Testing Tilly: Does War Really Make States?

DOI:https://doi.org/10.30884/seh/2022.01.07

Though much is writtenabout coercive theories of state formation and the role of war in the formationof the modern territorial state, no comprehensive quantitative test of thetheory, made famous by Charles Tilly, that ‘war makes states’ exists. Datacollected and analyzed from George Kohn's (2000) Dictionary of Wars and ValerieBockstette, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman's (2002) State Antiquity Indexfinally brings quantitative support for the argument that ‘war makes states,’providing insight into the impact of conflict on the ability of groups to formstates with strong institutional capacity. The results confirm Tilly's theory:war plays a prominent role in the formation of strong states, though, locationand foreign occupation also matter.

Keywords: coercive theories, conflict, state capacity, state formation,war.

Laura D. Young, Georgia Gwinnett Collegemore

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, CharlesTilly publishedCoercion, Capital, andEuropean States, AD 990 – 1992.The book introduces a coercive theory ofstate formation that analyzes the development of the modern territorial state in Western Europe. Tilly's main argument is thatwar is the driving force that leads to the modern territorial state. Histheory, ‘war makes states,’ has gone on to become one of the leading theoriesof state formation in comparative politics; though, he is, of course, not theonly one to make this argument. While much is written about coercive theoriesof state formation, at least to this author's knowledge, no comprehensivequantitative test of this theory exists. As a result, this paper constructs adataset from 0 – 1600 CE to test Tilly's theory that the consequences ofpreparing for and waging war leads to the formation of the modern territorialstate. The results add quantitative support for the argument that war reallydoes ‘make states.’¹

The relationship between conflict and stateformation is important because how the state evolved explains why some statesdevelop institutions with a great deal of capacity while others suffer from alack of capacity altogether. This, in turn, leads to more probing questionssuch as why some states failed to establish modern political institutions inplaces like Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Moreover, how a state evolved has important consequencesregarding its interactions in the international system. A state that controlsits territory and has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, for example,is better equipped to conquer nations lacking these capacities. Thisdifference explains the consequence of various state behaviors in theinternational environment. Because European states developed many more organizedand centralized government structures sooner than Asia and Africa, for example,European states dominated international relations for most of the pre-modernand modern era (Kennedy 1987).

One of the reasons why no one hasundertaken a quantitative analysis of Tilly's theory is likely because of thelack of available data. Although several datasets on war in the modern eraexist, a comprehensive dataset on wars in the pre-modern era does not.Likewise, because states in their present-day form did not exist in thepre-modern era, accounting for statecapacity during this period can be problematic. Fortunately, George Kohn's(2000)Dictionary of Wars and ValerieBockstette, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman's (2002)State Antiquity Index, provide information useful to construct adataset to test whether conflict led to the modern territorial state.

Unlike Tilly's original theory whichfocused on Europe, I test the hypotheses in Africa and Asia as well. I argue ifwar makes states, then we should expect to find that the reason why statesfailed to form in many parts of Africa prior to colonialism (despite the facthumans existed here millions of years longer than in Europe), for example, isbecause there was a lack of conflict in this region. The findings confirm thehypothesis. The more conflict a state faces, the more likely it is to developstrong institutional capacity. Those states that faced the least conflict, mostoften developed the weakest institutions. The results also revealconflict-prone neighbors can make even peaceful neighbors not engaging inconflict increase their strength to survive.

LITERATURE REVIEW

InCoercion, Capital and European States, AD 990 –1992,Charles Tilly makes the case that the modern state structure is a consequenceof the necessity of waging war. ‘War made the state, and the state made war,’he argues. Tilly does not disagree with economic and class-based theories² that argue the internal make-up of states(e.g., how classes are organized) isimportant regarding the variation in state development. He disagrees, however,that it is the main impetus that created the modern territorial state. Instead,the organization of classes merely affects the way in which rulers extract themeans (e.g., taxes, people) necessaryto engage in coercive efforts. Further, areas that were capital-intensive ratherthan coercive never fully developed into states. These areas remainedcity-states instead. The driving force behind state formation is, therefore,the preparation for and engagement in war. Those rulers that were mosteffective in concentrating and accumulating the means of coercion created anenvironment in which states grew (Tilly 1992: 19).

