living people, Mao himself had stated in 1945, adding that only the unborn and the dead don’t make mistakes. He had admitted to the many mistakes he and others (including Marx and Engels) had made in the course of revolutionary activity. But when Mao Zedong Thought was enshrined in the Seventh Party Congress of that year, those mistakes were excluded. Likewise in the present the mistakes Mao had made in his later years must be excluded from Mao Zedong Thought to preserve the latter’s status as the infallible guide to socialist reconstruction.18

• 19Franz Schurmann,Ideology and Organization in Communist China, new enlarged edition, Berkeley (CA),(...)

14To recall a distinction Franz Schurmann has drawn in his study of ideology in the PRC, Mao Zedong Thought is given an abstract existence and a longevity in these discussions that raises it almost to the status of an “ideology” of universal significance rather than a “thought” that represents the concrete practice of the ideology.19 As the 1981 “Resolution” framed it:

• 21Deng, “Drafts,” in SWDXP,op. cit., p. 283.
• 22For a cogent summary of the ideological process from the origins of Mao Zedong Thought to Hu Jintao(...)

15The greatest achievement of Mao Zedong Thought was its integration of universal Marxist theory and concrete Chinese practice. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping insisted that “it is precisely Mao Zedong Thought that the present Central Committee upholds, only we have given it concrete content.”21 The statement elevates Mao Zedong Thought to an ideological plane comparable to that of Marxism-Leninism, but at the same time evacuates it of any substantial content, which also increasingly has come to characterise the relationship of Chinese Marxism to Marxism. The development of the Chinese Communist Party beginning with Mao’s leadership in the 1930s has become at one and the same time the historical unfolding of “Chinese Marxism,” with ever fewer references to the theoretical sources it claims as its ancestral origins. In other words, its Marxism has become increasingly self‑referential.22

• 23Arif Dirlik, “Mao Zedong and ‘Chinese Marxism,’” in Arif Dirlik,Marxism in the Chinese Revolution,(...)
• 24Hu Sheng, “Mao Zedong de xinminzhu zhuyilun zai pingjia”(毛泽东的新民主主义论再评价Re-evaluation of Mao Zedong’s(...)
• 25Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, vol. 2, “Afterword,”op. cit., pp. 1070‑1074.

16In addition to the example it provided in the appropriate handling of Marxism in the national revolution, the reaffirmation of Mao Zedong Thought under Deng Xiaoping had a second, more concrete, significance. Mao Zedong Thought was formulated and reached its fullness in the course of the New Democratic revolution, of which it was the ideological expression. Hence its evocation also invoked the question of the relevance of its policies following the elimination of the leftist zeal of the Cultural Revolution. I have suggested elsewhere that there was much in common initially between reform policies after 1978 and policies of New Democracy that had brought the Communist Party to power: a coalition government under the leadership of the Communist Party and the “dictatorship of the proletariat”; a mixed economy blending private national capital and state management and direction (bureaucratic capital); and a culture policy that sought to integrate a new Communist culture with native legacies, especially popular culture.23 Theoretically speaking, reforms after 1978 picked up where the Eighth Conference in 1956 had left off, when the transition to socialism had been completed. As the 1981 Resolution stated in the section just quoted, however, while New Democracy belonged to an earlier phase of the revolution, it was the foundation of Mao Zedong Thought, and its documents would retain their significance for the foreseeable future. It is quite clear in hindsight that the reforms initiated in the 1980s would ultimately go back past 1956 to the mixed policies of New Democracy, especially in economic policy. Cultural policy has abandoned Mao’s stress on popular culture as the source of a new culture except in its more theatrical forms, and there has been a revival of elite traditions reminiscent of Kuomintang (guomindang国民党) policies in the 1930s. It is only in the consolidation of Communist Party rule and “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (albeit independently of the latter) that reform policies would go beyond the provisions of the 1956 conference. In an essay published in 1999, the distinguished historian Hu Sheng (head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences between 1985 and 1998) pointed out that New Democracy was very important for understanding “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”24 Hu at the time (until his death in 2000) was also in charge of the group working on the official History of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 published last year.25

• 27Guo Dehong (郭德宏, chief editor),Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi(中国马克思主义发展史History of the developme(...)

