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Home PhilosophyScientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense
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Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense

  • Howard Sankey
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De Gruyter
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New Approaches to Scientific Realism
This chapter is in the bookNew Approaches to Scientific Realism

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify and resolve a tension between scientific realism and commonsense realism that arises due to a purported conflict between science and common sense. It has sometimes been held that common sense is antiquated theory which is found to be false and eliminated with the advance of science. In this paper, a distinction is proposed between three kinds of common sense: practical skill; widely held belief; basic common sense. It is agreed that common sense in the sense of widely held belief does succumb to the advance of science. It is left open to what extent practical skill varies with scientific change. It is argued that basic common sense is by and large resistant to change due to scientific change. Epistemological aspects of basic common sense are explored. A number of objections to the proposal about basic common sense are considered. It is suggested that basic common sense is sufficiently epistemologically robust to provide a foundation both for scientific knowledge and for scientific realism.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify and resolve a tension between scientific realism and commonsense realism that arises due to a purported conflict between science and common sense. It has sometimes been held that common sense is antiquated theory which is found to be false and eliminated with the advance of science. In this paper, a distinction is proposed between three kinds of common sense: practical skill; widely held belief; basic common sense. It is agreed that common sense in the sense of widely held belief does succumb to the advance of science. It is left open to what extent practical skill varies with scientific change. It is argued that basic common sense is by and large resistant to change due to scientific change. Epistemological aspects of basic common sense are explored. A number of objections to the proposal about basic common sense are considered. It is suggested that basic common sense is sufficiently epistemologically robust to provide a foundation both for scientific knowledge and for scientific realism.

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Chapters in this book

  1. FrontmatterI
  2. ContentsV
  3. Novelty in Scientific Realism: New Approaches to an Ongoing Debate1
  4. I New Framework for the Realism and Anti-realism Debate
  5. Scientific Realism: What’s All the Fuss?27
  6. Scientific Realism and Three Problems for Inference to the Best Explanation48
  7. Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense68
  8. II Approaches based on History and Scientific Realism
  9. Evolving Realities: Scientific Prediction and Objectivity from the Perspective of Historical Epistemology87
  10. Do Cognitive Illusions Make Scientific Realism Deceptively Attractive?104
  11. III Logical Approaches in Realist Terms
  12. Against Paraconsistentism133
  13. Stratified Nomic Realism145
  14. IV Logico-Epistemological Structural Realism and Instrumental Realism
  15. Structural Realism: The Only Defensible Realist Game in Town?169
  16. Mathematical Language and the Changing Concept of Physical Reality206
  17. V New Developments on Critical Scientific Realism and Pragmatic Realism
  18. Interdisciplinarity from the Perspective of Critical Scientific Realism231
  19. Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity251
  20. VI Realism on Causality and Representation
  21. Realism and AIM (Action, Intervention, Manipulation) Theories of Causality291
  22. Is Physics Biased Against Alternative Possibilities?305
  23. VII Realist Accounts on Objectivity and Facts
  24. Realistic Components in the Conception of Pragmatic Idealism: The Role of Objectivity and the Notion of “Fact”331
  25. “Heard Enough from the Experts”? A Popperian Enquiry348
  26. Realism in Archaeology – A Philosophical Perspective365
  27. VIII Realism and the Social World: From Social Sciences to the Sciences of the Artificial
  28. A Structural Realist Approach to International Relations Theory391
  29. Objectivity and Truth in Sciences of Communication and the Case of the Internet415
  30. Index of Names437
  31. Subject Index447
Search book

Chapters in this book

  1. FrontmatterI
  2. ContentsV
  3. Novelty in Scientific Realism: New Approaches to an Ongoing Debate1
  4. I New Framework for the Realism and Anti-realism Debate
  5. Scientific Realism: What’s All the Fuss?27
  6. Scientific Realism and Three Problems for Inference to the Best Explanation48
  7. Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense68
  8. II Approaches based on History and Scientific Realism
  9. Evolving Realities: Scientific Prediction and Objectivity from the Perspective of Historical Epistemology87
  10. Do Cognitive Illusions Make Scientific Realism Deceptively Attractive?104
  11. III Logical Approaches in Realist Terms
  12. Against Paraconsistentism133
  13. Stratified Nomic Realism145
  14. IV Logico-Epistemological Structural Realism and Instrumental Realism
  15. Structural Realism: The Only Defensible Realist Game in Town?169
  16. Mathematical Language and the Changing Concept of Physical Reality206
  17. V New Developments on Critical Scientific Realism and Pragmatic Realism
  18. Interdisciplinarity from the Perspective of Critical Scientific Realism231
  19. Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity251
  20. VI Realism on Causality and Representation
  21. Realism and AIM (Action, Intervention, Manipulation) Theories of Causality291
  22. Is Physics Biased Against Alternative Possibilities?305
  23. VII Realist Accounts on Objectivity and Facts
  24. Realistic Components in the Conception of Pragmatic Idealism: The Role of Objectivity and the Notion of “Fact”331
  25. “Heard Enough from the Experts”? A Popperian Enquiry348
  26. Realism in Archaeology – A Philosophical Perspective365
  27. VIII Realism and the Social World: From Social Sciences to the Sciences of the Artificial
  28. A Structural Realist Approach to International Relations Theory391
  29. Objectivity and Truth in Sciences of Communication and the Case of the Internet415
  30. Index of Names437
  31. Subject Index447
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