Tilly is not the only one that arguescoercive theories explain state formation. Thomas Ertman agrees ‘the territorialstate triumphed over other possible political forms [of rule] because of thesuperior fighting ability which it derived from access to both urban capitaland coercive authority over peasant taxpayers and army recruits’ (Ertman 1997:4). In short, war-making and, most notably, the extraction of capital were theessential elements in the formation and survival of early states. Thus, thestronger the state, the more efficient it is at extracting capital (Acemoglu2005), and thus, the more successful it is at waging war (Glete 2002; Spruyt 1997).³

Coercive theories suggest several reasonswhy war leads to states. First, because leaders ‘must administer the lands,goods and people they acquire’ it requires more institutions and a larger bureaucraticorganization. Specifically, war ‘builds up an infrastructure of taxation,supply, and administration that requires maintenance of itself.’ Bureaucraciesform as a result (Tilly 1992:20). For example, the ruler's creation of armed forces generates a strongerstate structure because it brings with it bureaucratic organization such astreasuries, supply services, and tax bureaus.⁴ War also helpsconsolidate power in the governing body because of the collection of capital.The collection of capital is important for a state to wage war successfully.Therefore, those states which created a structure that efficiently extractedcapital proved more successful in waging war, and, consequently, consolidatingpower (Tilly 1992). Members of society deferred to the ruler because they weredependent on the ruler for protection against competing neighbors. Thisdeferral allowed for the strengthening of power in the ruler and providedopportunities for the ruler to structure society so that it could raise taxesas well as establish bureaucratic entities to manage society. Cities, and theneventually states, formed because of the increased ability for the collectionof revenue (Tilly 1992).

Another benefit of war is that it helpssocieties consolidate under one rule much quicker. Specifically, war helpssecure a distinct territory which is essential for defining not only thephysical boundaries of a state, but also demarcates the people under thestate's rule. In addition, war can expand the territory inhabited by villagesand tribes into greater areas which not only supports more population, but alsogreatly expands the power of the up-and-coming state. This distinction helps tofurther consolidate power and strengthen the state.

Though Tilly's theory applies to the modernstate system, war was also an important catalyst in the formation of thepremodern state. In fact, the idea that warfare is a modern invention isdisproven by exhaustive evidence which ‘shows a continuous use of violence byprehistoric human societies’ (Fukuyama 2011: 73). Interestingly, though, few ofthese wars resulted in conquest of new territory by the victor. This lack ofconquest is likely because, as Francis Fukuyama explains, war can occur for severalreasons other than for control of territory. War is also fought spontaneouslyor for prestige, honor, economic purposes, or revenge. Nevertheless, overwhelmingevidence suggests conflict occurred most frequently in antiquity when a societysuffered from a large population with scarce resources to support it (Carneiro1970). This point is important because disputes over territory were unique inthat these battles usually resulted in the conquest of land and foreign peoplesby the victor. Therefore, unlike other forms of warfare where the acquisitionof territory and people did not occur, conquest warfare – spurred by conflictover resources – created conditions that required the creation of institutionswith enough capacity to manage the ever-increasing complex society, thusrepresenting the origins and development of the early state (Carneiro 1970).

In sum, when it comes to state formation, coercive theories argue war isessential to the origins and development of the state – whether in thepremodern or modern era – since war comes with several benefits which help toconsolidate power and strengthen societies. In particular, war fosters thegrowth of a complex bureaucracy necessary to support the war effort, and ithelps consolidate power for the ruler as well as territory. Those societiesmost efficient at creating these institutions and consolidating power, therefore,develop the strongest states. The absence of war, on the other hand, does notnecessarily preclude a state from forming strong institutions, but without war,the need to form strong institutions is less important.

DEFINITIONS,DATA AND RESULTS

State formation is atopic given a lot of attention within comparative politics, and despite thetheoretical evidence available to support Tilly's findings regarding the impactof war on the creation of the modern state structure, as mentioned, noquantitative analysis exists to test this theory. This is likely becausediscussing the formation of states presents many obstacles. How one defines theterm ‘state’ or ‘state capacity,’ for example, can vary significantly. Inaddition, discussing the capacity of a state in a period before the stateformed requires an understanding of the evolution of states.

Because ‘scholars, predictably, disagree on exactlywhat social or cultural “complexity,” or a “civilization,” or a “state,” is,’there is no universally accepted definition (Wenke 1999: 331). In fact, thereare ‘no shortage of competing definitions’ mainly because ‘a definition of thestate always depends on distinguishing it from society, and the line betweenthe two is difficult to draw in practice’ (Mitchell 1991: 77). Although less ofa problem when examining societies individually, it becomes particularlyproblematic when attempting cross-country analysis.

The second reason it is sodifficult to define a state is because scholars, in particular political scientists,think of a state in very limited terms. Realism, for instance, defines statessimply as unitary, rational, and geographically-based actors. Defining power interms of relative military, economic, and even political capabilities allowsfor states to have different levels of power (Morgenthau 1948). Unfortunately,this definition lacks the ability to distinguish at what point a group reachesthe unitary-rational-geographically-based-actor status. While useful at the international level, it does littleto help explain much else about states outside of that arena. In addition, theliterature has reduced ‘the state to a subjective system of decisionmaking.’ This view is narrow and idealist because it attempts to divide thestate from society with an ‘elusive boundary’ scholars try to ‘fix’ with theright definition. Instead, ‘we need to examine the detailed political processesthrough which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and societyis produced’ (Mitchell 1991: 85).