18Mao Zedong Thought represented the integration of Marxist theory with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. It was not merely the application of Marxism to the Chinese revolution, but also added “new content” (xinde neirong新的内容) to Marxism and enriched it theoretically.27 Reference to Marxism has remained as a basic tenet of the Party’s practice, but Mao Zedong Thought itself has come to represent “a new stage of Marxism” for the Party to refer back to as a theoretical basis for practice in the new circumstances that it faced. It is worth noting also that however strenuously the Party sought to distinguish between Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, it could not (or would not) take Mao the person out of the thought so long as it insisted on that particular formulation.

• 30See fn. 7.
• 31 Zhang Qihua,op. cit., pp. 1071‑1073.Even then, according to Zhang Qihua, the investigators were n(...)

21The guidance was not just theoretical. While all officially sanctioned work acknowledges an arduous production process, this volume was particularly significant because of the sensitive issues it addressed of the post-New Democracy turn to the left in the transition to socialism and its culmination in the Cultural Revolution. It took nearly two decades to complete. Work on it began immediately after the publication in 1991 of volume 1 (subsequently revised for republication in 2002),30 which covered the period from the founding of the Party in 1921 to the victory of New Democracy in 1949. According to the editor’s account, it was vetted repeatedly by relevant scholars and Party leaders, and went through numerous revisions before it was finally approved for publication in 2011, in time for the Party’s ninetieth anniversary.31

• 32“Representative” is the preferred term in describing Mao throughout the period of New Democracy las(...)
• 33Guo Dehong (chief editor),Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhanshi(History of the development of Chinese Ma(...)

22These works are based on documentation not available to outsiders. What they have to say about specific historical matters in Mao’s life and activities may be taken up by specialists on those matters. What is of interest here is the delineation of Mao’s place in the revolution and Chinese Marxism. Beginning with the 1981 Resolution to the production of the histories of the revolution and the Communist Party, a generally accepted periodisation of the revolution has come into focus: a New Democratic phase when Mao played a leading role in coalition politics, economic flexibility, and military strategy as “representative” (daibiao代表)32 of the collective leadership of the Party; a Cultural Revolution phase (of over two decades) when Mao’s leftist inclinations toward hasty development, socialist purity, and class struggle led the revolution astray; and a third phase when, under the successive leaderships of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, a regime of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was established to guide the country through the initial phase of socialism, which is likely to last over a century.33

• 34Ibid. It is important that the usage in the title of the book, “Chinese Marxism,” has become preval(...)
• 35Guo Dehong (Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi, p. 382) and Song Shichang and Nong Fang (宋士昌 and农芳,M(...)
• 36 Guo Dehong,op. cit., chapter 12.
• 37Hu Jintao, “Speech at the CPC Anniversary Gathering,”op. cit., p. 4.

23This periodisation is evident with greatest clarity in discussions of Mao Zedong Thought. A recently published volume,34 also intended as a textbook for the required course on Marxism at the Party School, organises the development of Chinese Marxism in two stages, with the first stage serving as the foundation for the second: New Democracy from the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties, with Mao as its moving spirit, and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” theorised most importantly by Deng Xiaoping after 1978 but with subsequent accretions. Mao Zedong Thought, the emblem of Chinese Marxism and the product of the Party’s revolutionary practice, emerged during the first period in the Party’s integration of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete realities of revolutionary practice in “semi-feudal semi-colonial” Chinese society. It was not merely an application of theory to Chinese society; it opened up a new theoretical vista on Marxism in economically and politically backward societies suffering from colonialist aggression.35 Mao Zedong Thought was betrayed during the Cultural Revolution by Mao himself, when in his left turn he began to ignore the circumstances of Chinese society, broadened the scope of class struggle, and turned the masses against the Party.36 Mao nevertheless continued to make contributions to Mao Zedong Thought in the areas of development and international relations. It was most importantly the Party and the people, however, who kept it alive, and restored it to its rightful place after 1978. The restoration of the correct line of Mao Zedong Thought was accompanied by a second “great leap” in Chinese Marxism equal in significance to the emergence of Mao Zedong Thought that produced “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s theory and proceeding through Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s scientific outlook on development. It remains a work in progress in “the continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought.”37

• 38Guo Dehong,Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhanshi,op. cit.; Song Shichang and Nong Fang (chief editors),(...)

