Between 1890 and 1914, the United States acquired overseas colonies, built a battleship fleet, and intervened increasingly often in Latin America and East Asia. This activism is often seen as the precursor to the country's role as a superpower after 1945 but actually served very different goals. In contrast to its pursuit of a relatively liberal international economic order after 1945, the United States remained committed to trade protection before 1914. Protectionism had several important consequences for American foreign policy on both economic and security issues. It led to a focus on less developed areas of the world that would not export manufactured goods to the United States instead of on wealthier European markets. It limited the tactics available for promoting American exports, forcing policymakers to seek exclusive bilateral agreements or unilateral concessions from trading partners instead of multilateral arrangements. It inhibited political cooperation with other major powers and implied an aggressive posture toward these states. The differences between this foreign policy and the one the United States adopted after 1945 underscore the critical importance not just of the search for overseas markets but also of efforts to protect the domestic market.

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34. United States Census Bureau, “1900 Census of Population and Housing,”1900 Census of Population and Housing, 1901,https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/decade/decennial-publications/1900.html The states included in this group are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.

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41. These states also had 214 electoral votes in the 1892 and 1896 elections, when the total needed for victory was 223 and 224, respectively. The comparable numbers for the other elections were 229 of 239 votes needed in 1904, 229 of 242 in 1908, and 249 of 266 in 1912 (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “U.S. Electoral College,”https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/votes_by_state.html).

42. LaFeber,New Empire, 374–76.

43.Ibid., 328–31;LaFeber,Walter,The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913, vol. 2, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (New York:Cambridge University Press,1993),74–79Google Scholar similarly stresses the reciprocity provisions of the McKinley and Dingley tariffs. LaFeber similarly downplays the related debates over colonies after 1898, terming these a disagreement over “tactical means” to achieve the universally shared goal of overseas markets (416); Williams,The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 49, takes the same position, arguing that debates over imperialism was a “tactical disagreement” among policymakers committed to greater market access.

44. Williams,The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 35.

45. McCormick,China Market, 42.

46.Ibid., 46.

47.Terrill,Tom E.,The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874–1901 (Westport, CT:Greenwood Press,1973),184Google Scholar.

48. Rosenberg,Spreading the American Dream, 7.

49.Ibid., 54. American efforts to gained privileged access to Latin American markets while calling for nondiscrimination in East Asia present a similar contradiction.

50.Ibid., 10.

51.Ibid., 51.

52.Rosenberg,Emily S,Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930 (Durham, NC:Duke University Press,2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The index has no entry for tariff, protectionism, or trade.

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57.Trubowitz,Peter,Defining the National Interest (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1998),31–95Google Scholar. While Trubowitz treats tariffs much as historians have done, his interpretation diverges from them in other respects. He rightly points out that reciprocity did not work the same way in the 1890s as it has since World War II (p. 77). He also provides a more robust account of regional differences over the value of European and Asian markets, though he links these to exports rather than trade protection (pp. 52–75).

58.Narizny,Kevin,The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press,2007),39–51Google Scholar.

59. See, for example,Hoganson,Kristin L.,Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1998)Google Scholar; Hunt,Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy;Ninkovich,Frank A,The United States and Imperialism, Problems in American History (Malden, MA:Blackwell,2001)Google Scholar.

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62. Mills, “The Gladstone-Blaine Controversy,” 163. Many others made much the same point during other tariff debates. For example,Procter,John R., “America's Battle for Commercial Supremacy,”Forum16, no.3 (November1893):315–24Google Scholar, predicted the more liberal tariff under consideration in 1893 would permit the United States to surpass Britain as the leading commercial power.Healy,A. Augustus, “Necessity for Immediate Tariff Reduction,”Forum16, no.4 (December1893):407–408Google Scholar, took the same view, noting that “foreign nations need more of our products and would be glad to buy them, but they cannot buy if we will not allow the products they have to send us in payment to our ports.” See alsoMedley,George W., “A New Era for the United States,”Forum15, no.1 (March1893):24–30Google Scholar.

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64. Terrill,The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874–1901. Terrill's is one of the few accounts of American foreign policy to explore the role of the tariff as well as the search for overseas markets.

