Review Article
Open Access
Comparative Bureaucratic Politics
- Carl Dahlström1 andVictor Lapuente1,2
- View AffiliationsHide Affiliations1Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden; email:[email protected][email protected]2ESADE Business School, Barcelona, Spain
- Vol. 25:43-63(Volume publication date May 2022)
- First published as a Review in Advance on February 04, 2022
- Copyright © 2022 by Annual Reviews.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See credit lines of images or other third-party material in this article for license information
Abstract
This article discusses one of the most important institutions in the modern world, namely public bureaucracies, from a comparative perspective. Bureaucratic organizations can be seen as a result of handling dilemmas along two critical dimensions. The first dimension concerns whether bureaucrats should be autonomous or, on the contrary, directly accountable to their political masters. The second dimension is about whether bureaucrats should always be guided by the letter of the law, strictly following established rules, or, on the contrary, guided by the principle of management, searching for the most efficient solution. We review the extensive recent research on the effects of different ways of organizing public bureaucracies along these two dimensions. Specifically, we look at three fundamental outcomes: economic development, corruption, and the quality of public services. We conclude by discussing the pros and cons of the four types of bureaucracies—legalistic (accountability and law), populistic (accountability and management), Weberian (autonomy and law), and liberal (autonomy and management)—and how they relate to, but do not overlap with, the concept of administrative traditions.