24This interpretation of Mao in the history of the revolution is a far cry from that of the Cultural Revolution, which had rendered Mao “the helmsman” of the revolution, and class struggle the core principle of Mao Zedong Thought (and Marxism). If Mao Zedong comes anywhere close under the new historical regime to the revolutionary sagacity attributed to him earlier, it is for the first phase of the revolution before 1949. Even then, the emphasis currently is on Mao “the representative” of the Party, who kept class struggle in moderation and recognised the significance of the forces of production to keep the revolution moving forward. At the same time, Mao is now held to account for what happened during the Cultural Revolution. Volume 2 of theHistory of the Communist Party of China, and a number of officially-sanctioned works on Chinese Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought published during the last couple of years, usually under the rubric ofMakesizhuyide Zhongguohua(making Marxism Chinese), have broken the taboo on the discussion of the Cultural Revolution now that some agreement has been reached in the Party over the appropriate verdict that does the least damage to the Party.38 Previous histories, such as the 1990 history mentioned above, either stopped short of the turn to the left in the late 1950s, or simply blanked out the period between 1952 and 1978, as in the film produced on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic in 1999 or in the current historical display at the New Museum of National History.

• 41 Guo Dehong,Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi,op. cit., pp. 212‑227.

28If others shared in Mao’s errors, Mao himself was not completely given to the leftist line he had let loose, but made repeated efforts to correct his mistakes – as in the retreat from the communes after 1960, his purge of Lin Biao (林彪), his criticism in the 1970s of Jiang Qing (江青), and the move forward during the same decade to a moderate modernisation program (“The Four Modernizations”). China had registered economic and technological achievements during the Cultural Revolution, and there were important achievements in foreign relations. Mao continued to contribute to these advances through his theoretical writings. The greatest credit for these achievements must nevertheless go to the Party and the people who preserved their loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought against all adversity.41

• 42Zhongguo gongchandang lishi(2011),op. cit., pp. 1062‑1069.

31The recently published history concludes with a chapter, “The great achievements and basic experiences of socialist revolution and construction led by the Party,” that outlines the lessons to be drawn from the six decades of Party history covered in the text. The achievements range from finally unifying the country and bringing together the various nationalities to live in peace, to poverty alleviation, to the establishment of foreign relations and national defence to secure the safety of the nation. Of the lessons to be drawn from the experience, the centrality of economic development and advancing the forces of production take top priority. There is a reminder that sovereignty and self-reliance are preconditions of opening up to the world. In either case, a stable and consolidated Party leadership remains the guarantee for the country’s future.42

• 43See, for instance, the high school texts for required courses published by the Ministry of Educatio(...)

32Mao Zedong leads a double existence in post-revolutionary China. Mao the individual remains a national icon for the role he played in national liberation and consolidation. This is the most widely shared image of Mao. In the official line, he is portrayed as the representative of the collective leadership that achieved the victory of the New Democratic revolution in 1949, and initiated the transition to socialism that was completed between 1952 and 1956. It is also the pervasive popular image of Mao propagated in popular consciousness through education and the popular media.43 It is likely that these days the majority of the population knows Mao mostly by the endless series of TV movies on the national revolution and the Anti-Japanese War in which Mao figures prominently.

• 44Song Shichang and Nong Fang,Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua tonglun, vol. 1,op. cit., p. 19. It is diffic(...)

35Interestingly, since Mao Zedong Thought emerged in the midst of the New Democratic revolution, it bears upon it the stamp of both the policies and the theoretical achievements of that phase of the revolution. I have referred above to what these policies generally implied, and how the considerations that had given rise to them would also provide the reform leadership with its initial inspiration. That they were now premised upon a post-socialist situation called for further elaboration of Mao Zedong Thought in keeping with the times. According to the current interpretation, there have been two important periods in the making of Chinese Marxism: the New Democracy period and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which represented another “revolutionary great leap” in making Marxism Chinese. The Mao Zedong Thought the Party restored in 1978 returned it to its “true” spirit, that of New Democracy, premised upon class alliance (united front) and development of the forces of production as the primary goals. This was the Mao legacy Deng Xiaoping drew upon to formulate “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” One work writes more strongly that “Deng Xiaoping theory was nourished within the womb of Mao Zedong Thought” (yunyu yu Mao Zedong sixiang zhong孕育于毛泽东思想中).44

• 45Maurice Meisner,Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic,New York, The Free Press, 1977, p(...)

36The appropriation of Mao for the reforms was a much more astute move than repudiating Mao Zedong Thought. According to Maurice Meisner, the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 presided over by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) and Deng Xiaoping had deleted “the phrase ‘guided by the thought of Mao Tsetung’” from the new party constitution in order “to reinforce the new principle of collective leadership.”45 The deletion had been viewed by cultural revolutionaries subsequently as further evidence of Deng Xiaoping’s underhanded opposition to Mao. This time around, Deng recruited Mao for the reforms, while alleviating the anxieties of those within and without the Party who continued to be loyal to the revolution Mao had represented. More to the point here, by claiming Mao for his innovations, Deng incorporated Mao into his theory, which has since been passed down to “the important thought of ‘three represents’” and “the scientific outlook on development.”