65. For contemporary discussions of dumping, seeLitman,Simon, “Tariff Revision and Foreign Markets,”American Economic Association Quarterly, 3rd series,10, no.1 (April1909):314–15Google Scholar; andClark,John Bates, “Inexpensive Reciprocity,”Forum38, no.3 (January1907):413–23Google Scholar. The term is currently used for sales below the cost of production. Early twentieth century commentators appear to have used the term sales abroad below the home market price.

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67. “The McKinley Bill in Europe,”Literary Digest, September 20, 1890. For other summarizes of foreign reaction to American tariff policy, see “The American Tariff War,”Literary Digest, November 1, 1890; “French Comment on the Tariff Bill,”Literary Digest, November 8, 1890; “America and Protection”; “The McKinley Bill.”

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70. “America and Joseph Chamberlain,”Literary Digest, October 17, 1903, 494.

71. Reid,Problems of Expansion, 41–42.

72. For example,Gladstone,W. E. andBlaine,James G., “A Duel. Free Trade: The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone. Protection: The Hon. James G. Blaine,”North American Review150, no.398 (January1890):1–54Google Scholar.

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75. See, for example, Herbert, “Reciprocity and the Farmer”;Mills,Roger Q., “Reciprocity—Why Southward Only?”Forum11, no.3 (May1891):268–75Google Scholar; Vest, “The Real Issue.”

76.National Association of Manufacturers,Proceedings of the National Reciprocity Convention Held under the Auspices of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America (Washington, DC:National Association of Manufacturers,1901)Google Scholar. For the position of agricultural implement manufacturers, see pages 14–20. Comments on the Republican Party platform can be found on pages 21 and 43, among others. Concerns about the precedent set by concessions affecting some members of the protectionist coalition can be found on page 64. The final resolution on reciprocity can be found on page 145. TheLiterary Digest documented the extensive press coverage and editorial commentary on the convention “Net Results of the Reciprocity Convention,”Literary Digest, November 30, 1901. Laughlin and Willis,Reciprocity, 346–48, also emphasize the importance of appeals for solidarity among protectionists at the convention as a major reason for the failure of the McKinley administration's treaties.

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85. Williams,The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 45.

86. For example, addressing the American Academy for the Advancement of Political and Social Science on U.S. policy toward China, major speakers assumed that partition was inevitable. (Ford,Worthington C., “The Commercial Relations of the United States with the Far East,”Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science13, supplement (May1899):107–30Google Scholar; andHill,Robert T., “The Commercial Relations of the United States with the Far East,”Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science13, supplement (May1899):131–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.) Some in the audience disputed this premise, but mainly to argue that the United States needed to act more aggressively to prevent it. The Boxer Rebellion increased speculation about partition and debate about whether the United States could (or should) prevent it. (“Shall America Join in the Partition of China?,”Literary Digest, September 1, 1900.)

87.Culbertson,William Smith, “The ‘Open Door’ and Colonial Policy,”American Economic Review9, no.1 (March1919):333–34Google Scholar.

88. Wolman,Most Favored Nation.

89. National Association of Manufacturers,Proceedings of the National Reciprocity Convention, 41.

90.Ibid., 37.

91. Taussig,Tariff History, 5th ed., 240.

92. Wolman,Most Favored Nation, 15.

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102. Hannigan,New World Power, 33–34, 42–43.

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107.Reinsch,Paul Samuel,World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century (New York:Macmillan,1900),38–39Google Scholar. The same linkage between imperialism and protection can be found inHobson,John Atkinson,Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1965. First published 1902.),64–70Google Scholar. Some textbooks written during the interwar period also made this connection. See, for example,Moon,Parker Thomas,Imperialism and World Politics (New York:Macmillan,1936),33–34Google Scholar; Williams,Economic Foreign Policy of the United States, 256–57.

108. Adams's “The New Struggle for Life among Nations” is a good example of his thinking. (Adams,America's Economic Supremacy, 26–53.) Writing about the past, Mahan's tone was less apocalyptic. Nevertheless, he also viewed military competition for control of trade as a constant feature of human affairs. Mahan'sThe Influence of Sea Power upon History opens with the following observation about the benefits of seaborne commerce: “To secure one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or when these failed, by direct violence” (Mahan,The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1).

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110. Conant, “The United States as a World Power, I,” 608.

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113.Gray,George, “Two Years of American Diplomacy,”North American Review160, no.461 (April1895):424Google Scholar.

