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Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 November 2007
- THOMAS CHAPMAN
- Affiliation:Chapman Sustainable Business and Development
- PHILIP G. ROEDER
- Affiliation:University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Civil war settlements create institutional arrangements that in turn shape postsettlement politics among the parties to the previous conflict. Following civil wars that involve competing nation-state projects, partition is more likely than alternative institutional arrangements—specifically, unitarism, de facto separation, and autonomy arrangements—to preserve the peace and facilitate democratization. A theory of domestic political institutions as a constraint on reescalation of conflict explains this unexpected relationship through four intermediate effects—specifically, the likelihood that each institutional arrangement will reinforce incompatible national identities, focus the pursuit of greed and grievance on a single zero-sum conflict over the allocation of decision rights, empower the parties to the previous conflict with multiple escalatory options, and foster incompatible expectations of victory. The theory's predictions stand up under statistical tests that use four alternative datasets.
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- © 2007 by the American Political Science Association
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