• 46Mei Rongzheng,Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua shi,op. cit., pp. 4‑5.
• 47The reference here is to Zhang Musheng,Gaizao womende wenhua lishi guan(改造我门的文化历史观 Reforming our(...)

37In other words, New Democracy was one phase in the formulation of Chinese Marxism, but this first phase has been both a foundation and a paradigm for its subsequent development.46 These are the two temporalities of Mao Zedong Thought: one that relegates it to the past, as an expression of New Democracy that now has been superseded; the other a long-term reference for Chinese Marxism. In this perspective, there is hardly anything ideologically radical about the recent call by the prominent Party intellectual (and another “princeling”) Zhang Musheng (张木生) to return to the social and political policies of New Democracy to resolve contemporary problems of development. At the same time, if there is an affinity between New Democracy and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” as the leadership has claimed, it is unlikely that New Democracy would resolve problems presented by a developmental trajectory of its inspiration. Indeed, as I observed above, ignoring the part contradictions created by New Democracy may have played in the radical turn of the mid-fifties is a significant shortcoming of Party histories anxious to represent the Cultural Revolution as an irresponsible deviation.47

Mao quote in four parts in Mao’s hand from the revolutionary museum at Yan’an (延安革命纪念馆): Shi Shi Qiu Shi

© G.R. Barmé

• 48Hu, “Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering,”op. cit., p. 6.

39The development of practice, cognition of the truth, and innovation of theories know no boundary. The practice of the Party and the people keeps progressing, so should the theories guiding it. The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics will definitely be expanded through the innovative practice of the Party and the people, and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics will surely continue to improve as we deepen reform and open up wider. This process will certainly open up broad prospects for theoretical innovation. In upholding Marxism under the new historical conditions, it is important to promptly address new issues emerging in practice and thus provide scientific guidance for practice. We should have a correct understanding of the global development trend and China’s basic condition of being in the primary stage of socialism, find out more about the features of China’s development at the current stage, review the new experience gained in a timely manner by the people led by the Party, and create new theories with the focus on major issues concerning economic and social development, so as to ensure the vitality of scientific theories.48

• 49Guo Dehong,Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi,op. cit., p. 382.
• 50Xiao Dongbo and NieYueyan,Zhongguo gongchandang lilun jianshe de lishi jingyan yanjiu,op. cit., p(...)

40This endless development of theory in response to the changing needs of practice suggests that theory no longer serves as a check on, or even guide to, future developments, which are to be determined solely by their efficacy in securing the developmental goals of the regime. It is not that there is no longer any concern for Marxism; on the contrary, the Party repeatedly stresses its loyalty to the essence of Marxism as the thread that runs through the development of Chinese Marxism. Official publications express considerable concern over ignorance of Marxism, indifference to it for no longer being relevant, or feigning interest while undermining it, clearly referring above all to Party cadres.49 Hu Jintao was responsible for initiating in 2004 a “Marxism project” (Makesizhuyi gongcheng马克思主义工程) intended to produce an interpretation of Marxist classics appropriate to contemporary circumstances. One of the basic goals of the project was to provide theoretical, historical, and educational material that would give coherence to Party policies and revitalise the study of Marxism – Chinese Marxism.50

• 51Guo Dehong,Zhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shi,op cit., p. 381.

41The project is important for understanding the regime’s attitude toward Marxism and Mao’s place in it. The primary purpose of the project was to establish an unfolding Chinese Marxism on firmer theoretical ground by uncovering in the Marxist classics evidence that Marx and Engels at least in theory had anticipated developments in Chinese socialism; in other words, by articulating texts to policies that had guided the course the Chinese revolution had taken, as well as the policies of the leadership of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” from Deng through Jiang to Hu. As the authors ofZhongguo Makesizhuyi fazhan shiwrite, “The only Chinese Marxism is Marxism that has been integrated with Chinese realities. Only by answering to the needs of the Chinese revolution and reconstruction can Chinese Marxism take shape and advance.”51

• 52Ibid., pp. 384‑385.