Moreover, common definitions of a state in politicalscience provide little room to think about the state outside of a fullydeveloped stage. In fact, we consider states that do not meet these stringent requirementsas ‘failed states’ even though, clearly, some institutions still exist in itsplace. As Alexander Wenke puts it, ‘Even in our own age, it is difficult toavoid the notions that… simpler societies are incompletely developed, and thatall the world's cultures are at various points along a gradient whose apex isthe modern Western industrial community’ (1999: 336). Despite acknowledgingvariation exists when it comes to distinguishing what constitutes a state, itis still problematic to discuss the characteristics of a state such as Germany,or China, or even South Africa a thousand years ago when only individual groupslived in these areas and states in their present-day form clearly did not existat that time.

Though states did not exist in their present formhundreds or thousands of years ago, this does not mean that the origins of theGermanic people that currently make up the modern-day state of Germany, forexample, are not identifiable in some other type of societal structure prior tothe modern-day state era. ‘Cultural evolution is not a continuous, cumulativegradual change, in most places “Fits and Starts” better describes it’ (Wenke1999: 336). In short, states take on many shapes over the course of thousandsof years of formation. Thus, to understand this process requires thinkingoutside the rigid definitions of a state that typically apply only to the modernterritorial state.

In addition, focus is often placed on the type ofinstitutions within a state to help explain its formation. This, too, doeslittle to further our knowledge as to why states in Africa failed to developthe capacity of states in Europe. The typeor ‘ideology’ or institutions in a state matter, but matter to a muchless extent than typically portrayed. An autocratic regime can maintain stronginfrastructure, institutions, and internal as well as external military controljust like a democratic regime. Likewise, some democracies suffer from a lack ofcapacity, especially newly transitioning ones. Because state capacity is notdependent upon the type of institutions in place, it is necessary to broadenhow we think about states. Without a new way of thinking, research remainsblocked in its ability to fully explain the modern state, much less the differentiationin capacity across regions.

With this in mind, and drawing from various disciplines'definitions of ‘state,’ ‘society,’ and ‘civilization,’ I define a ‘state’ as asociety with some sort of rituals, traditions, and rules that can differentiatein terms of structural organization, such as levels of hierarchy, as well ascapacity to project power both internally and externally. This definition meetsmost basic assumptions about the various components that make up a state. Italso makes it possible to discuss a state throughout different levels acrosstime and space. In other words, reworking the definition of a state to includespecific characteristics of differing groups allows us to study the evolutionof a particular state during a period when the modern-day version did notexist. Though they do not specifically frame their discussion of stateformation in this same way, authors such as James Scott (2009), FrancisFukuyama (2011), Jared Diamond (2009), and Max Weber (1946) explore theevolution of the state, or the lack thereof in Scott's case, in much this sameway by starting with the organization of societies in primitive times. RobertJ. Wenke likewise defines society in a similar fashion (1999: 332).

It is necessary to note thisdefinition differs from that given to ‘nation.’ Although it defines onecharacteristic of a state as having some sort of ritual, traditions, and rules,this is not the same as having a shared identity or culture. Thoughimportant for state strength, it does not accurately define ‘state.’ As WalkerConnor explains, a state is tangible– readily defined and easily quantified. ‘Peru, for illustration, can bedefined in an easily conceptualized manner as the territorial-political unitconsisting of sixteen million inhabitants of the 514,060 square mileslocated on the west coast of South America between 69 and 80 west, and 2 and18, 21 south’ (1978: 300). No mention about the identity of the people in thearea is necessary to identify the ‘state.’ Therefore, a state can be thought ofas the territory over which a central power makes claim to political power andcan demonstrate that power by extracting compliance from inhabitants andrecognition of this power over the territory from foreigners and other states.

Nations, on the other hand, areintangible, self-defined, and consist of ‘a psychological bond that joins apeople and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members,from all other people in a most vital way’ (Connor 1978: 300–301). A populardefinition in international relations of a nation is that it consists of ‘asocial group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs,and a sense of homogenetry.’ The group may have a sense of belonging to aparticular territory, though certain religious sects also exhibit these samecharacteristics (Connor 1978: 301–304).International relations scholars have gone to great lengths to differentiatebetween state and nation. Nevertheless, ‘having defined the nation as anessentially psychological phenomenon,’ scholars still treat the term ‘as fullysynonymous with the very different and totally tangible concept of the state’(Connor 1978: 301).

The merger of these two terms is problematic. Thoughthe more homogenous a society the easier it is for a state to establish institutionswith a great deal of capacity, it is not an essential component for stateformation. In fact, Connor surveyed 132 states and found that only 12 states,or 9.1 per cent, qualified as nation-states. In ‘this era of immigration andcultural diffusion,’ he cautions, ‘even that figure is probably on the high side’(1978: 301–304). These two terms must be separated, therefore, so that theinclusion of states at all capacity levels is possible.