114. Perhaps because they tended to take American security concerns less seriously, foreign observers had long viewed the Monroe Doctrine as an effort to gain commercial control of the Western Hemisphere. The LondonEconomist remarked on American efforts to establish “the Monroe doctrine in commerce for the whole Western Hemisphere” in 1886 (“The Hide and Leather Industries,”The Economist, April 10, 1886, 6). TheLiterary Digest summarized the comments of an Austrian legislator along the same lines in 1892: “The American policy is that of a Great Power. Washington said to his countrymen: Take no part in European quarrels. Monroe came and said: No European state shall in the future found a new empire on this continent. Garfield and Blaine have gone a step beyond and said: The United States will extend its wings over the whole American continent, North and South, and will form a ‘Zollverein’ of the free countries of America.” (“The Commercial Policy of the World,”Literary Digest, April 16, 1892, 647.)

115. On the details of the dispute see LaFeber,New Empire, 242–83; Hannigan,New World Power, 57–60; Healy,US Expansionism, 24–28; McDonald,The Invisible Hand of Peace, 157–62.

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119.Lodge,Henry Cabot, “Our Blundering Foreign Policy,”Forum19, no.1 (March1895): 8, 12–3, 14, 15Google Scholar.

120. Atkinson, “The Cost of an Anglo-American War,” 74.

121.Ibid., 82.

122.Atkinson,Edward, “Jingoes and Silverites,”North American Review161, no.468 (November1895):558Google Scholar.

123. There is little evidence that this assumption changed until well after the outbreak of World War I. American leaders initially regarded the war in Europe with rather detached concern. Unlike most American diplomats, the U.S. consul in Budapest decided that the crisis of July 1914 was at least important enough to write about to Washington. However, he sent his message by regular mail out to avoid the cost of a cable transmission. It arrived on July 27, the day before the war began (West,The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War, 1).

124. Kennan,American Diplomacy, 4–5.

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126. Lodge, “England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine,” 651. Others writing on the Monroe Doctrine after the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895 took much the same position, arguing that it ruled out American intervention in Europe. See, for example,Jones,Robert Ellis, “Washington's Farewell Address and Its Applications,”Forum28, no.1 (September1899):13–28Google Scholar;Chambers,Julius, “The Monroe Doctrine in the Balance,”Forum46, no.5 (November1911):525–35Google Scholar;Taylor,Hannis, “A Review of the Cuban Question in Its Economic, Political, and Diplomatic Aspects,”North American Review165, no.492 (November1897):610–35Google Scholar; andMoore,John Bassett, “The Monroe Doctrine,”Political Science Quarterly11, no.1 (March1896):1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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128. Then as now, scholars like Sherwood could write what they liked, but questioning the Monroe Doctrine was dangerous for political leaders. For example, in 1906, Professor John W. Burgess gave a lecture in Germany arguing that both the Monroe Doctrine and the protective tariff were “almost obsolete.” Burgess was a professor at Columbia University where he had foundedPolitical Science Quarterly, and was then acting as Theodore Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions at the University of Berlin. His statements were widely attacked by American editorialists who mistakenly interpreted them as official policy because of Burgess's title. The administration quickly distanced itself from these comments, which reportedly caused the President so much irritation that “it probably could not be expressed in polite language.” (“A ‘Roosevelt Professor's’ Repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine,”Literary Digest, November 10, 1906.)

129.Procter,John R., “Isolationism or Imperialism,”Forum26, no.1 (September1898):23Google Scholar.

130. See, for example,Smith,Goldwin, “The Moral of the Cuban War,”Forum26, no.3 (November1898):292Google Scholar;Mahan,Alfred Thayer andBeresford,Charles, “Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion,”North American Review159, no.456 (November1894):565–67Google Scholar.

131. Irwin and Kroszner, “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change.”

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133. Tooze,The Deluge, 334.

134. For example, Wolman,Most Favored Nation.

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137. Fordham, “Economic Interests and Congressional Voting on American Foreign Policy”; Fordham, “Economic Interests and Public Support for American Global Activism.”

138. See, for example,Ikenberry,G. John,After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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141. Field, “American Imperialism,” 645.

142. See, for example,Boot,Max,The Savage Wars of Peace (New York:Basic Books,2003)Google Scholar;Kagan,,Dangerous Nation;Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence (New York:Knopf,2001)Google Scholar.