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SURREAL TIME AND ULTRATASKS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 August 2016
- HAIDAR AL-DHALIMY*
- Affiliation:Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
- CHARLES J. GEYER*
- Affiliation:School of Statistics, University of Minnesota
- *
- *DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 831 HELLER HALL 271 19TH AVENUE SOUTH MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55455, USAE-mail:haidar@umn.edu†SCHOOL OF STATISTICS UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 313 FORD HALL 224 CHURCH STREET SE MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55455, USAURL: users.stat.umn.edu/∼geyerE-mail:geyer@umn.edu
Abstract
This paper suggests that time could have a much richer mathematical structure than that of the real numbers. Clark & Read (1984) argue that a hypertask (uncountably many tasks done in a finite length of time) cannot be performed. Assuming that time takes values in the real numbers, we give a trivial proof of this. If we instead take the surreal numbers as a model of time, then not only are hypertasks possible but so is an ultratask (a sequence which includes one task done for each ordinal number—thus a proper class of them). We argue that the surreal numbers are in some respects a better model of the temporal continuum than the real numbers as defined in mainstream mathematics, and that surreal time and hypertasks are mathematically possible.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2016