The definition adopted in this paper coincides withTilly's own argument regarding the characteristics of a state. According tohim, city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of governmentabove the band or tribal level represent the different levels of statehood thatevolved over time. He argues, though each type of state has distinctcharacteristics to differentiate it as a separate type of political order, theyare merely ‘plausible alternatives’ from which elites choose; therefore, allrepresent one form of a state or another (Tilly 1992: 1–5; see also Connelly2003; Cooper 2005; Kumar 2010). As long as the organization controls ‘theprincipal concentrated means of coercion within delimited territories, andexercise[s] priority in some respects over all other organizations actingwithin the territories’ then, regardless of how homogenized or centralized authority,the political unit is a state (Tilly 1992: 5).

DefiningState Capacity

Just as disagreement exists on what constitutes astate, there is little consensus on how to measure the capacity of a state.Some scholars view state capacity in terms of economic and military prowess consistentwith the realist and neorealist understanding of relative power capabilities(Mearsheimer 2001; Morganthau 1948; Schweller 1992; Waltz 1979). Otherscategorize a state's capacity dependent upon its economic and developmentalcapabilities (Herbst 2000; Migdal 1988; Scott 2009; and Acemoglu 2005). Stateswhose leadership maintains a monopoly over the control of the populationthrough coercive policies and brute force are considered to have the mostcapacity according to others. Because democratic leaders are often constrainedby their constituency, democratic regimes are viewed as lacking the necessarycapacity to project power (Johnson 1984; Ikenberryet al. 1996; Katzenstein 1996). Authoritarian regimes, in contrast,enjoy a considerable deal of institutional capacity since leaders can makedecisions without fear of backlash from an angry Selectorate (Bueno de Mesquite2003). For some, a state's capacity is measured by its ability to influence andcontrol the perceptions of others (MacMillan 1978). Along these same lines, thecohesiveness of society can affect the state's level of capacity. ‘Since groupscan be mobilized by persuasion as well as coercion, it should be possible tobring and keep members together voluntarily’ (March and Olsen 1989: 12).

Since rituals and symbols create a sense of communitywhich helps unify society and thus, also increase legitimacy, those states withthe ability to build a cohesive society also, subsequently, have the mostinstitutional capacity (Desch 1996: 256). Combining definitions that emphasizethe scope as well as the capacity of a state is essential. Minimal states, forexample, provide public goods like internal order, external defense, and basicpublic infrastructure, but little else. This limited role results insignificantly weaker institutions than those found in maximal states. A maximalstate, on the other hand, has much stronger institutions since it must alsoperform ‘functions such as adjudication, redistribution, and extensiveinfrastructural development.’ In addition, divided states are less cohesive andtherefore have much less capacity than unified states. In short, ‘strong statesare highly cohesive and tend to be maximal states; weak states are divided andtend to be minimal states’ (Desch 1996: 240–241).

According to Charles Tilly (1992) and Max Weber (1946)the capacity of a state is determined by 1) its ability to concentrate coerciveforce in a single organization or set of organizations, 2) its ability toclearly delineate its borders from other states, and 3) the presence of a legitimategoverning authority. The stronger the institutions tasked with ensuring thisability, the stronger the state's ability to project its power. Others agree astate is just ‘a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule operatingthrough the continuous and regulated activities of individuals acting asoccupants of offices.’ The state has a specified territory ‘and monopolizes inlaw and as far as possible in all fact’ to protect its territory as it seesfit, in its own interest (Poggi 1978: 1). States lacking in capacity are unableto perform these tasks efficiently and effectively.

In sum, the literature views state capacity in termsof a state's 1) extractive, 2) coercive, and 3) administrative abilities. Extractive capacityrefers to a state's ability to raise armies and extract capital from itspopulation. Coercive capacity, on the other hand, refers to a state's ability toprotect its borders from both internal and external threats. Finally,administrative capacity is defined as a state's ability to deliver public goodsand services efficiently. This requires not only bureaucratic efficiency, butalso control over the territory of the state. Important for each of these areasis a state's ability to control its borders from both internal and externalthreats. Thus, those states with the most capacity are the most successful atmaintaining legitimate control over the monopoly of the use of force (Hanson andSigman 2011; Tilly 1992; vom Hauet al.2012;Weber 1946). The modern territorial state emerged as the most suitable way oforganizing rule with the most capacity as a result (Tilly 1992). Conversely,states lacking the capacity typical of the modern territorial state do not maintaincontrol over the entire population within its borders. In fact, the state maynot even have clearly defined borders or maybe governed partially or in whole by a foreign government. Additionally,capacity-poor states ‘lack the power to tax and regulate the economy’ and theydo not have the ability to maintain a ‘monopoly over violence’ (Acemoglu 2005:1199–1200). Jeffrey Herbst (2000), for example, argues African states lack theability to extract resources from their citizenry, because they lack the necessaryinstitutional capacity to do so.