42This is a theme that in a basic way runs through the corpus of Mao Zedong Thought, from Mao during New Democracy to Hu Jintao as the most recent representative of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” What is new about it is ruling out or downgrading certain fundamental features of Marxist theory – notably class analysis – from any consideration in the formation of Chinese Marxism. The issue of class is dismissed as having been exaggerated in the days of New Democracy, abused during the Cultural Revolution, and irrelevant under the socialist regime. While vigilance is called for against both the “right” and the “left,” it is the “left” that represents the more important threat to the Party’s policies and the country’s security and welfare.52 The problem is that leaving out those aspects of Marxist theory that contradict the regime’s policies obviates the need to engage Marxist theory in its wholeness, and suffers from the same tendentiousness in the reading of theory as its Cultural Revolution predecessors. Sweeping aside the issue of class also glosses over the contradictions of New Democracy that produced the conflicts of the 1950s, and the contradictions that mark Chinese society today. Marxism is obviously too important for the regime’s legitimacy to be simply cast aside. It is nevertheless instrumentalised in the service of policies that accommodate capitalism, which is in the process of transforming Chinese society – and not in any direction recognisable as socialism. What the future may bring is another matter, of course, but then judging by what the regime says, Marxism in the future may serve any and all policies that suit the needs of China as the regime perceives them. The gap between promise and reality may be an important reason that many in and out of China remain sceptical of the regime’s Marxism or socialist commitments.

• 53Ibid., p. 383.
• 54The preferred term is “innovate” (chuangxin创新), which has become a very popular term in the Party(...)

43On the other hand, the claims to Marxism need to be taken seriously for what they suggest. Chinese Marxism is a Marxism that is rooted in the Marxist tradition going back to Marx and Engels – “ancestors” (laozuzong老祖宗), as Deng Xiaoping described them.53 But it is also Marxism that has been integrated with Chinese circumstances in keeping with the history of Marxism, which has taken national form everywhere. And as the circumstances change, so does the synthesis of theory and practice. What is implied here is that Marxism is a work in progress and needs to be re-invented on an ongoing basis if it is not to degenerate into dogma.54 It is not a matter of following texts, but of creating new Marxisms out of them. Hence the insistence in the new texts on Chinese Marxism that both New Democracy and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” opened new eras in the unfolding of Marxism. They are most relevant to China, but they have implications for other societies as well at a time when socialism is in retreat.

• 55Interview with Yang Jinhai (杨金海), Deputy Secretary of the Central Compilation and Translation Burea(...)
• 56Song Shichang and Nong Fang,Makesizhuyi Zhongguohua tonglun, vol. 1,op. cit., pp. 2‑3.

44Two considerations guide the project. First, however fundamental the principles and methods of Marxism, Marx and Engels could not have foretold the course socialism would take once it had been established. Secondly, theoretical development to answer to contemporary needs can no longer rely on the mediation of Soviet interpretations, as in the past, but requires independent investigation of the texts.55 The investigation of texts has been international in scope as Chinese researchers comb libraries for Marxist texts, in some ways assuming leadership in such research. There is a suggestion in some discussions that the project of making Marxism Chinese has assumed an even broader scope than earlier. One text points to four dimensions to making Marxism Chinese: “concretisation” (jutihua具体化) of theory,“nationalisation” (minzuhua民族化) of its form, “modernisation” (xiandaihua现代化) of the classics, and “practicalisation” (shijianhua实践化) of its theoretical form.56 Especially significant is the modernisation of the classics.

• 57This applies even to Party elders critical of the turn Marxism has taken under the regime: “In July(...)

45Whether or not these new departures point to aspirations to leadership in global Marxism commensurate with the regime’s newfound power in the world as the foremost success story of socialism, or better still as a socialist version of capitalism, there is not much question about the immediate goals of refurbishing Chinese Marxism theoretically and giving it canonical status. What is less obvious but even more significant is that it is the Chinese present – the standpoint of an unfolding Chinese Marxism – that provides the guide to reading the classics and, in a manner of speaking, re-theorising the theory. What will be left of Marxism by the time they are finished remains to be seen. Mao’s successors have arguably gone beyond anything he claimed in making theory their own, subservient to the practices of national development within a context of global capitalism. Ironically, the more they change Marxism to respond to contemporary circumstances, the less connected they seem to an environment in which Marxism carries little weight among the population at large. But they may legitimately claim, as they do, that they are following the example of the Chairman – both in making Marxism Chinese and in silencing critics from the left who would suggest that the more the theory becomes “Chinese,” the less there is left of it that may be viewed as Marxist in any serious sense of that term.57