Towards the end of World War II, when the French had regained control of the Levant, revived fears of Hashemite expansion in that area gripped the Free French. The Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan were seen as subversive forces which were constantly attempting to destroy any French influence left in the Middle East, replacing independent states with Hashemite satellites. Eventually, if not counteracted, the whole Middle East would come under their control, and, as the British were behind them, the latter would have once again outmaneuvered their rivals.

^{page 314 note 1}de Gaulle,C.,War Memoirs, vol.2, trans.Howard,R. (New York:Simon and Schuster,1959), p.222;Google ScholarMonroe,E.,Britain's Moment in the Middle East (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1963), p.127;Google ScholarKirk,G. E.,The Middle East in the War (New York:Oxford University Press, RIIA,1952), pp.104–29.Google Scholar

^{page 314 note 2}Kirk,G.,Short History of the Middle East,7th rev. ed. (New York:Praeger,1964), p.122.Google Scholar

^{page 315 note 1}Antonius,G.,The Arab Awakening (New York:Capricorn Books,1965), p.436.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 1}Longrigg,S. H.,Iraq 1900–1950 (New York:Oxford University Press,1954), p.133.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 2}Kedourie,E., ‘The Kingdom of Iraq: A Retrospect’, inThe Chatham House Version and Other Middle East Studies (London:Weidenfeld and Nicholson,1970), p.241.Google Scholar The story was taken fromHasani's,Iraqi Cabinets, vol.I,2nd ed. (1964), p.43, n. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 3}de Gaury,G.,Three Kings in Baghdad (London:Hutchinson,1961), p.25.Google Scholar

^{page 316 note 4}US Department of State, 890G.00/167. 12–2–31;Google Scholarcf. Kedourie,op. cit. p. 246.Google Scholar

^{page 317 note 1}Khadduri,M., ‘The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity’, inThe Near East and the Great Powers, ed.Frye,R. N. (Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1951), p.150.Google Scholar

^{page 317 note 2}Khadduri,M.,Independent Iraq (New York:Oxford University Press,1960), p.344.Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 1} ‘General Nuri al-Sa′id's Fertile Crescent Scheme, December, 1942’, document no. 72 inHurewitz,J. C.,Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1914–1956, vol.2 (Princeton, N.J.:D. Van Nostrand and Company, Inc,1956), pp.236–7.Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 2}Interview with ‘Abd Allah Bakr by Dr P. Marr, 17 December1967.Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 3}Interview with Ahmad Mukhtar Baban by Dr P. Marr, Beirut, 11 December1967.Google Scholar

^{page 318 note 4}In his autobiography,Uneasy Lies the Head, Hussein describes the complete control the regent had over Faisal. He refused to let Faisal have a car, and according to Hussein forced the unwilling king to be head of the Arab Federation.Google Scholar

^{page 319 note 1}Seale,Patrick,The Struggle for Syria (New York:Oxford University Press,1965), pp.49–50;Google ScholarKhadduri,M., ‘Constitutional Development in Syria’,Middle East Journal, vol.V (1950), pp.147–60;Google ScholarTorrey,G.,Syrian Politics and the Military (Ohio State University Press,1964), pp.34–5;Google ScholarKubba,Muhammad Mehdi,Mudhakirati 1918–1958 (Beirut:Dar al-Talia,1965), pp.200–1.Google Scholar

^{page 319 note 2}Torrey, pp. 78–82.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 1}Interview with Najib ar-Rawi by Dr P. Marr, Geneva, 15 January1968;Google ScholarSeale,op. cit. p. 89.Google ScholarCf. Kubba,op. cit. pp. 292–3, where he reports the members of Istiqial present at the meeting; he mentions that the regent felt that Pachachi had deceived him.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 2}as-Suwaidi,T.,Mudhakirati (Beirut:Dar al-Katib,1969), p.528;Google ScholarHasani,,Ta'rikh al-Wuzarat al-Iraqiya,10 vols,2nd ed. (Sidon:Irfan,1968), vol. IX, p.76, n. 1. Midfai was not anxious to pay off Syrian politicians.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 3}Seale,op. cit. p. 538.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 4}As-Suwaidi,op. cit. p. 528.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 5}Al-Hasani,op. cit. vol. IX, p. 76.Google Scholar The Iraqi government allocated ID300,000 for Syria and ID150,000 for Jordan's Arab Legion.Cf.Perlmann,M., ‘Upheaval in Iraq’,Middle East Affairs, vol.V (1954), p.121. Jamali stated at the Arab League meeting that Jordan was not viable alone and that Iraq would pay the Arab Legion out of her oil royalties. There was opposition in Amman.Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 6}Seale,op. cit. pp. 139–40.Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 1}Ibid. pp. 170–1.

^{page 321 note 2} SeeEden's,A. Mansion House speech of 1941 in Kirk,The Middle East in the War, p. 334.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 1}Kedourie,op. cit. p. 240.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 2}Ibid.

^{page 322 note 3}Telegram, Cox to Churchill, 27 August1922, CO 730/24/1922.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 4}Kedourie,op. cit. p. 240.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 5}All evidence supports the view thatGhazi had nothing whatsoever to do with the coup. See Kedourie,op. cit. p. 248, where the author cites thatGhazi's ex-tutor told Taha al-Hashimi that the king boasted that the latter had organized the coup.Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 6}Monroe,op. cit. p. 184.Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 1}Little,T. R., ‘The Arab League: A Reassessment’,Middle East Journal, vol.x (1956), pp.140–5;Google ScholarGEK,, ‘Iraq, Egypt and the Arab League’,World Today, vol.XI (1955), pp.145–51.Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 2}Jawdat,A.,Dhikiryati (Beirut,1967), p.278;Google Scholar interview with Najib ar-Rawi byDrMarr,P., Geneva, 15 January1968.Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 1} SeeSuawkat,Sami, ‘The Profession of Death’, inHaim,S.,Arab Nationalism (Berkeley, California,1962), p.99, where he declares Faisal to be the successor to Harun al-Rashid.Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 2}Kedourie,op. cit. 248.Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 3}al-Husri,K. Sati', ‘Introduction’, to Taha al-Hashimi,Mudhakirati (Beirut:Dar al-Talia,1967), p.32.Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 4}Ibid.

^{page 325 note 1}Khadduri,M.,Independent Iraq. The sentence was later commuted.Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 2}Ibid.

^{page 325 note 3} Interview with Burhan ad-Din Bashayan byDrMarr,P., 17 December1967.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 1}Hasani,op. cit. vol. IX, p. 52.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 2}Seale,op. cit. p. 166;Google Scholaras-Suwaidi,op. cit. pp. 524–6.Google ScholarCf. Hasani,op. cit. vol. IX, p. 76. Nuri felt that subsidies to Syria and Jordan would bankrupt Iraq; he felt that Abdul-Ilah was looking to the end of his regency.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 3}Jamali,F., ‘Iraq Under General Nun’,Middle East Forum, vol.XI (1964), pp.13–24.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 4} Interview with Ahmad Mukhtar Baban byDrMarr,P., Commentary on Khalil Kanna, p. 2;Google Scholar Interview with Fadhil al-Jamali byDrMarr,P., Zurich, 22 September1967;Google ScholarAS-Suwaidi,op. cit. p. 400.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 5}Dann,U.,Iraq Under Qassem (New York:Praeger,1969), p.12;Google ScholarKhadduri,Independent Iraq, p. 14, n. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 6}lonides,,Divide and Lose (London:G. Bales,1960), pp.235–6.Google Scholar