Just as a state can gain capacity over time bystrengthening its institutions, circumstances can also cause a state to loseits capacity as well. A substantial loss of population, for instance, can havedire consequences. Even Rome, for example, suffered from a series of devastatingplagues which historians suggest contributed to its demise. Moreover, a statecan overextend itself both in territory and military engagements.Empire-building in particular places considerable strain on a state. If theempire stretches itself too thin, if it comes under considerable pressure fromattackers, if it fails to control or incorporate conquered peoplessuccessfully, and in some cases even if it suffers significant loss because ofdisease, the state's institutions can weaken. Once its capacity is weakened itopens the door for outsiders as well as the conquered people who have not beenhomogenized to fight for independence. War, in general, can also seriouslyweaken the capacity of a state. Not only does it often result in a loss ofterritory, but if the war is damaging enough, the losing state's institutionsare seriously weakened. This is especially so if the victor maintains at leastpartial control over the territory or government in the conquered state – afate suffered not just by the Romans, but countless fledgling societies, newlyformed states, and even Great Powers and other vast Empires throughout history.

Inantiquity a state built institutions to increase its capacity to maintainsociety because it faced issues of competition-scarcity or threat of war, butafter it acquired enough territory to satisfy its needs or it eliminated thethreat, the need for strong institutions diminished. This is especially true inthose areas where uninhabited territory was abundant because it provided alarge buffer-zone for security. This protection made external clashes lesslikely. If peace lasted long enough, the state may lose even more of itscapacity over time as the need for the institutions decrease. This is much lesslikely in the modern era, however, because states have expanded as far aspossible without crossing into another state's territory. Thus, a buffer zonelarge enough to protect from an external threat no longer exists. In addition, because the world is much moreinterconnected and weaponry is much more advanced, threats are no longer justfrom a state's adjacent neighbor, but can come from any state anywhere in theworld. As explained above, modern day states can still lose some, or all, oftheir capacity because of war or other circumstances, but the occurrence isless likely now than in antiquity.

Having established theparameters within which the variables are framed, I turn my attention todefining the variables used to test the hypothesis that war makes states.

Dependent Variable

State Strength:To operationalize the administrative capability ofpre-modern states an ideal measure of state strength would capture the abilityof a state to collect taxes. Unfortunately, because data is limited during thisperiod, compiling that information for all states in all regions underinvestigation is not possible. However, theStateAntiquity Index provides a comprehensive way of measuring state strengthwhich is compatible with my definition. The index contains data on statestrength for 149 countries from 1 to 1950 CE.⁵ To determinethe level of state strength for each country during the selected time periodstheindex allocates points to aseries of three questions asked about each state:

1. Is there a government above the tribal level? (1 pointif yes, 0 points if no); 2. Is this government foreign or locally based? (1point if locally based, 0.5 points if foreign [i.e., the country is a colony], 0.75 if in between [a localgovernment with substantial foreign oversight]; 3. How much of the territory ofthe modern country was ruled by this government? (1 point if over 50 %, 0.75points if between 25 % and 50 %, 0.5 points if between 10 % and 25 %, 0.3 points if less than10 %) (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman 2002).⁶

These questions accurately address theimportant components I useto define a state regarding whether there is a government and the ability ofthat government to control its borders.

To gather data for the index, Bockstette,Chanda and Putterman relied on the historical accounts for each countrycontained in the Encyclopedia BritannicaandMacropedia articles in theBritannicaonline. The authors acknowledge the use of this particular source is ‘far fromdefinitive,’ but due to gaps in the historical record for many states ‘no morespecialized compilation… containing the necessary information exists’ (Chandaand Putterman 2007).⁷ The data divides the period into 50-yearintervals and asks the above three questions during each segment. A score on ascale of 0–50 is then given based upon the responses to the questions. If acountry receives a 0 then no government above the tribal level exists. A scoreof 50 indicates a strong state is in place which maintains completecontrol over its entire territory. Scores falling somewhere in the middledemonstrate some type of government was in place, but it either did notmaintain complete control over the entire population, there was a foreign governmentin control, or a combination of local and foreign government control existed.

Because I ampredicting the probability that conflict creates strong states, I create avariable which divides state strength into three categories. All states with ascore ranging from 0–24 are coded ‘0’ for weak state. Moderate states, thoseranging from 25–34, are coded ‘1.’ Finally, states with a score 35 orabove are considered strong and coded ‘2.’

Independent Variable

Conflict:Although many conflict databases exist, findingcomprehensive data that begins before 1800 is a difficult task. I rely onGeorge C. Kohn'sDictionary of Wars (2000), a one-volume referencesource on conflicts from ancient times to present. Though it does not accountfor all conflicts throughout history it does include a comprehensive list ofall major and many minor conflicts that occurred across the globe from 3000 BCEto 1999 CE. In addition, Kohn relies on a broad classification of war definedas ‘an overt, armed conflict carried on between nations or states (internationalwar) or between parties, factions, or people in the same state (civil war)’(2000: 12). Moreover, Kohn defines international war as those events involving‘territorial disputes, injustice against people of one country by those ofanother, problems of race and prejudice, commercial and economic competitionand coercion, envy of military might, or sheer cupidity for conquest.’ Kohnincludes any ‘organized effort to seize power’ such as a rebellion,insurrection, uprising, or revolt as a civil war. Finally, Kohn adds ‘conquests,invasions, sieges, massacres, raids, and key mutinies’ to the list of entries.Having such a broad definition of war is useful because it allows a diverserange of disputes in the data. This is particularly beneficial for earlier timeperiods since present day states had not formed and classification of manybattles fall outside the scope of international wars biasing the results.

Conflict is an independent count variable measured as the total conflicts percountry per year. Using a count variable yields more precise predictions than abinary variable since it can pinpoint precisely how much different levels ofconflict impact state strength.

Control Variables

Conflict Adjacent:After remaining at a relatively steady rate with fewexceptions for centuries, around 1000 – 1200 CE the number of conflictsdramatically increases. Because the external environment in which a stateresides matters (Waltz 1979), it is possible states located next to a conflictprone state will also engage in conflict (offensive and/or defensive; seeMearsheimer 2001) regardless of its internal environment. To control for thiseffect, I include a dummy variable coded ‘1’ for any country next to oneinvolved in a conflict and ‘0’ for those countries not adjacent to a conflictprone state. Although I do not includeMiddle Eastern countries in the dataset, I use theDictionary of Warsto determine if any of those states were involved in a conflict and coded anyadjacent country in the dataset appropriately.

ContiguousStates:Prior researchindicates states that share a border with one or more states are more likely toengage in conflict. Following the lead used by the Correlates of War projectfor coding the contiguous characteristic of states I counted the total numberof known societies bordering the societies within the current territorialboundary of any given state from 0–1600. I relied on an exhaustive review ofhistorical data including map archives and accounts of the various groups ineach area, including all minor and major actors to determine how many borderingneighbors any one state or society had during this time. Some states, likeTajikistan and Uzbekistan, for instance, were not coded due to lack of availableinformation.

Landlocked:I include a control variablecoded ‘1’ for landlocked countries and ‘0’ for those that are not.

Island:I also include a controlvariable coded ‘1’ if the state is an island and ‘0’ if it is not.

RegionalControls:Qualitative casestudies reveal state formation occurred at different times and at differentrates. Asia developed much sooner, but a lot slower than Europe. Europe, on theother hand, arrived late on the state building scene, but progressed rapidly;Africa lagged behind both. To account for regional distinctions a dummyvariable is included for Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Africa.

ForeignInvasion: Foreign invasionis shown to weaken and strengthen a state, depending upon circumstances. Manystates in the early phase of development were overcome with foreign threats ofconquests; others residing in a peaceful environment. A dummy variable isincluded to account for the impact foreign invasion has on state development.All states that have mention of a foreign invasion in their historical recordby a group other than Rome are coded ‘1’. No foreign presence in the state iscoded ‘0’.

RomanOccupation:Qualitativecase studies reveal the presence of Rome in a state significantly impacts itsgrowth. The findings indicate while Rome may help elevate most states slightlyin strength, in the long term, its presence weakens the states development. This resultsbecause despite Roman institutions established to maintain the military establishment,Rome did little to strengthen the institutions in the state it occupied in anyother way. This lack of attention to institution building is evident after thefall of Rome. Europe, left with no rule of law and because Rome did little inthe way of state building in these areas to help the inhabitants enforce it on their own, state strengthwas weakened. The Dark Ages are the result. Though states did recover from Rome'sretreat, it is evident Rome set states back in their development at least temporarily. Every state in which Rome had apresence is therefore coded ‘1’. A lack of Roman presence is coded ‘0’.

RomanWithdrawal:Since the fallof Rome was so problematic for its foreign territories, the first year in whichRome's presence is no longer dominant is coded ‘1’. All other years are coded ‘0’.

Plague:Qualitative case studiesalso reveal states suffered significant setback in population levels and, inmany cases, their strength because of several devastating plagues that occurredthroughout history. Thus, any year in which the historical record indicates astate suffered a severe loss from a plague is coded ‘1’. Plague-free years arecoded ‘0’.

Data Analysis

I test the hypothesis that war makes strong states byusing panel data and multinomial logistic regression to predict whetherconflict increases state strength. In this model I use a count variable of thetotal number of conflicts per year for each country. This is appropriate sincethe hypothesis suggests the higher the number of conflicts, the stronger thestate. I also includeconflict_adjacentin this model since, as previously discussed, sharing a border with a conflictprone neighbor yields a degree of uncertainty forcing a state to defend itselfagainst potential aggression. A strong state would certainly be beneficial inthis regard. Finally, I control for landlocked and island states, Roman as wellas foreign occupation, Roman withdrawal, occurrence of the plague as well asfixed effects for year. I do not control for fixed effects for region in thismodel. Doing so produced extremely large error terms for each of the regionalcontrols and the constant. Goodness of fit tests reveal model specification isimproved significantly when not controlling for region. Fixed effects for yearimprove the model only slightly. Table 2 displays the results.

Thetotal number of conflicts a state is involved in does increase the probabilitythat it will develop a strong state structure. In addition, conflict adjacentstates are also more likely to have strong structures. Landlocked states aremore often moderate states but have less chance of becoming strong. Islands, onthe other hand, have a slightly higher chance of developing a strong state, butit has no significance on whether a state is weak.

As Figure 1 shows, as total conflictsincrease the probability that a state will develop weak institutional capacitydecreases. Whereas, Figure 2 shows as total conflicts increase, the probabilitythat a state will develop strong institutional capacity likewise increases. Infact, a state that engages in less than five conflicts has more than a seventeenpercent (17 %) chance of remaining weak. More than five (5) conflicts in aperiod, however, yields less than a ten percent (10 %) chance a state has aweak structure. A state that engages in fifteen or more conflicts has less thana one percent (1 %) chance of being weak. Conversely, the more conflicts astate faces, the higher its probability of developing a strong state structure.States that engage in fifteen (15) or more disputes have an eighty-eightpercent (88 %) chance of being strong. Twenty-five (25) or more conflictsincrease the chance to ninety-five percent (95 %) or greater. Weak states arelocated next to peaceful states only eighteen percent (18 %) of the time. Onthe other hand, fifty-five percent (55 %) of states located next to conflictprone states are strong. Landlocked states have an eighteen percent (18 %)chance of remaining weak, whereas the likelihood it will develop into a strongstate increases to forty-three percent (43 %). Islands, on the other hand, areonly fifteen percent (15 %) more likely to become strong than remain weak.

Rome'spresence produces varying results depending upon the classification of thestate. Roman occupation improves a weak state's condition by four percent (4 %).In other words, if Rome occupied a state's territory, the state wasstrengthened, but only slightly. Rome's impact on strong states is significant,however. A state left unconquered by Rome has a thirty-two percent (32 %)chance that it will become strong. Rome's presence, however, means states onlyhave an eighteen percent (18 %) chance of developing strong institutions. Thisfinding is particularly intuitive because it confirms that Rome did notestablish strong administrative structures in these areas. This confirms whythe areas were so weak after Rome fell; Rome's presence hindered, not helped,developing states.

In sum, thoughlocation is important, and conflict prone neighbors can induce states todevelop stronger structures, the findings confirm the hypothesis that statesthat engage in conflict more frequently are more likely strong.

CONCLUSION

The findings confirm Tilly's theory that war makesstates. The findings also show how conflict between just two states in an areacan have a reciprocal effect on other states in the region. Finally, the resultsyield interesting findings regarding the role Rome played in the state makingprocess. Notably, Rome's presence hindered, not helped, developing states.

The results are important for adding to ourunderstanding of how states developed, lending support for coercive theoriesthat find a positivecorrelation between the engagement in conflict and the strengthening of stateinstitutions. These findings do not account for economic or class-basedtheories' arguments regarding the role the market or cultural cleavages,etc. play in the formation of states. Nevertheless,it is clear conflict serves as an impetus for strengthening states, at least inthe pre-modern era. The more efficient a state is at extracting taxes, draftingsoldiers, providing resources, and maintaining control of its subjects thehigher its chance of success in war. Without war the need for this type ofstrong structure does not exist and, thus, does not develop.

These findings are important, not onlybecause it explains the difference in state strength in different regions, butit also provides insight into states in the modern era. If one of the mainreasons why states develop strong state structures is related to the amount ofconflict it faces, then that might explain why developing states in the modernera still find it difficult to create the type of strong states that flourishedin Europe for centuries. War⁸ creates a powerful incentive to findthe most efficient way to structure a state. Without this incentive, themotivation needed to force states on a rapid path of development does notexist.

NOTES

1 Though economicor class-based theories may also explain the formation of states, it isimpossible to quantitatively address each of these competing debates in thispaper. As a result, focus is solely on testing Tilly's theory.

2 The type of economic system a state developsdetermines its strength. The ability ofinstitutions to achieve economic growth, the timing of development, and thetype of structure in relation to the strength of the state drives the formationof the state. Others argue the ability of a state to foster trust andcooperation for the coordination of activities is important. States that createa more unified society and are better equipped at instilling trust gainlegitimacy and therefore strength. Class-based theories of state formation, onthe other hand, argue cleavages in society determine the structure of a state.

3 As states began to focus on non-military activities,however, ‘military expenditure declined’ relegating the ‘militaryorganization…from a dominant segment of the state structure to a moresubordinated position’ (Jönssonet al.2000: 69).

4 I borrow Max Weber's definition of abureaucracy (see Weber, M. 1946. In MaxWeber: Essays in Sociology. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. Oxford:Routledge Paperback).

5 For a complete list of countries included in thedataset used for this project see Appendix A.

6 For a detailed description of how the scores aretallied see Valerie Bockstette, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman. 2002. ‘Statesand Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start.’Journal ofEconomic Growth7: 347–69.

7 Despite the limitations of the data sources, the indexcreated by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman has appeared in a wide range ofpeer reviewed publications and has been cited numerous times in a variety ofstudies.

8 I refer specifically to international and not civilwar in this instance.

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D. 2005. Politicsand Economics in Weak and Strong States.Journalof Monetary Economics 52: 1199–1226.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. 2003.The Logic of Political Survival.The MITPress.

Bockstette, V., Chanda, A., and Putterman, L.2002. States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start.Journal of Economic Growth7: 347–69.

Carneiro, R. L. 1970. A Theory of the Originof the State.Science 169: 733–738.

Chanda, A., and Putterman, L. 2007. EarlyStarts, Reversals and Catch-up in the Process of Economic Development.Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (2): 387–413.

Connelly, M. 2003.A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and theOrigins of the Post-Cold War Era.Oxford University Press.

Connor, W. 1978. A Nation is a Nation, is aState, is an Ethnic Group is a…Ethnicand Racial Studies 1: 377–400.

Cooper, F. 2005.Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History.University ofCalifornia Press.

Desch, M. C. 1996. War and Strong States,Peace and Weak States?InternationalOrganization50: 2.

Diamond, J. 1999.Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Society.New York: W. W.Norton & Company, Inc.

Ertmann, Th. 1997.The Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval andEarly Modern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, F. 2011.The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the FrenchRevolution.Farrar, Straus and Girous.

Glete, J. 2002.War and the State inEarly Modern Europe.London: Routledge.

Hanson, J. K., and Sigman, R. 2011. MeasuringState Capacity: Assessing and Testing the Options.Paper Prepared for the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation.Sept., 1–5.

Herbst, J. 2000.States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority andControl.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G. J., Lake, D. A., andMastanduno, M. 1996.Approaches to ExplainingAmerican Foreign Economic Policy.Cornell Paperbacks.

Johnson,Ch. A. 1984.MITIand the Japanese Miracle. Stanford University Press.

Jönsson, Ch., Tägil, S., and Törnqvist, G.2000.Organizing European Space.London: Sage.

Katzenstein, P. 1976. InternationalRelations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of AdvancedIndustrial States.International Organization 30 (1) (Winter): 1–45.

Kennedy, P. 1987.The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.New York: Random House.

Kohn, G. C. 2000.Dictionary of Wars. Checkmark Books.

Kumar, K. 2010. Nation-States as Empires,Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles One Practice?Springer Science+Business Media. (January).

MacMillan, I. C.1978. Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts.St Paul, MN: West Publishing.

March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. 1989.Rediscovering Institutions: The OrganizationalBasis of Politics.The Free Press.

Mearsheimer, J. 2001.The Tragedy ofGreat Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.

Migdal, J. S. 1988.Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and StateCapabilities in the Third World.New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, T. 1991. The Limitsof the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics.The American Political Science Review 85: 1.

Morganthau, H. 1948.Politics among Nations: TheStruggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978.The Development of the Modern State: ASociological Introduction. Stanford University Press.

Schweller, R. 1992. Domestic Structure andPreventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?World Politics44: 2.

Scott, J. C. 2009.The Art of Not Being Governed.New Haven and London: YaleUniversity Press.

Spryut, H. 1997. War, Trade, and StateFormation. In Boix, C., and Stokes, S. (eds),The Oxford Handbook ofComparative Politics.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, Ch. 1992.Coercion, Capital, andEuropean States, AD 900 – 1992.Oxford: Blackwell.

Vom Hau, M., Scott, J., and Hulme, D. 2012.Beyond the BRICs: Alternative Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics ofDevelopment.European Journal of DevelopmentResearch24: 2.

Waltz, K. 1979.Theory of InternationalPolitics. New York: McGraw Hill.

Wenke, R. J. 1999.Patterns in Pre-History.4^th ed. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.